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The popular 1998 reformasi movement that brought down President Suharto’s regime demanded an end 
to illegal practices by state offi cials, from human rights abuse to nepotistic investments. Yet today, such 
practices have proven more resistant to reform than people had hoped.
Many have said corruption in Indonesia is “entrenched”. We argue it is precisely this entrenched character 
that requires attention. What is state illegality entrenched in and how does it become entrenched? This 
involves studying actual cases. Our observations led us to rethink fundamental ideas about the nature of the 
state in Indonesia, especially regarding its socially embedded character.
We conclude that illegal practices by state offi cials are not just aberrations to the state, they are the state. 
Almost invariably, illegality occurs as part of collective, patterned, organized and collaborative acts,  linked 
to the competition for political power and access to state resources. While obviously excluding many 
without connections, corrupt behaviour also plays integrative and stabilizing functions. Especially at the 
lower end of the social ladder, it gets a lot of things done and is often considered legitimate.
This book may be read as a defence of area studies approaches. Without the insights that grew from applying 
our area studies skills, we would still be constrained by highly stylized notions of the state, which bear little 
resemblance to the state’s actual workings. The struggle against corruption is a long-term political process. 
Instead of trying to depoliticize it, we believe the key to progress is greater popular participation. This book 
is the result of a series of workshops supported, among others, by the Australian-Netherlands Research 
Collaboration (ANRC).






























































“This is a thought-provoking volume on the nexus between the state and illegality. It treats illegality not 
as an abnormality, but as an integral aspect of statecraft and social life. The book advances theoretical 
 discussions around the meaning of illegality, and embeds them in rich empirical material that sheds much 
light on the intricate ways in which people in different localities and sectors in Indonesia use, make sense of, 
and negotiate illegality. This intriguing volume will benefi t students and scholars from various disciplines, 
seeking to explore the social meanings and functions of illegality in the everyday life of the nation.”
Barak Kalir, University of Amsterdam
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edward aspinall and gerry van klinken
The state and illegality in Indonesia
In July 2007, at the height of a government military operation against sepa-
ratist rebels in the Indonesian province of Aceh, a short but curious article 
appeared in the local newspaper.1 It quoted the Aceh military commander, 
Major General Endang Suwarya, warning members of the public not to be 
hoodwinked if they received a telephone call from someone claiming to be 
him and asking for money. Apparently, a group of swindlers had been tele-
phoning rich people in the province, with one first pretending to be Endang’s 
adjutant. After ascertaining the identity of the person being called, the ‘ad-
jutant’ would hand over the telephone to ‘the commander’ who would then 
ask for hundreds of millions of rupiah in order to help pay for the military 
operation. A number of local officials and businesspeople had apparently 
already fallen for the trick, and transferred large sums to the bank accounts 
in Jakarta nominated by the swindlers. Endang was angry: ‘For as long as 
I’ve been serving here, I have never telephoned anyone to borrow or ask for 
money.’2 Yet this was not the first time, nor the last, that confidence tricksters 
had pretended to be members of the security forces in order to extort money 
from people in Aceh; on the contrary, there have been repeated reports of in-
dividuals pretending to be police officers, army soldiers or agents of the State 
Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) for this purpose.3 
There is, of course, an unspoken irony in such stories. Here we have ordi-
nary civilians engaging in what are apparently acts of pure criminality that 
do not involve abuse of state office or misuse of state funds, but in order to do 
so, they find it most convenient to imitate corrupt state officials. Everybody 
involved apparently takes it for granted that this act of imitation is logical, 
even crafty. Neither the military officers being imitated, nor the police officers 
in charge of investigations, nor those being swindled, nor the reporters, ques-
1 Small parts of this introductory chapter are based on Van Klinken 2008. The authors thank Ian Wilson, 
Howard Dick, Ross McLeod and Robert Cribb, and the two anonymous reviewers, for their very helpful 
comments on earlier versions.
2 ‘Mayjen Endang Suwarya dicatut untuk memeras’, Serambi Indonesia 22-7-2003.
3 See for example ‘Rekan tersangka BIN gadungan dipanggil polisi’, Serambi Indonesia 27-6-2007; ‘Coba 
memeras geuchik, lima BIN gadungan dibekuk di Langsa’, Serambi Indonesia 22-4-2009.
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tion the effectiveness of the trick. And little wonder: the swindle is entirely 
plausible. Everyone in Aceh at the time of the story described above knew 
that military personnel were involved in all sorts of extortion rackets, as well 
as engaging in a variety of other ‘off-budget’ fundraising techniques, involv-
ing skimming off money from government development budgets, extracting 
protection payments from large companies, and participating in all manner 
of legal and semi-legal activities ranging from the marijuana trade to illegal 
logging. Ordinary soldiers and policemen routinely demanded payments 
from drivers of vehicles who drove through their checkpoints, or they stole 
money, household goods, livestock and other valuables from ordinary citi-
zens’ homes and farms when they raided villages in their hunt for separatist 
rebels. Hence the logic of the swindle: in order to be a criminal, so it seems, 
it helps if you are first a state official, or at least can pretend to be one. And 
although such swindles were especially common in Aceh, where the secu-
rity forces were until recently an overwhelming presence, they also occur 
throughout Indonesia. National and regional newspapers frequently run sto-
ries about extortion scams by ‘fake police’ (polisi gadungan), fake soldiers, fake 
intelligence agents, fake prosecutors, fake anti-corruption commissioners and 
many other varieties of fake state officials.4
Empirical and theoretical starting points
The concept of legality is inherent in the modern concept of the state. It is the 
state that defines what is legal and illegal and invests that distinction with 
legitimacy. The state also has the power to enforce the law, using violence 
if necessary, at least in theory if not always in practice. Every state that joins 
the United Nations subscribes to these ideas. Yet in reality state officials are 
themselves also not infrequently implicated in illegality of various kinds. This 
simple observation, which certainly holds true for Indonesia, is the starting 
point for the explorations in this volume. 
Throughout Indonesia, as in many other countries of the world, the in-
volvement of state officials in illegal activity is both ubiquitous and a matter 
of public knowledge. At the upper level of the state are the major scandals 
that habitually excite public opinion when evidence comes to light of senior 
government officials stealing from the public purse, striking shady deals with 
private entrepreneurs, or fleecing money from them. Very often the logic of 
illegality in such cases is nakedly self-serving and predatory, summed up by 
the Supreme Court judge in Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt’s chapter in this 
4 See, for example, ‘KPK gadungan ditangkap’, Kompas 18-7-2006, ‘Polisi gadungan ditangkap karena 
diduga memeras’, Pikiran Rakyat 21-1-2010.
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volume whose questions to a supplicant’s lawyer are blunt: ‘Do you have 
money or not? If you don’t, I’ll make an offer to your adversary.’ As we move 
down, the same predatory dynamic underpins much official illegality, rang-
ing from the policemen who extort money or sexual favours from suspects if 
they want to be released without trial, through to the impecunious elemen-
tary school teacher who charges the parents of his or her pupils unofficial but 
obligatory fees. However, as the naked greed of the wealthy senior official 
gives way to the more modest demands of the lower civil servant, who levies 
fees only in order to maintain a humble lower middle-class lifestyle, social 
attitudes toward such behaviour often change, with the demands of the less 
senior official frequently viewed as reasonable and sometimes even regarded 
with sympathy. Moreover, as some of the contributions in this volume make 
clear, illegality by state officials often also serves useful functions for large 
groups of ordinary citizens, thus not only for those who are cut special deals 
at the expense of others (such as rival ligitants in court cases). As a result, 
such illegality is often viewed as entirely legitimate by large sectors of society. 
Consider, for example, the helpful immigration officials in the Riau Islands 
who sell migrants ‘real but fake’ travel documents cheaply so the latter can 
move on quickly to Malaysia or Singapore and who, as Michele Ford and 
Lenore Lyons explain in their chapter, are seen by local people as resisting an 
unjust and unworkable legal regime imposed on them by Jakarta. 
It is when we begin to consider the social approval that such illegal behav-
iour often evokes that the censorious and normatively charged tone that sur-
rounds much discussion of corruption, defined conventionally as the ‘misuse 
of public office for private gain’, begins to come under strain. This conventional 
understanding of corruption is also strained when we find examples of illegal-
ity that are ostensibly for ‘public’ purposes, such as a dramatic case in 1999 that 
involved some of Indonesia’s most senior military officers counterfeiting Rp 
19.2 billion (US$2 million) in Rp 50,000 notes in order to buy weapons for pro-
integration militia in East Timor. According to one of those charged in the case, 
this activity was carried out with the approval of officials at Bank Indonesia 
(BI), so long as ‘the amount printed did not exceed Rp 200 billion. The numbers 
and series were to be given by BI, the quality of the printing had to be good, 
and the fake notes were not to circulate outside East Timor.5 As both Ross 
McLeod and Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland make clear in their contri-
butions to this volume, state officials routinely violate their own cumbersome 
and opaque rules just to ensure the regular functioning of the bureaucracy. To 
further complicate matters, many state officials are also involved in ‘ordinary’ 
illegality that occurs in the societal domain and does not involve as its main 
focus the predation of state resources. Wherever one goes in Indonesia, state 
5 ‘Investigation: smiling – all the way to the bank’, Tempo 10-16 July 2001.
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officials are especially likely to be involved in criminal activities that involve 
a high degree of organization, such as extortion and protection rackets, smug-
gling, illegal logging, and the narcotics trade, while law enforcement officers 
enjoy close and murky relations with everyday criminals. 
Before we go further, a qualification is in order. We certainly do not believe 
that illegality is the exclusive preserve of state officials, nor that state officials 
never take action to uphold legal order. Much illegal activity in Indonesia is 
carried on entirely by individuals who are not directly connected with the 
state. Indonesia has its share of robbery by taxi drivers, enslavement of do-
mestic servants by wealthy entrepreneurs, tax dodging by restaurateurs and 
the full range of mendacity, cruelty, crimes of passion and of desperation 
that modern societies are capable of generating. Moreover, the state employs 
a large number of functionaries to police the rules it sets for society. We do 
not wish to create the impression that state officials never uphold these rules. 
Many police detectives, prosecutors, judges, jailers, as well as teachers, social 
workers, and other public moralists do in Indonesia more or less what they do 
in other countries to control this kind of behaviour. Indonesia is by no means a 
Hobbesian jungle. According to (somewhat problematic and dated) compara-
tive official statistics (Arthur and Marenin 1995), homicide, rape and robbery 
rates in Indonesia have historically been among the lowest in the world. But 
we have chosen not to focus primarily on these state successes in maintaining 
legal order. The reason is not that we dispute their reality. Rather it is that 
control of crime is so often overshadowed by other forms of illegal activity in 
which state functionaries collaborate or are even the directing agents.
Why, then, did we write this book? In the first place, phenomena that so 
constantly undermine public faith in the state cry out for morally engaged 
comment and analysis. The popular 1998 reformasi movement that brought 
down President Suharto’s New Order regime demanded above all an end 
to illegal practices by state officials, from military human rights abuses to 
nepotistic investment policies. This movement created as its main rallying 
cry the condemnation of Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi 
dan Nepotisme, KKN), a phrase that has remained central to public political 
discourse to this day. The problem of corruption, which in public perception 
seems to trump all other forms of illegality, has stimulated a flood of advice 
to every government since that of Suharto, both from within and outside the 
country. Yet today corruption and other illegal practices by state officials 
have proven more resistant to reform than people had hoped. Many new 
anti-corruption regulations have been created, new institutions built, elec-
tions have introduced a measure of accountability for parliamentarians and 
elected executives, and the much lauded Corruption Eradication Commission 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) has made spectacular arrests. Yet 
Indonesia has crept up only slowly on international corruption lists. It has 
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gone from 2.0 to 2.8 (on a scale of 0 to 10) between 1998 and 2009, according 
to Transparency International’s corruption perception index (admittedly an 
index that has been widely criticized for the methods that it uses).6 According 
to the World Bank, Indonesia had by 2008 improved to 31% on ‘control of 
corruption’ from an absolute low of 9% in the chaotic year of 1998, but it 
has still not quite returned to its late New Order level of 33% measured in 
1996.7 Public opinion surveys in Indonesia itself likewise record alarmingly 
low levels of trust in public institutions, and a common view that corruption 
is all-pervasive. Indonesia’s public political domain is still characterized by 
animated discussion of corruption and the abuse of power by public officials: 
this alone makes a scholarly treatment of this topic urgent and appropriate.
This ubiquity and resilience of corruption and other illegal practices by 
state officials points to a second reason why we wrote this book. As many re-
ports have put it, corruption and other forms of state illegality in Indonesia are 
‘entrenched’. We argue it is precisely this entrenched character that requires 
attention. Rather than add to the flood of advice with another survey of the list 
of things that should be, could be, or had already been done to combat illegal 
practices, we wanted to do some serious intellectual work on the problem of 
entrenched illegality. What is state illegality entrenched in and how does it be-
come entrenched? Answering this question involves first studying actual cases 
of state illegality, and trying to understand them, as far as possible, from the 
standpoint of the participants. In particular, as will become apparent through 
this volume, it especially requires studying closely the webs of relationships 
that run in all directions, both within and beyond the state. Within the state, 
for example, a senior teacher has to bribe his or her Education Department 
superior if he or she wants to be appointed school principal (as related in 
Danang Widoyoko’s chapter). The ‘backing’ (beking or deking) that petty gang-
sters enjoy from military patrons who help to enforce their protection rackets 
among Jakarta’s street vendors cross the formal boundary between state and 
society (see Ian Wilson in this book). Motorcycle thieves, pirates, drug dealers, 
prostitutes, illegal timber cutters, their clients and financiers, who sometimes 
appear to operate purely within society, are often protected by state actors. 
Comparative statistics throw little light on these relationships. Only detailed 
case studies of the kind included in this book can do that. 
A third goal of the volume, therefore, was to see what inquiring into the 
nature of illegal activities by state officials would tell us about the nature 
of the state itself. Much discussion of corruption and other forms of illegal 
behaviour by state officials takes a highly normative view of the state, see-
6 http://ww_w.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009. For one criticism see Galtung 
2006.
7 Kaufmann et al. 2008: Table C6. Continually updated rankings available on full dataset, available through 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (accessed 8-3-2010).
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ing them as deviations from an ideal bureaucratic machine bound by legal 
rationality. Even the words we use to describe this sort of behaviour betray 
these assumptions: misconduct, misuse, misdemeanours and so on. By look-
ing at both the broad patterns and micro processes of state illegality, we wish 
to describe and understand the state as it is, not as we believe it should be. 
Taking this approach does not entail abandoning the moral engagement that 
underpins our work, but is simply necessary for thinking clearly about the 
state and illegality. Clear thought is especially necessary in circumstances 
where, as we explain below, there is a large gap between activities that are 
formally in contravention of state law and hence illegal and those which are 
the target of social opprobrium and hence illicit. Our observations of actual 
practices led us to rethink some fundamental ideas about the nature of the 
state in Indonesia, especially regarding its socially embedded character.
In noting the ubiquity and entrenched character of corruption and state 
illegality, and its centrality to how the state operates, we are of course not 
breaking entirely new ground in the study of Indonesian politics and society 
but instead building on a long tradition of close observation of illegal prac-
tices built up during the New Order and before it. Studies by Harold Crouch 
(1979), Richard Robison (1986) and others on the centrality of corrupt patron-
age distribution to the functioning of the New Order have become classics 
in the field. In the late New Order years, a growing focus on the state’s links 
with criminal groups,8 and historical research on the anti-communist po-
groms of 1965-1966 (Cribb 1990) opened researchers’ eyes to the illegal vio-
lence the state perpetrated. To mention just one other example, in a striking 
essay written in the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime, 
Tim Lindsey (2001:284) wrote of the New Order as a ‘criminal state‘ in which 
‘the real structures and systems by which the New Order operated were il-
legal‘. We have learned much from these and other prior research efforts, 
and present this volume as a contribution to an ongoing discussion about the 
nature of the state and illegality in Indonesia.
Studies of state actors’ entanglement in illegality in Indonesia, and beyond, 
can be conveniently divided into four broad streams: marketist, culturalist, 
statist and strategic-relational approaches. The first category is the dominant 
one in writing on corruption, and has surprisingly little to say about the state 
except as the field in which corruption takes place; the final three are dis-
tinct approaches to the study of the state that imply different emphases and 
postures regarding the study of illegality by state functionaries. While the 
boundaries between the approaches are somewhat fuzzy, each has a distinct 
view on how to explain the sources and motivations of the intermeshing of 
state and illegality in countries like Indonesia. 
8 Especially in the so-called ‘Petrus‘, or ‘mysterious shooting’, killings of 1983 (Bourchier 1990, Siegel 1998).
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The first interpretation, which is dominant in the international scholarly 
literature on corruption, posits that state officials operate according to a mar-
ket logic. Illegality by state officials – like all forms of crime – is a consequence 
of rational choice, in which participants balance the likely benefits of crime 
against the risk of being apprehended. Individual officials act like rational 
entrepreneurs seeking to maximize their ‘rents’. There is nothing inherently 
problematic with the state in this view, except that it is sometimes too weak 
to enforce its rules on all its members all the time. The Africanist Colin Leys 
(1965) wrote a pioneering paper articulating this viewpoint. He urged the 
study of corruption not primarily as a moral problem but as one involving 
material incentives for officials operating in an impoverished and poorly 
disciplined state. The political scientist James Scott was another pioneer of 
this approach with his observation that corruption was a businesslike affair 
(Scott 1969) (although Scott also emphasized the nature of the regime that dis-
pensed corrupt patronage and thus foreshadowed the statist interpretation). 
On the assumption that people act collectively only if it brings them a private 
return (Olson 1971), neo-liberal economists subsequently developed a theory 
of rent-seeking behaviour that remains influential. In this view, officials enjoy 
discretion in the way they collect or spend the large sums of state money that 
pass through their hands. If their salaries are low, if they are under pressure 
from all sides to do more than they can realistically achieve, or if hardly any-
one looks over their shoulder while they work, so the argument goes, they 
are likely to collude with the taxpayers or recipients of government funds 
to cream off some of those funds on the way. Governments that implement 
regulations, for example, to restrict imports or license businesses, merely 
create opportunities for corruption that, on balance, cost society more than 
having no regulation at all (Krueger 1974). The implications were not only 
that corruption was more costly to society than previously thought, but also 
that the way to solve the problem was to reduce government intervention in 
the market, thus reducing the opportunities for state officials to act corruptly. 
The economist James M. Buchanan won the 1986 Nobel prize for developing 
these fundamentally anti-state ideas into a field of study known as public 
policy (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980). The approach long remained 
agenda-setting in anti-corruption prescriptions produced by multilateral 
agencies like the World Bank. By the late 1990s, however, the emphasis was 
shifting from pushing back government intervention, regulation and discre-
tion to improving government discipline (Rose-Ackerman 1999). The World 
Bank, USAID, the United Nations Development Program and other interna-
tional agencies have produced numerous expert ‘good governance’ reports 
over the last decade advising the Indonesian government how to reform 
its institutions to improve free market competition, reduce government red 
tape, protection and subsidies, and strengthen checks and balances. Most of 
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Indonesia’s governance reforms since the International Monetary Fund inter-
vention in 1997 have been technically informed by this advice. Yet the mar-
ketist approach has been criticized by many authors, including some in this 
book (see in particular the chapter by John McCarthy) on a range of grounds. 
One criticism has been that by locating the motive for corruption and other 
forms of state illegality in individual greed it misses wider contexts. For ex-
ample it closes its eyes to the very embeddedness of such practices in state 
institutions, the often political motivations that guide such behaviour, and 
the social and cultural codes that govern and legitimate it.
The second approach, which we call culturalist, imagines that illegality 
by state officials is rooted not in rational calculation but in a moral order that 
legitimates certain forms of behaviour by officials even when they contravene 
the state’s formal laws. Individuals act not primarily according to calcula-
tions of potential personal benefit balanced against the risk of exposure and 
punishment, but according to a coherent set of moral values. Very often, the 
roots of such a moral order are depicted as lying in the precolonial past. The 
Africanist J.P. Olivier de Sardan (1999) has explained contemporary corrup-
tion with the logic of a ‘moral economy of corruption’, in which tribal chiefs 
expect tribute, private and public affairs are indistinguishable, and ordinary 
folk are not citizens with rights but subjects who must ingratiate themselves 
with the chief to get anything done. Illegality disappears from this literature 
as an inappropriate alien imposition. At most, it persists as a theatrical device 
in discourses aiming to discredit rivals; but everyone understands that such 
talk is hypocritical. Africanists find the culturalist argument so compelling 
because the modern state south of the Sahara is often so weak that it re-
sembles a thin institutional veneer over a society whose roots lie far deeper 
(D.J. Smith 2006). In Indonesia the state is far less dysfunctional than in, say, 
Sierra Leone, yet here too it is much more thinly spread than in a developed 
economy. This is evident from statistics of, for example, civil servants as a 
proportion of the population, or the state budget as a proportion of GDP.9
Scholars studying weak states and resurgent authoritarianism in Southeast 
Asia in the 1960s and 1970s began to describe elite behaviour in terms of a 
return to a precolonial template. Several took an interest in the role of pa-
tronage in providing internal coherence to these states, in the power of the 
patrimonial values behind authoritarian and corrupt bureaucratic practices, 
and in the precolonial origins of both the values and the practices (Resink 
1975; T.M. Smith 1971; Wertheim 1964). Indeed, the Austrian ethnologist 
Robert Heine-Geldern had helped found modern Southeast Asian studies in 
the United States with a 1942 paper on Southeast Asian notions of kingship 
9 Indonesia’s central government tax revenue was 12.8% of GDP in 2001, less than a third of the 38.2% in the 
Netherlands, while 2.0% of the total population worked for the Indonesian government in 1997, less than half 
the 4.6% in the Netherlands in 1995 (Tables 1 and A.4 in UNPAN 2002).
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(Heine-Geldern 1956). This led Benedict Anderson to write his influential 
paper on the resurgent influence of allegedly traditional Javanese values of 
deference on contemporary Indonesian politics, in which he ascribed official 
corruption to ‘the residual influences of the appanage system [of precolonial 
times] in contemporary administrative behavior’ (Anderson 1972:48). Harold 
Crouch, in his analyses of New Order military politics, likewise drew on the 
idea that precolonial styles of personal rulership had experienced a revival 
in the postcolonial state. Sharing insights common in Africanist and Asianist 
circles, he saw the bureaucracy as a highly personalized hierarchy of neo-
patrimonial relations, in which ‘traditional modes of thought and behavior 
have often continued to influence the workings of apparently modern insti-
tutions’ (H. Crouch 1979:194). The idea of a ‘culture of corruption’ rooted in 
Java’s feudal traditions remains strong in journalistic circles (Loveard 1999), 
and above all in Indonesian public discourse. For example, some years ago, 
the Indonesian historian Djoko Suryo wrote:
Under the Javanese kings the word corruption did not exist. But that doesn’t 
mean behaviour similar to corruption did not exist. Tribute beyond taxation 
was one example. That was normal at the time […] Probably the regents of 
those days only realized this was wrong after Multatuli in [the novel] Max 
Havelaar harshly criticized their tribute practices.10
During the late 1970s and 1980s serious doubts began to arise among schol-
ars of Indonesia about such an approach, under the impact of both Marxist-
oriented structuralism (see especially Robison 1981) and Edward Said’s 
powerful critique of Orientalist scholarship, much of which, in Said’s view, 
presented an ahistorical and essentialized understanding of the East and 
its culture. For Indonesianists these doubts were expressed in an important 
book by John Pemberton (1994), which showed that Javanese political cul-
ture had not remained static since precolonial times. On the contrary, it was 
largely constructed out of the interaction between the Javanese courts and 
the growing Dutch state during the nineteenth century. The manipulation of 
‘culture’ continued during the New Order, when the regime invoked themes 
of Javanese subservience to enforce its authoritarian rule. Pemberton did 
not intend by this observation to replace the power of culture with that of 
the state, but rather to contextualize it. Thus, while culturalist explanations 
for involvement by state officials in illegal behaviour can often be revealing, 
they need to avoid reifying culture as static and somehow isolated from the 
behaviours they seek to explain. Rather, the cultural codes governing illegal-
ity are best seen as themselves embedded in and constructed out of dynamic 
10 ‘Pamomong: budaya ‘korupsi’ di Jawa (1)’, Suara Merdeka 14-8-1997.
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interactions between state and societal actors.
The preceding two interpretations of the state’s entanglement in illegality 
– the one marketist, the other culturalist – tend to think of the modern state as 
largely unable to discipline its members. The first sees state actors as primarily 
acting out of their own material interests, and the second sees them as mainly 
motivated by a complex of cultural obligations. A third interpretation, some-
times called the statist approach, attributes a great deal of autonomy to the 
state as a unit. Rather than seeing it as being too weak to prevent illegality, or 
as confounded by competing moral values, it views the state itself as a preda-
tory institution designed to extract benefits for the people who control it.11 
The dominant image of the state in the study of Indonesian and Southeast 
Asian politics and history is of an alien and sovereign force imposing its 
will upon society. The injurious effects of a relatively autonomous colonial 
bureaucratic machine upon an agrarian society became a major theme in 
Southeast Asian studies, notably at Cornell University under the influence of 
Oliver Wolters and Benedict Anderson. The model was attractive for many 
observers for a long time because colonial and independent states that lacked 
legitimacy and acted violently formed a pattern throughout the region in 
much of the twentieth century. Anderson took this approach to its apogee in 
an influential essay that posited something resembling a zero-sum contest be-
tween state and society in Indonesia. He described the New Order regime as 
representing little less than the victory of state over nation (Anderson 1983). 
This approach, which tends to see the state as a leviathan, undifferentiated 
and monolithic, gave rise to many revelatory studies of Indonesian politics. 
It especially helped explain instances of gross violence perpetrated by state 
officials against citizens (Anderson 2001). But this approach is arguably less 
useful for explaining the quotidian practices of everyday corruption and 
petty illegality with which this book is mostly concerned. Borrowing from 
Robert Cribb, we might also argue that this approach has little to say about 
the motivations behind state illegality, except to point to ‘personal lust for 
extraordinary power – and a drive to maintain that power’.12 
A fourth approach to the study of the state that has been gaining ground 
in recent years has sometimes been called ‘strategic-relational’.13 In this ap-
proach, illegal behaviour by state officials is best understood as a product 
of competitive strategizing among the heterogeneity of interests and actors 
that populates the state. While wanting to retain a central place for the state 
11 We are grateful to Robert Cribb for this formulation.
12 Cribb 2009:2. Cribb made this comment in relation to early studies showing participation by Western states 
in clandestine and illegal activities, such as the heroin trade in Southeast Asia, pointing to the difficulties the 
insights conferred by such research had in meshing with conventional political science analysis.
13 Jessop 2007. An alternative nomenclature would be derived from what Migdal (2001) calls a ‘state-in-
society’ approach. 
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in their analysis even in developing countries, the scholars who formulated 
the strategic-relational approach have preferred to see the state less as an 
autonomous actor and more as an arena that favours certain kinds of strate-
gic action while obstructing others, and where multiple players compete for 
influence, make alliances, and expropriate resources. One of the most influen-
tial authors in this field, Joel Migdal (2001:15-6), defines the state as ‘a field of 
power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image 
of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the 
people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts’. 
Viewing the state as ‘field of power’ is central to this emerging revisionist po-
litical science literature. Abandoning the conventional Weberian ideal type of 
the autonomous, bureaucratic state ‘firing on all cylinders’ (as Migdal 2001:14 
put it), it proposes simply studying actual state practices with the eye of the 
ethnographer, minus the Weberian assumptions. It no longer sees the state 
as a ‘thing‘, but as a relational arena. In this view, the essence of the state is 
relationships and strategies, developing through time and space, rather than 
static structures or impersonal rules.14 The basic argument is to envision the 
state as a competitive arena and site of strategic struggle for the ultimate rule-
making authority. The ‘ideal’ state, meanwhile, should be studied for what it 
is, namely an ideological construct or, in Migdal’s term, an image, deployed 
by both state officials and their opponents in society. Another thrust of this 
thinking is that the homogeneity of the state, and its autonomy from social 
forces – themes prominent in writing about Indonesia during the New Order 
– have been greatly exaggerated. Instead, the study of the state is increasingly 
being reinserted into the study of society, and anthropologists, political sci-
entists and others are becoming more alert to the ways in which state actors 
seek out and collaborate with societal allies, often to such an extent that the 
boundary dividing state from society may be blurred almost to the point of 
erasure, especially at the local level. 
A strategic-relational approach helps illuminate the problem of illegality 
and the state in several ways. It can throw light on the ways in which the 
socially embedded character of the state shapes and impels certain forms of 
illegality. An example may be drawn from Gerben Nooteboom’s study in 
this book of the relationships between police officers and Madurese migrant 
entrepreneurs, including ones engaged in illegal activity, in East Kalimantan. 
14 The theoretical political science literature on the state is too voluminous to trace here. One of us (Van 
Klinken) co-authored two introductory chapters tracing its links with writings about the state in Indonesia from 
the 1950s to the 2000s (both in Van Klinken and Barker 2009). A powerful statement rejecting the concreteness 
of the state and calling for an ethnographic study of actual state practices in all their fragmentedness is Abrams 
(1988). Van Klinken owes a debt to Bob Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational’ approach to the study of the state (Jessop 
2007). Jessop develops at length a provocative statement by Nicos Poulantzas that ‘the state is a social relation’, 
by which he meant that we cannot study the state without having a clear grasp of what we mean by society. 
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Here we see a complex web of relationships in which state actors not only 
threaten and exploit, but also depend upon, societal actors. As Nooteboom 
writes ‘The police in Samarinda need to permit a certain level of criminality in 
order to keep criminality under control.’ Police officers who collaborate with 
petty criminals while tolerating and profiting from certain forms of illegal be-
haviour can gain access to criminal networks. They need access to obtain the 
information, resources and agents they need to act against other forms of ille-
gality they consider more serious. Here engagement by state actors in illegal-
ity is not so much a sign of venality or of the overbearing power of the state 
over society as it is of the state’s dependence on societal actors. Seeing the 
state as an arena in which competing forces contend for power and resources 
also provides a political motive for state actors to engage in activity that can 
be illegal according to the state’s normative rules. An example is drawn from 
Marcus Mietzner’s chapter on illegal funding practices by political parties. 
We cannot understand this behaviour simply through a marketist lens, for 
there must be easier and less risky ways of making quick money than run-
ning a public election campaign. Nor will cultural deference to patrons do as 
an explanation, for frequently the relationships are quite businesslike. And, 
of course, by disaggregating the state into smaller units that often compete 
against each other, the strategic-relational approach avoids the statist trap of 
assuming the state is a single ‘leviathan’. 
The authors of this book debated these fundamental issues about the state 
and illegality at two workshops. We did not seek to reach a common view, 
but some commonalities did emerge. One of these is a certain theoretical 
ecumenism. Most of us feel the pull of all four approaches discussed above, 
and we believe all have made durable contributions to our understanding of 
the problem of the state and illegality. We are not necessarily trying to burst 
any paradigms, or to create new ones. There is, as we have indicated, a rich 
tradition of studying the state and illegality in Indonesia, even if it does not 
always use the same terminology and nomenclature that we use here. We 
want to contribute to this growing tradition. Before we explain how we hope 
to do so in conceptual terms, it is necessary to explore the methods contribu-
tors to this book used in their research.
Methodological challenges
Illegality is notoriously difficult to study directly. In most situations, illegal ac-
tivities are either fully or partly hidden. Individuals involved in illegal behav-
iour typically have strong interests in concealing that involvement, because 
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they fear legal sanction, social opprobrium or both.15 Their individual interests 
in concealment are typically reinforced by strong collective codes of silence 
in institutions and networks involved in the illegal behaviour, codes that can 
be policed socially, by exclusion from the benefits of illegality or by physical 
violence. Even where participants know that certain forms of behaviour (petty 
corruption, for example) are highly unlikely to invite juridical punishment, 
even a small risk is typically enough to discourage them from breaking their 
habit of silence to discuss their involvement openly with non-participants. 
Where the illegal activity in question, such as logging in state forests or unof-
ficial border crossing, is locally socially acceptable or legitimate, and takes 
place more or less in the public eye, participants can be more willing to talk. 
But even then they are likely to fear that open acknowledgment to a researcher 
or journalist might invite the unwelcome attention of outside law enforcement 
officials. Moreover, illegal behaviours are often conducted in a highly coded 
language that can be next to impossible for non-initiates to penetrate.
In general, secretiveness increases in tandem with both the illicitness and 
illegality of the behaviour in question, and with the risk and magnitude of 
punishment. It is easier to research petty corruption than grand corruption, 
and easier to research, say, the smuggling of contraband where it is everyday 
and visible (for example, ordinary trade goods on the Thai-Burma border) than 
where it is highly secretive (for example, the smuggling of narcotics through 
major airports). Finally, and of particular concern for this book, illegality in-
volving state officials is almost by definition difficult to research because, as 
already indicated, modern bureaucratic states are based on the principle, or at 
least the fiction, that they are rule-bound and disciplined organizations. Hence, 
no matter how ubiquitously state officials engage in corrupt and other illegal 
practices, they are typically unwilling to acknowledge them publicly. 
As a result of this combination of circumstances, directly researching il-
legality can be both difficult and risky for researchers and those who help 
them. Investigative journalists and other researchers who have looked into 
organized crime in some countries have been killed; some Indonesian jour-
nalists who have dug too deeply into corruption cases have suffered the same 
fate. Many others have been subject to non-fatal forms of violence, or threats 
of it. The more common problem is that of information failure: the frustrating 
experience of coming up against a blank wall, of knowing that a particular 
form of illegal behaviour is everywhere around you, but learning that nobody 
will even acknowledge its existence in anything but the most platitudinous 
terms. Little wonder, therefore, that so much literature on illegality ends up 
relying on data produced by law enforcement agencies or on anonymous 
15 For interesting comparative discussions of the practical, ethical and methodological challenges of 
researching criminality, see Ferrell and Hamm (1998).
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surveys and other forms of arms-length research.
How did the contributors to this volume try to get around these problems? 
What kinds of methods did we use and what lessons might be drawn from our 
approaches to benefit scholars studying similar phenomena in different coun-
tries and contexts? Answers to these questions begin with three observations. 
The first observation is that many of the contributors to this volume did 
not become interested in the topic of illegality by design. Instead, many of us 
were drawn into it as a by-product of other research on a highly diverse range 
of subject matters ranging from party system institutionalization to migrant 
risk-taking cultures, from armed insurgency to local politics. That so many of 
us ended up becoming concerned with illegality is itself indicative of the cen-
trality of this phenomenon, especially corruption, in Indonesia’s economic, 
social and political structures. 
But this background also had implications for the methods that many of 
us used in researching illegality. In most of the cases in this book where the 
interest in illegality arose as part of a wider research agenda, researchers 
were able to use the local or sectoral knowledge, expertise and contacts they 
had built up over long periods to gradually learn more about illegality. Some 
contributors had spent long periods getting to know informants from par-
ticular locations and/or sectors: Madurese brick makers in East Kalimantan 
(Nooteboom), former guerilla fighters in Aceh (Aspinall), political party lead-
ers in Jakarta (Mietzner), senior officials in state security bodies (Honna) and 
so on. We were, in other words, able to draw on relations of familiarity and 
trust built up over long periods of fieldwork – sometimes totaling years – to 
slowly learn more about the illegal behaviours that are the subject of this 
book. If expressed schematically, we might say that our research typically 
progressed through phases: first, becoming generally familiar with a topic 
area, research site and set of actors; next, learning about the ‘public transcript’ 
(Scott 1985) of legally sanctioned activity concerning that topic; then, gradu-
ally picking up second-hand stories and rumours about the shadow world of 
corruption and illegality; and, finally, being able to discuss under-the-table 
details of such illegal behaviours directly with participants.
In one respect, therefore, this book is founded on what is typically called 
an area studies approach. Contributors to the book include persons trained in 
various disciplines (anthropology, economics, political science, sociology and 
history), but those of us from outside Indonesia have all spent long periods 
of training on the language, history, culture and politics of the country, and 
have spent years acquiring the research skills needed to conduct fieldwork 
there. The techniques most of the contributors used to research their chap-
ters will be familiar to area specialist scholars with a variety of disciplinary 
backgrounds: long immersion in field sites, participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, intensive utilization of local press reports, and so on. 
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As one of our contributors, Howard Dick, put it, our research often involved 
asking the basic question of all fieldwork: ‘What do people do and why do 
they do it?’ Curiosity about the social, economic and political interactions we 
witnessed around us prompted us to inquire into illegal practices, but doing 
so would have been impossible without knowledge of local culture, politics 
and language. Such knowledge was essential for at least beginning to under-
stand the often subtle signals associated with illegal behaviour and to begin 
to penetrate the largely hidden world of illegality.
In some respects, therefore, this book may be read as a defence of area 
studies approaches, or at least as a demonstration of what theoretically in-
formed area studies scholarship can produce. Indeed, we suspect that the 
skills that area studies training provides are essential for collecting data on, 
understanding, and theorizing about the sorts of behaviours discussed in 
this book. This comment applies not only to Indonesia: the inter-penetration 
of state and illegality discussed in this book is not just an Indonesian phe-
nomenon but is strikingly similar to patterns described by scholars working 
in diverse settings in Africa, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet states, and in parts of the developed world. The ‘shadow state’ 
is close to being a universal phenomenon, at least in the developing world 
(Wilson and Lindsey 2009). New understandings of the state that take into 
account this reality are almost exclusively products of area studies scholar-
ship. Without the insights that grew from applying our area studies skills, we 
would still be constrained by highly stylized and abstract notions of the state 
that bear little resemblance to the state’s actual workings.
A second observation is that, for most of us, conducting fieldwork re-
search on illegal practices also meant adopting a considered approach to our 
informants, whereby we guaranteed their anonymity and safety and avoided 
judging them personally for participating in the activities we set out to 
study. Scholars who have researched similar topics in other places have been 
required to adopt a similar posture. Giorgio Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
(2006:9), for example, in the introduction to their study on the everyday poli-
tics of corruption in Africa note that ‘it was important that, as researchers, we 
refrained as far as possible from all moral condemnation and normative judg-
ment throughout the duration of the study‘. This posture derives from practi-
cal considerations flowing from the imperative that, if we are to understand 
it, corruption and state illegality ‘has to be studied from the viewpoint of the 
participants’ (Olivier de Sardan 1999:25). Research on illegality most often 
fails because informants seek to maintain secrecy. Both in order to overcome 
this challenge and for ethical reasons we were required to ensure confidenti-
ality of sources to ensure that none of our informants or the persons close to 
them were harmed directly or indirectly because they assisted our research. 
This could at times lead to uncomfortable situations for the researcher. By not 
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stating disapproval of illegal acts, the informant might assume the researcher 
approves of them or might even wish to participate. Thus, one of our number 
(Ian Wilson) was once unexpectedly asked to address a group of about 200 
petty gangsters, with police in attendance, to explain why he thought the 
group was within its rights to demand ‘taxes’ from businesses. Those present 
assumed that he would be a public advocate on their behalf.16 
A third observation about the contributions in this volume is that many 
of their authors were informed by or made use of what some readers may 
consider to be a surprisingly large array of material available from public 
sources, especially from the Indonesian media. Especially since the fall of the 
Suharto government in 1998 (but even before that), the media have been full 
of reports about corruption and other impropriety by state officials. Indeed, 
we might say that exposing corruption has become the major concern of es-
pecially the quality print press over the last decade. The pervasiveness of this 
sort of reporting is itself a product of two contradictory features of illegality 
(especially corruption) in contemporary Indonesia that have already been re-
marked upon: its ubiquity, pervasiveness and centrality in virtually all forms 
of state activity on the one hand, and the social illegitimacy of much of it on 
the other. This combination of circumstances means, for one thing, that there 
has been an enormous volume of public reporting on corruption and other 
illegal behaviour by state officials, even if relatively little of this reporting is 
deeply investigative, and if there remain many silences and inconsistencies 
in it. The silences are due in part to what is commonly called the ‘envelope 
culture’ in the media itself – so named for the most common method for 
conveying cash payments to journalists. Yet the envelope culture has not si-
lenced some extremely revealing public reports about corruption. The story 
of involvement by state intelligence officers in mass-scale counterfeiting near 
the start of this introduction is one of them. Highly detailed stories abound 
about bribes and commissions paid by aspiring politicians in the regions to 
legislators or party officials whom they believed would further their ambi-
tions. Almost all the contributors to this book have learned a great deal about 
their topics from the Indonesian media and we should acknowledge our debt. 
Even with the combination of sources, skills and methods elaborated upon 
above, the contributors to this volume still faced a set of challenges that we 
suspect are common to researchers on the state and illegality anywhere in the 
world. These challenges can constrain the approaches that researchers take to 
their topics and limit the information they acquire. Some of these limitations 
are evident in this book, perhaps not so much in what it does contain as in 
what it does not touch upon. 
A first limitation concerns sources. It remains very difficult to conduct 
16 Our thanks to Ian Wilson for sharing this experience with us.
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research on illegality and the state by obtaining information directly from 
state officials involved in illegality. Most of the scholars in this book ap-
proached their topics from the margins. There were exceptions, but our 
overall tendency was not to seek or obtain information from state officials 
involved in illegal activities, but from people who had dealings with them. 
We spoke with Madurese migrants struggling to establish themselves eco-
nomically, rather than with the police officers who levy fees on them; with 
ex-combatants trying to make it in the contracting industry, rather than the 
government officials they bribe and intimidate; with petty gangsters rather 
than the police officers with whom they cooperate, and so on. Sometimes we 
were able to cross-check information from other sources, such as the press 
and NGO reports. Most respondents naturally show a bias determined by 
their position in the system of relations in a particular illegal activity, so the 
ongoing problem is how we can obtain a full picture. Where illegal behav-
iours are locally legitimate and carried on more or less in full public view, it 
can be less difficult to access state officials. Thus Michele Ford and Lenore 
Lyons had greater success in speaking directly with state officials engaged in 
irregular border crossing in the Riau Islands than did most of the researchers 
who contributed to this book. By contrast, Ian Wilson chose, for his research 
on relations between gangsters and police in Jakarta, to interview retired po-
lice officers rather than active ones. This technique has also been long used 
by researchers working on the Indonesian military.
Our preferences are part of a broader pattern. With only a few exceptions, 
scholars have not been able to observe closely the everyday operations of 
state officials in such a way as to attain direct insights about their involve-
ment in formally illegal activities. (One notable exception is Joshua Barker, 
who wrote a PhD dissertation on the police and local security in West Java: 
Barker 1999a). This is not only because state officials tend to be reticent about 
such activities, but also because of a wider culture of secrecy in the bureau-
cracy that makes it difficult to obtain official permission to conduct such 
research. One participant in the workshop that led up to this volume, but 
who did not end up contributing a chapter, had achieved the rare feat for a 
foreign researcher of building close research relationships with police officers 
in one Indonesian town. He observed that he did not want to make inquiries 
of them or other informants about police involvement in corruption because 
he believed that such inquiries would jeopardize his relationships and lead to 
them cutting off all contact. Another participant (Gerben Nooteboom), whose 
field research touched directly upon illegal activity by police officers, did not 
attempt to even make contact with those officers, fearing this would attract 
unwelcome attention. Many other participants agreed that they deliberately 
minimized their direct contacts with state officials – especially those from law 
enforcement and security agencies – because they feared that if their research 
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interests became known the authorities could take action to interrupt or stop 
their research, or even have them expelled from the country. As a result of 
such practical difficulties, in Indonesia as elsewhere, we still have a long way 
to go in understanding what might be called the internal modalities of state 
officials’ involvement in illegal activities, especially the norms and moral 
codes governing that involvement. 
A second limitation concerns the range of topics we address in the book. 
Certain types of activity remain very difficult to research and are hardly 
touched upon in this book. One contributor, Ian Wilson, remarked that while 
he found it possible to observe the daily activities of small-scale gangsters 
running local protection rackets in Jakarta, as soon as his inquiries began to 
touch upon the activities of much more secretive, violent and wealthy gangs 
known to be involved in more highly organized criminal activities such as 
the narcotics trade, he was immediately warned off in a threatening manner. 
Petty gangsters themselves also warned him he would end up ‘out of his 
depth’. In his research on contracting activity in post-conflict Aceh, Edward 
Aspinall found it much easier to obtain information about the activities of 
relatively poor, low-ranking and unsuccessful ex-combatants than about 
how their leaders were managing to strike deals with senior government 
officials. As a result of such difficulties, where high-scale elite corruption or 
illegality in Indonesia is discussed publicly, the discussion tends to be either 
highly charged and condemnatory (in the media or advocacy literature) or, 
in the scholarly literature, rather formal and abstract. Where flesh is put on 
the bones of such analyses, it is common to rely on a relatively small number 
of cases that have been exposed by the media or anti-corruption NGOs, or 
which have been prosecuted. As a result, while we have a relatively clear 
picture of the ubiquity of corruption in the upper echelons of the state, we 
often get little more than glimpses of its fine mechanics there or how it is 
comprehended by the participants. When close studies are made of the lived 
experiences of corruption and state involvement in illegality (and this book 
is one of the first concerted efforts to do this for Indonesia), the tendency 
is to focus on the petty rather than the grand, the everyday rather than the 
spectacular, the local rather than the national. Thus, this book contains dis-
cussions of small-scale street gangsters, but nothing on high-level organized 
crime; we have a chapter about the important topic of massive illegal border 
crossing by people, but not about the smuggling of narcotics; we learn about 
how low-ranking police officers interact with impoverished migrants in 
Kalimantan, but not how their most senior leaders exchange fees and favours 
with politicians in Jakarta.
All of this leads to an obvious point: we hope that this book will be a spur 
for future research efforts to comprehend more fully the relationship of state 
and illegality in Indonesia. We believe that we have only begun to scratch the 
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surface of many of the most intriguing and perplexing questions in the field. 
Key among them are those regarding the way state involvement in illegality 
is understood and legitimated by participants, how it is regulated by them, 
what systems of norms govern it, and how participants themselves draw the 
line between tolerated and excessive illegality. 
The approach of this book
Most of the authors gathered in this volume are university academics (one is 
a member of an important Indonesian anti-corruption organization). None 
are directly engaged in making policy or advising government. This gives us 
less access to the inner workings of government, but arguably a sharper eye 
for the unexpected twists and ironies that policy inevitably brings about. The 
academics all consider themselves social scientists – historians, anthropolo-
gists, political scientists, and economists – and at the same time area special-
ists. No doubt with some of the conceit that comes from enjoying what we 
do, we feel we have something to contribute that the well-funded multilateral 
agencies are missing. 
The following pages sets out what we consider to be the main messages 
of this book. The starting point for our project was our agreement that illegal 
activities by state officials are best understood, not as an aberration external 
to the normal workings of the state, but as somehow part of its very logic. 
Others had explored this line of reasoning before us (Heyman 1999), but 
not for Indonesia. It implied a research agenda of looking for contexts and 
processes that cut across the state-society divide. Doing that led us to fresh 
insights, and thence to the thematic chapter division. 
The book begins with a set of essays which contextualize the problem of 
illegality and the state historically and theoretically. Robert Cribb begins by 
arguing that a central problem in Indonesia is not that law does not matter, 
but that there is an elaborate ‘system of exemptions’ that means it does not 
apply to many persons, especially state officials. ‘Indonesia is not a lawless 
society, but rather one in which law is unevenly implemented’, he writes. 
Understanding this system, he argues, requires paying attention to three fac-
tors – state weakness, the disjuncture between law and popular moral values, 
and the fragility of a tradition of social contract. Each of these he traces back 
to the colonial era and the early decades of Indonesian independence when 
state criminality was necessary to ensure the state’s survival. Next, we have an 
analysis that contextualizes the current period of pervasive state corruption by 
looking back to the three decades of President Suharto’s New Order regime 
(1966-1998). In this period, argues Ross H. McLeod, Suharto constructed a 
‘franchise system […] the fundamental purpose of which was to use the coer-
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cive power of government privately to tax the general public and redistribute 
the revenue to a small elite’. The ‘franchisees’ in the system – virtually all state 
officials – were allowed to exploit the economic opportunities their positions 
brought for their own benefit, but they also had to make payments to the ‘fran-
chisor’ to secure their positions in the system. A key to the system’s resilience 
was the low formal remuneration paid to civil servants, making them perma-
nently dependent on the system of private taxation in which they participated, 
and in a state of permanent political dependence on their superiors and, ulti-
mately, Suharto himself. Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland, viewing the 
state as a ‘political marketplace’ draw particular attention to the use of slush 
funds to buy the loyalty of associates, rivals and subordinates within the state. 
Analysing the chief varieties of such slush funds, they trace the transition from 
a system under Suharto in which their use was arranged in a hierarchical pat-
tern, to a much more fluid and complex Reformasi pattern of horizontal intra-
elite rivalry and competitive party politics. In both periods slush funds play a 
key role in achieving an ‘elite consensus that moderates intra-elite rivalry and 
the social divisions that would flow from it’.
The second section of the book consists of a set of closely observed case 
studies on state illegality in various sectors of Indonesian government. Each 
one of these studies also raises broader conceptual and analytical issues about 
the relations between state and illegality. The first two essays in this section 
both illustrate how local regimes of legality/illegality can come into conflict 
with those imposed from the centre. The first essay, by John F. McCarthy, 
looks at the vexed topic of ‘illegal logging’ in Indonesia. He points to a ‘mis-
match between legal logic and everyday practices’ in the management of 
Indonesia’s natural resources. He does this by describing instances in which 
local people exploit the forest ‘more in keeping with local perceptions of jus-
tice than the formal law’, and instances when, following Indonesia’s demo-
cratic and decentralizing reforms from the late 1990s, local administrations 
authorized forestry activities that technically violated existing state laws. 
Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons illustrate the extent and pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon of local state illegality as they explore a sprawling but efficient 
web of migration agents and public servants in the Riau Islands. They coop-
erate to assist would-be ‘illegal’ migrants to obtain ‘real but fake’ documents 
that help them to cross the international border to Singapore and Malaysia to 
find employment. This system of illegality is understood by its participants 
not as something exploitative or oppressive, but as a helpful response to lo-
cal needs as well as the needs of migrants, in the face of an alien and unjust 
migration regime imposed on them by the national government in Jakarta. 
If Ford and Lyons describe state illegality from the perspective of some of 
the most marginalized and disempowered people in regional Indonesia – 
undocumented labour migrants – Marcus Mietzner, by contrast, looks at the 
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apex of political power in the regions. He details how aspirants for state office 
at the local level – candidates in direct elections for local government heads 
– systematically and flagrantly disregard the legal regime governing cam-
paign finances. They raise money from private donors, to whom they remain 
indebted after winning office. Gerry van Klinken and Edward Aspinall take 
up the same theme of the intermeshing of local economic and state power by 
examining the construction sector, which in Indonesia is the source of income 
for a hugely politically influential class – contractors – who are dependent 
upon state largesse for their success. In the Suharto era, relations between 
state actors and contractors were organized through formal corporatist orga-
nizations. Since democratization, contractors have remained tightly bound to 
the state, but now through complex and informal webs of influence and ex-
change. The pervasive system of corruption that results has proven resistant 
to attempts to reform construction and clean up government procurement. J. 
Danang Widoyoko explores corruption in the education sector. His analysis 
identifies four levels of corruption, from the Ministry of National Education 
and the national parliament in Jakarta, down to the principals and teachers 
at the school level. As with the preceding two chapters, Widoyoko also illus-
trates the intrinsically political nature of corruption. Everyone, from officials 
at the Ministry of National Education in the centre down to school principals 
in the villages, needs extra money. Whether they gain it from the national 
budget or from fees they illegally levy on students, they use it partly to buy 
political support and pay off superiors and potential adversaries. The recipi-
ents range from obstreperous legislators able to sabotage Ministry policy at 
the centre, to local bureaucrats able to transfer principals to remote and poor 
schools. In the last piece in this section, Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey provide 
a detailed exploration of illegality in the judicial system. Given the central 
role of the judiciary in upholding legality, this is clearly a crucial case study. 
Yet the judiciary is itself deeply implicated in illegality in Indonesia. Butt 
and Lindsey distinguish between ‘internal illegality’ and ‘external illegality’. 
The former covers illegal actions by judges themselves in the discharge of 
their judicial functions, typically in the form of deciding cases not on their 
merits but on the basis of corrupt payments. The latter concerns the judicial 
endorsement of illegal acts performed by other agents of the state. On the 
one hand, external illegality may have declined in the post-Suharto period: 
the judiciary has become more inclined to find that certain actions of state 
officials are illegal. (Human rights abuses by military officers constitute an 
important exception.) Internal illegality, on the other hand, is as entrenched 
and pervasive as ever, with judges fighting hard to resist attempts to impose 
external accountability mechanisms on them.
Finally, the connection between insecurity and illegality was strong enough 
that we placed the essays dealing with this problem in a third section of their 
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own. The poverty of the good governance approach to the problem of illegal-
ity is nowhere more evident than in its inability to sense the extent to which 
people’s actions are motivated by fear. Conversely, insecurity is central to our 
political approach to the problem. It is the logical consequence of the internal 
competition that characterizes the state. Hence, the very marginality and le-
gal tenuousness of many of the business activities engaged in by Madurese 
migrant entrepreneurs in East Kalimantan is what drives them into the arms 
of the police as both protectors and exploiters (Nooteboom). The racketeers 
Ian Wilson describes are not simply entrepreneurs engaged in a benevolent 
market. They are engaged in a frequently violent struggle for political mastery 
over territory. Nor does it help to view their activities as evidence that the state 
is weak. On the contrary, they owe their strength to the superior repressive 
capacities of their ‘backers’ within the state apparatus. The irony of predatory 
violence emanating from the state whose most basic function is to keep citi-
zens safe is a most pressing reason to review mainstream views of the state. 
The failure of the mainstream discourse on the state can have serious practical 
consequences. This is evident in Jun Honna’s chapter on the international dia-
logue about transnational crime. The discourse permitted Indonesia’s security 
agency charged with the ‘war on drugs’ to argue effectively for increased in-
ternational funding in the name of capacity building, while shielding it from 
the consequences of the state’s own involvement in drug crimes. 
The idea in this book was not to cover every conceivable sector or aspect 
of illegality, but rather to explore patterns that may be common to many sec-
tors. Readers may object that some key sectors – fisheries, for example – have 
been neglected. Our book also does not deal at length with certain aspects of 
illegality that are arguably crucial, among them gendered aspects of illegal-
ity, and the role of customary law (adat) as an alternative source of notions of 
legality. Nor, as already pointed out, did we seek to achieve a uniform view 
of the correct meaning of the inter-penetration of the state and illegality. 
Nevertheless, we think that the volume contributes a breadth of discussion 
that is rarely found in analyses of state illegality and corruption, suggesting 
new avenues for future research, and pointing toward new ways of thinking 
about the topic. The following pages abstract from the essays in this collection 
what we, the editors, think are among the most important insights into the 
subject of illegality and the state in Indonesia. 
The ubiquity and centrality of illegality to the state
If we hope this book will convey one simple message it is this: illegality by 
state officials is as central to the way that the state operates in Indonesia as 
are the formal rules and bureaucratic structures that constitute the state on 
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its surface. It should thus be a central task of scholars to integrate consid-
eration of such illegal practices into the way that we conceive and analyse 
the Indonesian state. Although, as we have noted, much of the literature on 
corruption in Indonesia points to its ‘entrenched’ and ‘pervasive’ character, 
too often the discussion remains trapped in a limiting normative framework 
that takes either positive law or idealized notions of good governance as 
their starting points. It thus sees corrupt or illegal activities by state officials 
as aberrations.17 In reality, if there are pockets in state institutions where 
formal bureaucratic procedures and legal rules are scrupulously observed, it 
is these pockets that are the aberrations, not the illegal practices that are so 
ubiquitous. The levying of illegal taxes on students by school principals who 
need the money to buy protection or promotions from their supervisors; the 
collusive networks that determine how government construction contracts 
are awarded, the cooperative arrangements that local police officers system-
atically build with local gangsters: these practices are not just an aberration 
or an undermining of the state, they are the state.18 
The political character and functions of illegality
Another lesson to be derived from this book is that it is essential to under-
stand illegality by state officials through a political, rather than merely a 
legal, lens. Political structures and arrangements shape the ‘syndromes of 
corruption’ (Johnston 2005) that are experienced in different countries, and 
Indonesia is no exception. Of course, involvement by state officials in illegal 
behaviour frequently involves personal enrichment as one of its goals, but 
making this mundane observation does not get us very far. More important-
ly, our contributors also show that such illegality almost invariably occurs as 
part of collective, patterned, organized and collaborative acts, linked to the 
competition for political power and access to state resources. Understanding 
illegality in this way is helped by viewing the state less as a bureaucratic 
machine and more as a field of power characterized by competition and inse-
curity. Particular instances of illegality by state officials can almost always be 
viewed as connected to the distribution of material resources and political op-
portunities. These goods pass up, down and sideways through and along the 
patron-client networks and alliances that pervade state institutions and that 
crisscross the boundary between state and society. Some of the contributions 
in this volume demonstrate this dynamic clearly. The political problem of 
purchasing internal cohesion in an insecure system riven with competing fac-
17 As already noted, one important exception is Lindsey 2001; see also Lindsey and Dick 2002.
18 The authors would like to thank Ward Berenschot for this formulation.
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tions is central to Ross McLeod’s evocative essay on the ‘Suharto franchise’. 
In McLeod’s analysis, the New Order strongman encouraged officials to ‘live 
off the land’ in order to retain their loyalty. Since all of them were guilty of le-
gal transgressions, he could easily threaten to exclude any of them from these 
perks by waving the rule book. As in a commercial franchise, incumbents 
were free to use their wits for their own self-advancement, while preserving 
the trappings of uniformity. In Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland’s essay 
on political slush funds, rivalry between elite factions is again the opera-
tive principle, with slush funds providing the fuel that powers that rivalry, 
but also the resources that buy elite cooperation and social peace. Many of 
the close local case studies in the book also point to the ubiquity of political 
motives in illegality: petty gangsters act as muscle in electoral and other po-
litical conflicts (Wilson, Nooteboom), small-time contractors are drawn into 
political networks and fund election campaigns if they want to succeed in 
the construction field (Mietzner, Van Klinken and Aspinall). Indeed it might 
be possible to argue that the vast majority of illegality by state officials in 
Indonesia concerns the construction of political networks, specifically involv-
ing the purchase of political protection or access from above, or the purchase 
of political support or acquiescence from below, or to exclude rivals laterally.
There is of course also an exclusionary element and a class dimension to 
these bureaucratic politics that we should not lose sight of. Those with power 
to allocate state resources not only distribute them to buy support from above 
and below, but in doing so, they inevitably block access to actors who lack 
such privileged access. Those who are not part of the network find it hard to 
get jobs, their communities receive school buildings and bridges that crumble 
before their time, and they resent those who do manage to build privileged 
access. It is precisely for such reasons that condemnation of corruption re-
mains a powerful rallying cry in Indonesian political life. It explains why 
local anti-corruption groups try to focus their campaigns on increasing com-
munity awareness about the effects of corruption and on opening up chan-
nels for them to participate more fully in the political process. 
The benefits of illegality
Yet awareness of the exclusionary and hierarchical framework that organizes 
much illegal behaviour by state officials should not blind us to the wider inte-
grative and stabilizing functions that such behaviour may also have. Indeed, 
one of the revelations that was shared by most participants in the workshops 
that gave rise to this book was that many of the illegal practices we discussed 
had aspects that could be described as socially beneficial. Particularly at the 
lower end of the social ladder, they sometimes seemed essential to the proper 
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functioning of the state and provided benefits even to marginal groups. 
Sometimes those benefits occur in an exploitative context: the petty collu-
sion between police and small-time entrepreneurs in East Kalimantan that 
Gerben Nooteboom describes costs the latter 5-15% of their turnover; but it 
also helps them get around many obstacles that would otherwise impede 
their activities. Police collaboration with criminals also, as Nooteboom ar-
gues, allows the police ‘to keep criminality under control’, an outcome that 
arguably has wider social benefits. Collusive favouritism and networks of 
illegality can provide working solutions to difficult problems. These include 
how to facilitate the speedy and convenient exit from Indonesia by would-be 
migrant workers (Ford and Lyons), or how to ensure that volatile and poten-
tially violent ex-combatants are satisfied with the outcome of a peace process 
by giving them a stake in the existing system (Van Klinken and Aspinall). 
Indonesia’s shadow state may be an alternative to a smoothly functioning, 
Weberian taxation and policing system. Precisely because it is a state that is 
based on personal contacts and networks rather than impersonal hierarchies 
and rules, it is also a system that gets lots of things done.
The blurring of the state-society boundary
The next point follows logically from our earlier one about how much illegal 
activity by state officials takes place in networks that both pervade the state but 
also cut across the boundary separating formal state institutions from society. If 
we view the hidden illegal practices of the state as being as central to its func-
tioning as the bureaucratic structures and procedures that appear in the formal 
sphere – and we do hold this to be so – and if these practices involve alliances, 
networks and partnerships that cross the state-society divide, then it follows 
that our conceptual boundary between state and society begins to break down. 
At the very least, thinking seriously about state involvement in illegality helps 
us to think of the state as being socially embedded. As Joel Migdal has written, 
the presence of behaviours like ‘corruption’ and ‘criminality’ by state officials 
might in fact reflect the influence of alternative moral codes derived from soci-
ety. This might lead us to re-think our image of the state:
Various parts or fragments of the state have allied with one another, as well as 
with groups outside, to further their goals. Those practices and alliances have 
acted to promote a variety of sets of rules, often quite distinct from those set 
in the state’s own official laws and regulations. These alliances, coalitions, or 
networks have neutralized the sharp territorial and social boundary that the 
first portrayal of the state [that is, as a dominant and integrated entity that mo-
nopolizes rule-making in a given territory] has acted to establish, as well as the 
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sharp demarcation between the state as preeminent rule maker and society as 
the recipient of those rules. (Migdal 2001:20.) 
Certainly, the following pages provide many illustrations of this dynamic at 
play. In particular, they illustrate just how many state (or at least state-like) 
functions in Indonesia (for example, the levying of ‘taxes‘, the redistribution 
of material resources, the maintenance of order and suppression of certain 
forms of criminality) are carried out not simply by state institutions in their 
formal, bureaucratic mode, but by networks of state and societal actors, in 
which both sides are engaging in activities that are formally illegal. 
The licitness of illegal activities
Another theme that recurs in the chapters that follow therefore concerns the 
social legitimacy or ‘licitness’ (Abraham and Van Schendel 2005) of much of the 
illegal behaviour that we discuss. Many of our contributors draw attention to 
what we have already indicated is one of the striking characteristics of illegal 
behaviour by state officials: its often brazen openness. As Marcus Mietzner 
puts it in his chapter on elections: ‘many politicians, entrepreneurs and rent-
seekers simply ignore the law and expect that nobody will notice or care’. In 
some cases, as in those depicted by Mietzner and by Widoyoko, political apa-
thy on the part of citizens accounts for their passive acceptance even of activity 
that may be disadvantageous to themselves. They are habituated to a system 
where everybody knows the formally illegal acts in question are unlikely to be 
punished. In such cases, state illegality may be illicit, or socially disapproved, 
yet still ubiquitous and open. However, another explanation is provided in 
chapters by John McCarthy and by Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons. These 
explore how societal actors and state officials in Indonesia’s regions cooperate 
to build mutually beneficial local regimes, for example to regulate logging and 
migration. Both parties view the central government’s rules as intrusive and 
antagonistic to local needs. Both of these accounts portray the central state as 
a predatory outsider, a hostile leviathan, that does not understand or connect 
with the real social world at the grassroots, a world in which low-ranking lo-
cal state officials are immersed, adopting its rules and seeing its interests as 
their own. In such accounts we see conflict between local regimes of licitness 
and state legality, as well as conflict between the state’s commanding heights 
at the centre and its socially embedded functionaries at the local level. In yet 
other chapters licitness differs between insiders and outsiders. Simon Butt and 
Tim Lindsey point to modes of illegal behaviour in and around the judicial or-
gans where insiders apparently adhere to reasonably well-regulated rules and 
norms, while outsiders, from whom these behaviours are hidden, regard them 
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disapprovingly and call their practitioners the ‘judicial mafia’. In such cases we 
may perhaps speak of ‘insider’s licitness’. All of this is to reinforce a point we 
have already made above, namely, that we hope this book will help to prompt 
future research into the internal modalities that shape state officials’ involve-
ment in illegal activities and, we might add, how those modalities intersect 
with broader societal norms concerning the licitness of such activities.
Policy implications
Few of the contributors to this book are deeply engaged in the work of mak-
ing policies or building institutions designed to combat corruption or other 
forms of illegal activities by state officials. As students of the deep structures, 
quotidian practices and social embeddedness of state illegality in Indonesia, it 
is perhaps not surprising that when we turned to the global discourse of good 
governance that has now become so dominant in shaping the fight against 
corruption in the country, the overwhelming instinct of most participants in 
this project was to stress the difficulties that beset that fight and the ironies 
that occur when the global good governance discourse is translated into prac-
tice. Most good governance anti-corruption strategies aim to depoliticize the 
state, to reduce the ‘fight’ to a technical operation. Here, cleanliness is to be 
achieved by separating vested interests from decision-making processes and 
by empowering oversight and investigatory agencies to enforce the law and 
police the probity of state officials (see Dick 2002). We feel the pervasiveness 
of illegality makes this a process fraught with difficulty. Very often the new 
regulations and institutions simply end up providing new opportunities for 
predation. No clearer example exists in Indonesia than the decentralization 
legislation passed in 1999. The legislation was intended to bring government 
closer to the people and thus make it more accountable, more responsive and, 
by implication, cleaner. Yet, as is widely known, decentralization also pro-
vided manifold new opportunities for local actors to engage in novel forms 
of predation. A similar example, given in this volume, is reform of school 
governance in the education sector (Widoyoko). Moving control of funds to 
the schools simply shifted the locus of corruption to the school level. Reform 
of government procurement is another case (Van Klinken and Aspinall). By 
creating a new class of supervisory consultants empowered to ensure that 
projects proceed on track, it created a new layer of predators in the system. 
In a slightly different vein, global discourses of good governance and crime 
prevention, and the funding support they promote, can readily be turned 
by state actors to their own, often particularistic interests. We see this in Jun 
Honna’s analysis of how Indonesian security agencies seized upon new inter-
national discourses about transnational crime to expand their own authority.
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Instead of trying to depoliticize corruption and the fight against it, we ar-
gue for accepting that both are political processes. The key to progress – even 
if it is by necessity very slow progress – will be in making politics accountable 
to a broader public. This requires greater politicization, not less. As Michael 
Johnston (2005:3) has argued, 
[opposing corruption] is a matter not only of improved public management 
but of justice. It requires ‘deep democratization’: not just elections but vigor-
ous contention over real issues among people and groups capable of defending 
themselves politically, and of reaching settlements sustained by their own last-
ing interests.
Combating corruption and other forms of illegality thus requires what has 
been called in another context a transition ‘from clientelism to citizenship’ 
(Fox 1994). Such a transformation – still in many respects a distant dream in 
Indonesia – would require a new form of socially embedded state: one that is 
embedded not in webs of clientelism and particularistic dependency, but in a 
politically engaged citizenry.
Theoretical and historical perspectives

robert cribb
A system of exemptions
Historicizing state illegality in Indonesia
If Weber had been thinking of law rather than violence when he addressed 
the University of Munich in 1918, he might well have described the state as 
‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the right to 
determine what is legal and illegal within a given territory’.1 Although it is 
commonplace to say that the power of the state ultimately rests on violence, it 
might plausibly be argued that the creation and administration of law is more 
central to the nature of the state even than control of violence. The right to de-
termine what is legal and illegal is a complex attribute, including the right to 
declare law, the right to investigate (suspected) breaches of the law, the right 
to determine guilt and the right to punish. Whereas some of these rights may 
be claimed (successfully) by other sections of society, only the state possesses 
the full range of these powers over legality and illegality. Indeed, so closely 
entwined are the concepts of state and law that a state which makes no claim 
to administer law is probably not to be regarded as a state at all.2
Classic conceptions of law interpret this right to determine legality and 
illegality in terms of the state’s presumed capacity to translate the general 
interests of society into a legal system. According to Williams (1994:11), for 
instance, crime is:
1 Weber, of course, actually referred to the state’s ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’; see Max 
Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’, (‘Politics as a vocation’), Gesammelte politische Schriften (München, l921), pp. 396-450. 
Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker and Humboldt, Munich. http://
www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/DSS/Weber/polvoc.html.
I should like to thank Gerry van Klinken, Antje Mißbach and two anonymous readers for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
2 This issue is not a trivial one in the Indonesian context. At various times in Indonesian history, notably 
during the first weeks of the national revolution in August-September 1945, many groups of people claimed 
to represent organs of the Indonesian Republic, even though they had no connection with what were then the 
exceedingly rudimentary institutions of the new state. The argument in this chapter focuses on those periods 
when the state is powerful enough to grant and to withhold exemptions. A different kind of analytical framework 
is needed for circumstances in which state power is diffuse and subordinate to other sources of power.
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a wrong to society involving the breach of a legal rule which has criminal con-
sequences attached to it (that is, prosecution by the State in the criminal courts 
and the possibility of punishment being imposed). 
For a rather long time, however, observers have been aware that the law also 
tends to uphold the social order, falling unevenly on different social groups. 
Anatole France (1905:87) memorably summed up this insight at the end of 
the nineteenth century: ‘The poor must work […], in presence of the majestic 
quality of the law which prohibits the wealthy as well as the poor from sleep-
ing under the bridges, from begging in the streets, and from stealing bread.’ 
The Foucauldian approach takes this insight still further: the law can be seen 
as an arbitrary tool of authority, important less for its content than for the fact 
that it is law, to which people are subjected.
Remarkably sparse in the analysis of law, however, has been an apprecia-
tion of the role of discretion in determining the social impact of law. Discretion 
refers to the fact that the implementation of the law never fully follows the 
letter of the statutes, decrees or whatever other written or oral form the law 
may take. Rather, the law is always administered selectively, differentially, 
partially. Discretion on the part of police, prosecutors and judges is an essen-
tial part of the humane and effective administration of the law. At very least, 
discretion avoids clogging the legal system and afflicting the population with 
prosecution for actions which, although they may technically be illegal, are 
in fact trivial and not worth the attention of the legal apparatus.3 At its more 
creative, it may recognize that the breaker of a law may have been acting un-
der unusual compulsion or that the prospects for rehabilitation would not be 
served by giving a criminal record to a young offender. Discretion, however, 
is also a key element in the use of law to uphold or change the social order. 
In every system, at least some of the decisions about which cases to pursue 
and which to ignore are made on the basis of social impact – certain individu-
als and groups who are considered in some way to be socially ‘valuable’ are 
protected from the force of the law while others, considered to be less useful 
or even dangerous, are not. 
In every legal system, therefore, there is a gap between written law and 
the law that is actually applied in society. In Indonesia, this gap appears to be 
particularly wide. Other chapters in this book suggest the scope of the phe-
nomenon. Politicians and government employees accept bribes, inducements, 
favours, commissions and kickbacks in a variety of forms in exchange for 
making decisions that favour one party over others in a dispute, examination 
or competition. They solicit and receive payment for overlooking regulations, 
and for providing routine government services, including licences. State 
3 In the legal context, the principle is known as de minimis non curat lex (the law is not concerned with trifles).
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funds are embezzled directly or are extracted by means of legal or quasi-legal 
devices such as commissions and uncompetitive pricing. Funds that might 
otherwise flow to the state are channelled into private pockets. State property 
and state facilities are used for private purposes. State security forces remain 
largely immune from prosecution for illegal acts of violence in the past 
against other citizens. All this illegal activity leads some observers into the 
impression that law matters little in Indonesia. This is a mistaken impression. 
The central characteristic of the Indonesian system is that law matters, but 
only to some people and only in some circumstances. Indonesia is not a law-
less society, but rather one in which law is unevenly implemented. The legal 
system managed by the Indonesian state is above all a system of exemptions. 
Understanding this system of exemptions requires attention to a range of 
underlying features of Indonesian society which work in favour of exempting 
some people from the full force of the law. These elements are: the weakness 
of the Indonesian state and its institutions; a mismatch between law and 
moral values; and the weakness of a sense of social contract in the Indonesian 
political order. None of these features is in any way inherent to Indonesian 
societies or cultures, but they are connected with features of Indonesian cul-
ture that have been reinforced by historical circumstances. For this reason, 
they do not lend themselves to simple remedies. In addition, the system of 
exemptions needs to be understood as a form of economic behaviour which 
persists not just for historical reasons but because it delivers profitable out-
comes. Seeing exemption as an economic device highlights its connections 
with the current political order and suggests potentially useful remedies.
State weakness
For a complex range of historical, geographical and social reasons, Indonesia 
lacks the capacity to implement law evenly across the whole of its territory. 
Lack of state revenue, shortages of personnel, lack of equipment and training, 
and the social and geographical complexity of the country all make it difficult 
for Indonesia to carry out that suite of activities – statute drafting, surveil-
lance, record-keeping and coordination, investigation, prosecution and pun-
ishment – that normally underpins a modern system of legal order. Laws and 
regulations are often not drafted with sufficient care so as to be readily imple-
mented, or they may be inconsistent with other laws or regulations. Dutch 
colonial rule left Indonesia with relatively few trained lawyers and build-
ing a strong legal profession was never a high priority after independence. 
Knowledge of the law is weakly and unevenly spread though society. The 
police force has historically been understaffed and underfunded. Indonesia’s 
rate of incarceration is 45 per 100,000 of national population, one of the low-
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est in the world,4 but this rate reflects a lack of capacity to incarcerate rather 
than low levels of major crime. During the six decades since independence, 
moreover, Indonesia has come under domestic and international pressure 
to expand its repertoire of prohibitions. Colonial Indonesia was a relatively 
under-governed society, but the years since 1945 have seen the promulgation 
of laws prohibiting various activities in the name of environmental protec-
tion (pollution, toxic waste, endangered species), human rights and moral-
ity (trafficking in people, prostitution, extra-marital sex, drugs, gambling, 
medicines), heritage (protection of antiquities) and citizenship and residence. 
In addition new opportunities have emerged for criminal activity as a result 
of the closing of the resource frontier (making the theft of natural resources 
lucrative in a way that it has not been before). The expansion of welfare and 
development funding has also created a flow of funds available to be tapped 
criminally. Every legal system faces problems of capacity, and it typically cuts 
its losses by deciding not to devote resources to every sector. Over the whole 
of the period since independence in 1945, however, Indonesia’s capacity to 
administer law has fallen dramatically short of what the law itself would 
seem to demand. Unevenness in law-keeping across the archipelago has been 
the consequence.
Law vs moral values
A second reason for the system of exemptions is a sense of mismatch between 
law and moral values. We see in many other countries that laws implementing 
values not shared by society are simply ignored. In some cases, the law may 
go beyond what is considered improper behaviour by the community at large 
and will thus be disregarded. Offending laws may simply be relics of past 
times whose values no longer apply. In other cases, thoughtlessly drafted laws 
arising from hasty over-reaction to a crisis may simply not be able to be imple-
mented in a way that is consistent with social values. Conversely, laws may 
not go far enough to reflect social values. Then sections of society may take the 
law into their own hands if they feel that the legal system is failing to address 
some wrong to society. It is unlikely that there is a greater sense of mismatch 
between law and moral values in Indonesia than in many countries. Rather, it 
appears that Indonesians are more willing than many peoples to allow moral 
values to trump the letter of the law when a conflict becomes apparent.
The principle that law was subject to moral review was embedded into 
the legal system of independent Indonesia as early as 10 October 1945, when 
4 By contrast, the incarceration rate per 100,000 of national population in Sweden is 82, in The Philippines 
108, in Australia 126, in Singapore 350 and in the United States 738 (2006 figures). See Walmsley 2008.
 A system of exemptions 35
Government Regulation no. 2 provided that laws promulgated in the colonial 
era would be valid only as far as they were consistent with the Constitution 
(Linnan 2008:75). Since the Constitution was a brief, often vague, document, 
this provision meant that the application of law was formally subject to 
political considerations. Sharp evidence of the gap between law and public 
morality includes the prevalence of market-place lynchings (pengeroyokan) of 
suspected thieves and Islamist attacks on bars and brothels (Colombijn 2002; 
Welsh 2008). This sense of mismatch was also evident in the decade-long re-
luctance to prosecute former President Suharto for his various economic and 
political crimes on the grounds that he had also made great contributions to 
the state. There was no doubt in the minds of citizens and opinion-leaders 
that Suharto had carried out many illegal acts during the course of his presi-
dency, but proponents of leniency argued that his achievements on behalf of 
the nation ought to be set against these crimes and to render them unworthy 
of prosecution. In more recent times it has been argued publicly that the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) 
should be bridled because its work is hampering the development process. 
The illegality of the acts that it pursues is not in question, but the proponents 
of a bridle believe that the application of law ought to be dependent on some 
external judgement of the likely consequences. We can recognize such argu-
ments as self-serving, of course, but the fact that they can be made publicly in-
dicates that there is in Indonesia a widespread belief that external arguments 
can trump legality. (Contrast this with the phenomenon, relatively common 
in the West, of otherwise competent politicians whose careers are ended by 
some form of misdemeanour unrelated to their overall performance.)5
The conviction that moral values ought to prevail in any mismatch be-
tween law and moral values probably has its origins in the colonial history of 
Indonesia. In contrast with most other colonial rulers, the Dutch in Indonesia 
were slow to move towards a system of universal law. Instead of a single set 
of statutes applying to all in the colony, they partly preserved, partly con-
structed a baroquely complex legal system which recognized a multitude of 
indigenous laws and separate indigenous legal jurisdictions under the broad 
heading of adatrecht (Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 1980). 
This system had originally been a matter of convenience and parsimony for 
the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC); 
it spared the company the cost of running a legal system which would ser-
vice all the people within their possessions. Over time, however, it became 
a matter of strategy: abjuring any idea of a civilizing mission, the Company, 
and the Dutch colonial state that succeeded it at the end of the eighteenth 
century, believed in the principle of ruling people as far as possible by their 
5 The legal maxim in this case is fiat justitia, ruat coelum (let justice be done, though heaven falls).
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own laws and under their own rulers. Most of these laws addressed family, 
property and religious issues, but the idea of culturally determined law even 
stretched into criminal law (Cassutto 1927). The existence of these multiple 
legal systems within the Netherlands Indies undermined the tendency, which 
universalist legal systems encouraged, to regard the law as an expression 
of common human moral values. Created by the colonial state for its own 
purposes, modern law in Indonesia bore its Western origins more obtru-
sively than did the law in many European colonies. As a consequence, when 
Indonesian national identity began to assert itself, the legal system lacked 
the moral authority which would have made obedience to it a natural conse-
quence of citizenship.
The consequences of legal pluralism were exacerbated by the fact that the 
Dutch colonial administration paid relatively modest attention to administer-
ing law to Indonesians. Although the colonial state was vigorous enough in 
applying legal sanctions to its political enemies, it paid relatively little attention 
to the role of the law as an arena for arbitration between subjects and still less 
to its role as a forum within which subjects might obtain redress against the 
state. In consequence, Indonesians in general lacked day-to-day experience of a 
Western legal system. The vast majority of Indonesians simply did not feel the 
statute book, even indirectly, as a direct influence on their lives. This system en-
couraged the assumption that law should relate to specific local values, rather 
than to universal principles. It left open a strong sense of the appropriateness 
of correcting social injustice and unfairness without recourse to law.
When Indonesia achieved independence, therefore, the law was exception-
ally weak as an arena for resolving social disputes. Most Indonesians had very 
little reason to imagine that the law would either punish them for infractions or 
come to their aid if they were being afflicted. Colonial Indonesia lacked a social 
class of lawyers and bush lawyers who would have made it their business to 
know the law and to turn it to their own advantage and to the advantage of 
their clients. Legal consciousness, in other words, and the penetration of legal 
skills in society were both weak. The law was distant and ill-defined, moral 
values were close and familiar. Small wonder that moral values prevailed.
If moral values had been shared, such a situation might naturally have 
produced a stable social order, but during the closing decades of the colo-
nial era, the legal pluralism that had its roots in the VOC was matched by 
an increasingly explicit moral pluralism in politics. In the earliest years of 
the Indonesian nationalist movement, it had seemed to some Indonesian 
leaders at least that the aspirations of the non-European inhabitants of the 
archipelago would be satisfied if the Dutch would only treat everyone by 
the same standard. The 1912 essay by Soewardi Soerjaningrat, ‘Als ik eens 
Nederlander was’ (‘If I were a Dutchman’), was a rebuke to the colonial hy-
pocrisy which would allow the Dutch in the colony to celebrate the centenary 
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of their own liberation from Napoleonic rule while at the same time suppress-
ing the freedom of colonized peoples (Soewardi Soerjaningrat 1913). Yet its 
tone implied at least a faint optimism that the Dutch would see the injustice 
of their ways and would accept a shared political morality with their Indies 
subjects. During the three decades that followed, however, such hopes were 
repeatedly dashed, as the colonial authorities adopted strategy after strategy 
to thwart the growth of nationalist strength.
The colonial authorities defined sedition in broad terms that made much 
nationalist activity illegal, and the political style of the figures who were to 
lead Indonesia after independence was shaped by the reasonable assumption 
that laws might need to be broken to achieve results. More specifically, one 
of the most important tools of Dutch political repression in the colony was a 
formalized system of executive discretion known as the extraordinary pow-
ers (‘exorbitante rechten’) of the Governor-General to remove any European 
from the colony and to impose internal exile on any indigenous colonial 
subject. These powers dated from the nineteenth century and were explicitly 
intended to address the difficulty and expense of prosecuting political oppo-
nents of the colonial order. Initially they were employed against insubordi-
nate local rulers and rebellious Islamic leaders, but in the twentieth century 
they became the device by which the colonial government exiled hundreds 
of communists to the Boven Digul settlement in New Guinea following the 
1926-1927 communist uprisings, and by which the most prominent national-
ist leaders – Sukarno, Hatta and Syahrir – were consigned to isolated corners 
of the archipelago for the last decade of the colonial era. This assumption 
was all the more deeply embedded by the armed struggle for independence 
in the 1940s. In the four-year tangled political and military struggle to secure 
independence that followed the foundation of the Indonesian Republic in 
1945, nationalists operating in territories occupied by the Dutch routinely 
and unselfconsciously characterized their work as not legal (‘tidak legaal’), as 
indeed the Dutch resistance to Nazi rule in the occupied Netherlands had 
called itself the legality (illegaliteit). Legality and illegality were thus political 
categories, not deeper moral ones. The experience of nationalist struggle and 
independence war thus helped to embed assumptions that legitimized a high 
degree of discretion in implementing laws.
Weakness of the social contract
A third reason for the system of exemptions has been the weakness of ideas 
of social contract in Indonesia. At the heart of this concept is the idea that 
the sovereign people delegate to the state the right to govern in exchange 
for good government. Although we should not suppose the social contract 
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really underpinned the relationship between state and society in the West, 
the rhetoric and imagery of the contract was a powerful element in the emer-
gence of state legitimacy in the West. In particular, it encouraged a discourse 
of government responsibility to the people which included a moral respon-
sibility to behave properly in positions of authority. The social contract also 
replaced the notion that the ruler owned the state with the more modest no-
tion that the ruler was entitled to proper recompense and respect for the task 
of governing; the very term ‘contract’ implied an economic dimension to the 
relationship. The Netherlands Indies of the nineteenth century, however, was 
a direct heir to the Dutch East Indies Company in its insistence that the sole 
purpose of the colony was profit. The open description of the colony as a re-
gion of profit (wingewest) persisted until the introduction of the Ethical Policy 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. There was virtually nothing in the 
idiom of colonial rule before the twentieth century that seriously suggested 
the colonial state’s responsibility for the welfare of those it ruled.6 
The colonial state’s lack of quasi-contractual responsibility to its subjects 
was reinforced by its reliance on indigenous aristocratic elites as the formal 
source of political legitimacy for colonial rule. This reliance rested in turn on 
the convenient fiction that the indigenous peoples of the archipelago were 
less advanced than their European masters. They were scattered, so it was 
said, at various points on the scale of human development, from Stone Age 
to Mediaeval, but all these stages were located conveniently before the era 
which had led in European history to the emergence of the social contract 
idea. This is not to say that pre-colonial polities in the Indonesian archipelago 
lacked any notion of the rulers’ responsibility to his (or occasionally her) 
subjects. Rather, such responsibility was conceived principally in terms of 
personal, patrimonial bonds, with indigenous aristocrats offering protection 
and favour in exchange for support and material tribute. But such benevo-
lence was imagined in terms of the individual character of a particular ruler, 
rather than in the abstract terms of a social contract. Within the already lightly 
administered legal order of the Netherlands Indies, therefore, the colonial 
authorities were consistently indulgent towards the patrimonial privilege 
of indigenous aristocratic elites. They interpreted the patrimonial system 
as permitting traditional rulers considerable license to treat their subjects 
as they wished, as long as they did not exceed some indefinite, but always 
rather high, threshold of barbarity, greed or incompetence. The colonial na-
tive district chiefs (demang, bupati) and other indigenous office-holders of the 
regions did not enjoy a formal immunity from prosecution or litigation, but in 
practice they were brought to court only in the most extreme of cases.
6 Through much of the nineteenth century, there were strong criticisms of colonial rule from Dutch observers 
who did subscribe in one way or another to the notion of a social contract. Their criticisms, however, had no 
serious influence on government policy. 
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It is true that the Ethical Policy, announced by the Netherlands govern-
ment at the opening of the twentieth century, had many of the characteristics 
of a social contract view of politics. Indeed, the essay that stood most clearly 
for the ethical approach in colonial policy was entitled ‘A debt of honour’ 
(Van Deventer 1899:205), implying precisely the kind of contractual relation-
ship that was presumed to exist in Western polities. The Ethical Policy, how-
ever, was short-lived, undermined by the Depression and by its own inflated 
expectations, and its intellectual legacy was weak. In consequence, by the 
end of colonial rule in 1942, Indonesia had experienced only the early stages 
of the inevitable collision between traditional ideas of patrimonial govern-
ment and modern universal law. In patrimonial government, there was no 
presumption of equality between citizens or subjects and a pronounced blur-
ring, by contrast, of the distinction between public office and private interest 
that modern societies identify as corrupt. This blurring was most pronounced 
in the regions of the Netherlands Indies that were under indirect rule, but it 
applied also within the indigenous section of the Binnenlands Bestuur, the 
central organ of the colonial administration. It should be emphasized that 
the colonial system did not leave Indonesians tolerant of corruption as such, 
but rather that it left intact the cultural assumptions of privilege which led 
to corruption. The working out of the contradiction between assumptions of 
privilege and probity, which no society resolves quickly or easily, had barely 
begun when Indonesia achieved independence. 
Villains and Heroes 
The three sections above argue that the Indonesian state has been institution-
ally and politically weak, primarily for historical reasons, when it comes to 
consistently implementing the law. The state has been unable to marshal the 
government apparatus needed to implement law effectively, thus leaving 
serious gaps in the rule of law. The state has lacked unambiguous popular 
legitimacy to apply written law because the colonial tradition of legal plural-
ism, in combination with the legal expediency of the anti-colonial struggle, 
hampered the emergence of a sense of the universal moral value of law. And 
the colonial order failed to make a serious start with combating patrimonial 
assumptions about government, with the result that political values indi-
rectly conducive to corruption, exemption from punishment and other forms 
of special treatment have tended to persist.
These arguments accord with the conventional view that the state, as 
the institution which creates law and defines crime, has a natural interest in 
implementing law and combating crime. In this view, a state’s failure to do so 
is necessarily a consequence of weakness. The description of such weakness 
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typically refers both to structural weakness of the kind suggested above and 
to the role of what are commonly called ‘rogue elements’ (oknum7), individu-
als and groups who calculatingly exploit state weakness. The conventional 
view makes it almost impossible to imaging the state committing acts which 
it defines as criminal (unless the state as a whole has become a ‘rogue state’). 
It provides no framework for analysing the systematic complicity of the state 
in illegal or criminal activity. 
In recent times, Timothy Lindsey has made an important contribution 
to understanding this issue with his coining of the term ‘preman state’ to 
characterize the Indonesian state. Preman is one of the common terms for 
Indonesia’s vigorous community of (semi-)criminal toughs (Lindsey 2001, 
2006). Lindsey’s central proposition resembles parts of the argument set out 
earlier. He suggests that Indonesia missed out on the political presumptions 
surrounding the social contract and that the apparatus of state is a tool for 
the enrichment of power holders. This analysis is influenced by Lindsey’s 
lawyerly instinct to look at the Indonesian Constitution to discern the essen-
tial character of the state. In examining that document, and the intellectual 
environment which produced it, he came to the disturbing conclusion that 
the basic document which is supposed to determine Indonesian governance 
demonstrates no real interest in the state’s role as an arbiter between citizens, 
in other words, no real interest in keeping social order except as it relates to 
the state’s own interests. The legitimacy which the state might have obtained 
by providing social order was, in his view, replaced by an ideological claim to 
state legitimacy as the embodiment of national identity and the popular will. 
In other words, the Indonesian state came into being with the presumption 
that it could by definition do no wrong.
The pioneers of national independence, therefore, paid little or no atten-
tion to creating a court system which might stand up for individuals against 
the state. This neglect had the consequence that the court system was unable 
to prevent a massive recruitment of state institutions to private purposes. 
In Lindsey’s view, the whole of government in Indonesia came to resemble 
the territory of a preman, with officials collecting rent or tribute for whatever 
activity passed through their domain and enjoying something close to legal 
impunity while doing so. 
Although Lindsey’s argument suggests an important mechanism by 
which corporatist ideology could lead to self-serving individualism on a vast 
7 The term oknum has a curious etymology. Uqnum is a Christian Arabic term originally used to translate 
the Greek ‘hypostasis’, a term referring to the separate characters of the three elements in the Christian trinity. 
It does not appear in any recognizable form in the Malay Concordance Project (http://mcp.anu.edu.au/Q/mcp.
html), which indexes most early Malay language texts; Indonesian-English dictionaries of the 1960s translate it 
innocuously as ‘person’, but by the 1980s it acquired an increasingly negative connotation and was used to refer 
only to people with bad intentions.
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scale, his analysis remains broadly within the ‘rogue elements/rogue state’ 
framework. Because Lindsey’s analysis rests on a broad characterization of 
the ideas underlying the Indonesian state, it implies a sweeping negative 
judgement of the Indonesia venture. It also implies a basically heroic solution. 
Indonesia will be redeemed, if that is possible, by individuals who are able 
to construct a legal system and a set of political assumptions that will shift 
the balance of power between the individual and the state. It is a tall order.
In portraying a world of (scarce) heroes and (numerous) villains, Lindsey 
accurately reflects a widespread Indonesian perception of corrupt officials as 
evil, or at least morally weak. This perception is a common one throughout 
the world and may be reasonably accurate, at least in its gentler form, but 
in Indonesia it tends to be paired with a somewhat unrealistic expectation 
of what it should mean not to be corrupt. The difficult years of nationalist 
agitation against an entrenched and obdurate colonial government, and the 
harsh challenges of armed revolution, entrenched a culture of self-sacrifice in 
Indonesian public life. There were no material rewards for being a nationalist 
leader in the colonial era. Those who campaigned for their country’s inde-
pendence gave up hope of government employment and faced harassment 
and exile. During the revolution against the Dutch, many lost all they owned 
and survived the struggle eating frugally, wearing old clothes, living simply. 
Those who resisted the Dutch often faced harsh conditions, and risked loss 
of life or crippling injury in an armed struggle in which they were almost 
always poorly supplied with weapons and ammunition. Indonesians in this 
era were capable of great sacrifice for the sake of their nation, and those who 
sacrificed much were deeply admired by their fellow Indonesians.
These examples of self-sacrifice, together with the absence of a social 
contract notion of proper reward for high government service, meant that 
Indonesians have tended to believe that holders of public office ought to 
serve from conviction and should not expect substantial material rewards for 
their service. This sentiment is common, of course, in most modern democ-
racies, but it was particularly acute in Indonesia because the independence 
struggle had set such high standards of self-sacrifice. There was no attempt 
in post-revolutionary Indonesia, therefore, to set salaries for politicians or 
senior officials at a level that would enable them to maintain an elite life-
style without engaging in some form of additional, often corrupt, means of 
income-seeking. These perceptions have led to an assumption that all that is 
needed to improve the situation is heroic behaviour, rather than attention to 
the structures that promote state criminality. It would be surprising, how-
ever, if criminality were only a consequence of a lack of heroic spirit. What, 
then, are the structures that promote state criminality? Specifically, what is 
the economic logic of the Indonesian system of exemptions?
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State structure and the economic logic of exemption
To explain the economic logic of exemption, it is necessary to depart from the 
main conventional views of crime. The modern criminological understanding 
rests uneasily on two different paradigms. One is basically microeconomic: it 
sees each crime as an act carried out on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, in 
which the key considerations are the likely benefit to be had from the crime, 
the likelihood of success in relation to effort, the risk of detection and the 
severity of punishment. Within this paradigm, the key to control of crime 
is to shift the cost-benefit calculation as far as possible against committing a 
contemplated crime. This shift is predicted to be achieved by enhancing pre-
vention (through surveillance and physical barriers), by detection (through 
police work, forensics and the court system) and by deterrence (through pun-
ishment). The second paradigm is that crimes are committed by the ‘bad, sad 
and mad’, in other words by those who for some reason fit poorly with soci-
ety. Such people commit crimes not out of any intention to profit but out of 
some flaw in their nature. The remedy for crime that this paradigm proposes 
is either reform (redemptive punishment, changes in the social environment 
that stimulates crime) or removal (normally execution, exile or incarceration, 
occasionally mutilation so as to make the criminal physically incapable of 
repeating his or her crime). Both these paradigms focus on the individual and 
therefore do not lead further than the ‘rogue elements’ argument which we 
have found wanting in the analysis of state crime.
An alternative approach is to shift the focus from criminals and criminal 
acts to what might be termed criminal niches, by analogy with the concept of 
ecological niches which support particular kinds of organism. The decision 
by a state to prohibit an activity does not make everyone cease to be inter-
ested in doing it, but rather raises the threshold for entry into that particular 
market. In effect, the state creates a criminal niche and paradoxically, by its 
policing activities, protects the criminals who are clever enough and power-
ful enough to occupy that niche from competition by other sections of society.
One would normally expect the state to have no involvement in the eco-
nomic functioning or social life of these criminal niches. Indeed, the very 
absence of the state sometimes gives these criminal niches a state-like charac-
ter: without a legitimate state to provide basic government services, criminal 
bosses themselves sometimes have to set up rudimentary systems to provide 
basic social services to their followers. There are three circumstances, how-
ever, in which a state might become complicit in activities that it has banned.
First, a state may recognize that a stable, segregated regime within an 
identifiable criminal niche is preferable to chaos. This argument helps ex-
plain, for instance, the long-term historical relationship between Chinese 
states and the warlike nomads beyond the northern frontier. Chinese emper-
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ors generally preferred to deal with a single powerful Mongolian khan and 
a regulated system of protection payments which kept the nomadic hordes 
on their side of the Great Wall, rather than face a multitude of ambitious war 
leaders, each tempted to obtain fame and fortune by mounting an expedition 
against China (Barfield 1989; Waldron 1990). 
Second, the state may have some additional use for the organizations 
which develop to exploit a criminal niche. This reason is particularly relevant 
in Indonesia, where the state has a long tradition of using criminal organiza-
tions as a violent auxiliary to state power. Although there is some evidence 
that the colonial state connived in violent clashes between the Islamic and 
communist nationalists in the 1920s in order to deploy violence that the state 
did not want to take public responsibility for, the long golden age of criminal 
recruitment to politics began early in the armed revolution against the Dutch, 
when the new Republican government found the violence of former criminal 
gangs a valuable element in their campaign for international recognition. 
Only by recognizing the Indonesian Republic, went the argument, would 
the international community assuage the anger of the Indonesian masses 
against colonialism that was leading to mass slaughter and the destruction of 
property (Cribb 1991). From that time on, there has been a consistent pattern 
in Indonesian politics of recruiting gangsters to carry out armed actions that 
the state authorities can deny responsibility for (Ryter 1998; Bourchier 1994; 
Cribb 1984). Bearing in mind the political value of these gangs, the state has 
diminished incentive to attempt to smash them.
Even more important, state connivance in illegality, particularly various 
forms of bribery, has permitted Indonesia to sustain a government apparatus 
very much larger than could have been supported out of legitimate forms 
of revenue. This dependence on extra-budgetary funding had its origins 
in the national revolution, when the new Indonesian Republic was simply 
unable to access the traditional sources of state revenue that had sustained 
the Netherlands Indies government. The central government could resort to 
devices such as the unrestrained printing of currency and the trade in opium 
(Cribb 1988), but most sections of the government, including the armed forces, 
depended for their continuing operations on the collection of contributions 
from local communities and from local business activities. Pressing need in 
the revolutionary era came to be institutionalized as routine practice in the 
1950s, especially in the absence of strong countervailing ideological or social 
forces, and this routine practice was reinforced again during the economic 
chaos of the 1960s. Even when the resources boom of the New Order meant 
that these practices were no longer crucial to the survival of the government 
apparatus, they were so deeply entrenched that they did not disappear.
Third, the state’s prohibition of an activity may be a device to restrict the 
market. In other words, the state exempts itself and its associates from rules 
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that it applies in other parts of society and uses that exemption as a source 
of profit. Put slightly differently, the state creates rules, sometimes primar-
ily, sometimes incidentally, as an opportunity for its officials to collect rents 
(that is, unproductive levies on social activity). The vast system of exemptions 
– characterized by Lindsey as the preman state, by Ross McLeod (in this vol-
ume) as the Suharto Franchise and by just about everyone as rampant corrup-
tion – is an exercise in economic protectionism. Its enduring seductive power 
and its great political strength, lie in the competitive advantage that it gives 
to insiders. The underlying driving force behind the involvement of govern-
ment officials in illegal activity is the consciousness of the huge advantage 
that state protection confers on any kind of economic activity. The advantage 
is the same whether those fields are legal or illegal.
The system of exemptions that still dominates the Indonesian political 
order is sustained by three distinct but inter-related factors. First is the du-
rable sociocultural environment of state weakness, moral pluralism, and the 
weakness of the social contract described in the first part of this chapter. This 
complex factor profoundly undermines the institutional and moral capacity 
of the Indonesian state to attack illegal state activity. Nonetheless, the sig-
nificance of this sociocultural heritage is diminishing with the strengthening 
both of state capacity and of political discourses favouring moral universal-
ism and social responsibility. Second, state criminality is institutionalized. 
Having been necessary for the survival of the state for much of the Republic’s 
first two decades of existence, the official habit of creating and exploiting 
exemptions from the law became too deeply entrenched to eradicate with 
simple measures. This second factor too, however, is diminishing in impor-
tance. There is a growing consensus that corruption cannot be defended as a 
form of subsidiary state finance and serious efforts are being undertaken to 
reduce it. Only the third factor remains undiminished. The simple advantage 
that comes from using state power to restrict the marker for private gain is a 
seductive one throughout the world. Except through enhanced surveillance 
and punishment, Indonesia is unlikely to be able to reduce this temptation.
ross h. mcleod
Institutionalized public sector corruption
 A legacy of the Suharto franchise
Policy analysts in Indonesia are familiar with the formal hierarchy of various 
kinds of state laws.1 The Constitution is the highest law of the land, followed 
in turn by laws enacted by the Indonesian parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR), government regulations, presidential decrees, and regional gov-
ernment regulations (Law no. 10/2004 on the Formulation of Laws, Article 7). 
But in reality another law outranks all of these, despite lacking any means of 
enforcement: namely, the economic law of supply and demand, according to 
which the prices of goods and services and assets adjust so as to bring supply 
into balance with demand. When governments create laws that are in conflict 
with the law of supply and demand, this inevitably generates illegal behaviour. 
Examples abound. Since long ago, governments around the world have 
legislated against activities such as prostitution, gambling, and the consump-
tion of recreational drugs, but have never succeeded in eliminating them: in 
each case, demand always finds sources of supply. At various times countries 
have tried to legislate their exchange rates, only to see a black market emerge 
in which both buyers and sellers are happy to do business. In the current 
Indonesian context, regulations that set fuel prices well below world mar-
ket levels result in outward smuggling of fuels, and regulations that seek to 
prevent imports of rice result in inward smuggling of that commodity. In the 
labour market, the fixing of minimum wage rates above free market levels 
results in bribery of labour inspectors to turn a blind eye to infringements. In 
short, laws that attempt in some way to maintain prices different from those 
that would result from the unfettered interaction of supply and demand are 
virtually guaranteed to result in behaviour that is illegal in terms of those laws.
This same principle applies in the case of laws and regulations that deter-
mine the basic salaries of civil servants. The relevant law (Law no. 43/1999 on 
the Civil Service, Article 7) states simply that civil servants ‘have the right to 
1 This chapter draws heavily on McLeod 2008a. Useful feedback on this earlier paper from participants in 
the workshop on which this volume is based is gratefully acknowledged.
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a fair and reasonable salary commensurate with their work and responsibili-
ties’. While this aspect of the law cannot be faulted, the actual basic salaries 
set out in the related government regulations are deeply in conflict with the 
law of supply and demand. The individuals who comprise the civil service 
(and indeed the entire public sector workforce) supply services in return for 
remuneration, the ‘fair and reasonable’ level of which is indicated by the 
interaction of supply and demand in the private sector.2 It can be expected 
that public sector salaries will be somewhat lower because of the much higher 
degree of job security, the promise of a pension after retirement, and the pro-
vision of a range of fringe benefits – not to mention the willingness of some 
individuals to sacrifice self interest in the service of the nation. The size of 
this gap in Indonesia, however, particularly at higher levels of management, 
vastly exceeds any realistic estimate of what is reasonable, as we shall see.
Similar to other cases in which state law conflicts with economic law, 
the consequence here is that public sector employees are bound to devote a 
significant part of their energies to finding ways to make their total incomes 
broadly comparable with what otherwise would be determined by the forces 
of supply and demand. Indeed, over the course of several decades, the civil 
service and other parts of the public sector have developed a variety of mech-
anisms to minimize the gap between private and public sector remuneration. 
In the specific case of the civil service, the most obvious of these is the pro-
liferation of allowances (tunjangan) of various kinds. These include family 
allowances, rice allowances, structural allowances (for holders of managerial 
positions), functional allowances (for employees with certain professional 
skills), and so on; there is even an allowance for civil servants who for what-
ever reason do not receive structural or functional allowances (Presidential 
Regulation no. 12/2006). The purpose of all these allowances is to bring total 
remuneration levels closer to those of individuals in the private sector with 
similar qualifications and experience. 
This effort still falls well short of what is required for higher level officials, 
however, even though the sum total of allowances far exceeds their basic sala-
ries. Figure 1 compares managerial level remuneration in Indonesia’s public 
and private sectors. The public sector data refer to the totals of basic salaries 
plus structural allowances at the senior upper levels of Echelons I-IV, which 
are assumed to be roughly equivalent to Chief Executive Officers, Directors, 
Senior Managers and Junior Managers, respectively, in the private sector. It 
can be seen that the gaps are enormous – and increasingly so, the higher the 
level of management responsibility. In other words, private sector salaries 
have a high degree of progressivity with respect to increasing levels of re-
2 The elucidation of the law interprets ‘fair and reasonable’ salary levels as those that avoid a gap between 
the welfare of public and private sector employees. 
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sponsibility, whereas the civil service structure is very flat by comparison.3 
When the overall package of basic salary and formal allowances is clearly 
inferior to that available in the private sector, many government officials can 
be expected to react to the failure of their employer to pay them a ‘fair and 
reasonable salary commensurate with their work and responsibilities’ by 
finding ways to generate additional income from the opportunities that pres-
ent themselves – including those that involve corruption. As a consequence, 
informal – and often illegal – practices have been introduced over the years, 
the effect of which is to make a public sector career far more attractive than 
formal remuneration levels would suggest. Many high-level officials exploit 
these opportunities to the full, becoming extremely wealthy in the process. In 
short, governments’ attempts to defy the law of supply and demand – both in 
their regulation of private sector activity, and in relation to remuneration of 
their own employees – result not only in patterns of illegal behaviour in the 
private sector, but also in the public sector itself.
The foregoing discussion suggests that it is unhelpful to view endemic 
corruption simply in terms of unprincipled behaviour on the part of the in-
dividuals who comprise the public sector workforce. A large proportion of 
these individuals see nothing wrong in their routine acceptance of additional 
payments that may be technically illegal, knowing that their formal entitle-
ment to remuneration falls short of their private sector peers’ incomes. At 
the same time, many members of the general public are usually not too con-
cerned by the petty extortion they encounter in their dealings with the public 
sector. On the contrary, it is by no means unusual for them to make small gifts 
to officials they deal with from time to time – much like tipping waiters in 
restaurants – because they know that official remuneration is unrealistically 
low. Rather than being seen as individual impropriety, corruption is best un-
derstood in terms of institutional weakness. More specifically, it is a product 
of entrenched personnel management practices that ignore market realities. 
The main focus of the discussion that follows, therefore, is the central role 
played by these practices in the public sector during the Suharto New Order 
era (1966-1998). 
The Suharto franchise
I argue that former president Suharto moulded the five major components of 
the public sector into a ‘franchise’ system (Figure 2), the fundamental purpose 
of which was to use the coercive power of government privately to tax the gen-
3 By contrast, remuneration for new tertiary graduates to the civil service is much closer to private sector 
levels. Here the shortfall is of the order of 50%, but this gap would be partly offset by fringe benefits of various 
kinds.
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eral public and redistribute the revenue to a small elite. Government was not 
‘of the people, by the people and for the people’, but rather ‘of the people, by 
and for the controlling elite’. The discussion that follows provides a detailed 
interpretation of how this system came to operate under Suharto. It is not 
intended to suggest that he came to the presidency armed with a full-fledged 
blueprint for this ‘franchise’, but rather that it evolved under his direction 
through a process of trial and error over a period of several years, and build-
ing on his own previous experience and observations of aspects of govern-
ment both under the Dutch colonialists and under former President Sukarno.
The first branch of the franchise encompassed the legislature and the po-
litical parties. There were only three parties, one of which was Suharto’s elec-
tion vehicle, Golkar. The other two were tame parties that had been formed by 
forced amalgamations of a greater number of parties that had existed in years 
gone by. The second branch of the franchise comprised most of the bureau-
cracy – that is, most ministries, plus a number of non-department agencies. 
The third element was the judiciary and the associated legal bureaucracy, 
such as the Attorney General’s office and the Department of Justice. Fourth 
was the military, which, under Suharto, also included the police.4 Finally, we 
come to the numerous state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that were spread over 
a wide range of sectors of the economy, such as banking and finance, natural 
resources, transportation, retailing, plantation agriculture and so on.
The core activity of this giant franchise was located in the bureaucracy 
and, to a lesser extent, the state enterprises. One of the key functions of the 
bureaucracy was to implement policies that would generate rents on behalf 
of the beneficiaries of the franchise system. These ‘insider’ beneficiary firms 
included the so-called ‘conglomerates’ (that is, large, diversified business 
groups owned by cronies of the president, most of which were owned by 
ethnic Chinese); a number of large foreign firms permitted to operate in 
Indonesia, almost always in partnership with some local entity favoured by 
the regime; companies owned by the first family (that is, relatives of the presi-
dent himself);5 and companies owned by franchisees (numerous officials at 
various levels within the public sector institutions) and their families. Rents 
could be generated in countless ways by the bureaucracy for each of these 
beneficiary groups. A simple example from the early days of the regime was 
the granting of exclusive rights to import cloves – the all-important special 
ingredient in Indonesia’s famous clove cigarettes, or kretek – to just two firms, 
one owned by the president’s half-brother, Probosutedjo, the other by one 
of his closest cronies, Liem Sioe Liong (Backman 1999:114). Another type of 
4 In recent years, the police force has been separated from the armed forces.
5 This group became increasingly important and significant in the economy as Suharto’s children grew to 
become adults and began to establish businesses of their own, rather than in partnership with their father’s 
cronies.
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monopoly was that enjoyed by individuals – often serving or retired military 
officials – designated as concessionaires with the sole right to undertake log-
ging in large parts of Indonesia’s vast rainforests.6 
Monopolies and concessions of one kind or another were just two of the 
means by which the beneficiaries of the franchise could be virtually guaran-
teed to earn very high profits, which were then to be shared with Suharto and 
his family members, and with highly placed members of the franchise.7 The 
state-owned enterprises were also used as a means of enriching the beneficiar-
ies of the franchise system, most obviously the conglomerates and first-family 
companies. Firms in these groups engaged in business transactions with SOEs 
at artificially determined prices favourable to themselves. Loans from state 
banks carried below-market interest rates, and often had the enormous added 
benefit of not having to be repaid. Fuel could be purchased at below-market 
prices from the giant state oil company, Pertamina. Airport space and facili-
ties could be rented from state-owned airport operators at below-market rates, 
again with the added bonus of perhaps indefinitely delayed payment.
The same kind of symbiotic relationship as that which existed between 
the president and big business was replicated on a smaller scale at ministerial 
level and below, as well as in regional governments throughout the country. 
Provincial governors, mayors and heads of districts, subdistricts and even 
villages, along with their bureaucrats and administrators, were encouraged – 
indeed, expected – to act in similar manner. When opportunities existed for 
government officials at any level to use their authority in ways that gener-
ated excess profits for favoured businesses, this was precisely what occurred. 
Obvious examples include awarding overpriced contracts for the construc-
tion of public works, government buildings and so on, or for the supply 
of equipment and materials to government offices, schools and healthcare 
facilities, and even for catering for official gatherings of one kind or another. 
Enterprises and banks owned by lower level governments were also used to 
generate excess profits for favoured private sector businesses.
While insider firms harvested the rents generated for them by the bureau-
cracy, other ‘outsider’ private sector firms and individuals served instead as 
targets for predation. Franchisees within the bureaucracy, the military and 
police were expected by Suharto to generate additional income via extortion 
from these firms and individuals, including smaller foreign firms, and to 
share the proceeds with him. Bureaucratic extortion usually took the form of 
requiring bribes as a condition for the issue of licences, the delivery of normal 
6 Barr 1998:4-6. These were monopolists in the sense that they were simply awarded concessions by government 
fiat, rather than needing to bid in competition with other firms for the right to log the concession areas. 
7 Two important techniques for rent sharing were donations by the insider firms to a number of non-
transparent and non-taxable foundations controlled by the regime, and the issue of shares in these firms, free 
of charge, to family members of the franchisor and franchisees.
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public services, and so on, while extortion of a more overtly criminal nature, 
involving the use or threat of violence, was undertaken by the military,8 often 
working through private sector sub-contractors – gangs of thugs known as 
preman (Wilson 2006). The military also generated large amounts of income 
through involvement in victimless crime – gambling, prostitution and drug 
trafficking – and through illegal exploitation of the nation’s natural resources, 
such as forests, minerals and fisheries (Rieffel and Pramodharwardani 2007).
The relationship of the public sector with outsiders was parasitic, while 
that with insiders was symbiotic. But in both cases it was the general public 
that ended up paying the ‘tax’. The prices of products it purchased and of 
those purchased on its behalf by the government from the insider firms were 
artificially high; and the prices of goods and services sold to insider firms by 
state enterprises were artificially low. The payments made by individuals in 
response to bureaucratic, military and police extortion differed only in that 
they were quite transparent to the ‘taxpayer’.
The ‘product’ offered by the Suharto franchise was the right to make use 
of the coercive power of government to impose this ‘private taxation’ on the 
general public, whether by means of bureaucratic or conventional extortion, 
or by artificially boosting the profitability of insider firms at the expense of 
the general public (and then sharing the excess profit harvest with the ben-
eficiary companies). The revenues collected were for the private benefit of in-
dividual members of the franchise and their subordinates and of the ‘owner’ 
of the franchise, Suharto. In order to join the franchise or to move to a higher 
level within it – for example, by being appointed as a provincial governor 
or district head, or to a position of authority in one of the ministries, or to a 
court in one of the main commercial centres, or to a management position in 
one of the state enterprises – the individual was required to make a payment 
in some form, directly or indirectly (through higher level franchisees) to the 
franchisor. This can best be considered as the upfront payment of a share of 
revenues expected to be received in the future by virtue of the exercise of 
the power to extort individuals and firms, or to generate and share in rents 
harvested by insider firms.9
8 Suharto himself had previously been involved in such activity, and ‘was dismissed from his position as 
commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java in October 1959 for demanding money from local 
businesses’ (Rieffel and Pramodharwardani 2007:31). 
9 Note that whereas a large part of the early public choice literature (see, for example, Buchanan and Tullock 
1962; Krueger 1974; Posner 1974) focuses on ‘rent-seeking’, the emphasis here is on ‘rent generation and 
harvesting’.
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Explaining success
By any measure, the Suharto franchise was spectacularly successful in its 
objective of generating wealth for its members and cronies. Pre-crisis esti-
mates of the net worth of the Suharto family run to many billions of dollars, 
while cronies such as Liem Sioe Liong became among the richest individuals 
in Asia. Countless high-level bureaucrats, military officials, state enterprise 
managers and judges became fabulously wealthy relative to their miserably 
small official salaries. One of the keys to success was the fact that the regime 
was able to maintain a very high average annual rate of economic growth 
(well over 7% in real terms) over some three decades; very few countries in 
the world are able to boast a similar achievement. Of course, the regime col-
lapsed in fairly spectacular fashion during the Asian financial crisis in 1998, 
and the economy plunged into a very deep recession. But although economic 
output fell by 13% in that year, conditions were able to be stabilized quite 
quickly after the regime change, and by 2000 the economy had returned to 
growth at annual rates of around 5%. Even taking into account this major set-
back, Suharto left Indonesia’s economy, and most of its people, considerably 
better off than they had been when he first came to power, notwithstanding 
the large-scale redistribution of income from the general public to the elite. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the important distinction between Suharto 
and most other developing country dictators is that he had an implicit under-
standing of the logic behind the so-called ‘Laffer curve’: that maximizing tax 
revenue (whether public or private tax) involves keeping the rate of taxation 
modest, since high tax rates have the effect of encouraging tax avoidance and 
evasion, or even driving the taxed activity out of existence (McLeod 2000:105-
6). The Suharto franchise owed its success to a strategy of imposing private 
taxation at relatively low rates on a very wide tax base – effectively the entire 
economy and its supporting natural resources. In other words, most kinds 
of economic activity were taxed in some way, but relatively lightly, so as not 
to destroy incentives for their continued expansion. The contrast with highly 
destructive dictatorial regimes such as those in developing countries like 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe, where private taxation was levied at high rates that 
took no account of their longer term implications, could not be more stark.
Since the effectiveness of any organization depends on the behaviour of 
the individuals that comprise it, Suharto’s principal concern as ‘owner’ of the 
franchise was to create a set of incentives for individuals within it that would 
guarantee its success. An important concern of this chapter is to elaborate the 
nature of these incentives.
As is the case with commercial franchises in the world of business, the 
basic incentive to high performance on the part of franchisees is the monetary 
return this brings. Countless individuals were able to achieve huge increases 
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in their net worth during their working careers by virtue of their success as 
Suharto franchisees. The strong financial incentives they faced are clearly 
reflected in the fact that there have always been numerous applicants for 
positions in the civil service and the military relative to the number of such 
positions available at any time, and that individuals have always been willing 
to make under-the-counter payments to the relevant ‘gatekeepers’ to secure 
such positions, or to secure promotions and transfers to more lucrative posi-
tions once inside the system (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006). 
Another similarity with ordinary business franchises was the existence of 
a process of ‘natural selection’ that contributed to overall success. Individual 
performance relative to the objectives of the franchise was constantly moni-
tored, and franchisees were continuously assigned and reassigned to positions 
that reflected their performance. The less successful franchisees found them-
selves shifted sideways as they were replaced by others willing to bid more for 
their positions, or who had persuaded officials at higher levels that they were 
capable of superior performance – and therefore of making greater financial 
and other contributions to the franchise – than those of the incumbents.
Public sector employees as threats to the regime
The Suharto era version of the Law on the Civil Service (no. 8/1974) required 
individuals employed in the bureaucracy to sacrifice their own interests in 
the service of the state and their fellow citizens (Article 3). In reality, it seems 
unlikely that the prospect of a lifetime of self-sacrifice would have held much 
appeal to most public sector employees, who presumably hoped simply to 
earn a reasonable day’s pay from an honest day’s work – just like those who 
took up private sector employment. It also seems unlikely that public sector 
employees would have been happy with the notion of government as an 
instrument for redistributing income to the elite, however. One of the key 
problems Suharto faced, therefore, was to ensure that civil servants would at 
least acquiesce in the face of common knowledge as to what the franchise was 
about, and certainly not actively oppose it. 
A key part of the solution to the problem of ensuring loyalty to the fran-
chise can be seen in Suharto’s approach to determining the structure of em-
ployee remuneration.10 The 1974 Law required that salaries be determined 
bearing in mind the financial capacity of the state (Elucidation, Article 7), 
which provided a pretext for keeping them low. In fact, if they had been set 
at levels comparable with those in the private sector, the public sector could 
10 For earlier discussions of the nature, structure and consequences of public sector employee remuneration, 
see for example, Smith 1975; Gray 1979; and Clark and Oey-Gardiner 1991.
 Institutionalized public sector corruption 55
have been staffed perfectly adequately for the purpose of undertaking what 
are commonly regarded as the legitimate responsibilities of government.11 
However, this would surely have resulted in the recruitment of large num-
bers of individuals who would have baulked at the abuse of the powers 
of government that characterized the Suharto regime. The franchise could 
hardly have been successful under such conditions. 
Instead, the approach was to maintain a compensation structure that 
provided market-comparable incomes at the lower levels of the civil service 
(where opportunities for supplementing one’s income were limited), but 
which kept earnings increasingly far below those for similarly qualified and 
experienced individuals in the private sector at the higher levels (where such 
opportunities were widespread). Thus, as we have already noted, the remu-
neration structure was greatly compressed: ratios of high-level to low-level 
incomes were much smaller than in large private sector organizations.
At first glance, this would appear to have made a career in the civil service 
thoroughly unattractive, except perhaps for those who did not aspire to pro-
motions significantly beyond the lower ranks; and yet there were always far 
more applicants for civil service positions than there were jobs available. To 
some extent this could be explained by applicants having unrealistic percep-
tions as to the possibility of being recruited despite their limited educational 
achievements. The prospect of lifetime employment, a government pension 
beyond that, plus various other benefits such as subsidized family access to 
health services, free transport to the place of work and so on, was also im-
portant. More important, however, was the widespread and well-founded 
perception that the income-earning potential of positions in the public sector 
was far greater than the pattern of formal remuneration and other benefits 
sug gested. In other words, it was well-known that one could expect to receive 
a wide range of additional allowances of one kind or another, and that if one 
were so inclined there would be ample opportunity to be involved in lucra-
tive corrupt activity.
The history of the judiciary under the New Order clearly illustrates the 
key features of the Suharto strategy for ensuring that most members of the 
franchise institutions would support the franchise, and that few would op-
pose it (Pompe 2005). The imposition of very low salaries relative to compa-
rable private sector levels ensured that judges would be forced to play by the 
rules of the franchise if they were to enjoy a standard of living commensurate 
with their professional status. Members of the judiciary who were unwilling 
to do the bidding of the regime – including, as Aspinall and Van Klinken put 
it in the introduction to this volume, by endorsing ‘illegal acts performed by 
11 Just as in the private sector, the socially optimal size of the bureaucracy is defined by the margins at which 
the gain to society from employing additional personnel just matches the cost of doing so, evaluated at market-
determined salaries. Getting this balance right is a matter of adjusting numbers of employees, not salary levels.
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other agents of the state’ – found themselves languishing indefinitely in far 
distant outposts, with few fringe benefits, little work to occupy their time 
or hone their skills, and no hope for a ‘successful’ career in any sense of the 
term.12 At the other end of the spectrum, those who, like the president him-
self, enthusiastically embraced the notion of taking advantage of their posi-
tions to achieve personal enrichment, were only too willing to do what was 
asked of them by the regime (see Butt and Lindsey, in this volume). Among 
the latter, those who were most effective were appointed to highly lucrative 
positions in the most active big city district courts, and some were promoted 
to the high court or the supreme court.
With salaries and formal allowances kept low, public sector institutions 
needed only to be provided with limited funding from the budget to cover 
their personnel costs. The practical implication was that managers of these 
institutions had to find additional, off-budget sources of funds if they were 
to get things done and to provide additional income to their employees in 
order to secure their loyalty and support. Inevitably this would involve en-
gagement in various forms of activity that were either clearly corrupt, or at 
least were located within the fuzzy boundary that delimits corrupt and non-
corrupt activity. Thus, for example, despite the importance of the military’s 
contribution to maintaining Suharto’s political monopoly,13 on which the 
success of the franchise depended, 
the military won little in the way of budget resources during the Soeharto era. 
[...] By withholding budget funds, [Suharto] gave military commanders a strong 
incentive to engage in income-generating activities. At the same time, his ability to 
grant or deny access to these activities fostered a high degree of loyalty and de-
pendence among these commanders. (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani 2007:32.)
In other words, Suharto secured the loyalty of the military not by allocating 
government revenue to it, but by appointing its commanders as franchisees 
– granting them the right to collect private tax revenues and to allocate them 
as they saw fit, including to their own pockets. The similarity with the case of 
the judiciary discussed above is obvious.
Within the bureaucracy, management would ordinarily devote part of 
the so-called ‘development’ budget, largely deriving from bilateral and mul-
tilateral aid agencies, to the payment of various allowances over and above 
12 Widoyoko in this volume, discusses the same issue in relation to school principals. 
13 The threat of military-sanctioned violence was not limited to the purpose of extortion, but also as a means 
of repressing potential opposition to the regime. The army had given a green light to the killing of hundreds 
of thousands of alleged communists and communist sympathizers as a prelude to Suharto’s appointment as 
president, and this served as a vivid reminder of the likely fate of any who dared too openly to criticize the New 
Order government. Discussion of these aspects of Suharto’s rule is beyond the scope of this chapter, however.
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the formal entitlements – for example, to people who served on project com-
mittees (and, through them, to both their superiors and subordinates in the 
same area). More obviously corrupt was the practice of awarding government 
contracts at inflated prices to firms that agreed to kick back a suitably large 
portion of the excess over reasonable market value to the officials or commit-
tees that awarded the contracts.14 These illicit payments were typically used 
as slush funds for topping up the incomes of other employees of the govern-
ment entity in question. The key point to note here is that the rents were 
shared widely within the relevant part of the bureaucracy. In this manner, 
large numbers of officials became dependent on the continued operation of 
the system. It was highly unlikely that any individual would blow the whistle 
on such practices, because to do so would be to put at risk not only a signifi-
cant part of one’s own overall income, but also that of one’s peers. Lack of 
transparency within the system for transfers and promotions meant that such 
individuals could be severely punished by denying them promotion and ac-
cess to informal allowances in cash and in-kind to which they had no formal 
entitlement, or moving them to bureaucratic backwaters.
In short, the kind of salary structure chosen for public sector institutions 
was such as to discourage the entry of highly principled individuals (which 
is not to deny that many such were recruited, nevertheless), and correspond-
ingly to encourage that of people who at least would not concern themselves 
too greatly about the sources of their special allowances and other salary 
supplements – or, better still, of those predisposed to engage actively in the 
work of the franchise. This is the only plausible explanation for the fact that 
individuals were willing to pay for the privilege of embarking on, and per-
severing with, a career characterized by increasingly large shortfalls below 
market salary levels the higher one rose in the hierarchy. 
Decisions had to be made not only about the public sector salary struc-
ture, but also about the number of employees. Indonesia’s civil service under 
Suharto was never particularly large,15 and yet, in relation to the fairly nar-
row objectives of the franchise, the number of public sector employees seems 
at first glance to have been unnecessarily great. This impression is no doubt 
heavily influenced by the obvious degree of underemployment within the 
bureaucracy, which was quickly apparent to visitors to virtually any gov-
ernment office building. Early in the New Order, Suharto decided to adopt 
personnel man agement practices within the bureaucracy that mirrored those 
he had been used to in the army. One aspect of this was a rigid pyramidal 
hierarchy, in which the commanding officer would have a fixed number of 
subordinates reporting to him, each of whom would have a fixed number re-
14 The chapter by Van Klinken and Aspinall in this volume is much concerned with such practices.
15 In 1997 (Suharto’s last year in office), Indonesia had 4.1 million civil servants, equivalent to just 2% of the 
population.
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porting to him, and so on down to the level of private. Thus all battalions, all 
regiments and so on would have the same number of individuals at each level 
in the hierarchy. Whatever its merits in the military context, such an approach 
made little sense within the bureaucracy, because different agencies were 
involved in widely varying activities, and their staffing needs differed cor-
respondingly (Synnerstrom 2007:164-5). Nevertheless, the benefit to the fran-
chise was that this approach typically resulted in excessive numbers of bu-
reaucrats at low levels16 and insufficient numbers of them at high levels. The 
rampant underemployment of staff just mentioned was in fact a characteristic 
only of low-level employees; by contrast, those at high levels were quite often 
heavily overworked. The implication was that relatively few at the low levels 
could expect rapid promotion, and yet promotion was the only way to gain 
access to the more lucrative opportunities for supplementing one’s income 
with special allowances and other top-ups paid from slush funds or derived 
from participation in corrupt activity. In these circumstances, individuals 
desirous of promotion had strong incentives to compete with their peers – es-
pecially for promotion into positions in the ‘wet’ areas, where the availability 
of off-budget funds was greatest (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006).
Such competition took a variety of forms, and working hard was by no 
means the only one. The process for determining promotions and transfers 
within the bureaucracy lacked transparency and objectivity, and relations 
with one’s own superior were, in practice, the crucially important deciding 
factor – hence the prevalent culture of asal bapak senang – ‘as long as the boss 
is happy’ – within Indonesian public sector institutions. Management of fran-
chises at the local level is typically delegated to the franchisee, who is then 
more or less free to choose which of his subordinates to promote or transfer to 
positions of greater authority, and which to leave where they are or to shift to 
positions of little influence. In the context of the Suharto franchise, in which 
the primary objective was regressive redistribution of the national income 
rather than the delivery of services to the public, it is hardly surprising that 
competition also often took the form of bidding for desirable positions.
In Indonesia, most civil service positions are for sale, rather than being 
acquired in open competition based on merit. The practice of selling civil 
service jobs goes hand in hand with corruption more generally – from one 
perspective, the investment needed to obtain a position needs to be recov-
ered; from another, the likelihood of access to lucrative opportunities for self-
enrichment makes such an investment worthwhile (Synnerstrom 2007:174).
The winners of the competition were those who bid the highest prices for 
promotion or appointment to particular positions, and these were typically 
those who had the greatest confidence in their ability to abuse these prospec-
16 The problem persists to this day, including at local government level (McLeod 2008b:204).
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tive positions of authority to generate cash inflows. That is, just as the salary 
structure encouraged recruitment of the kinds of individuals who would 
serve the franchise well, so the hierarchical structure within the bureaucracy 
reinforced this tendency by promoting the same kinds of individuals after 
they had had a chance to demonstrate their capacity and willingness to con-
tribute to the objectives of the franchise.
There was perhaps one additional reason for recruiting what may seem 
like excessive numbers of high school and university graduates to the pub-
lic sector.17 The regime had decided to increase significantly the number of 
children and young people attending schools and universities, since this was 
clearly a way of generating support from the public and thus offsetting con-
cerns that the government cared only about its big business friends. But stu-
dents have always been a potent political force in Indonesia (Aspinall 2005: 
Chapter 5), so it made sense to hold out the enticing prospect of a well-remu-
nerated career in the public sector following graduation, because students – 
and their parents – would have been well aware that involvement in student 
activism directed against the regime would very likely ruin any chance of 
being recruited. The strategy of offering eventual access to lucrative positions 
in the franchise to those who demonstrated their willingness to accept it for 
what it was thus extended even to potential public sector employees.
Allowing members of the bureaucracy and SOE branches of the franchise 
to tap into foreign aid flows and to collude with private sector firms engaged 
in economic transactions with the public sector constituted useful and ef-
fective means of allowing public sector employees to top up their formal 
remuneration and thus to ensure their support for the broad objectives of the 
franchise. But there were, of course, additional means of doing this. Recall 
here the distinction introduced earlier between insiders and outsiders. The 
insiders were the privileged firms that cooperated with the franchise so as 
indirectly to tax those outside the elite in one way or another. The outsider 
firms and individuals, on the other hand, were the targets rather than the 
beneficiaries of such taxation, and they were taxed by way of extortion ‘unof-
ficial imposts’ (pungutan liar or pungli). Broadly speaking, the bureaucracy 
created a wide range of regulations with which firms needed to comply, and 
then found ways of forcing firms to pay bribes in order to obtain certification 
of such compliance. In addition, it accepted bribes from firms wishing to re-
duce, or avoid altogether, their payments of legitimate taxes, such as customs 
duties, value added tax and income tax. Outsider firms and individuals were 
also subject to extortion by the military and police, involving the employment 
of violence or the threat of violence to persuade them to contribute to their 
own ‘protection’. The small but relatively wealthy ethnic Chinese community 
was always particularly vulnerable, and some of its members found it pru-
17 In 1997, 83% of civil servants were graduates of senior high school or tertiary institutions.
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dent to try to keep local military officials favourably disposed to it (Susanto 
2006). But indigenous (pribumi) citizens were also targets.
It is because of the heavy emphasis on public sector extortion of firms 
and individuals that Indonesia has such a poor image in relation to corrup-
tion and bureaucratic inefficiency (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008; 
World Bank 2008; see further discussion below). Indonesia’s rapid economic 
progress under Suharto is somewhat paradoxical when viewed against this 
background. The paradox is readily resolved, however, when we recall the 
existence of insider firms, which collectively accounted for a very large share 
of the modern sector of the economy, and which were not only broadly im-
mune to such extortion but in fact benefited strongly from their privileged 
relationship with the bureaucracy, the state enterprises and the public sector 
in general.
Post-Suharto reform
The Asian financial crisis that began in mid-1997 suddenly created turmoil in 
Indonesia, depriving the New Order regime of its legitimacy as a sound eco-
nomic manager. In turn, this simultaneously emboldened opponents of the 
regime and dramatically weakened Suharto’s ability to maintain discipline 
within the franchise, such that its various branches and members no longer 
continued to act in a mutually supportive fashion. As a result, he was pushed 
out of office in May 1998, and reformers then moved quickly to overturn 
several key features of the regime he had built up over the previous three de-
cades. Relatively little progress has been made in reforming the bureaucracy, 
however, which remains highly dysfunctional.
The law on the civil service was amended in 1999 so as to replace the previ-
ous naïve requirement for civil servants to sacrifice their own material well-
being in the interests of the state and the people with a more realistic emphasis 
on the need for comparability of public sector remuneration with that in the 
private sector. This perfectly sensible restatement of principle has not been 
accompanied by an equally sensible restructuring of remuneration packages, 
however: as we have seen, these remain far removed from the realities of the 
private sector market for professional and managerial labour. Inevitably, the 
failure to remove the conflict between state law and economic law has meant 
that corrupt behaviour remains endemic in Indonesia’s public sector.
Surveys such as those undertaken by Transparency International suggest 
that Indonesia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world (ranked at 
equal 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption 
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Perceptions Index for 2008, with a score of just 2.6 on a scale of 1-10).18 Other 
sources, such as the World Bank’s Governance Matters and Doing Business 
reports (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008; World Bank 2008) show 
clearly that it is also very inefficient, and emphasize the deleterious impact of 
this inefficiency on the business and investment environment. For example, 
Indonesia was ranked only in the 42nd percentile in terms of ‘government 
effectiveness’ in 2007 in the Governance Matters report.19 At the same time, its 
world ranking on a number of important standardized indicators of the ease 
of doing business (as this relates to the influence of the bureaucracy) can also 
be seen to be very low (Table 1). 
Table 1 Ease of doing business in Indonesia: selected sub-indices and components 
18 See http://www.transparency.org.
19 On this index, the lower the percentile rank, the less effective government is perceived to be.
Indicator Measure Rank
(among 181 countries)
Overall ease of doing business 129
Starting a business 171
Time 76 days 165
Cost (% of income per capita) 77.9% 146
Employing workers 157
Difficulty of Hiring Index (0-100) 61 153
Difficulty of Firing Index (0-100) 60 157
Firing costs (weeks of wages) 108 weeks 168
Paying taxes 116
Time 266 hours 103
Registering property 107
Time 39 days   75
Cost (% of property value) 10.7% 143
Dealing with construction permits 80
Time 176 days   75
Cost (% of income per capita) 221.1% 176
Source: World Bank (2008).
Note: The closer the numerical rank to 1, the easier it is perceived to do business.
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The bureaucracy succeeded in generating consistently high economic growth 
during the New Order period because this was in the interests of the franchise, 
and because there were strong incentives for success within it. The franchise 
prospered by taxing virtually the entire economy, so the faster the economy 
grew, the greater the pay-off. But in the entirely different context of post-
Suharto democratic Indonesia the bureaucracy as economic policy maker has 
been found wanting. The franchise no longer exists, since there is no longer a 
franchisor capable of imposing discipline on all of its branches: this became an 
impossibility once Suharto’s monopoly on the presidency came to an end. Its 
collapse following Suharto’s demise is directly analogous to the breakdown of 
a cartel as a result of its individual members’ failure to restrict their output to 
agreed quotas: cartels cannot survive in the absence of internal discipline. In 
post-Suharto Indonesia officials still have an incentive to abuse their authority 
to their own advantage, but they now do so in uncoordinated fashion, com-
peting with each other rather than playing defined, mutually supportive roles 
within the giant organism that is the Indonesian public sector.
To the extent that current and future governments in Indonesia perceive 
government as an instrument for improving the efficiency of the economy 
rather than one for redistributing income in favour of sections of the elite, it 
seems clear that removing the conflict between state law and economic law 
is of crucial importance. This should not be interpreted to mean that merely 
improving the formal remuneration of public sector employees is all that is 
needed, however. Remuneration comparable with that in the private sector 
must be accompanied by other human resource management practices that 
are also comparable with those in the private sector. This should be taken to 
include a strong emphasis on performance evaluation as the key determinant 
of promotions (and therefore remuneration), and the opening up of vacant 
positions to competition among the widest possible range of applicants. In 
short, if individuals are to be paid market salaries, then they must also be 
obliged to compete on equal terms for positions within the public sector with 
all others who think themselves worthy of filling those positions. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to show how the Suharto regime managed 
the economy and polity of Indonesia for the benefit of the dominant elite, 
rather than for Indonesian citizens in general. I have argued that his New 
Order ‘franchise’ was extraordinarily successful in terms of its own objec-
tives, and that this reflected the strategies employed to provide appropriate 
incentives to individuals within the various branches of the public sector. 
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Suharto set total formal remuneration for more senior personnel very low rel-
ative to market levels. At the same time, however, franchisees were effectively 
granted the right to collect private taxation, backed by the full resources of 
the franchise. Positions as franchisees were thus eagerly sought after by those 
who had no qualms about using the coercive power of government for their 
personal benefit. Others who wanted nothing more than fair and reasonable 
– that is, private sector-comparable – remuneration were obliged to suppress 
their moral concerns about the functioning of the franchise unless they were 
prepared to be left to languish in positions where they would have no real 
influence on the processes of government, and where their earnings would 
be far below that of their private sector peers. 
The conflict between the law on the civil service as implemented and the 
law of supply and demand resulted in a constant search by franchisees for 
ways to supplement their incomes, inevitably drawing them towards corrupt 
activity – thus making them dependent on, and unlikely to challenge, the 
status quo. Paradoxically, low salaries enabled Suharto to buy support for 
the corrupt practices of his franchise. If significant progress is to be made in 
minimizing corruption and improving the performance of the bureaucracy it 
will be essential to remove this conflict by more closely aligning remunera-
tion and personnel management practices with those of the private sector.20
20 While the present government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono does not see this as a priority, there is, 
nevertheless, a desire on the part of at least some members of his cabinet to move in this direction. Foremost 
among these is the Minister for Finance, Dr Sri Mulyani Indrawati; details of the far reaching bureaucratic 
reforms taking place in the finance ministry are discussed in McLeod (2008a).

howard dick and jeremy mulholland
The state as marketplace
Slush funds and intra-elite rivalry
Why is the state so weak and erratic in enforcing legislated sanctions against 
corrupt and criminal behaviour?19 This question is usually referred to as the 
problem of ‘implementation’, as though the failure was simply one of admin-
istrative competence or a confusion of priorities. Critics also frequently cite 
‘lack of political will’, which is no more insightful. Such rationalizations blur 
the essential distinction between the state as it should be and the state as it is. 
Corruption and crime invariably co-exist with the state. 
This messy and unsatisfactory situation can be explained and analysed in 
terms of the behaviour of the elites who control the state and access to it. The 
state is the arena for contestation (Migdal 2001; Day 2002). We refer to this 
as the elite game of power, wealth and status. New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) usefully distinguishes between formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ 
whereby informal rules or norms of behaviour regulate the formulation and 
application of formal rules, including legislation (North 1990). For example, 
there are many reasons why allegations of criminal or corrupt behaviour 
may not result in legal convictions: hearsay allegations may not be brought 
to public notice because of fear of retribution; police and prosecutors may not 
proceed with charges; evidence may not substantiate them; witnesses may 
refuse to testify; restitution may be made before prosecution; courts may be 
influenced; or appeals may overturn convictions. In short, illegality becomes 
a matter for negotiation under a complex interaction of formal and informal 
rules. Contestability is seen also in the way informal rules serve to redistrib-
ute power, wealth and status. A useful perspective on the state is therefore 
that of a transactional space in which the rules of the political system are 
constantly being tested and renegotiated. The state may not work in accor-
dance with the constitutional and legislative façade but the informal rules of 
the game, however inscrutable to outsiders, help to maintain and enrich the 
often fractious power elite.
19 Research for this chapter was assisted by an Australian Research Council grant.
66 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
By a next logical step, the state may be construed not just as a transactional 
space but as a political marketplace, in which access to authority and proper-
ty rights to economic resources are traded in the process of elite contestation. 
Trading occurs most obviously through negotiation over the relevant formal 
and informal rules. But money and prices may become an explicit part of the 
negotiation over political outcomes within the state itself, as well as between 
state actors and the rest of society. The essential difference between such a 
political market and an economic market is that monetary payments in the 
former are only part of the transaction, a balancing item or ‘side-payment’, 
not its summation. Nevertheless, a fruitful line of research is to follow the 
‘money trail’ or, perhaps even better, the ‘money chain’ because the need for 
concealment often gives rise to a series of intermediate transactions between 
the principals. Along this transactional chain flows an exchange of money for 
favours. The direction and pattern of the chain are never random. Networks 
and personal influence map the pattern and channel the flows. 
This chapter attempts to follow the money chain and informal modes of 
behaviour in Indonesia during the transition since 1998 from authoritarian to 
democratic regime. It thereby seeks to throw some light on the unexpected 
outcome that a revolution intended to overthrow the highly corrupt Suharto 
regime has led to a democratic regime in which corruption is even more per-
vasive and apparently less well-ordered (MacIntyre 2001). Notwithstanding 
neo-liberal orthodoxy that the state should withdraw from direct economic 
involvement, democracy makes it more likely that ideological and policy 
battles within the elite may result in the state becoming more interventionist 
because elites need insulation from markets in order to generate the rents that 
keep them in power or fund their ambitions.
NIE is a powerful body of theory that relates power to contestation for 
resources and property rights through formal and informal rules and their 
legitimating ideology (North 1990, 2005). Yet while sometimes endorsing 
(Mokyr and Nye 2007; Jones 2006), sometimes belittling the significance of 
intra-elite rivalry (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), NIE does not incorporate 
it explicitly into its theory of political and economic change (North, Wallis 
and Weingast 2009). There is no need to reinvent the wheel, however, be-
cause the disciplines of sociology and political science have already done the 
work. Mills (1956) identified and Putnam (1976) deconstructed the elite in its 
monopoly of power, wealth and status. At the apex of every society is a small 
power elite (ruling clique): the president and ministers, generals and top 
bureaucrats plus close confidants and business leaders. Clustering around 
the power elite is the several thousand strong ruling elite within which indi-
viduals and groups called ‘elite members’ fight against each other and make 
strategic collaborations. Thus the elite is not singular but plural (Higley and 
Burton 2006; Pakulski 2006). Elite individuals and groups are in a constant 
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state of flux between cooperation and competition for the spoils of power, 
wealth and status. 
In Indonesia, intra-elite rivalry was a feature of democratic politics (1950-
1957), to be deftly manipulated by President Sukarno during the era of 
Guided Democracy (1957-1966), then suppressed under President Suharto 
under the New Order (1966-1998) before bursting forth again with the new 
party politics of Reformasi. Political analyses of Indonesia have almost in-
variably addressed intra-elite rivalry and personality politics but this focus 
has still not been well translated into theory. Based upon the Weberian 
model which Fred Riggs (1966) had applied to Thailand, Karl Jackson and 
Lucian Pye (1978) portrayed New Order Indonesia as a ‘bureaucratic polity’. 
The particular emphasis upon bureaucracy might have been appropriate in 
the colonial era but was curiously anachronistic after independence when 
bureaucratic power was eroded by the successive assaults of party politics, 
martial law, executive authority and military supremacy. Elite polity would 
have been a better formulation. Applying neo-Marxist theory with Weberian 
elements, Richard Robison (1986) put forward a more nuanced model of 
bureaucrat-capitalism in which the bourgeoisie is a harmonious alliance of 
indigenous politico-bureaucrats and Indonesian-Chinese business conglom-
erates. Yet here again, as in later works such as Robison and Hadiz (2004) and 
Chua (2008), the emphasis upon ‘bureaucrat’ seems too narrow and too much 
agency is attributed to ethnic Chinese business leaders, who institutionally 
and ideologically are still shut out of political power. Causation surely runs 
the other way with state powerholders using their leverage to negotiate rent-
sharing access to the means of production. 
Ross McLeod (this volume, preceding chapter; 2000) presents an elegant 
‘franchise’ model of the hierarchical distribution of rents during the New 
Order, which looks to be an exemplary case of ‘well-ordered corruption’. 
Nevertheless, this system was not so much a product of Suharto’s brilliant 
design as the gradual outcome of improvisation, muddle and improvement. 
The regime evolved, along with Suharto’s own power and stature, from a 
broad-based elite coalition to military-technocratic dictatorship to family 
business, then collapsed like a house of cards in mid-1998. Explanation of 
historical continuity therefore directs attention to how that rivalry was sup-
pressed by the rewards and sanctions of an increasingly centralized, patron-
age-based and hierarchical system of government, then with regime change 
gave way to a more contested system.
This chapter addresses two different ways in which the Indonesian state 
may be understood as a political marketplace by exploring patterns of routine 
informal behaviours. First, it looks at the role of ‘slush funds’ as the unaccount-
able revenues and expenditures that underpinned the Suharto hegemony but 
carried over into the era of Reformasi. Here the emphasis is upon the informal 
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rules governing relations between state actors who extract slush funds and 
their ‘clients’ who seek favours and/or control resources. Second, it considers 
how the shift after 1998 from an authoritarian to a democratic regime has in-
fluenced the dynamics of intra-elite rivalry. Here we pay particular attention 
to informal rules governing the new relationship between the executive and 
parliament. The former demonstrates the continuity of informal rules between 
regimes, the latter change and discontinuity. In both cases, corruption is seen 
to be intrinsic to the state, whether authoritarian or democratic. 
Slush funds 
‘The state does not produce its own subsistence’ (Dick 1993:5). Even to main-
tain the state apparatus, the state must extract resources from the rest of soci-
ety. In the first instance, this can be done by taxation. Control of the state, the 
so-called ‘monopoly of violence’, confers rights of taxation (Levi 1990; Bates 
2008). However, systematic taxation has the notable disadvantages to rulers 
of requiring an effective bureaucracy and of being transparent and account-
able under the state budget. As Paul Collier (2007) points out, it also tends to 
erode the popularity and legitimacy of weak governments. 
While budgetary revenues finance some state functions, rulers also need 
to find resources to ‘buy’ and maintain the loyalty of associates, rivals and 
subordinates, both within the elite and among the populace at large. Despite 
some scope for ‘pork-barrelling’, budgetary revenues are not readily deployed 
for ‘political’ purposes, certainly not for those where secrecy is paramount and 
perhaps also where the amount and timing are unpredictable (Lambsdorff 
2007; Johnston 2005). Hence there is a need for off-budget, non-accountable 
and discretionary revenues that we denote here by the generic term ‘slush 
funds’ – the term is more journalistic than academic but it has common cur-
rency and best describes their nature and purpose. Powerholders need slush 
funds because they are discretionary, not bound by the formal rules, proce-
dures and accountability that govern budgetary revenues and expenditures. At 
the very least, they provide a cushion against what is expected of officeholders 
from limited resources and improve their chances of securing favour and pro-
motion. As explained in greater detail below, they may also be ploughed into 
official projects, fund personal emoluments, reward subordinates and provide 
gifts to superiors and patrons. They may also be used for political purposes. 
The opaqueness or muddiness of slush funds, is their raison d’être. 
Historically in Southeast Asia, rulers generated slush funds through land-
holdings and commerce (Reid 1993:245-51). In the tiny sultanate of Brunei 
Darussalam, state revenues are still not formally separated from the royal 
household: foreign oil companies provide a ready source of revenue, there 
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is minimal taxation and everything flows from the sultan’s munificence. In 
Indonesia, former presidents Suharto and Habibie both benefited from com-
merce through the extensive business interests of close family members, who 
in turn benefited from their proximity to the centre of power (Aditjondro 
2006). The Reform era has seen private wealth become a springboard for po-
litical careers. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 2004 presidential campaign was 
supported among others by business magnate Aburizal Bakrie, who became 
a senior minister in his government. Jusuf Kalla’s family fortune helped him 
to become leader of the Golkar Party and subsequently Vice-President with 
no disadvantage to his family’s diverse business interests (Aditjondro 2009). 
In 2009 former general Prabowo Subianto’s campaign for the Gerindra Party 
and, unsuccessfully, for the presidency was financed by his brother, Hasjim 
Djojohadikusumo.
In the modern state, enormous creativity goes into generating many other 
forms of slush funds. The informal mechanisms by which the Indonesian 
state apparatus generates off-budget and unofficial revenues are multifarious 
and the result of continual innovation. Nevertheless, at least five different 
types of behaviours or extractive mechanisms may usefully be distinguished. 
The five types overlap and are therefore something less than a typology but 
the point is not so much to classify as to identify the different mechanisms of 
extraction, all of which characterized the New Order period but have carried 
over into the era of Reformasi.20 These streams of fungible revenues flow into 
broader and muddier rivers of ‘slush funds’. 
Levies are informal taxes and imposts for state services, sometimes re-
ferred to as unofficial imposts (pungutan liar or pungli). Thus police, customs 
or immigration officers and many other bureaucrats require small payments 
for signatures for the issuing of permits, licences, approvals and so on over 
and above the official charges. These levies are captured by the official con-
cerned and often placed in a common pool for distribution according to 
agreed formulae with shares being scaled down the hierarchy according to 
rank (Goodpaster 2002:93, 97-8). 
Leaks are funds siphoned informally from budgetary or project revenues. 
At each step along the way in the collection of revenues and the disburse-
ment of expenditures in and out of the state budget, a percentage is extracted 
as something like an unofficial fee for service. In 1993 economist and former 
minister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo estimated that the national budget in-
curred leakages of around 30% each year.21 In 2003 Minister for Planning 
Kwik Kian Gie more conservatively estimated budget leakages as at least 20% 
20 Our approach differs from that of MacIntyre (2000), whose analysis of off-budget funds and rent-seeking 
distinguished ‘command lending’, ‘private contributions’ and ‘hidden government funds’. 
21 Biografi Prof. Dr. Sumitro 2009. The same figure was later cited by Jeffrey Winters as applying to leakages 
from World Bank loans to Indonesia (Winters 1997:29).
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(Kwik 2003). A significant proportion of these leaks are distributed as a top-
up of official salaries and/or the operating expenses of their respective offices. 
Deals are one-off arrangements to generate informal revenues, making 
state officials or their nominees party in their own right to transactions with 
private interests. Typical examples are kickbacks on contracts (public works, 
procurement), the issuing of licences (especially in forestry and mining), the 
sale of public land or the rezoning of private land. Generous commissions 
have also been paid in relation to the privatization of state assets – one notori-
ous set of deals immediately after the Suharto presidency was the Indonesian 
Bank Reconstruction Agency (IBRA) in its disposal of nationalized bank assets.
Gift loans are non- or part-repayable loans from state banks with less than 
commercial levels of collateral and perhaps also concessional rates of interest. 
President Suharto’s children were prime beneficiaries of such arrangement, 
usually in response to a personal note (surat sakti) or informal advice from the 
president or his close advisers. By the 1990s, however, as the children became 
more active, they more often made direct approach to bankers, who just as-
sumed presidential approval and granted the requested loans.
Rents are contrived income streams to state powerholders who have lever-
aged their position to become stakeholders in productive or financial assets. 
During the Suharto era it was common practice for foreign multinationals 
setting up in Indonesia to allocate equity holdings to well-connected mem-
bers of the Indonesian elite, in the early years often to military interests, later 
more frequently to members of the President’s extended family. Typically the 
Indonesian party made no capital contribution but enjoyed the dividends on 
these sleeping equity holdings as the price of political protection. After the 
early 1990s the government’s new divestment policy for foreign investment 
created a market in which it was easy for political insiders to acquire substan-
tial shareholdings at a discounted price. Rental streams could also be created 
by the allocation to favoured individuals and their companies of privileged 
monopoly contracts to operate public facilities (for example, airport services, 
toll roads) or to provide services to foreign multinationals. The Freeport 
gold and copper mine in Papua exemplifies both practices (Leith 2003:68-76). 
These contrived rents usually accrued to senior powerholders but the money 
trail was often disguised through beneficiaries such as family members or 
non-profit foundations (yayasan). 
Besides these five mechanisms of extraction, there are the issues of how 
slush funds are stored and how they are disbursed. If funds are collected in 
cash, they may be deposited in bank accounts, more or less opaque, earning 
interest until disbursement. In Suharto’s Indonesia, funds for presidential use 
were commonly held on account by foundations (yayasan), whose purposes 
were ostensibly charitable but whose accounts were never properly audited 
(Aditjondro 2006). Not all funds, however, needed to be collected in advance 
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of their use. Since the need for funds was unpredictable, the patronage system 
worked in such a way that those who held office by presidential favour, as 
also those who enjoyed the benefits of state licences or contracts, necessarily 
incurred contingent obligations. The powerholder granting a favour could de-
mand its return, whether in money or in-kind at any time and to any amount 
within the capacity of the recipient. To refuse would be proof of gross disloy-
alty and incur certain punishment through the withdrawal of favour and loss 
of position, perhaps even charges of corruption, trial and imprisonment. 
The best examples of the working of this patronage system were state 
enterprises and agencies (Badan Usaha Milik Negara, BUMN). The trusted 
subordinates appointed as heads of state enterprises were expected not only to 
direct a proportion of revenues to powerholders but also to respond to periodic 
requests from the responsible minister or even the president himself. In return, 
they siphoned off revenues for their own purposes. With the notable exception 
of the state oil company Pertamina, most state enterprises therefore ran at a 
loss, the amount being reimbursed from the state budget.22 In this way budget 
revenues were routinely diverted into non-official channels. Loosely super-
vised state enterprises were therefore broadly equivalent to the older notion 
of appanage, a grant to a powerholder of the surplus entitlements of an area 
of land and its villagers. We denote these consolidated rental streams as fiefs.
For Suharto, loyalists like Ibnu Sutowo at the state oil company Pertamina 
and a series of trusted subordinates at the state logistics agency Bulog were 
also like personal bankers, ever expected and able at short notice to extend an 
overdraft. Thus Pertamina might be asked as the need arose to undertake or 
underwrite a ‘national project’ such as a new manufacturing plant or indus-
try or to fund infrastructure. As with state banks themselves, the device by 
which President Suharto made his requests was a polite, ambiguous request 
known as surat sakti (literally ‘sacred letter’). A loyal subordinate took the hint 
and responded to the request, checking if need be with presidential advisers. 
If the job was done well, reward or promotion would follow – if not, presi-
dential favour could be withdrawn without further explanation.
The logic of slush funds extended from the president down to the bottom 
of the bureaucratic hierarchy. A variant of the section’s opening axiom might 
be ‘the state provides no more than a subsistence’. In Indonesia after inde-
pendence it became common for ministers to reward followers by granting 
them positions in their department, whether at the central or local level, or by 
allocating them contracts to generate rents from informal collaborations with 
businesspeople. After 1957 the state’s seizure and nationalization of most of 
the modern sector of the economy gave enormous scope for arbitrary use of 
22 Pertamina itself went spectacularly bankrupt in the mid-1970s, leading to the fall from grace of Suharto 
confidant Ibnu Sutowo (McCawley 1978). It still has the reputation of leaking revenue like a sieve.
72 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
power, extortion and smuggling in state enterprises and the bureaucracy. As 
inflation became rampant, rising from some tens to hundreds of percent per 
annum by the mid-1960s, civil service positions became valued simply for 
their monthly rations in-kind, mainly rice, sugar, cooking oil, salt and textiles. 
The civil service ballooned as a patronage-based relief organization, the ben-
eficiaries hardly being expected to do actual work but simply to report, then 
carry on whatever other employment would earn the necessary balance of an 
income (Feith 1967). Of course the incentive system was entirely pernicious. 
Civil servants had every incentive to maximize bureaucratic complexity to 
extract funds from whoever could afford to pay, which in practice meant 
mostly private business, but also state enterprises, and to some extent the 
impoverished general public. 
The New Order in its early years sought to trim the size of the bloated 
bureaucracy but never cut it back to a merely functional size. The excess staff, 
including the so-called honorary appointments (honorair), was maintained by 
keeping the basic monthly salary very low and allowing civil servants and 
the military (including police) to find extra revenues to meet administrative 
needs and private incomes. From top to bottom, a civil service position was 
therefore equivalent to a ‘hunting licence’, subject to various informal rules 
as to what type of exactions and how much was acceptable. 
The disbursement of informal revenues or slush funds can be divided into 
three broad categories. First is to fund the operation of the department or 
agency. The routine budgets of most civil service departments are still low, 
not only in wages and emoluments but also in the funds allocated for office 
buildings, fit-out and even such essentials as stationary and utilities. In other 
words, official funds may suffice for only a few months of the year. A good 
department or section head has therefore not only to try and manipulate the 
best possible budget but also to secure top-up funding. One expedient, quite 
effective in terms of utilities, is simply not to pay the bills to the responsible 
state agencies and let the government sort it out. But other sources of revenue 
have also to be found. Under the New Order, the most important were not 
illegal or quasi-legal sources of funding but development projects, funded 
partly from the state budget but mainly from development aid. Thus bu-
reaucratic politics revolved very much around competition for projects and 
all their associated benefits: better offices, computers, vehicles, travel, extra 
salary, and so on. Astute heads knew how to squeeze budgets (‘leaks’) so that 
the maximum amount was retained by the office and the least amount was 
spent on the project consistent with its successful completion. At the end of 
the Suharto era a figure of 30% was widely quoted as a conservative World 
Bank estimate of the leakage of aid funds (McCarthy 2002:42-3). 
The second category of disbursement is the support of a state official’s 
family to provide an adequate standard of living and lifestyle. Given the 
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reality of low official salaries and emoluments, every official has long been 
allowed some discretion in generating additional income. The means are not 
necessarily extractive or illegal. While some officials such as police, customs 
and immigration have been notorious for greed and lavish lifestyles, civil ser-
vants can also quite legitimately earn attendance money for meetings or semi-
nars or per diems for travel. They can engage in second jobs. Thus doctors in 
public hospitals run after-hours private practice, teachers give private tuition, 
academics at state universities teach also at private universities or engage in 
consultancy projects, mostly for government departments or donor agencies. 
As the economy has expanded, the means have increased, but so also have 
the demands. Indonesia is a highly status-conscious society, so the growth of 
a middle class highly dependent upon the state and with a more and more 
westernized and luxurious lifestyle has meant that the modest growth in civil 
service salaries could never keep pace with rising expectations. Strong infor-
mal sanctions underpin these informal norms: an official reluctant to take 
advantage of his/her position or to share the rents may be condemned as too 
idealistic, even stupid, unworthy or stingy. 
The third category may be described broadly as political disbursements. 
In the Suharto era, these payments would pass up the hierarchy as the ‘rent’ 
on patronage, though perhaps more typically they would be contingent 
and would involve making payments or providing services or projects on 
demand, whether for a covert political object, in the ‘national interest’ or for 
the purposes of ‘development’. Under Reformasi, when political competition 
has become more intense, these slush funds are aptly referred to as ‘tactical 
funds’ (dana taktis) (Bayuni 2005).
In these various ways, following the money trail of slush funds reveals 
an informal or shadow state that only partially coincides with the formal 
state apparatus. Part of the explanation for the divergence is that the state 
is chronically underfunded by the formal budgetary system, so that deficits 
have to be made good by informal means. A deeper explanation is that the 
rational bureaucratic state as portrayed in organizational charts is subverted 
by networks of patron-client ties. Powerholders within these networks may 
take advantage of their position to raise and distribute informal revenues for 
non-state purposes. The following section will consider in more detail how 
the shadow state has evolved from the hierarchical system of the Suharto era 
to the more democratic and contested system of the Reform era. Particular at-
tention will be paid to the new relationship between the executive and parlia-
ment, the emergence of political markets and the role of informal institutions 
in moderating intra-elite rivalry. 
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Regime change
Some scholars, such as Higley and Burton (2006) and Pakulski (2006), maintain 
that tension and conflict between elite individuals and groups drives political 
and economic change. When an elite group gains control of the state appara-
tus, it can institutionalize its informal norms and view of the world through-
out society. Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998) was an archetypal case of what 
Higley et al. (1998) refer to as an ‘ideologically unified elite’ or, more precisely, 
a dictator and his ruling clique that over time impose a master ideology limit-
ing and concealing intra-elite rivalry. Yet within fractious elites, a shared and 
stable consensus over the rules governing competition for and deployment of 
state power is not normally to be expected. Many countries have post-colonial 
histories of chronic instability. Indonesia looked to be following the same 
path until the three decades of stability under the New Order, whose sudden 
collapse in 1998 could confidently have been predicted to lead to renewal of 
fierce intra-elite rivalry and bloodshed. Instead the outcome was confounding.
The most remarkable thing about the transition from the authoritarian 
New Order to the representative and procedural democracy of the Reformasi 
era is that it was accomplished with relatively little violence and bloodshed, at 
least at the centre (King 2003; Emmerson 1999). After the riots that convulsed 
Jakarta and several other cities in May 1998, President Suharto resigned with 
quiet dignity and there was an orderly transition. Notwithstanding some 
horrific outbreaks of communal and separatist violence on the periphery and 
much random criminality on Java, it was still a marked contrast to the wave 
of mayhem and mass murder that followed the collapse of the Sukarno re-
gime in 1965-1966 (Roosa 2006; Van Klinken 2007; Sidel 2006). Over the next 
six years there were three changes of president through parliamentary and 
electoral means and various changes in the composition of coalition govern-
ments, all achieved without bloodshed or any force of arms, then a full five-
year term of stable and quite effective coalition government under President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (JK), again 
without repression. 
The stability of the SBY-JK government was therefore of a very different 
kind from that of Suharto’s long term in office. Whereas the New Order was 
characterized by centralized control, patronage and repression, the Reformasi 
era has seen continual and intense intra-elite rivalry between parties and 
within factions for access to state power. Since many of the leading actors and 
parties are the same as in the New Order, this sudden change in the dynamics 
of the game of power, wealth and status is at first sight illogical and demands 
explanation. Clearly, as New Institutional Economics would suggest, there 
has been a reconfiguration of the ‘rules of the game’. Moreover, the stability 
of those new rules suggests, in Higley’s terminology, a new elite consensus 
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that imposes limits on the extent of conflict and allows for effective coopera-
tion to mutual benefit.
This chapter addresses one important aspect of the new political consen-
sus, namely the modes and mechanisms of competition for access to resourc-
es as the means to buying and defending power in the state. Here there is an 
essential difference between the New Order and the Reformasi era. Under 
the New Order, as described by McLeod in the preceding chapter, intra-elite 
rivalry was channelled through a hierarchical patronage network controlled 
ultimately by Suharto himself through allies and subordinates. By contrast, 
under the parliamentary democracy of the Reformasi era, the power of the 
executive has been diluted by the necessity of coalition government and the 
demands for accountability to parliament. Hence there is much more hori-
zontal competition and jostling between parties and factions, as also a much 
more lively public debate cutting across any dominant political ideology. 
Structurally the most important change has been the emergence of the leg-
islature as an independent power centre. Until 2004 the president was elected 
by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
MPR) and appointed a coalition government that would enjoy support of 
a majority of legislators in the People’s Representative Council (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), Indonesia’s main legislative body responsible for 
passing laws and approving the state budget. Since the introduction of direct 
presidential elections in 2004, the president has enjoyed an independent pop-
ular mandate but still requires DPR approval for the passage of legislation 
and budget. The eleven DPR standing committees (komisi) have also acquired 
strong bargaining power in the drafting of legislation and budget, as also 
in the questioning of ministers and officials over matters of public account-
ability. Christianto Wibisono argues that parliament has become ‘a monster’ 
that has no compunction about squeezing the executive, a view that is widely 
shared among Jakarta’s political elite. 23
Also significant has been the formal independence of the judiciary. Since 
1957, first Sukarno and then Suharto had intimidated, subordinated and 
corrupted the judiciary to become a mere instrument of state power (Lev 
1999). One of the conditions of IMF aid after the Asian Crisis was the re-
establishment of an independent judiciary as part of the proper architecture 
of the state. Not taken into account was that independence would entrench 
and probably exacerbate a high level of corruption. The executive would now 
need to negotiate and pay for outcomes that once had simply been validated 
by a tame judiciary (Pompe 2005; Lindsey 2008).
These changes in the nature of political competition ought logically to be 
reflected in the informal flow of funds. In the Suharto era, the main use of 
23 Christianto Wibisono, interview, Jakarta, 2007.
76 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
slush funds was to maintain patronage, whether in rewarding loyalty within 
the state or in maintaining popular legitimacy through development projects. 
Under Reformasi, political parties and factions need slush funds because 
public funding and membership dues are minimal (Mietzner 2008a). One 
source is through pricing legislative outcomes: ministers, agencies and state 
enterprises now need to buy the passage of new legislation through parlia-
ment and even to smooth the way for favourable committee hearings, just 
as hostile interest groups may buy damaging questions and parliamentary 
votes, or perhaps just legislative delay. Within political parties, positions and 
parliamentary seats are allocated by internal auction, moderated by patron-
age and influence (Ziegenhain 2008). Parliamentarians may in turn seek to 
pave the way for their candidates to be appointed as ministers or officials or 
buy journalistic favour. Business firms including state enterprises are there-
fore under pressure to contribute funds in return for favours. And, of course, 
individuals also need support and funds in the scramble for promotion 
within ministries and agencies, even including Bank Indonesia. To acquire 
those funds and reward their own supporters, increasingly they need to be-
long to cliques, factions and parties. This is the world now so aptly described, 
after Japanese usage, as ‘money politics’. No one should be surprised that the 
combination of parliamentary democracy and regional autonomy has led to 
corruption becoming more widespread and less ordered. 
The presidential succession
Under the New Order, as explained above, President Suharto accumulated 
slush funds through various devices and deposited them in foundations 
(yayasan), while contingent funds were kept on hand through loyal cronies, 
both in state enterprises (Pertamina, Bulog) and in private business (Liem 
Sioe Liong, Bob Hasan) (Aditjondro 2006). Since Reformasi such informal 
practices have persisted but the execution has become more discreet in 
response to more powerful media, the threat of political exposure and the 
greater risk of sanctions. One clear indication that the informal rules were 
simply being adjusted to circumstances was the failure over a decade of 
half-hearted efforts to investigate Suharto’s alleged wealth and the role of his 
foundations. To legitimize his rule and prove that he was not a Suharto pup-
pet, Habibie at first supported the formation of an independent investigative 
team but backed away when Suharto’s lawyer, Yohanes Yakob, threatened to 
lay bare everyone’s secrets (O’Rourke 2002:191). 
President Habibie realized from the outset that he needed to build up 
legitimacy and funds to be re-elected in his own right after the foreshadowed 
round of general elections. A campaign team (Tim Sukses Habibie) was 
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formed to plan for this (O’Rourke 2002:245-55, 283-91). Sources of funding 
were readily to hand. In the wake of the Asian Crisis, many business tycoons 
had seen their companies nationalized and they sought by backdoor means to 
regain control of the billions of dollars of assets, now held by the Indonesian 
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) as collateral for non-performing loans. 
The agency’s mandate was gradually to sell off these assets to the highest bid-
der and re-inject the funds to the state budget. With so many opportunities 
for influencing the disposal program and generating slush funds, the chair-
manship of IBRA immediately became a highly contested and fast-rotating 
position (Mulholland and Thomas 2002; Basri 2005). An early scandal was 
the Bank Bali case. The former owner of Bank Bali sought to block its sale 
to the British Standard and Chartered Bank and made informal payments 
to various political powerbrokers, in part alleged to be financing President 
Habibie’s re-election campaign (Saydam 1999). Habibie’s close ally, Minister 
of Cooperatives Adi Sasono, used budget and aid funds channelled through 
cooperatives under the social safety network program to siphon off sub-
stantial amounts. In the context of ongoing anti-Chinese violence, pressure 
was also applied to exact levies from Indonesian-Chinese business magnates 
(O’Rourke 2002:149-51; Purdey 2006:180-2). 
Nevertheless, all Habibie’s efforts were in vain. At the June 1999 elec-
tions, no party won an outright majority, leaving the former governing party 
Golkar, now a vehicle for President Habibie, and Megawati Sukarnoputri’s 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – 
Perjuangan, PDI-P) to face off for the presidency. The MPR eventually reject-
ed President Habibie’s accountability report and he withdrew his candidacy. 
After out-manoeuvering Megawati in parliamentary negotiations, a third 
candidate, the blind but ambitious Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), came 
to the presidency amidst high hopes that, as a democrat and intellectual, he 
would decisively break with the New Order. Unfortunately his stubbornness 
and erratic use of power soon alienated his coalition supporters. Gus Dur 
tried unconstitutionally to dissolve Parliament through presidential decree 
but instead was impeached in a backlash from an alliance of party bosses, 
allowing Vice-President Megawati to succeed him.
During the Gus Dur period (1999-2001), the government was very ‘loose’ 
(longgar). Business magnates such as the Eka Tjipta Wijaya and Marimutu 
Sinivasan of the illiquid Sinar Mas and Texmaco groups, respectively, had 
easy access to the president and his ruling clique as they sought to influence 
the outcomes of debt restructuring (O’Rourke 2002:330-9, 361-5). The most 
notorious example of this looseness was that Gus Dur’s masseur, Suwondo 
was even able to ‘represent’ Gus Dur in establishing a company and pressur-
ing the Bulog Director-General to transfer rents to it. Gus Dur dismissed any 
prior knowledge or involvement in the case but suspicions remained that he 
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had delegated his masseur Suwondo to get funds from Bulog; this Bulog-gate 
scandal became grounds for his impeachment (Ridwan and Soewarno 2002; 
O’Rourke 2002:388-9).
Megawati’s government represented a stronger and more disciplined co-
alition focused on her own PDI-P but, for all her popular legitimacy, Megawati 
was not a strong political actor in her own right. Her effectiveness depended 
heavily upon two astute political operators, her husband Taufik Kiemas, 
widely known as Mr President, who was her political power broker, and her 
very efficient State Secretary, Bambang Kesowo. Taufik had become a success-
ful businessman in his own right, winning some large public works contracts 
(Aditjondro 2006:395-6). He formed a close relationship with Jacob Nursalim, 
the nephew of Sjamsul Nursalim, head of the Gajah Tunggal conglomerate and 
one of the leading debtors after the Asian Crisis but then in self-imposed exile 
in Singapore after withholding cooperation with state agencies in the debt-
restructuring process. Jacob Nursalim frequently accompanied Taufik Kiemas 
and seems to have acted as an informal financier. In return, as IBRA’s man-
date was expiring, Taufik Kiemas arranged for the government at the end of 
2002 to ‘release and discharge’ corporate debtors including Sjamsul Nursalim 
(Rafick 2008:51, 316-28). Marimutu Sinivasan of the troubled Texmaco group 
also benefited from Taufik’s favour after he had been appointed to the board 
of that conglomerate (Aditjondro 2006). The coalition government lost one of 
its pillars in March 2004 when Coordinating Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), resigned in consequence of grow-
ing distrust and animosity to build up popular support in his own right as a 
basis for winning the direct presidential election a few months later.
SBY came to the presidency in 2004 without a parliamentary majority in 
his own right. His own minor Democrat Party formed a rainbow coalition 
including the largest party, Golkar, now led by businessman-cum-politician 
Jusuf Kalla, who became Vice-President. As a business magnate in his own 
right, Kalla had reputedly bought his way to Golkar leadership against 
incumbent Akbar Tanjung, who had backed Megawati in her failed re-
election bid. Kalla proved to be a wily politician and a powerful executive 
Vice-President. His influence soon led to tensions in regard to SBY’s anti-
corruption campaign, with a government helicopter deal through his fam-
ily’s Bukaka group being one of several issues taken up by the media.24 
Nevertheless, the anti-corruption drive and the growing effectiveness of the 
new Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 
KPK) meant that political funds now had to be raised more discreetly, not 
least by the President himself. Lacking personal wealth and without the sup-
port of a large party, SBY had to rely on an inner circle of sometimes compet-
24 See ‘Kisah kalla dan heli bukaka’, Tempo 20-26 March 2007.
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ing indigenous business magnates, most notably Jusuf Kalla, Coordinating 
Minister Aburizal Bakrie of the Bakrie group, Fahmi Idris (Kodel Group) and 
Tanri Abeng (Tason Group), as well as some leading figures from the Sino-
Indonesian business community, especially Siti Hartati Murdaya (Central 
Cipta Murdaya group).25 Slush funds were also accumulated informally in 
foundations such as Yayasan Puri Cikeas and Yayasan Majelis Dzikir SBY 
Nurussalam where they could be deployed at arm’s length from the presi-
dent (Aditjondro 2009). 
This brief review of the several changes in government since 1998 points 
to a fairly rapid turnover in governing coalitions, ministers and backers. At 
the same time, many of the leading figures remain the same and there is a 
good deal of circulation. Thus intra-elite rivalry is a good deal more complex 
than a zero-sum game. In the rest of this section we explore how the work-
ing of parliament and its relations with the executive and state apparatus are 
shaped by informal behaviours and lubricated by slush funds.
Parliament
Nowhere is the state-as-marketplace more apparent than in Indonesia’s na-
tional parliament, the DPR. Coalition governments looking to re-election are 
highly vulnerable to parliamentary obstruction because it lays them open to 
criticism of inaction. And within the DPR standing committees (komisi), there 
are countless opportunities for negotiation over legislation, committee hear-
ings, projects and appointments (Haris 2007). If a powerholder or business 
magnate needs to do a deal with the DPR, it has to be done with money: ‘They 
only will listen and agree to money.’26 
Political gossip in Jakarta wittily distinguishes two kinds of parliamen-
tary committees: ‘wet’ committees (komisi mata air) and ‘dry’ or ‘tear drop’ 
committees (komisi air mata). Lucrative committees include budgetary affairs, 
finance, forestry, transportation and defence. Of all 11 committees, that deal-
ing with financial and monetary affairs (Komisi XI) is reputedly the wettest, 
that dealing with trade, industry and state enterprises (Komisi VI) the next, 
followed by Defense (Komisi I), Primary Resources (Komisi IV), Transport 
and Telecommunications (Komisi V) and Energy and Mining (Komisi VII);27 
the least lucrative committee is probably religious affairs (Komisi VIII).
While the powers of parliament derive from the constitution, legislation 
and administrative codes, the exercise of those powers is shaped by informal 
25 See ‘Sekoci Sang Presiden’, Tempo 28 May-3 June 2007.
26 Adnan Buyung Nasution, interview, Jakarta, 2007.
27 See ‘Pengakuan dari Komisi Mata Air’, http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2002/09/30/LU/
mbm.20020930.LU80999.id.html, No. 31/XXXI/30-9-2002 (accessed 1-6-2010).
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norms. Five kinds of informal behaviours or, in Indonesian terms, ‘common 
practices’ (praktek-praktek lazim) may be distinguished. First is negotiation 
over the content of legislation. State ministries, departments and agencies 
compete for influence in the drafting of laws. For example, Bank Indonesia 
and the State Mint (Perum Percetakan Uang Republik Indonesia, Peruri) com-
peted over the right to print money under the revised Finance Law.28 Bank 
Indonesia had a slush fund which, among other purposes, could be drawn 
on for making payments to members of parliament to secure favourable 
consideration of legislation or to facilitate committee hearings. Exposure of 
this practice by the KPK led to the imprisonment of the former head of Bank 
Indonesia and indictments against other directors, including a deputy-direc-
tor and the father-in-law of the president’s son. Committees also allow out-
side parties such as the Chamber of Commerce (Kamar Dagang dan Industri, 
Kadin) or private business interests to lobby for favourable treatment, as 
under the prolonged negotiations over a new Shipping Law (Dick 2008). 
Even when drafting in committee is regarded as complete, further payments 
may be required before parliamentarians are willing to vote on the measure. 
Ministers who do not authorize payments find their legislation held up.
Second is the determination of budgetary allocations and the disburse-
ments. In the past, the DPR did not have power over project allocations. 
It can now make decisions over not only national strategic allocations but 
down to local-level projects. Hotels around the parliamentary complex bustle 
with local government delegations from all over the country. The Finance 
Committee is the primary portal for foreign aid projects, also a gateway to 
influencing local government projects. The disbursement of disaster relief 
illustrates how the system works. There is a specified global budgetary al-
location but committees can block the release of funds, thereby forcing lo-
cal governments to draw upon their own resources. Local governments are 
obliged to inflate the required allocation, employ a broker (calo) to meet the 
relevant committee members and agree to paying committee members a 
substantial cut of at least 20-30% before the funds will be released, a practice 
tantamount to extortion (pemerasan).29 Similarly, a business magnate want-
ing a product in the budget can use brokers to pay off members of a special 
parliamentary committee (panitia khusus, pansus) so that the company name is 
formally inserted into the specifications (spek) of the project.30 Ever working 
their mobile phones, brokers meet parliamentarians along the pathways and 
in the corridors and canteens of the parliamentary buildings, even mingling 
28 See ‘Menarik pak pos ke khitah’, Gatra 10-2-2003, http://www.gatra.com/artikel.php?pil=23&id=25372 
(accessed 1-6-2010).
29 Confidential interview, Jakarta, 2007.
30 See ‘Uang haram mengalir sampai Senayan’, Gatra 10-7-2008, http://www.gatra.com/2008-07-16/artikel.
php?id=116620 (accessed 1-6-2010).
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in the standing committee offices – Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono tried 
unsuccessfully to prevent brokers from influencing members of the Defence 
Committee (Komisi I).31 Of course, the brokers also take their cut but they al-
low the principals to avoid the complications of direct contact. 
Third is the determination of property rights and the legality of business 
activities. Parliamentary committees have assumed powers to issue permits 
and approvals that used to be at the discretion of the bureaucracy and a mat-
ter of ministerial responsibility. One example is the definition of property 
rights associated with land. Business magnates compete to obtain permits for 
amending land-use. A DPR member was recently convicted and jailed by KPK 
for accepting payment to alienate land in Riau province from forest to com-
mercial use (hak peruntukan).32 The DPR can also play a role determining prop-
erty rights in non-land cases: the Bank Indonesia scandal referred to above 
revealed that executives of state banks wanting to sell shares needed to obtain 
‘approval’ from the majority of DPR members on the Finance Committee.
Fourth is influence over appointments and promotions. Some appoint-
ments are determined by parliament, others by the government but may still 
require de facto parliamentary approval. In 2008 there was a tussle between 
the government and parliament over the appointment of the new Governor 
of Bank Indonesia, two presidential nominees being rejected before Professor 
Boediono was finally approved. In the same year the reappointment of KPK 
Vice-Chairman, Amien Sunaryadi, was rejected by parliament. A more gen-
eral case was that of Minister for Oceans and Fisheries, Rokhmin Dharuri, 
who collected money from his departmental officials by way of leaks and 
levies to top up the ministerial slush fund set up by his predecessors. He then 
distributed the funds as patronage to members of the executive and parlia-
ment. When this became known, a big scandal ensued, leading to his arrest 
in November 2006 (Rafick 2008:55-7). There seems to have been no ulterior 
motive beyond keeping him in good favour and hopefully being rewarded 
with a more senior cabinet position in the next government, testimony to the 
informal influence of parliament on cabinet appointments, notwithstanding 
that the formal power to appoint cabinet members lies in the hands of the 
president. Dharuri simply acknowledged the new informal rules of power 
that govern the relations between the executive and parliament.
Fifth is influence over the dissemination of information. Not only in 
Indonesia is payment made for asking parliamentary questions. In Indonesia, 
however, payment is also made for not asking questions. Company directors 
are summoned to parliament nominally on grounds of accountability but 
31 See ‘Para makelar di seputar anggota dewan’, Gatra 1-11-2007 http://www.gatra.com/2007-10-29/majalah/
beli.php?pil=23&id=109150 (accessed 1-6-2010).
32 See ‘Uang haram mengalir sampai Senayan’, Gatra 10-7-2008, http://www.gatra.com/2008-07-16/artikel.
php?id=116620 (accessed 1-6-2010).
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also as a basis for negotiating payments. Thus if a director-general or head 
of a state enterprise wished to avoid or enjoy only mild committee scrutiny 
at scheduled or special hearings, payments may be issued to members of the 
parliamentary commission in question. An ‘uncooperative’ director may be 
ridiculed, demoted and/or fired. Contacts between members of parliament 
and the media are a reliable way to leak sensitive information.
These sets of informal parliamentary behaviours focus attention upon 
processes of negotiation between parliament, the executive, the bureaucracy, 
state enterprises and the private sector. Such negotiations involve political 
calculation, personal influence and often monetary payments. For some rou-
tine matters there are even tacitly understood schedules of prices based upon 
precedent, a clear sign of markets. The intrusion of money into parliamentary 
practice is certainly not because parliamentarians are poor. In 2005, ordinary 
members of parliament enjoyed monthly salaries (excluding their many per-
quisites) of Rp 39 million, twice that of ministers and two-thirds that of the 
president himself.33 The new mode of informal money politics may be better 
understood as the dynamics of a party democracy in a patronage society. 
Parliamentarians, committee members and chairs, faction leaders and party 
bosses need to raise and disburse slush funds to acquire position, maintain 
loyalty and negotiate outcomes, as also of course to campaign in elections. 
These expenses are not covered by salary and perquisites or the tiny amount 
of public funding to political parties. The system works but it is not what 
would be regarded as good governance and involves a good deal of outright 
corruption. Several national parliamentarians and numerous provincial and 
local representatives have been arrested and charged by the KPK. At the trial 
of parliamentarian Hamka Yandhu, Corruption Court judge Hendra Yospin 
asked him, ‘Do all laws being discussed in the House need extra money from 
the [Executive]?’ ‘There are some’, was the guarded reply, seeming to confirm 
that bribery has indeed become a norm in parliament (Wardany 2009).
A particular feature of the new money politics is that slush funds are 
sometimes shared across apparently competing political parties and factions. 
The evidence is still circumstantial because only in the event of scandals, 
investigation and trials do the details ever emerge. The pattern showed up 
in Fisheries Minister Rokhmin Dharuri’s donations across the spectrum of 
coalition political parties. Evidence in March 2009 by parliamentarian Hamka 
revealed how payments to committee members are shared between the po-
litical parties. Thus, in the case of the payment of Rp 31.5 billion (US$1.86 
million) made in 2003 by Bank Indonesia to two members of the Finance and 
Banking Committee (Komisi XI) to smooth passage of amendments to the 
Bank Indonesia Law, funds were redistributed to the Committee Chairman, 
33 See ‘Gaji pejabat ditata ulang’, Republika 21-2-2005. 
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members of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 
PKB), PDI-P, the Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) and the 
National Police and Military faction (Wardany 2009). While the money poli-
tics may be crude, the political logic is sophisticated: parliamentary politics in 
Indonesia is not a zero-sum game. All political parties are seen as stakehold-
ers in some degree and the committee system is one of the modes of distribu-
tion.34 In other words, corrupt informal norms help to maintain a Higleyian 
elite consensus that moderates intra-elite rivalry and the social divisions that 
would flow from it. Marcus Mietzner’s (2008a) portrayal of Reformasi party 
politics as ‘centripetal’, in contrast to the ‘centrifugal’ politics of the 1950s, 
points in the same direction, as does Dan Slater’s (2004) analysis of collusive 
‘party cartels’. Just as a powerholder who did not share the spoils of office 
would be regarded as greedy and selfish, so a party which monopolized the 
spoils of government would be seen as an unworthy coalition partner. 
Conclusion
History seeks to tease out patterns of continuity and change. ‘Regime change’ 
in Indonesia is readily apparent in drastic modification of the political system 
along with its constitution, laws and formal procedures. Yet regime change 
is also a matter of transition, during which some things remain the same. In 
particular, many of the people holding power in the ‘new’ state are those who 
used to hold power in the old, while much of the formal structure and orga-
nization of state institutions and bureaucracy also survives. Even more tena-
cious are habits of thinking and routines of behaviour. A good understanding 
of the democratic transition, in Indonesia as elsewhere, therefore requires 
study of continuity and change in informal modes of behaviour. The ‘who’ of 
political analysis and journalism is often less important than the patterns of 
informal norms and behaviours that constrain what does or does not happen.
This chapter has argued two propositions. First, a very important ele-
ment of continuity between regimes is the widespread use within the state 
apparatus of ‘slush funds’. While the mechanisms of raising, storing and dis-
tributing funds have been adapted to parliamentary democracy, the informal 
rules are much the same. The bureaucracy is still underfunded and reliant 
on informal leaks and levies for top-up funding. Powerholders still engage 
in private business, leverage corrupt deals and manipulate flows of rents 
with fierce competition for the most lucrative fiefs within the state apparatus. 
Some of the slush funds are still siphoned off into foundations which, though 
34 Indonesia is not a unique case. Japan has long demonstrated similar dynamics. Even at the height of the 
Liberal Democratic Party hegemony, opposition parties routinely shared in the spoils, albeit in lesser degree 
(Bowen 2003). 
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managed more at arm’s length from the main political actors, remain char-
acterized by secrecy and lack of accountability. What is somewhat unusual 
about Indonesian democracy is that money politics applies not only to rela-
tions between the state and society but also within the state itself. Outcomes 
between the executive and legislature, as also between state agencies like 
Bank Indonesia or state enterprises and the legislature, are subject to intri-
cate negotiations that involve monetary transfers. In other words, political 
horse-trading – in Indonesian ox-trading (dagang sapi) – is literally a matter 
of negotiating prices and payments as part of the outcome. Money politics 
in Indonesia therefore penetrates much deeper into the state than the pork-
barrelling associated with electoral politics in many other countries. The in-
formal behaviours that govern the collection and distribution of slush funds 
have monetized relations even between the organs of the state and created a 
large political marketplace at its heart. That is not to say that the state can be 
reduced to a market place but that patterns of routine informal behaviours 
have created markets within the state itself alongside the more conventional 
transactions between state actors and society. This has been accompanied by 
a marked shift in power from the executive to parliament. Slater (2004:66) 
nicely describes Reform-era cabinets as ‘the gilded bridge between parlia-
ment and the presidency’. 
Secondly, representative democracy has revived a lively intra-elite rivalry 
that had been tightly constrained during the New Order. The hierarchical 
patronage of the New Order has given way to much more horizontal compe-
tition between parties and factions. Models of a homogeneous elite are obvi-
ously no longer appropriate, if indeed they ever were. Instead the state has 
become a site of fierce intra-elite contestation for the political spoils. Yet the 
outcome has not been what might have been predicted in 1998. Fragmented 
parliaments and unstable coalition governments have been the bane of 
Indonesian democracy. The general elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009 have 
entrenched fragmentation but they have not resulted in unstable coalition 
government. After an initial five years of jostling, the 2004-2009 period saw a 
stable coalition with only minor cabinet reshuffles. In Higleyian terms, there 
has been an elite consensus. The analytical challenge is to understand how 
intra-elite rivalry has been moderated to maintain a workable political peace 
during a turbulent decade of transition.
At its most crude, our troubling contention is that this elite democratic con-
sensus has been underpinned by a high level of corruption. After a decade of 
Reformasi, Indonesian democracy has achieved a degree of political stability 
founded on agreement over the basic formal rules and a set of informal rules 
to give them effect, yet in no way could the outcome be characterized as ‘good 
governance’. Since 2004 the KPK has vigorously prosecuted top officials, min-
isters and parliamentarians without obviously changing modes of behaviour, 
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except perhaps to make corruption more discreet. Notwithstanding public 
anger and international condemnation, corruption is proving extraordinarily 
resilient because its various informal behaviours are so embedded within the 
cultural habits of society, especially among elites. In 2009 KPK’s relentless 
campaign provoked a backlash from within the power elite: the chairman 
and two commissioners were arrested and obliged to resign over murder 
and corruption charges that subsequently looked to have been fabricated by 
senior figures within the Police and Attorney-General’s Department. KPK 
looked in vain for support from either parliament or the executive. Clearly 
we need much more insight into culture, society and politics before we can be 





The limits of legality
State, governance and resource control in Indonesia
As anyone reading the Indonesian press or scholarly literature will inevitably 
note, the problem of illegality plagues discussions of natural resource manage-
ment – with so much debate devoted to the problems of ‘illegal’ mining, log-
ging and fishing.1 According to reports 90% of community mining in Indonesia 
is regarded as ‘illegal’, with illegal mines employing between 465,000 and a 
million people, and operating in an estimated 77,000 mining sites (Lestari 
2008; Manaf 1999). The extent of production is also immense, with ‘illegal’ 
mines in South Kalimantan alone extracting up to 9.4 million tons of coal per 
year (Manaf 1999). These mining operations involve large trucks, excavators 
and machinery including smelters and ships, with large illegal stockpiles of 
minerals standing by ports equipped with barges waiting to ship the mineral 
out for export. Given the very large sums of money required, these mining 
operations are clearly funded by large business networks. According to these 
accounts the ecological impacts are also extensive, with landslides, soil ero-
sion, sedimentation in streams, acid rock drainage, together with mercury, 
cyanide, tailing and toxic fumes poisoning the water, land and atmosphere 
and affecting fishing and farming activities (Lestari 2008).
News and development agency reports have often stated that ‘illegal 
logging’ extends in a similar fashion, amounting to two-thirds of the annual 
timber harvest in Indonesia.2 In 2002 one report estimated that Indonesia’s 
illegal logging industry was worth around US$5 billion per year. At the high 
tide of ‘illegal logging’ after 1998, this involved a clientelist system extending 
from highly capitalized actors with extensive funding and large, industrial 
scale business operations, to mid-size district-based timber barons, down 
to the capillaries of the system which included village-based logging teams 
deploying buffalo and chain saws.3 
1 Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007a; Resosudarmo 2006; Warren and McCarthy 2008.
2 DFID 2007. For discussions of the illegal logging problem see also Tacconi 2007. 
3 For accounts, see McCarthy 2006, 2007b. 
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While these illegalities are clearly complex phenomena, in donor and 
policy narratives the environmental problem revolves around the question of 
legality. As the UK’s aid agency website noted in 2007:
A major factor that has allowed illegal logging to thrive is confusion over the 
law. This is why the governments of Indonesia and the UK got together in 2002 
to agree on a definition of what was and was not legal. The resulting Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU) set out clearly the laws on logging, making it 
much easier for the courts to prosecute offenders (DFID 2007).
The problem of ‘uncontrolled’ logging and mining is naturalized as a legal 
question in large part because virtually all natural resource policies, plans 
and projects are ultimately expressed in legal terms. In all sorts of ways 
state agencies set about using the law to control access and use of natural re-
sources, in order to lead to some desired set of environmental consequences, 
to change people’s behaviour for environmental ends, to generate revenue, 
and so on. The problem, as simply framed in press, natural resource manage-
ment and governance narratives, is a question of legality: why can’t the state 
implement its laws? Why does it so often fail?
While state failure in environmental management contributes to environ-
mental decline, it also brings up the very question of the state. It is commonly 
observed that state legitimacy rests on avoiding political instability through 
administrative effectiveness and maintaining political order. State environ-
mental management – encompassing the protection of collective resources 
and public health – plays a key role in establishing that legitimacy. The role of 
natural disasters in traditional cosmologies suggests as much, as does, more 
recently, the perception of environmental collapse posed by the forest fires 
during the legitimacy crisis that led to Suharto’s downfall in 1997-1998, and 
the role of cyclone Katrina in the decline of President Bush. The state is con-
sidered the essential provider of key public goods through regulating natural 
resource management, and securing desirable environmental outcomes upon 
which so many livelihoods, production activities and underlying environ-
mental services depend. The problem, as Evans (1995:5) has noted, is that ‘all 
states would like to portray themselves as carrying out a project that benefits 
society as a whole, but sustaining this image requires continuous effort’. 
This chapter is concerned with the question: why has the pervasive ille-
gality in natural resource sectors persisted for so long in the face of so many 
campaigns, donor initiatives and legal changes aimed at its eradication? 
While these interventions continue to meet with limited success, the illegality 
narrative continues to pose the problem in the same terms. Accordingly, here 
I will consider a number of uncomfortable questions: what purpose does the 
policy narrative of illegality serve? Does it perhaps support particular po-
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litical projects? What role does it play in justifying particular interventions? 
How does it help envision a rational-legal, bureaucratic state even when any 
study of illegality in this sector points to its very absence? If it does this, does 
it not conceal as much as it reveals? How might we reframe the legality/ille-
gality opposition in order to more usefully understand the logic of illegality?
In the first section I discuss the question of legality with respect to the 
concepts of law and the state before, in the second section, considering the 
historical genesis of this problem in relation to the state in Indonesia. In the 
third section I discuss Indonesia’s most recent experiment with governance 
approaches, focusing on the role of narratives of illegality during the decen-
tralization reforms. 
The idea of the state and the limitations of legality
Lurking behind illegality narratives are a set of Western ideas about law de-
rived from a tradition of political thought stretching back to the Enlightenment 
and beyond. Reason should serve as the primary basis of authority, and law 
represents the most rational foundation for the social order (Griffiths 2002). 
In this tradition authority, centralized in the state and represented through 
government, is legitimate if the state ‘as an organized entity is conceived to 
be limited by laws and by fundamental principles of legality’. In other words 
authority needs to accord with ‘values of procedural fairness or due process’ 
that are applied in the ways laws are enacted and implemented (Allan 1998). 
In contrast, an activity is ‘illegal’ and hence deemed unacceptable if it vio-
lates state law. In this way, in so many contemporary discussions of ‘illegal 
logging’ or ‘illegal mining’, the state and its laws ipso facto gain legitimacy 
merely because state law should have precedence over other possible nor-
mative orders. In other words the state, through its capacity to define (if not 
implement) rules, sets the parameters of the policy discourse which frames 
how the issue is typically considered.
For example, in policy and press narratives ‘illegal logging’ – known as 
‘anarchic’, ‘uncontrolled’ or ‘wild logging’ (penebangan liar) – has long been 
considered the main critical problem to be addressed in forest management. 
Clearly it is indeed a major issue, especially when loggers enter into national 
parks and steep protection forests, as this is seen to contribute to biodiversity 
loss, floods, erosion, landslides and carbon emissions. Yet, arguably poorly 
managed but legally sanctioned extractive industries can have even more sig-
nificant ecological impacts. For instance, industrial timber extraction carried 
out under the selective logging system developed under the framework 1967 
forestry law led to significant forest degradation. According to the Ministry 
of Forestry’s own figures, there are now 59 million hectares of ‘degraded for-
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est land’ (Departemen Kehutanan 2008), mostly areas logged under the legal 
timber regime. Rather than sustainable production, legal timber production 
had dropped from 27 million cubic metres in 1990 to 5.8 million cubic metres 
in 2005. 
Drawing on this historical inheritance, the governance discussion places 
‘the rule of law’ alongside democracy, a free press and free and fair elec-
tions as critical achievements of modernity. This is reflected in attempts to 
measure the extent to which ‘agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society’. For instance, quantifiers have developed a ‘World Map of 
the Rule of Law Index’ that colours in the world map from green (in Western 
Europe, Australasia and North America, where we have the rule of law) to 
red (the bottom, predominantly African, quartile, where law is problematic). 
With all its problems applying state law, Indonesia finds itself painted pink 
– somewhere in the middle. The aim of development policy then would be to 
stimulate the process of evolution towards the green quartile.4 
While without doubt the law remains a critical element in the dynamics 
leading to poor social and environmental outcomes, the problem with this 
policy narrative is that it is somewhat reminiscent of modernization theory: 
the assumption is that with the right assistance and governance support, the 
Indonesian state will evolve towards Weber’s ideal typical rational-legal, bu-
reaucratic state.5 Yet, as earlier attempts to transplant a foreign legal culture 
during the time of the ‘Law in Development’ movement found during the 
1960s, institutional arrangements are not so readily reformed. 
This line of inquiry suggests that we need to bear in mind the role that the 
concept of legality – or what we might call a narrative of illegality – plays in 
relation to what Abrams (1988) called the ‘idea of the state’. From Abrams’ 
perspective the state is an ideological effect, acting to homogenize and legiti-
mize a disparate collection of actors and institutions as ‘the state’. ‘The idea of 
the state’ leads us to imagine a coherent national state extending from central 
government agencies to encompass local authorities, thus delocalizing a dis-
parate set of actors and practices. It does this by applying the ‘state’ label to 
local agents who, although claiming to be working in the name of ‘the state’, 
are actually focused around localized political concerns (Gupta 1995). As 
Pierce writes of Nigeria, from this perspective ‘the state’s primary power is an 
ideological figure that allows government actors to present their actions as be-
ing fully rational.’ Through the operation of the state-effect, ‘officials can claim 
legitimacy for actions and projects that, were they not labelled state actions, 
would be wholly illegitimate’. In other words the function of the state idea is 
4 Kaufmann et al. 1999; Methodologies in the Promotion of the Rule of Law http://www.passia.org/
seminars/2007/Seminar 20 Nov/Methodologies in the Promotion of the Rule of Law.ppt (accessed 1-6-2010).
5 As Pierce (2006:900) has noted in an African context, the modernization idea of a modern state governing 
traditional peoples retains its salience.
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to enable particular political projects, opening up ‘possible avenues of action’ 
while ‘masking their political content’ (Pierce 2006:898). The idea of the state 
and its concomitant legality generates ‘possibilities for on-the-ground action’, 
nowhere more so than with respect to the control of natural resources. 
Illegality can then be considered a state effect: through the working of the 
narrative of ‘illegality’, paradoxically we come to imagine a coherent, ratio-
nal-legal state actor as the answer to the problem. If we had a coherent state 
agency with ample capacity, this narrative suggests, we could clean up these 
‘wild’ or ‘chaotic’ activities. In other words, the ‘idea of the state’ is invoked 
through its very absence in the regulation of logging and mining. As Pierce 
(2006:899) has observed in the Nigerian context, the logic of the idea of the 
state acts to cover the state’s ‘inability to act as it ought’.
Further, the narrative of ‘illegality’ involves labelling a disparate ‘collec-
tion of individual actions and practices embedded in particular circumstanc-
es’, in the process reducing these to ‘a general condition’ (Pierce 2006:899). 
In this way the illegality narrative closes discussion. For while research into 
extra-legal timber and mining activities point to their complex nature, the 
narrative simply fixes these disparate phenomena as ‘illegal’, reducing our 
need to inquire further into their causality. 
The function of the illegality might be compared to the phenomenon of 
‘displacement’ in Freud’s Interpretation of dreams. According to Freud (1991), 
under the censoring influence of the moral component of the psyche, threat-
ening impulses during dreams are displaced so that the essence of dream-
thoughts only find passing and indistinct representation in dreams. In a 
similar way, under the influence of the dominant political forces, narratives 
of illegality shift policy attention away from the unacceptable topics of how 
access to resources is shaped by the political economy and property relations 
onto the comparatively safe issue of law enforcement. Accordingly, rather 
than unsavoury discussions of how laws open the door to a political economy 
linked to legal entitlements that disregard long-standing property claims (dis-
cussed later), the policy community and the press focuses on better mecha-
nisms of law enforcement. For, if these illegal activities are simply examples 
of breaking the law, we need donor interventions and governance reforms to 
‘strengthen state capacity’ (an opaque expression) and reduce corruption. But 
these easy assumptions – sustained by the ideological function of narratives 
of illegality – do not sweep the problem away.
This fissure has never been missed by regional communities. They have 
witnessed state-licensed timber and mining extraction in areas subject to local 
property claims, and the enclosure of nearby areas for nature conservation, 
even as their own small-scale activities were deemed ‘illegal’. By the time of 
the economic crisis of 1997, rent-seeking combined with a highly partial use 
of the law to support large-scale extractive industries licensed from Jakarta – 
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often in disregard of local sensibilities – had worked to de-legitimize all state 
environmental management, including that of national parks and protected 
forests. This was especially the case where the considerable coercive capacity 
of the central state had been used by politico-bureaucratic business coalitions 
to over-ride locally embedded property rights. With the temporary collapse 
of the state coercive apparatus after 1997, this contributed to a pandemic of 
‘illegality’ in the natural resource sector (McCarthy and Warren 2008). In 
contrast, a more nuanced approach would require us to unpack the legality/
illegality opposition, and to examine the mismatch between legal logic and 
everyday practices. Such inquiries should reveal the role of ‘illegality’ in its 
wider context, where it becomes part of an underlying logic of political rela-
tionships that actually sustain it. 
A social theory approach to the state and its laws suggests that the law 
reflects power relations. We need to study who makes the law, who uses it, 
and how. This perspective points to the need to investigate how the ‘illegal’ 
is constituted, how and why particular resource entitlements are legally pro-
tected while others are not. For the state system – the police, army, forestry 
and mining agencies – clearly sustains some entitlements while seeking to 
quash others. Those with these entitlements can gain access to law enforce-
ment and dispute resolution processes such as the courts, while others re-
main subject to informal dispute resolution processes and extra-legal modes 
of resource control embedded in asymmetrical power relations. 
Law is a fundamental expression of state power. On the one hand, through 
law the state works to create, strengthen, limit and legitimize particular pat-
terns of resource use by granting resource entitlements legal status (for ex-
ample, timber or mining concessions). On the other hand, as these legal rules 
are invoked in negotiating access and control of natural resources, they affect 
the distribution of benefits from resource extraction: state law can shape the 
power relations so central to resource control. Further, the state’s capacity to 
legitimize the exercise of power and to apply this power in particular contexts 
clearly affects the pattern of resource use. The sociology of law suggests that 
we can’t assume a direct relationship between a legal rule and an outcome. 
We need to understand interactions in the specific setting, including the 
strategies various actors take up and how they make use of various regula-
tory orders to pursue their interests. Law both constrains and is a resource. 
Law often ‘follows rather than determines social relationships’ (Crook and 
Houtzager 2001). The processes of interpretation and transformation that oc-
cur in local settings give law a local and a specific character.
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Studying the state: placing ‘illegal’ practices in a historical and institutional  
context
In short, the foregoing discussion suggests that we need first to restore 
the heavily laden terms ‘the state’ and ‘the law’ to their historical context, 
and then consider again how applicable they are to the management of 
Indonesia’s environment. Inevitably this leads to a discussion of state forma-
tion, the emergence and extension of state legal norms, and of the social in-
terests that underlie particular areas of environmental regulation in history. 
State law emerged in Indonesia at ‘the cutting edge of colonialism’ (Merry 
1991:46). It was essential to the colonial project to govern its subjects and 
control its territories. With respect to natural resources, European law played 
a primary role in state objectives – including the extraction of timber, the 
control of land for plantation development, the creation of a wage labour 
force, and the redefinitions of property relations in rural domains. Yet, while 
the Dutch brought with them the European concept of the state and ‘its cor-
responding institutional arrangements’, as elsewhere in the colonial era, they 
had to contend with ‘other surviving concepts and structures – different from 
and antagonistic to the new concept’ (Nandy 1992:266). 
The Dutch colonial state practice of indirect rule involved recruiting in-
digenous leaders, allowing that areas of life should be left to local, ‘custom-
ary’ or indigenous law, and repackaging indigenous institutions to incorpo-
rate them into the bottom rung of the colonial state. Inevitably, this involved 
allowing space for locally embedded patronage networks sustained by all 
sorts of payments for access to the local state and use of resources in the local 
domain. These ‘informal’ payments defied state attempts to formalize them 
(McCarthy 2006). Given the poor penetration of the Dutch colonial state, 
locally embedded institutional arrangements governing natural resources, 
particularly property rights, remained strong, especially in those ‘remote’ 
areas outside the core colonial economic domains. 
In many respects these practices have remained, if not intact, at least 
normatively relevant, constituting an informal route to access that has of-
ten worked in parallel with the state system. There are two reasons for this 
persistence. First, after independence, the state failed to develop the fiscal 
capacity to support local state agencies sufficiently. Local state-based actors, 
including military commands and party apparatuses, needed to fund the pa-
tronage networks that kept the machinery working. Consequently, local state-
based actors developed ‘off budget’ sources of revenue to support their op-
erations, particularly after President Sukarno introduced the chaotic Guided 
Democracy period in 1959 (Obidzinski 2002). Second, the official system of 
resource entitlements either insufficiently provided room for local resource 
practices and property rights or created formal and expensive barriers to ac-
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cess (for example, red tape and the difficulty and expense of processing per-
mits). This left much local mining and timber activity in the ‘illegal’ category. 
Here it is important to bear in mind a critical tension brought to light by 
studies of the Indonesian state during previous decades. On the one hand, 
building on the vestiges of the colonial bureaucracy, Suharto was held to 
have forged a state with considerable coercive and autonomous capacity, an 
order vested in the trappings of a rational-legal, coherent bureaucracy. Here, 
power and governance were structured ‘around institutions qua institutions’ 
(Kuhonta 2008). On the other hand, Suharto’s regime was often portrayed as 
dominated by powerful ‘politico-bureaucrats’ who were entangled with big 
business (Robison and Rosser 1998). Their interests penetrated the state to 
the extent that they hijacked natural resource policy in significant ways. The 
archetypical example was the capacity of Bob Hasan to dominate forestry 
policy (Barr 1998). 
Yet, at the time of independence Indonesian nationalists, as in so many 
other newly decolonized states, had hailed the modern state as ‘the clue to 
western success and political dominance’ (Nandy 1992:266). Embracing the 
Enlightenment concept of rational governance, they embarked on an ambi-
tious project to establish the primacy of the state system. Nationalist state 
building projects judged all other political arrangements only in terms of 
how they served ‘the needs of or conform[ed] to the idea of the nation state’ 
(Nandy 1992:267). This insistence on conformity caused serious problems for 
natural resource management in Indonesia.
As numerous NGO critiques of state resource management frameworks 
have suggested, the post-colonial state proved either unable or unwilling to 
expunge the colonial legal assumptions embedded in natural resource law. 
Rather than erasing these assumptions, in many cases the concepts were 
reformulated and reapplied in various ways. For instance, the colonial state 
had developed the concepts of state domain and idle land, concepts that had 
been used in various ways under the agrarian and forest laws. The ‘domain 
declaration’ (domeinverklaring) facilitated the development of the Dutch plan-
tation system by allowing that all lands without statutory certified ownership 
(eigendom) remained ‘waste’ land not under permanent use and hence the 
‘free’ domain of the state.6 
Post-independence, a clause in the Indonesian constitution stated that the 
new nation’s natural wealth should be regulated by the state ‘for the welfare 
of the nation’.7 During the early Suharto years this ‘state right of regulation’ 
(hak menguasai negara) was extended under the Basic Mining Law (UU no. 
11/1967) and the Basic Forestry Law (UU no. 5/1967). The Basic Forestry Law 
6 Tjondronegoro 1991; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Heryani and Grant 2004.
7 ‘Bumi dan air dan kekayaan alam yang terkandung didalamnya dikuasai oleh negara dan dipergunakan 
untuk sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat’ (Clause 33, 1945 Constitution).
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of 1967, as given force in the forest mapping process, built on this principle 
by placing approximately 70% of the national land area at the disposal of the 
state.8 This opened up the possibility of a particular political project – using 
forest resources to underwrite Suharto’s patronage machine. In the name of 
this ‘state right of regulation’, Suharto’s policy facilitated extractive indus-
tries via state-licensed concessions issued irrespective of pre-existing notions 
of tenure and territory. Thus state laws outlawed long-established rights and 
practices over a huge area which lacked state permits. The state handed out 
concessions over this land to retired generals and others close to the regime, 
as rewards for services rendered. 
Earlier, the new state had set out to create a single framework for the 
regulation of land issues for all Indonesian citizens. The objective was to 
overcome the pluralism of colonial land law. However, by not providing for 
an effective system for recognizing complex local property rights systems, 
and by providing a strong national interest clause that was open to abuse, 
the Basic Agrarian Law of 1961 at best provided only very weak protection 
to that majority of rural property right holders whose land remained without 
full certificates. The New Order then legislated to attract foreign investors, 
granting them more certain, state-protected property rights. Taken together, 
these two moves merely exacerbated the legal uncertainty and the conflicts 
that confound the resource sector in Indonesia. By creating distributional 
justice problems, such policies ultimately undermined the legitimacy of state 
control over natural resources while at the same time constituting many of 
the ‘illegalities’ that have plagued natural resource management.
Too often the discussion of legality in the resource sector leads into dry un-
resolved arguments over the constraints ‘customary communities’ (masyarakat 
adat) experience under state law.9 The main point here is that, when the con-
temporary state attempts to exert legal control over land and surface resources, 
including mineral and petroleum found under the ground, it inevitably bumps 
up against parallel – albeit overshadowed – normative orders that have much 
to say about how access should be regulated and benefits distributed. The state 
attempts to make legitimate and enforceable decisions based on state legal as-
sumptions that insufficiently take into account the locally embedded assump-
tions regarding how the benefits derived from the local domain should be 
distributed (McCarthy 2006). This goes some way toward explaining why the 
state system faces so much difficulty in making locally legitimate and enforce-
able regulations addressing local environmental problems.
It is tempting, at this stage, to reframe the issue in terms of ‘legal com-
8 This territorial strategies involved creating what Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) have called ‘political 
forests’ – that is lands which the state declares as ‘forest’ (according to law) irrespective of pre-existing 
property rights systems. 
9 For a recent overview of these debates, see Davidson and Henley 2007.
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plexity’, since state law operates in domains characterized by competing sets 
of rules derived from the plurality of legislative, executive and bureaucratic 
activities as well as from the local normative ordering. But this notion of legal 
complexity can obscure the distinction between legal norms and the power 
play that is so important in determining outcomes. Local officials have con-
siderable discretion in deciding how policy gets translated into decisions and 
the extent to which accommodations are made with regional interests and 
‘local customs’. Hence, local society confronts a ‘local version’ of the state – 
that is, a ‘policy interpretation’ quite different from the (nominal) intentions 
for which the law may have been created in the distant capital (Von Benda-
Beckmann 1989). 
During field studies in Aceh in the 1990s I found that localized normative 
systems continued to regulate areas of social life outside the reach of the state. 
For instance, poor villagers had long met their livelihood and timber needs 
through logging practices, in areas informally subject to a local ‘right of avail’, 
even though they lacked formal state licences in what state foresters had 
mapped as conservation areas and state forest. In making decisions that might 
be legitimate and enforceable locally within a context of overlapping normative 
systems, state-based actors needed to pragmatically take into account the local 
moral economy. They were well placed to make use of the ideological device 
of the state. By threatening to apply the state law against practices that were 
formally illegal, they gained the capacity to extract rents.10 Accepting bribes 
(or extracting ‘rents’) for permitting ‘extra-legal’ resource practices obtained 
degrees of local legitimacy if those practices were more in keeping with local 
perceptions of justice than the formal law. Moreover, extra-legal rents helped 
close a chronic budget shortfall. Those with power and resources had the 
means to acquire the required permits. Villagers living close to the subsistence 
line did not. They carried out their mining, logging and fishing outside the 
umbrella of the law. In many cases villagers then sold on their products to ac-
tors with officially recognized marketing or processing permits. Accordingly, 
those in possession of licences had the capacity to render the resources ‘legal’ 
and to sell them on at much higher prices, thus winning the lion’s share of the 
benefits. At the time it was hardly surprising that it was rare for cases of ‘il-
legal’ mining or logging to get to court. Even if the village logging and mining 
teams were apprehended, the law enforcement agencies were reluctant to put 
poor people in jail for small-scale livelihood-related offences. Meanwhile, the 
well-connected agents behind the operations – who usually had considerable 
political investments – were hardly ever apprehended. 
10 By outlawing local extractive practices while granting particular actors licences and permits, the system 
of rent seeking allows the latter to ‘launder’ resources extracted in the informal ‘illegal’ sector, in the process 
extracting the lion’s share of rents. 
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From a ‘post-institutionalist’ perspective, outcomes emerge from pro-
cesses rather than from regulatory orders. The focus shifts from the formal 
institutions to the complex interactions that occur when competing actors 
attempt to make use of particular repertoires of shifting institutional arrange-
ments and normative orders. They deploy only those particular rules that 
most work to their advantage (Wollenberg, Anderson and Edmunds 2001). 
Rather than studying static regulations, we can understand what is occurring 
more readily from studying actors’ expectations and strategies – including 
their use of law. The processes that actually shape resource outcomes can 
often be complex and fluid. They diverge substantially from more public 
forms of decision making and negotiation as set out by state laws. The de facto 
arrangements determining resource outcomes tend to be deeply embedded 
in the local world where such processes come into play. 
This has consequences for outsiders wishing to ‘craft’ more functional, 
formally rational institutional orders. They find this state of affairs perplex-
ing. In the social and political world in which an issue is situated, rights of ac-
cess and compliance with rules are often ambiguous. Outcomes often emerge 
from continuous processes of dispute and negotiation. In such contexts, 
outsiders who wish to intervene successfully find it difficult to simply apply 
the law as it appears on the books. They may need to accept the dynamic 
nature of institutional practices, and accommodate a variety of partial and 
contingent solutions (Cleaver and Franks 2003). 
However, as Lund (2006:700) notes in his writing on Africa, there is a 
paradox at work here: too much focus on the contingent, local reality can 
lead to an ‘individualistic, voluntarist and somewhat episodic perspective’. 
Yet, over time the accumulation of this ‘unpredictable fluidity’ can lead to 
‘systemic, general and institutional outcomes’. As in the case of illegal log-
ging and mining, all too often these institutional outcomes are associated 
with insecurity, conflict and severe environmental impacts. For this reason 
environmentalists wishing to put an end to such ecological tragedies can 
readily become nostalgic for the ‘rule of law’ found in the green quartile in 
the map discussed earlier. 
This paradox can assist in understanding the persistence of illegality. On 
the one hand, processes of ‘regularization’ involve the production of ‘rules 
and organizations and customs and symbols and rituals and categories’ to-
gether with efforts to embody these in robust social forms (Moore 2000:50).
These are efforts to ‘fix social reality, harden it, and give it form and predict-
ability’ (Lund 2006:699). On the other hand, for many of the reasons discussed 
above, actors often seek to manipulate the rules, or manoeuvre between 
different repertoires of rules, in a fashion that leads to ‘unpredictability, 
inconsistency, paradox and ambiguity and institutional incongruence’. This 
manipulation has been called ‘situational adjustment’. The reality is that both 
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regularization and manipulation tend to happen at once. So while institutions 
claiming to embody the state may seem to be working for formalization, this is 
undone by the simultaneous workings of ‘corruption, political networks and 
powerful alliances in the same institutions’ (Lund 2006:699). Lund observes 
that we would be in error to assume some kind of ‘evolutionary development 
from incongruence towards congruence’ in institutional terms – towards legal 
integration and the rule of law. Rather, he suggests, processes of situational 
adjustment work against these outcomes. In Indonesia, the continuing chasm 
between formal legal stipulations and the requirements of everyday life makes 
‘situational adjustment’ a constant necessity. 
Governance approaches
Over recent years the issues surrounding these manifold illegalities in the 
resource sectors have gained further salience. Since the time of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992, interest in the use of legal instruments to protect the 
environment has only grown. All governance programs in the area of natural 
resource management stress the importance of law. The greenhouse issue 
has given the problem international importance, increasing the potential for 
embarrassment to any state where unregulated exploitation of resources is 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions. 
After 1998, faced by a crisis in state capacity, and under the influence of 
outside models, the Indonesian state embraced the vocabulary, if not the 
methods, of ‘good governance’. While previously the state was seen as the 
solution to social problems and placed at the centre of decision making, it was 
now widely critiqued as predatory and inefficient. The alternative to state-led 
development was to be found in the unleashing of society-based problem-
solving mechanisms. ‘Governance’ caused a shift in perspective regarding 
state-society relationships. Rather than command and control, the state was 
meant to work in concert with other actors to deal with collective action prob-
lems. The role of the state became one of ‘enabling’, establishing the regula-
tory framework for environmental management (among other things), using 
partnerships, negotiation and persuasion.11 
The governance approach invoked in Indonesia’s decentralization reform 
involved granting enhanced discretionary authority to regional governments, 
who are said to be closer to the people and thus more locally accountable. 
Decentralization was meant to ‘bridge’ the national and the local. It was en-
visaged as a means to overcome the state’s legitimacy deficit by developing 
locally derived forms of accountability and representation, encompassing 
11 Rhodes 1997; Tendler 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000.
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more negotiation and persuasion.12 In other words, the state took up the 
vocabulary of participation in order to mobilize other social actors for its 
purposes (McCarthy and Warren 2008).
However, for governance to work, the state needs to retain the capacity ‘to 
make and implement policy, in other words, to steer society’ (Pierre 2000). It 
needs to be strong enough to ensure effective regulation of the economy and 
social stability. To do so, the state requires sufficient infrastructural power 
– the capacity to penetrate civil society and to implement political decisions 
(Mann 1986). In other words, the state needs to retain its autonomy while be-
ing sufficiently ‘embedded’, or enmeshed, in the social networks that put it 
in close contact with private actors outside the state (Evans 1995). While the 
first characteristic allows states to pursue policy, the second allows them to 
pursue governance strategies – working in concert with other actors to deal 
with collective action problems.
For the Indonesian state after Suharto, governance entailed a profound 
shift in much more than philosophy. The problem, as Indonesia’s mixed ex-
perience of decentralization suggests, is that the state system is not well fash-
ioned to apply significant infrastructural power to obtain the collaboration of 
networks of groups and individuals that could lead to good environmental 
policy outcomes. In many areas of the archipelago, as noted earlier, state-
based actors have used the idea of the state to exploit rules and relationships 
in the local domain for political and economic ends.
The institutional complexity of state administration exacerbated the state 
capacity problems. In any bureaucratic system, the state divides management 
problems into components and designs legal-institutional arrangements for 
each part (Rhodes 1997). Inevitably, different state institutions are given re-
sponsibility for different aspects of decision making and implementing the 
rules governing their own sector, while overlooking issues related to adjacent 
sectors. As state agencies have adjacent and often overlapping mandates and 
agendas, strong coordination is needed to avoid duplication, role confu-
sion, competition and mistrust. Suharto had overseen the conflict between 
these sectoral agendas, including the contradiction between environmental 
regulation and the rent-seeking of powerful ‘politico-bureaucrats’ and their 
business partners, by combining a modicum of law enforcement with a firm 
hand that favoured those with access to the inner circle. But under decentral-
ization, with so many different state actors creating rules according to their 
own agendas, with overlapping authority between different levels of govern-
ment, the state has lacked a coherent form, let alone a strong coordinating 
hand (McCarthy 2004). Indonesian administrative arrangements elaborated 
12 In natural resource management this paradigmatically extends to community governance and co-
management as a social arrangement for sustainability, and to initiatives to mobilize ‘social capital’ (a process 
captured in the phrase ‘community-driven development’). 
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different logics of regulation, leading to an ‘internal pluralism’ of the state 
institutional order that works against the kind of coherence expected of states 
(De Sousa Santos 1992:134). The struggle over the logic of state action – be-
tween different interests, sectors and coalitions – reduced policy coherence. 
In devolving authority to the district, the reforms confronted the deeply 
rooted state/society nexus that works according to its own logic. It encom-
passed, as we have seen, long-established and emergent domains of social 
organization, including clientelist arrangements. The central state had de-
volved authority to domains that already worked to their own logic, readily 
confounding attempts by the centre to ‘steer’ sub-national state and extra-
state actors for policy objectives. For instance, a district head might turn 
a blind eye to ‘extra-legal’ logging or mining operations while extracting 
revenue, in order to increase local district revenues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, 
PAD) and to develop off-budget funds for the election campaign. At the same 
time, increased revenues redistributed under the decentralization reforms – 
including natural resource rents – might be used to fund building projects 
that provided contracts to key clients. 
These relatively autonomous domains accommodated a range of local in-
terests. Local businessmen could make backroom arrangements with agents 
of local state agencies that now had greater discretionary power. At the same 
time, the ambiguous and contested state of affairs increased the bargaining 
position of actors able to use coercion or the threat of it to control access to 
land or resources. Corporate interests needed to court district elites, entre-
preneurs and key village actors, where possible recruiting them into their 
processes of resource control. As localized actors became more autonomous 
of central control, more actors benefited. As corporate interests and investors 
adjusted, their strategies increasingly accommodated local actors. This meant 
that the fruits of resource extraction, now largely outside the control of cen-
tral state administration, were now more widely distributed. 
Inevitably, this caused chagrin among particular actors in Jakarta. As I 
will discuss further below, conflict within the state between different inter-
ests were often played out in law. Central actors disapproved of many local 
projects legitimized by decisions and laws passed by local administrations. 
A district might create its own spatial plan and issue logging and plantation 
licences, only to find this policy coming into conflict with decisions taken by 
the Ministry of Forestry. These sorts of conflicts clouded the state’s monopoly 
over the definition of ‘legality’. Inevitably, the attention of powerful actors at 
the centre – alongside the press and the donor community – focused now on 
the (previously invisible) extra-legal aspect of long-established and emergent 
local domains of social organization. To be sure, in the absence of effective 
control, monitoring and supervision, some districts had issued small-scale 
concession licences all over the place, often with ambiguous legality, exac-
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erbating the rapid liquidation of the nation’s forest reserves. Yet, to a large 
extent the narrative of localized illegality also served political ends for central 
state actors. It justified a retreat to older statist modes of resource control. For 
instance, while the decentralization reforms initially devolved authority over 
small-scale logging permits directly to district governments, this authority 
was later withdrawn. 
The struggle culminated in March 2005, when during a high-profile cam-
paign against corruption President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono launched 
intensive police operations against illegal logging that had an ‘immediate 
impact’ (Soetjipto 2005). Although these operations may not initially have 
netted the leaders of the major timber networks, higher transaction costs 
for illegal logging networks due to police enforcement, combined with the 
increasing scarcity of timber in many places, convinced key actors to move 
into other comparatively booming sectors of the economy, particularly oil 
palm (McCarthy 2007b). Over time, Jakarta consolidated its authority over 
timber licences by moving against those district and provincial govern-
ments that had, under their spatial planning authority and interpretations 
of earlier regional autonomy legislation, been allowing exploitation within 
the ‘forest zone’. As these licences fell in areas that the Ministry of Forestry 
still classified as ‘state forest’, technically these concessions violated existing 
forestry laws. Now, with the swing back to centralized control, several dis-
trict and provincial heads faced charges for having issued ‘illegal’ permits. 
For instance, the governor of East Kalimantan, who had issued hundreds of 
oil palm plantation permits that disregarded forest boundaries, was jailed in 
2006 for illegal forest destruction. 13
The project of reworking state legitimacy by devolving areas of state au-
thority was thus at best only partially successful. Besides the problems men-
tioned above, it also had yet to address the vexed question of the legal entitle-
ments to natural resources, including the overlap between local ‘customary’ 
entitlements and concession rights issued during the previous period. In the 
interim, local actors had taken initiatives on their own to increase control 
over resources, without having these new claims formalized in law. When 
control shifted back to the centre, village access to resources in the local 
domain remained subject to state definitions of ‘illegality’. As the Ministry 
of Forestry reasserted its control over access to trees and land in the name 
of the state, it reverted to its past practice of considering villagers inside the 
‘forestry estate’ as ‘forest squatters’ and ‘illegal loggers’.
For example, after 2003 the Ministry of Forestry gradually began to 
reapply its legal power over the ‘forestry estate’ in the province of Jambi. 
After 1999 ethnic Malay villagers in one district had acted on long-standing 
13 ‘KPK tahan Gubernur Kaltim’, Kompas 20-6-2006; ‘10 regents in Kalimantan prosecuted for illegal logging’, 
The Jakarta Post 5-12-2005.
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grievances over the appropriation of village land for plantations and timber 
concessions under Suharto. Claiming traditional (adat) rights over the land, 
they occupied plantations and opened gardens in former concession areas. 
Several NGOs supported them. For some time the district government turned 
a blind eye to local people ‘illegally’ opening gardens in the ‘forestry estate’. 
However, the Ministry of Forestry retained de jure (if not de facto) control over 
the 46% of this particular district that was mapped as state forest land. Facing 
the fact that local government and local people were establishing ‘facts on the 
ground’, the Ministry allocated the area as a timber plantation concession. 
Eventually, to enforce this property right and effectively to re-establish the 
state forest status of the land, a paramilitary Police Mobile Brigade (Brigade 
Mobil, BRIMOB) special operations unit moved in to shift the ‘forest squat-
ters’. The villagers opening rubber or oil palm gardens on state forest land 
found themselves evicted as ‘illegal loggers’ (McCarthy 2008). In other 
well-established areas the Ministry was less able to regain control (Afiff et 
al. 2005). The Ministry sought to diffuse conflict while retaining the formal 
forestry status of this land by granting limited access rights to communities 
already in control of ‘forest land’. The Ministry did this by introducing 35-
year People’s Timber Plantation (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat) leases to villagers 
over areas already under de facto community control (Peoples Plantations 2007).
District governments have retained considerable discretionary power 
in other areas. For instance, while the central government retains ultimate 
authority to issue long term concession licences (Hak Guna Usaha, HGU), 
districts hold the authority to issue location permits and plantation licences 
(izin prinsip, izin lokasi and izin usaha perkebunan). This means that control over 
land for investment purposes continues to be mediated via the local state, en-
suring that investors have to negotiate control of land in the local domain first 
before proceeding to process the concession licence in Jakarta. With outside 
interests needing to make significant local investments within the local po-
litical domain to secure access to land, corporate interests might strategically 
accommodate district elites, entrepreneurs and key village actors in processes 
of ‘freeing up’ land for development.
Conclusions
Narratives of illegality provide an important frame for policy and aid inter-
ventions. The problem is that the prevalent narrative of illegality narrows 
policy thinking by shrinking disparate actions and practices embedded in 
particular local circumstances into the simple category of illegality. A rigid 
narrative of ‘illegality’ closes discussion of key issues such as the link between 
‘illegal’ practices and the political economy, the distribution of the benefits 
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of resource access, and property rights. By passing over underlying issues, 
this can lead to premature analytical closure of intricate problems, and in 
the process foreshadow disappointment for project and policy interventions.
These narratives help us to imagine that simply creating a coherent, 
rational-legal state actor is the answer to the problem. In this way they serve 
to underpin particular types of interventions – usually technically conceived 
ones that avoid confronting politically unsavoury corruption problems (for 
example, using satellites to capture illegal loggers in Kalimantan’s jungles). 
Yet, as suggested here, there is no substitute for thinking through the com-
plex dynamics and variety of causalities at work in ‘illegal’ phenomena. 
Armed with such knowledge, policy makers may be more likely to be in a 
position to devise strategies and evaluate their likelihood of success. 
A key problem facing attempts to implement the law is state capacity. 
To be sure, the central state has the capacity to apply its coercive power to 
affect legal resource control in resource-rich enclaves where foreign invest-
ment is at stake, such as for wealthy mineral and oil concessions. However, 
outside these enclaves, in areas where state capacities are thinner on the 
ground, resource control may well be a much more negotiated affair, con-
ducted in both formal and informal ways. Local power relations are highly 
clientelist in nature. Deals are made at the intersection of state legal norms, 
reinterpreted by local state-based actors, and what passes for ‘customary 
orders’ (McCarthy 2006). These latter modes of negotiating resource access 
have a degree of local legitimacy. They can lead to a wider distribution of 
resources locally when compared to the state-regulated resource enclaves; 
they provide a social safety net for the rural poor who find work in logging 
and mining teams deployed outside the law; and finally, they allow local ac-
cess to resources that might be subject to a local ‘right of avail’ that remains 
unrecognized in state law. Unfortunately, where this ‘situational adjustment’ 
occurs in a highly clientelist way without effective governance mechanisms, 
this overlap between state and local institutional arrangements does tend 
towards resource depletion and environmental degeneration. 
The loss of faith in the state as the custodian of collective resources and 
public goods – including the environment – in large part provided the motor 
behind the shift from government to governance. While governance theory 
suggests a decreasing reliance on formal-legal powers, the political impor-
tance of law remains evident, as any witness to the efforts various actors 
continue to invest in law formation processes can attest. The problem re-
mains that unworkable existing legal definitions sustain a particular political 
economy of natural resources that benefit powerful actors. As legal change 
would require confronting these dominant interests, the required legislative 
and practical policy changes required for dealing with this problem remain 
intractable.
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In governance theory, it is suggested that the devolution of authority to 
local authorities coupled with the provision of ‘effective safeguards against 
arbitrary exercise of localized power and clear relations of accountability’ 
can change the relationship between local constituents and local decision 
makers (Lemos and Agrawal 2006:305). By ensuring that the rule-making 
process reaches down to the local level, where management, enforcement, 
and dispute resolution occur, this theory suggests that more realistic, locally 
legitimate and hence more enforceable legal regimes might emerge that do 
away with the problem of illegality and poor resource management inherited 
from the past. This requires the combination of localized modes of participa-
tion and accountability with the capacity of a central state to carry out the 
required degree of monitoring, supervision and sanctioning to counteract the 
power of unaccountable local elites. It remains unclear when or how such 
state and society capacities will evolve in the rural contexts where most of 
Indonesia’s natural resources exist. Meanwhile the persistent chasm between 
the local ‘informal’ social world and the state legal regime may continue to 
allow maximum space for powerful actors – working locally and at a distance 
– to use concepts of state legality to pursue political and economic projects. 
Where this occurs at considerable cost to the local social and natural environ-
ment, it will continue to provide the grounds for ‘illegal’ local adjustments 
to continue.
michele ford and lenore lyons
Travelling the aspal route
Grey labour migration through 
an Indonesian border town
Scholarly and public policy accounts of temporary labour migration in Southeast 
Asia emphasize the manifold problems associated with attempts to regulate 
the flows of so-called ‘undocumented’ migrant workers throughout the region. 
Part of the difficulty in managing the ‘illegal’ movement of labour migrants is 
that categories used by receiving countries such as ‘documented’ and ‘undocu-
mented’ or ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ are extremely fluid and temporary labour 
migrants can move between them rapidly (Grewcock 2003). Migrants who pass 
through legal channels may also confront a range of practices in their home 
countries, such as falsified or fake documents, that blur the distinction between 
legal and illegal recruitment and deployment (Skeldon 2000). 
While much attention has been paid to the role of people smugglers and 
traffickers in illegal border crossings, the part played by the state has been 
given less consideration. And yet, the state is clearly involved in the illegal 
practices associated with international temporary labour migration in all 
its forms. As Willem van Schendel (2005:54) has argued ‘the image of states 
as simply reactive, responding to the growth of clandestine transnational 
flows, is misleading because it understates the degrees to which states actu-
ally structure, condition, produce, and enable clandestine border crossings’. 
Labour migrants weave their way in and out of intersecting spheres of legal-
ity and illegality as they negotiate the complex nature of the labour migration 
regimes that sending and host countries construct (Ford 2007).
This chapter explores the state’s role in semi-legal migration flows through 
Tanjung Pinang, the capital city of the province of Kepulauan Riau (the Riau 
Islands) in the borderlands between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.1 In 
the Riau Islands, local officials play a pivotal role in facilitating the flow of 
temporary labour migrants across the border. They collaborate with a range 
1 The research on which this paper is based was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery 
Project grant In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in Insular Riau (DP0557368).
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of other actors involved in the labour migration process, including official 
and unofficial labour recruitment agents; local brokers who act as middle-
men between agents, officials and prospective migrants; and numerous other 
private entrepreneurs who provide specialized services, such as those run-
ning ‘passport bureaus’. While some of these actors are involved in legal busi-
nesses, others operate illegally but with local government sanction. Together 
they are part of an alternative labour migration system that sits alongside the 
official process, and which has both legal and illegal aspects to its operation.
As Riau Islanders are quick to observe, in the islands ‘illegal doesn’t mean 
that labour migrants travel through the pelabuhan tikus [illegal ports, lit. rat 
ports]. They have passports’.2 As this comment suggests, locals make a dis-
tinction between ‘documented but illegal’ labour migrants who travel with 
authentic documents issued by the local immigration office, but obtained or 
used illegally, and ‘undocumented illegal’ migrants who use the services of 
smugglers to slip across the border undetected. The documents the first group 
of migrants carry are described in Indonesian as being ‘real but fake’ (asli 
tapi palsu, aspal), reflecting the fact that they are genuine documents obtained 
without going through all the processes that define formally sanctioned chan-
nels of temporary labour migration. We describe this ‘grey’ labour migration, 
where workers cross Indonesia’s borders with real passports, and sometimes 
work permits, obtained with real or fake documents obtained through irregu-
lar channels at the point of origin, transit or departure – as the aspal route. 
The actions of officials involved in the aspal route are clearly corrupt. They 
provide identity cards, official passports or even work permits to official and 
unofficial labour recruiters and other middle-men in return for payments in 
cash or in-kind services or as favours for friends or relatives. In doing so, they 
knowingly circumvent existing central government population laws and the 
policies and procedures of the national labour export program. However, it 
would be a mistake to view their behaviour solely as a matter of corruption 
motivated by personal gain or the desire to influence local politics. While in 
many cases their actions are linked to attempts to shore up their local politi-
cal power bases or simply to supplement meagre wages, they are also part 
of a local community-sanctioned response to international migration flows 
through the islands. Many local people view these practices as a necessary 
and obvious solution to the presence in the islands of large numbers of in-
tending labour migrants. The licitness of these illegal practices within the 
community has important implications for the way in which the aspal system 
operates. Significantly, it means that forms of criminality often associated 
with corruption in Indonesia (such as the presence of strongmen or violent 
coercion) are typically absent in much of the grey labour migration process. 
2 Interview with NGO activist, December 2006.
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This chapter traces the different practices and motivations associated 
with the aspal route in order to shed light on the nature of state illegality in 
Indonesia. In doing so, it seeks to go beyond simply describing modes of cor-
ruption to also examine the multiple meanings attached to the provision of 
‘real but fake’ documents by the range of actors involved in the labour migra-
tion process. The aspal system is not unique to the Riau Islands or other transit 
areas; it is also found in provinces of origin and major urban centres like 
Jakarta. However, these practices become magnified in the periphery because 
of the vast flows of migrants into the transit provinces and across the border. 
Our concern with the transit provinces in general – and the Riau Islands in 
particular – also reflects an increasing awareness that accounts written from 
the perspective of the periphery offer alternative accounts of state illegality 
(McCarthy 2002; Wadley and Eilenberg 2005; McCarthy 2007a). Since borders 
act as ‘pivots’ (Van Schendel 2005) between territorial states and transnational 
flows, attention to the regulatory processes involved in managing labour 
migration flows in transit provinces offers both a corrective to state-centric 
understandings of migration and important insights into the state’s involve-
ment in irregular migration practices.
Indonesia’s national labour migration system
The Indonesian state’s management of temporary labour migration from 
Indonesia has attracted intense scrutiny over the last three decades as the 
numbers of Indonesians seeking work overseas continues to grow. Successive 
governments have been subject to sustained critiques which focus on their neg-
ligence in managing the formal process of labour migration, and emphasize 
the corrupt and inadequate structures of the system and their implications for 
individual migrant workers (see for example Indonesian migrant workers 2002; 
Human Rights Watch 2004, 2005:13-5). Less understood are those migrants 
who follow the aspal route or bypass the system altogether. Yet these migrants 
constitute a significant proportion of migrant flows to regional destinations. 
According to the government’s own estimates, between 200,000 and 300,000 
Indonesians working in Malaysia alone have bypassed the official system.3
Migrants who circumvent the official system are motivated to do so be-
cause of the very complicated processes set out under Law no. 39/2004 on the 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas, a law ostensibly 
designed to improve the placement and protection of Indonesian migrant 
workers. Under the law, the central government – through the National 
3 Moh. Jumhur Hidayat, head of the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers, cited in Waspada Online. See ‘Indonesia asks Malaysia not to issue working visa to individual 
applicants’, Waspada Online 14-9-2008.
110 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, 
BNP2TKI) – is responsible for ‘regulating, guiding, carrying out and over-
seeing the placement and protection of Indonesian workers overseas’ (Law 
no. 39/2004, Article 5) in collaboration with local government and other 
agencies. In order to be considered ‘legal’ under this framework, intending 
labour migrants must first register with the responsible local labour office, 
assumed – although not stated – to be in the province of origin. Workers are 
recruited from this pool by officially sanctioned recruitment agents. Agents 
must be legally constituted companies in possession of a Migrant Worker 
Placement Licence (Surat Izin Pelaksana Penempatan TKI, SIP) issued by the 
Department of Manpower and Transmigration, a recruitment agreement, a 
job order and a draft contract from an agent or individual in a receiving coun-
try. Workers who are selected by the recruitment agent then undergo mental 
and physical health checks organized by the Department of Health, receive 
training and undergo an assessment of their work-related competencies. The 
agent organizes insurance, an official migrant worker passport (which has 
only 24 pages rather than the normal 36 or 48), visas and payment of the 
US$15 fee levied by the government on intending migrant workers. 
During the processing phase, intending migrant workers are housed in 
barracks. Immediately prior to departure, they go through a final training 
process and receive a copy of their employment contract and their migrant 
worker identity card (Kartu Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, KTKLN), which re-
places their standard identity card whilst overseas. This card can be issued 
by a representative of the centrally controlled migrant labour placement of-
fice in the province of origin or at the point of embarkation. Once they have 
their migrant worker identity card, intending labour migrants can be issued 
with a letter of exemption, which removes the obligation to pay the exit tax 
(fiskal luar negeri) levied on Indonesians travelling abroad. Finally, recruit-
ment agencies are required to report all successful placements to the local 
manpower office (Law no. 39/2004, Article 54). At each stage of the official re-
cruitment process, prospective labour migrants are faced with another round 
of paperwork and fees they must pay. Significantly, the labour recruitment 
process requires intending migrant workers to remain in holding centres 
for between one and three months while they wait to be placed overseas.4 
The complexities of the official process, combined with the time and costs 
involved have created ample opportunities for rent-seeking within the formal 
system and a motivation for the establishment of an alternative route.
4 Under earlier regulations they could be kept in a holding centre for up to 150 days. The description that 
follows held true at the time of writing, but it should be noted that the system is continually changing.
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Migration through the transit provinces
Many of the studies that seek to examine the nexus between migration and 
state illegality in Indonesia focus on the dedicated terminal for returning 
migrant workers at Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta airport, Terminal 3.5 As Rachel 
Silvey (2007) argues, a close study of processes within Terminal 3 demon-
strates not only the complicated role of the state in migration but also the link 
between state-sanctioned processes and illegality. These illegal state practices 
may extend beyond simply ‘breaking the law’ to include bureaucratic incom-
petence, red-tape, patronage and lack of responsiveness. 
Much less studied sites for examining illegal state practices in regard to 
the regulation of temporary labour migration are the transit provinces in 
Sumatra and Kalimantan through which labour migrants pass on their way to 
Singapore and Malaysia (Ford 2006). One such transit province is Kepulauan 
Riau, the province which incorporates the islands that lie to the east of main-
land Sumatra. The geographical proximity of the Riau Islands to Indonesia’s 
neighbours serves as a magnet both for internal labour migrants and for 
significant flows of regular and irregular labour migrants across the border.6 
International migrants pass through many ports in the islands, including the 
town of Tanjung Pinang, which has long been considered a strategic point 
from which to travel illegally to Singapore and Malaysia (Sobary 1987:5). The 
Riau Islands are also one of the nearest points for repatriation of large num-
bers of workers whose contracts have ended and undocumented migrants 
who have been deported from Malaysia. Tanjung Pinang alone receives hun-
dreds of deportees almost every week. In 2006, 16,805 Indonesians passed 
through the Tanjung Pinang holding centre, which can accommodate up to 
600 people at a time.7 Deportees regularly arrive at the centre on a Thursday 
and stay a maximum of three nights before being returned by the local gov-
ernment to their provinces of origin.8 
A detailed report compiled by the Indonesian Auditor General identifies 
a whole series of very serious problems, including endemic corruption, in its 
review of the labour migration process in Mainland Riau and the Riau Islands. 
The report identified a number of problems in the recruitment and deploy-
5 See for example Surtees 2003; Rudnyckyj 2004; Silvey 2007. Similar terminals exist in Surabaya and Solo.
6 Lyons and Ford 2007. According to the 2000 census, Singapore’s 612,200 foreign workers constitute 29.2% 
of the total workforce (Singapore Department of Statistics 2000). About 500,000 of these workers are considered 
unskilled or low-skilled and Indonesians are strongly represented in low-skilled service-sector jobs and on 
commercial ships based in Singapore. In 2006, the total number of employed persons in Malaysia was around 
10.6 million (Government of Malaysia 2007). As of the end of June 2006, there were 1.84 million registered 
foreign workers in Malaysia, primarily in manufacturing, services and agriculture. 64.7% of these registered 
foreign workers were from Indonesia (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2007).
7 Details of this centre’s operation can be found in Daftar kedatangan (2006a, b, c). 
8 Interview with NGO worker in Tanjung Pinang, November 2006. Central government contributions to the 
local budget of major transit areas include an allowance for the provision of these services.
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ment process including incomplete documentation,9 and a failure to pass on 
over Rp one billion in charges levied on intending migrant workers to the 
Indonesian Migrant Worker Placement Service Centre (Balai Pelayanan dan 
Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BP2TKI) (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan 
Republik Indonesia 2006:63-92). The report also identified a mismatch be-
tween the number of migrant workers registered with Pekanbaru office of the 
BP2TKI, which has responsibility for overseeing migrant workers in the Riau 
Islands, and the numbers of workers that claim exit tax-free status (bebas fis-
kal luar negeri).10 The Auditor General found that a significant number of exit 
tax exemptions were issued to workers who had not followed the mandated 
procedure. Of the 151,762 intending labour migrants who received exit tax 
exemption letters in Mainland Riau or the Riau Islands in 2004-2005, 112,444 
were issued tax exemption letters in the islands, yet only 43,989 exemp-
tions were recorded with the BP2TKI (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik 
Indonesia 2006:87-8). 
Our research shows that similar inconsistencies are evident at the local 
level. In 2006, 1,910 migrant workers left Tanjung Pinang on official migrant 
worker passports, only 310 of whom were issued exit tax exemption letters 
by the Department of Manpower’s Tanjung Pinang office.11 These figures 
suggest that instead of applying for their tax exemption letters from the local 
BP2TKI representative as required under Law no. 39/2004, large numbers of 
otherwise regular labour migrants leave Indonesia through the islands using 
aspal tax exemption letters obtained from local government agencies in the 
islands. In other words, they leave with authentic and appropriate docu-
ments obtained via irregular means. Our interview data and local statistics 
indicate that irregularities in the issuance of tax exemption letters are not the 
only example of aspal practices. For example, many labour migrants leave the 
islands without registering with BP2TKI at all. In 2006 alone, an estimated 
2,000 migrant workers passed through the local port monthly on their way 
to Singapore or Malaysia despite the fact that fewer than 700 applications for 
placement were approved in each month.12 
The Auditor General’s report attributes such irregularities to understaff-
ing, a lack of coordination between different agencies and between local gov-
ernments in sending and receiving provinces. However, central government 
agencies are well aware of the involvement of local government authorities in 
9 During the course of the pre-departure process, intending migrants must produce or obtain a standard 
identity card, school records and birth certificate, and marriage certificate where relevant; a letter of permission 
from their spouse, parents or guardian; a certificate of their work-related competencies; a certificate of physical 
and mental health; a work visa; a work placement contract; a work contract and a migrant worker identity card 
(Law no. 39/2004, Article 51).
10 This number does not include those with local papers, since Riau Islanders are exempt from the exit tax.
11 Daftar calon 2006; Daftar PJTKI 2006.
12 Interviews, December 2006; Department of Immigration internal documents.
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the aspal route, a situation that it has sought to redress by establishing a dedi-
cated team for the prevention of departures that might be designated as being 
‘non-procedural’ according to Ministerial Decision no. KEP-14/MEN/I/2005. 
These ongoing efforts have had limited success in stemming the practice of 
issuing ‘real but fake’ documents, but for large numbers of labour migrants, 
the aspal system continues to be the most efficient way of crossing the border 
and seeking work abroad since it offers them the hope of becoming ‘docu-
mented’ workers in the receiving country without the costs and red-tape 
associated with formal system.13 For many of the public officials responsible 
for issuing documents required in the labour migration process, the rewards 
– but also the logic – of the aspal route is self-evident in a context where local 
conditions are not taken into account in national-level decision making about 
Indonesia’s labour export program.
Travelling the aspal route
Intending labour migrants who transit in the town of Tanjung Pinang generally 
seek assistance from one of three kinds of migration agents. The first group 
consists of companies that are officially registered with the BNP2TKI and that 
follow official procedures. As of November 2005, there were 24 registered 
agents in Tanjung Pinang, six of which had their head office in the town (Badan 
Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia 2006:77). The second group of agents 
deliver workers with no papers to Malaysia and Singapore by boat (a practice 
typically referred to as ‘people smuggling’). The third group consists of agents, 
either officially registered companies or individuals, that use local contacts 
to organize local identity cards and passports for workers outside the formal 
system either exclusively or in addition to engaging in that formal system. This 
third group of agents is the group associated with the aspal route.14
The aspal route begins when individuals are convinced or decide to mi-
grate for work without registering with the local Manpower Office in their 
district of origin. This may happen because the intending labour migrant has 
insufficient knowledge about the formal procedures or because an acquain-
13 This reflects a structural failure in Indonesia’s labour-sending system. The system relies on receiving countries 
accepting only those migrant workers who have followed the requirements of Law no. 39/2004, which specifies 
that workers can only be recruited by officially approved recruitment agents based in Indonesia. Recruitment by 
an Indonesian or foreign sponsor is explicitly forbidden (see Explanatory notes for Article 37, Law no. 39/2004). 
However, attempts by the Indonesian government in collaboration with the governments of major receiving 
countries to police this system have not been particularly successful. The central government has repeatedly tried 
to deal with the problem of direct recruitment by foreign agents or employers, most recently sending a diplomatic 
note to the Malaysian authorities, asking them not to issue working visas to individual applicants. See ‘Indonesia 
asks Malaysia not to issue working visa to individual applicants’, Waspada Online 14-9-2008.
14 Falsification of identity and many of the other aspects of the aspal route described here are also found 
within the formal labour migration system. 
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tance, relative or local middle-man (calo) suggests that the aspal route is a bet-
ter option for them. These workers are brought by either middle-men or em-
ployees of agents based in Kepulauan Riau directly to the islands. The agent, 
which might be a legally registered company or an individual, then obtains 
a local identity card from his or her collaborators in the local administrative 
office under the intending worker’s real name or a pseudonym in a process 
that can take as little as a day. In 2006 the going rate for what is referred to 
locally as a seasonal identity card (‘KTP musiman’) was Rp 125,000. Once a 
local identity card is in hand, the would-be migrant can then obtain a stan-
dard passport through regular means or more quickly through the agents’ 
contacts in the local office of the Immigration Department. The fact that they 
are obtained using a local identity card means that their bearers can benefit 
from the province’s exit tax-free status. 
Although these passports are different from those issued to intend-
ing labour migrants by the Indonesian authorities, they are official travel 
documents that may be recognized by overseas governments issuing work 
visas. This means that a prospective labour migrant can use the passport to 
exit Indonesia and legally enter a neighbouring country. Although migrant 
workers are required by Indonesian authorities to hold a labour migration 
passport (paspor TKI), Indonesian citizens leaving Indonesia are unlikely to 
be more than summarily quizzed about the purpose of their travel when they 
pass through an Indonesian immigration checkpoint on a standard passport. 
Some of these migrants enter Singapore and Malaysia as ‘tourists’ on visi-
tor’s passes and then convert their visas to work permits with the assistance 
of a local labour placement agent. Others may be issued with work permits 
on arrival on the basis of aspal migrant labour passports issued at the point 
of departure. Some are turned back as potential ‘illegal’ workers, but many 
more pass through undeterred.15
The ‘passport bureaus’ that have developed to service the aspal route 
are an integral part of this system. An owner-operator of one such passport 
bureau, run from a shop-house in the town of Tanjung Uban, about an hour 
from Tanjung Pinang, specialized in providing passports for domestic work-
ers planning to go to Malaysia and Singapore. Although he also provided 
passports for accredited labour agents, the vast majority of the applications 
he processed were for migrant workers intending to leave without fulfill-
ing all the requirements of the official labour migration process. Between 
15 Some of those who enter on a visitor’s pass may work illegally. Indonesia has signed a number of MOUs 
on the labour migration process with the governments of Singapore and Malaysia. These have been partially 
successful in addressing anomalies in the immigration regimes governing foreign workers. For example, 
Singapore has introduced a ‘single gate policy’ for the recruitment of domestic workers. Before it was 
introduced, domestic workers leaving Indonesia through alternative channels were not necessarily illegal in 
Singapore (Abdul Rahman 2003:100).
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2001 and 2003, this bureau agent ‘processed’ several hundred passport ap-
plications per day. He obtained the ‘real’ passports supplied by his bureau 
through a contact in the local immigration office who was able to supply 
him with official passports using local identity cards supplied to him by his 
clients. Once the bureau agent received the passports, he passed them on to 
a range of other actors involved in the labour migration process. His clients 
included accredited labour agents, unofficial labour agents, casual labour 
brokers and sometimes intending labour migrants themselves.16
It is through bureaus like this that the unofficial labour-sending agents 
who are the mainstays of the aspal route obtain travel documents for their 
clients. An agent interviewed in 2001 was one of a large number of local ‘en-
trepreneurs’ engaged in grey labour migration.17 He and his wife were not 
registered with the Department of Manpower, nor did they have a legally 
constituted company. They operated their business from their residence in a 
lower middle-class suburb of Tanjung Pinang, supplying domestic workers to 
a Malaysian contact. The Indonesian agent recruited women from local place-
ment agencies in Jakarta that were not registered to supply workers for posi-
tions overseas. Once the women arrived in Tanjung Pinang, the agent used 
his contacts in local government and the immigration department to obtain 
local identity cards and passports for them. The Indonesian paperwork he 
provided to the women was recognized in West Malaysia, and he used ap-
propriate permits for employment supplied by his Malaysian counterpart.18 
Although it is now illegal for Indonesian workers to be deployed by re-
ceiving-country agents independent of the Indonesian system, these practices 
persist not least because of the many benefits workers derive from travelling 
the aspal route. As a Tanjung Pinang-based NGO activist observed, the aspal 
process is much faster and cheaper than the formal process because intending 
migrant workers get a passport, but do not have to pay for a visa (which their 
employer arranges once they have entered the host country), insurance or a 
medical check-up (mandated as part of the formal labour migration process), 
or the extra charges associated with obtaining these documents.19 Most im-
portantly, intending migrant workers do not have to wait long periods in bar-
racks in Java or elsewhere before placement. Nor are they required to return 
to their province of origin before being redeployed. And although the time 
taken by the aspal process varies according to the efficiency of the agent and 
16 As he was not particularly well-connected, this agent’s business declined sharply in 2004 when the central 
government attempted to short-circuit the system by bringing in immigration officials from head office. The 
success of the central initiative was short-lived because the newcomers were quickly socialized into the culture 
of the local office and became integrated into the aspal system.
17 For a fuller account of this operation and details of women’s motivations for using this agent see Ford 2001.
18 Malaysia’s eastern states have a separate immigration system.
19 NGO interview, 13-12-2006.
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the fees levied on the worker, it can be remarkably quick. Zain Zainuddin, a 
Malaysian journalist with the daily Harian Metro, claims that in 2006 workers 
could be deported, organize a new passport in Tanjung Pinang, and be back 
working in Malaysia the same day (Zain 2006). Interviews with grey migra-
tion agents in Tanjung Pinang and evidence from other transit locations con-
firm that such rapid processing of documents is indeed possible. In Nunukan, 
for example, illegal agents simply have to telephone the immigration depart-
ment to obtain hundreds of passports within days.20
What is interesting about the aspal process is not that it exists, since it pro-
vides benefits for workers in a context where government corruption is taken 
for granted. As Nengsih – a former domestic worker who spent time in a 
Singapore prison for entering Singapore under a false name – reminds us, sec-
ond or even third identity cards are easily obtainable anywhere in Indonesia:
In Indonesia even if we have been deported from one country it’s easy just to 
make another passport and go somewhere else. That’s how it is here. Easy. 
There’s nothing to stop someone having more than one passport. The govern-
ment can’t do anything about it. All we need to do is move from Jakarta to 
Batam and then from Batam to [Tanjung] Pinang. In each place we can be a 
different person.
What is remarkable, rather, is the high level of institutionalization and pub-
lic acceptance of this alternative system. While it is illegal for temporary 
labour migrants to leave Indonesia without passing through formal labour 
migration procedures, local agents of the state are involved in the setting-up 
and operation of the aspal route. As a consequence, the production of aspal 
documents has become an established part of the immigration process in the 
transit zone. The aspal route has become such an entrenched part of local life 
that most locals know how the system works and who to contact to obtain 
the necessary paperwork. By contrast, few understand the steps involved 
in the official process, or could explain how or why the aspal system is ‘il-
legal’ beyond the fact that it may involve the payment of bribes to officials. 
As Nengsih’s comment suggests, the payment of these bribes in itself is not 
regarded as a remarkable act – it is simply the way things get done.
While the local government officials involved in the aspal system recog-
nize that their acts are not strictly legal, they see the grey migration system 
as a legitimate response to the difficulties associated with implementing the 
national labour migration process. Large numbers of prospective interna-
tional labour migrants arrive in the Riau Islands with the hope of crossing 
the border into Malaysia and Singapore. They travel great distances and 
20 Personal communication with Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, 14-7-2003.
 Travelling the aspal route 117
endure an arduous journey before arriving in the islands. The arrival of these 
intending migrants in the islands poses an enormous dilemma for the local 
authorities. Sending them back to their provinces of origin to apply through 
the proper channels for an overseas job would not be practical even if the 
local authorities had the resources or wherewithal to do so. Given the large 
numbers involved, ignoring the problem is also not a solution. From the per-
spective of local government officials and community leaders, then, facilitat-
ing their migration by issuing ‘real but fake’ documents is an ideal response. 
It ensures a fast and efficient flow of migrants across the border (thereby miti-
gating against the need to feed and house the incoming migrants); provides a 
livelihood for members of the local community involved in the labour migra-
tion process; and affords some protection to workers once they are overseas 
(because they are in possession of ‘real’ documents). For many local officials 
involved in the provision of aspal documents, the fact that they make a side 
income (penghasilan sampingan) is a taken-for-granted aspect of their work. 
No one involved in the process would expect it to be any different.
Like many other aspects of state practice in the borderlands, the aspal 
route is thus at least in part a structural response to the intersection between 
national and local regimes – in this case the intersection between a central-
ized labour migration regime and a local immigration regime developed in 
response to the political economy of this particular borderland, characterized 
by close and easy physical access to neighbouring Singapore and Malaysia 
and the fact that islanders are exempt from the national exit tax. To fully com-
prehend the nature of ‘state corruption’ in labour migration flows, therefore, 
we must pay attention not only to the ways in which individual claims to 
licitness intersect with state practices, but also to the interstices of such com-
peting regimes. What this points to is a need to invoke the concept of scale not 
only in terms of establishing the importance of the borderlands as periphery, 
but also in relation to the state itself. In particular, we need to consider dif-
ferences (and similarities) in the ways that local, provincial and national level 
governments and officials respond to labour migration flows. 
Migration, illegality and the state
Given the systemic involvement of Indonesian government officials in illegal 
practices, it is not surprising that corruption has emerged as a significant 
problem in policy making and academic research on the Indonesian state 
(Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007b). Indeed, a growing number of 
detailed studies of the ‘webs of political, economic, and social exchange’ 
(Migdal 1988:247) in which grassroots politicians, bureaucrats and strongmen 
are involved conclude that corruption is endemic in contemporary Indonesia. 
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One of the enduring explanations for widespread corruption in Indonesia 
is that there exists an in-built, structural requirement for the bureaucracy 
and the military to raise funds to support its own activities and pay wages 
(Mietzner 2008b). As these accounts suggest, in such a system officials extract 
as much ‘informal’ income as they can. Other accounts point to the lack of 
formal channels for meaningful participation in government decision-making 
processes, arguing that this encourages individuals to pursue their interests 
using informal networks built on personal ties (H. Crouch 1975, 1978, 1979; 
Robison 1981, 1986). This view, which suggests that corruption is part of an 
elite-sponsored system to shore up power and draw attention away from the 
regime’s own complicity in illegal practices, has fed into more analyses that 
focus on idea of a ‘shadow state’ – a concept that describes the part of the 
state that lies outside formal state structures, in which political authority is 
drawn from the ability to control the informal economy (Harriss-White 2003). 
The literature on the shadow state suggests that while control of the infor-
mal economy may sometimes depend on the use of actual physical force by 
strongmen, more often stakeholders exert influence through market monopo-
lies, as state actors invite non-state actors to join in the shadow state network 
they build and provide them with protection from formal state authority 
(Erman 2007; Hidayat 2007; Migdal 1988). Those involved in the shadow 
state use formal institutions for private ends, including corruption, collusion 
and forced privatization of state assets. Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 
(2007b:7) argue that as a consequence of these practices, the ‘boundaries 
between (legitimate) state violence and (illegal) criminality, and between 
formal institutions and semi-informal criminal gangs’ become increasingly 
blurred. Corruption thus provides the ‘space collective state actors need to 
build political coalitions with societal partners against perceived rivals’ (Van 
Klinken 2008). However, the problem with these accounts of state corruption 
or involvement in illegal activities is that they assume that state actors regard 
corruption as a form of criminal behaviour.
In contrast to this view, many of those involved in so-called corrupt 
practices, including state officials, may consider themselves legitimate entre-
preneurs or leaders and be recognized as such in the eyes of the local com-
munity. Far from being ‘strongmen’ or belonging to ‘criminal gangs’, they 
may be legitimate community leaders seeking to address what they see as in-
equities in a system which works in favour of the central government and its 
cronies. John McCarthy’s (2002, 2007) work on illegal logging in South Aceh 
and Central Kalimantan, in which he begins to unpack the difference between 
legality and what he calls ‘legitimacy’, examines the role of local strongmen 
and the development of local extralegal systems which act to compensate for 
a system in which ‘state agencies working with nation wide organizational 
rules are often unable to accommodate the interests of diverse groups and 
 Travelling the aspal route 119
the variety of variables involved in local settings’ (McCarthy 2002:880). In 
the case of Aceh, McCarthy (2002:873) asserts that local leaders were able 
to claim legitimacy for many of the illegal practices he observed because 
‘outside interests and central government gain the lion’s share of economic 
rents derived from legal logging concessions’. Illegal logging employs many 
people in the local community and beyond, including those in retail and ser-
vice sectors as well as the wide network of district official raising taxes and 
oknum receiving payments. Thus, the local community benefits considerably. 
This dynamic, combined with other factors (notably, a fall in prices for other 
local products), produced a situation in which logging became legitimate. 
Similarly, in their work on logging in West Kalimantan, Reed Wadley and 
Michael Eilenberg (2005) use the term ‘illegal’ in inverted commas to suggest 
that although logging is seen by both the Indonesian government and the 
international community as an illegal activity, the local communities see it as 
a negotiated sale of timber from their traditionally managed forests and thus 
a legitimate act. As Anne Casson and Krystof Obidzinski (2002:2148) argue, 
‘illegal’ logging can be viewed as a structurally important element of life in 
rural Kalimantan, and in some cases, it is no longer considered to be ‘illegal’. 
In other cases, confusion over what constitutes ‘illegal logging’ is further 
heightened as a result of attempts by the central and provincial governments 
to re-assert national laws. Whereas previously little attempt was made to 
enforce the national laws, heightened concerns by the central government 
about the practice of ‘illegal’ logging led to an active process of criminalizing 
such acts through arrests and court procedures (Wadley and Eilenberg 2005). 
It is no surprise then that local border communities are confused about what 
is considered legal and illegal, and have a heightened mistrust towards state 
laws and regulations (Eilenberg 2008:8).
These examples demonstrate that the involvement of local government 
authorities in illegal practices cannot be regarded as simply a matter of 
entrenched nation-wide corruption that manifests itself at all levels of bu-
reaucracy. Instead, we need to explore particular expressions of corruption 
and its meanings for local officials and other stakeholders. Itty Abraham and 
Willem van Schendel (2005) have used the concept of ‘licitness’ to take into 
account the gap between the state’s understandings of criminal activity and 
those understandings deployed by individuals themselves. They call for the 
need to identify the origins of regulatory authority and distinguish between 
political authority (whether something is legal or illegal) and social authority 
(whether it is licit or illicit). In other words, to use the example of labour mi-
gration, persons involved in the management of cross-border flows, as well as 
migrants, may or may not share the state’s categorization of their activities as 
criminal (Abraham and Van Schendel 2005). As Horstmann and Wadley point 
out, differences between regulatory authority and social authority are accen-
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tuated in border zones because of the presence of dense webs of connection 
that link individuals on either side of the border – connections that prompt 
frequent cross-border flows of objects, peoples and practices (Horstmann and 
Wadley 2006). When this is combined with the vast geographical distances 
between the centre of state political authority (usually located in the nation’s 
capital) and life in the margins, the state’s categorization of certain kinds of 
cross-border movements as ‘illegal’, may be deemed by borderlanders them-
selves as a ‘way of life’.
We find the heuristic device of (il)legal/(il)licit also useful when describing 
flows whose trajectories extend beyond the borderlands because it allows us 
to challenge commonsense understandings of the boundaries between legal 
and illegal flows across international borders. For example, in her study of 
Indonesian women who migrate to Malaysia as undocumented domestic 
workers, Diana Wong (2005) argues that while the receiving state may view 
their arrival as a problem of human smuggling (an illegal activity), the major-
ity of international migrants see it as a natural response to Malaysia’s demand 
for cheap, low-skilled labour (an activity which is perfectly licit). The fact that 
their work may be deemed ‘illegal’ or that they enter the country as ‘irregular’ 
migrants is blamed on the Malaysian government’s unfair migration system. 
This commonsense view of the ‘illegal but licit’ nature of the presence of large 
numbers of ‘illegal migrants’ in Malaysia, is supported by research which 
shows that in situations where a high demand for labour is combined with 
a highly restrictive migration regime, there is an increased likelihood of ir-
regular migration, trafficking and human rights violations (Hugo 2005; Kelly 
2005; Athukorala 2006). In these situations, there is also heightened capacity 
for rent-seeking on the part of bureaucrats and local authorities who regulate 
labour migration in both sending and host states. These practices further blur 
the line between the illegality and legality of state practices.
Within Indonesia, migrant workers pay unofficial charges even when us-
ing official government channels (Hamim 2003). In the face of the activities 
of state bureaucracies, individuals may determine that the laws governing 
temporary labour migration are simply ‘bad laws’ (Vásquez-León 1999) and 
thus ‘illegal’ migration is a rational choice.21 Indeed, as we noted earlier 
many people who leave Indonesia through the transit provinces see irregular 
labour migration as attractive precisely because of the complexity, slowness 
and high cost of government-sanctioned processes.22 In the eyes of many of 
21 Vásquez-León (1999:255, footnote 2) defines the informal economy ‘as that part of the illegal economy 
that results in legitimate economic activities that have to be undertaken illegally because of bad state laws and 
regulations, which make them too costly if undertaken legally or make legal activity non-viable for many low-
income entrepreneurs’.
22 Spaan 1994; Ford 2001; Abdul Rahman 2003; Idrus 2008. McCarthy (2002:870) describes a similar rationale 
behind the actions of ‘illegal’ loggers – the process of obtaining legal logging papers in Aceh was so time 
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these migrants, as well as local bureaucrats and leaders in the transit zones, it 
is the national laws and those who create them that are corrupt. According to 
this view, laws to protect migrants appear designed to squeeze money out of 
poor workers who incur large debts and lengthy repayment schedules. This 
suggests that in order to understand the nature of state involvement in illegal 
practices, attention must first be given to the ways in which certain acts come 
to be identified as being illegal. In the case of Indonesia’s labour migration 
program, this would require an approach that examines how a system that 
has been established ostensibly to assist and protect hundreds of thousands 
of low-skilled workers in fact makes criminals out of those same workers and 
the officials that try to help them.
The case of the Riau Islands also demonstrates that in order to understand 
the nature of corruption we should not only take into account the structural 
factors that support (or inhibit) state involvement in illegal acts, but also con-
sider the meanings attached to those acts by different individuals and com-
munities. It is clear from our interviews and from other studies (Idrus 2008) 
that grey migration agents and the intending labour migrants who choose 
to use their services – and the passport bureaus that support them – believe 
that their activities are licit. But the fact that grey migration agents and aspal 
passport bureaus have formalized, and openly promote, their collaborative 
relationships with government agencies suggests that grey labour migration 
also has a degree of licitness for local agents of the state. For many of these 
officials, the aspal solution is a necessary and inevitable response to flaws in 
the national labour migration system. 
Conclusion
This discussion of the aspal system in the Riau Islands points to the complexi-
ties surrounding attempts to theorize the form and nature of state involve-
ment in illegal activities. Disjunctures between the ways the official labour 
migration system is supposed to assist migrant workers and the reality of 
its impact on those workers and on communities create opportunities for 
the aspal system to emerge and flourish. The ways that individuals respond 
to the grey labour migration system – including the ‘corrupt’ practices of 
local government officials – reflects their understanding of a number of fac-
tors including the legitimacy of central government policy (and authority), 
the impact of such policy on the local community, and the saliency of local 
expressions of identity. In the case of the Riau Islands, on the whole the local 
consuming and complex, that local entrepreneurs would give up and provide payments to local officials to 
‘turn a blind eye’.
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community regards the aspal system as an inevitable outcome of the central 
government’s failure to understand life in the border zone. Most local people 
also see the behaviour of local officials and their private partners in the grey 
migration system as a legitimate response to the flows of migrant workers 
into the islands.
An examination of the intersections between legality and licitness in 
labour migration processes in different sites opens up possibilities for re-
thinking the nature of state illegality, not just the dissonances between society 
and state. If we are to understand the corrupt practices of local government 
officials with regard to labour migrants passing through the transit zone we 
require an approach that accounts for the structural factors that support or 
inhibit corruption as well as the meanings associated with different forms 
of illegal behaviour. As the visibility and community acceptance of the aspal 
route implies, the motivations behind ostensibly very similar forms of state 
involvement in illegal practices in different sites may vary considerably. In 
the case of the Riau Islands, corrupt practices around the issuing of travel 
documents are in part a local community-sanctioned response to managing 
the impact and limitations of a central government policy that fails to take 
local conditions into account. Like the local ecologies of legitimacy that sur-
round illegal logging in other parts of Indonesia, this case suggests that atten-
tion to scale is important in the study of the motivations and manifestations 
of the Indonesian state’s engagement with illegality.
marcus mietzner
Funding pilkada
Illegal campaign financing in Indonesia’s local elections
One of the most intriguing features of illegal activity in Indonesia’s post-
Suharto state has been the unashamed ‘transparency’ with which political 
actors have violated existing laws and regulations. Far from developing 
sophisticated schemes that outsmart investigators and the public, many 
politicians, entrepreneurs and rent-seekers simply ignore the law and expect 
that nobody will notice or care. Mostly, the perpetrators can be confident 
that their actions will be met with apathy, indifference or – as Aspinall and 
Van Klinken note in their introduction to this book – even ‘social approval’. 
Indeed, there are entire policy fields in which no effective regulation takes 
place, with relevant laws deliberately overlooked by both violators and state 
prosecutors. One such policy field is that of political financing in general 
and campaign funding in particular. Since 1999, Indonesia’s electoral laws 
have set detailed limits for the amount of donations that political parties and 
individual candidates are allowed to receive, and have obliged them to sub-
mit audited reports on income and expenditure to the authorities. However, 
parties and nominees have developed a habit of reporting only a fraction of 
their donations and costs, with prosecutors showing little interest in inves-
tigating these transgressions. In interviews with the media, politicians have 
regularly mentioned much higher numbers for the costs of their campaigns 
than stated in their financial reports, and except for a small number of civil 
society groups, neither the public nor the state have aggressively questioned 
these discrepancies (IFES 2004). Apparently, most Indonesians have come to 
view illicit campaign financing as an inevitable side effect of political activity, 
and thus are not overly concerned about the legal violations involved. In fact, 
many political commentators seem to prefer illegal party self-financing to a 
more effective system of control, which would reduce the overall income of 
parties and encourage them to request more money from the state.
124 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
This chapter discusses illegal campaign financing in Indonesia’s direct 
local elections (or pilkada),1 which have seen a particularly high level of unre-
ported donations from lobbyists and wealthy entrepreneurs. At the national 
level, financial underreporting and illicit fundraising has been rampant as 
well (Mietzner 2007), but the need for a centralized campaign organization 
and the scrutiny from Jakarta-based media has had a moderating effect on 
parties and candidates. In the regions, however, the lack of financial contri-
butions from Jakarta, the absence of strong control mechanisms through the 
media, and the personality-focused nature of direct elections have aggravated 
the problem significantly. This chapter approaches the issue of illicit financ-
ing of campaigns in local ballots in three steps. First, it explains the regulatory 
framework for political fundraising and spending in Indonesia, outlining the 
legal parameters which sponsors and politicians alike find so easy to violate. 
In the second section, this set of legal norms is contrasted with the reality of 
campaign financing in local elections. Faced with exploding campaign costs 
and provided with almost no public subsidies, parties and candidates have 
decided to ignore the official caps on donations that, if adhered to, would 
dramatically cut into their funding base. Having established the illegality of 
these actions, the third part of this chapter evaluates the impact of prohibited 
campaign funds on the quality of democratic institutions and the outcome of 
elections. While there is sufficient evidence that the current campaign financ-
ing system fuels corruption, it does not seem to seriously distort the result of 
local ballots, as claimed by some authors (Choi 2005; Hadiz 2007). Finally, I 
explain how the inherent pragmatism of the Indonesian elite vis-à-vis illegal 
activity has contributed to the post-Suharto polity’s perception of itself as a 
transitional and ‘preliminary’ state. Conveniently, this concept has allowed 
the elite to use the state as a forum to unabatedly compete for power while 
still upholding Weber’s ideal of a positivist, unbiased regulator.
Campaign financing in Indonesia: laws and regulations
When Suharto’s authoritarian regime fell in 1998, the reform of Indonesia’s 
campaign financing laws was viewed as one of the most crucial preconditions 
for the development of a competitive and transparent democracy. Under the 
New Order, the government had not only used the military to control politi-
cal activity, but it had also shifted so many financial resources to its electoral 
machine Golkar that no meaningful competition at the ballot box could take 
1 Pilkada is the Indonesian acronym for pemilihan kepala daerah (election of chiefs of regions). In order to 
distinguish them from the previous elections through local legislatures, the pilkada were initially called 
pilkadasung or pilkada langsung (direct election of chiefs of regions). But pilkada is now the more commonly used 
acronym.
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place (Suryadinata 1989). The authorities provided Golkar with impressive 
office buildings, and all government officials and civil servants were expected 
to support the party with funds and development projects. In addition, 
Suharto personally managed a foundation that helped to finance Golkar’s 
operations and electoral campaigns – at the time of his resignation, that foun-
dation still controlled funds of over Rp 900 billion (about US$90 million).2 
By contrast, Golkar’s competitors were only given small offices and equally 
meagre allowances, and they were not allowed to be politically active below 
the district level.3 Against this background, the post-autocratic party system 
emerging after 1998 urgently needed fair and strict campaign financing laws, 
which would guarantee a level playing field for all contestants and neutral-
ize the privileges accumulated by Golkar over the course of three decades. 
Accordingly, the political elite agreed to limit the amount of money parties 
could routinely collect, and to require them to report their expenditures to 
relevant state bodies. For electoral campaigns, separate regulations were is-
sued, which set different levels of allowed income and obliged the contestants 
to submit audited reports on their campaign funds to the electoral commis-
sion shortly before and after the ballot. 
Despite frequent revisions to the laws on political parties and general elec-
tions, there are three principles of post-Suharto campaign financing that have 
remained largely constant.4 To begin with, Indonesia is primarily concerned 
with imposing income limitations, not expenditure caps. The current regula-
tions explicitly refrain from regulating the maximum amounts politicians can 
expend during campaigns, making it impossible for the authorities to detect 
possible discrepancies between reported income and spent funds. Given that 
expenditures are generally of a public nature and thus easier to scrutinize 
than donations, Indonesia’s decision to focus its relevant laws exclusively 
on income figures has rendered its campaign financing controls largely 
ineffective. Second, Indonesia’s lawmakers have refrained from defining en-
forceable sanctions for possible violators of campaign financing regulations. 
While the state threatens those who exceed the allowed amount of donations 
with stiff prison terms and fines, its laws are deliberately vague on how such 
transgressions can be verified. Most importantly, the regulations only discuss 
the possibility of parties or candidates obtaining too many donations on their 
officially registered bank accounts – but remain silent on the obviously much 
2 Interview with former Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung, Jakarta 17-12-2007. Suharto discontinued 
funding for Golkar after his fall.
3 Golkar was able to establish offices everywhere, including in villages. Through a bizarre but effective legal 
construction, Golkar was not classified as a political party, which meant that restrictions that applied to parties 
did not affect Golkar.
4 The first post-authoritarian laws on political parties and on general elections were passed in 1999. The 
party law was subsequently revised in 2002 and 2008, while the electoral laws were rewritten in 2003 and 2008.
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higher chance of such payments going into private accounts or being handed 
over in cash. Third, Indonesia’s system of campaign financing supervision 
operates in an environment in which parties and candidates receive only 
small amounts of subsidies from the state. While the level of public party fi-
nancing has fluctuated significantly over the years, it has consistently covered 
only a small percentage of the real expenditures of electoral contestants.5 As 
a result, Indonesia’s party financing laws have not only encouraged, but in 
fact forced participants in elections to raise the bulk of their campaign funds 
from external sponsors.
These three main pillars of campaign financing in post-Suharto Indonesia 
were also used to develop the regulatory framework for the direct elections 
of governors, regents and mayors, which began in June 2005. In the 2004 law 
on local government, it is regulated that nominees can raise funds for the 
elections from three sources only: first, from their own pockets; second, from 
the political parties that nominated them; and third, from donations by indi-
viduals or corporations (paragraph 81-1). The law grants no state subsidies 
for the candidates, who presumably are expected to utilize the small amounts 
of public funding made available to political parties under other laws and 
presidential decrees. Based on the funding formula laid out there, each year 
central party leaderships receive Rp 21 million (US$2,100) per seat obtained 
in the last elections at the national level. Similar arrangements are in place for 
the party boards in provinces and districts. Given the low sums paid out un-
der this mechanism, it has been very difficult for parties to make ends meet. 
For example, between 2004 and 2009 the medium-sized National Awakening 
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) received an annual subsidy of only 
Rp 1.092 billion (US$110,000) for its central board. At an average of 100 local 
elections per year during that period,6 the party thus had a mere US$1,100 
to hand out to each of its district or province-level candidates – assuming, of 
course, it had no other operational costs to cover. The regulations on external 
donations in local ballots are equally ‘idealistic’. Individuals are allowed to 
donate Rp 50 million (US$5,000) each, while enterprises can sponsor can-
didates with up to Rp 350 million, or US$35,000 (paragraph 83-3). While 
these limits are high compared to developed democracies (the US allows for 
individual donations of US$2,300 for each candidate per election),7 they are 
prohibitively low for the socioeconomic context of contemporary Indonesia. 
Given the small number of affluent citizens who are able and willing to make 
5 For example, the subsidies received by PDI-P in 2005 were only enough to pay for 1% of its officially 
reported campaign costs in the 2004 elections.
6 Indonesia has currently more than 470 districts and municipalities, and 33 provinces. This number is likely 
to rise over the next few years.
7 Overall, political donors in the US can spend a total of US$108,200 to parties and candidates over a 2-year 
period.
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campaign contributions, parties and candidates in Indonesia must raise large 
donations from an exclusive circle of sponsors. The limitations set by the law 
effectively obstruct this effort. 
Similar to the income caps, the reporting obligations are tight and detailed 
– on paper, that is. Candidates in local elections have to set up official cam-
paign accounts, and are personally responsible for their use. Nominees are 
not permitted to accept money from foreign groups or governments, or from 
domestic state enterprises, local administrations and unidentified sources. 
Every donation above Rp 2.5 million (US$250) needs to be reported to the 
local election commission, stating the amount and the name of the sponsor 
(paragraph 83-5). These reports have to be submitted one day before the 
campaign period begins, and the electoral commission is expected to publish 
them in the media. Three days after voting day, candidates are obliged to 
inform the commission of their expenditures during the campaign. However, 
no limits for campaign spending have been fixed, raising the question of what 
exactly it is that the commission is supposed to check or verify. According 
to the law, the commission has to forward the reports to public accountants, 
who are required to audit the submissions within 15 days. Subsequently, 
the reports are returned to the commission and made available to the public 
(paragraph 84-5). While these reporting regulations appear strict, the cata-
logue of sanctions attached to them is all but unenforceable and thus of a 
largely normative nature. Whoever receives campaign donations above the 
stated limit is threatened with jail terms between 4 and 24 months, and a 
fine between Rp 200 million (US$20,000) and Rp 1 billion, or US$100,000 
(paragraph 116-6). The law also defines sanctions for accepting money from 
unlawful sources, and for making false statements in the reports. However, 
the regulations only scrutinize the formal accuracy of the submitted reports, 
suggesting that donations not listed in the official campaign account are le-
gally irrelevant. In other words, as long as candidates are smart enough to 
keep their reports within the framework of the law, they don’t have to fear 
legal consequences.
Local campaign financing: the reality on the ground
Since 2004, Indonesia has witnessed a huge increase in the cost of political 
activity. Previously, party leaders had to focus on only one parliamentary 
election every five years, with most top public officials subsequently selected 
through indirect votes in national and local legislatures. This electoral mecha-
nism had kept costs relatively low; in fact, parties could raise additional 
income by demanding hefty fees from individuals interested in executive 
positions. After 2004, however, the expenditure of political parties and their 
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nominees for electoral campaigns grew exponentially. The introduction of 
direct presidential elections in that year added two new national ballots to 
Indonesia’s electoral cycle, stretching already tight party budgets.8 More 
importantly, however, Indonesia launched direct local elections for gover-
nors, regents and mayors in June 2005, resulting in more than 500 polls over 
a five-year period.9 Besides their overwhelming frequency, the direct nature 
of these elections has also created new costs: parties now have to conduct ex-
pensive opinion surveys in order to identify their nominees for the elections, 
flushing hundreds of billions of rupiah into the pockets of pollsters, political 
consultants and strategic advisors (Mietzner 2009a). Since the mobilization of 
party networks has often been insufficient to win personality-based elections, 
the nominees and their parties also have had to invest much more money 
into media campaigns than was previously the case. While parties typically 
have tried to shift these costs onto their candidates (even asking them for 
extra money in exchange for the nominations), many local party branches 
have found it difficult to stay financially afloat. Accordingly, parties and 
candidates have become dependent on external donations. Some of these con-
tributions have been made to the official campaign accounts; most of them, 
however, have circumvented all legal channels. 
Estimates of the campaign costs for local elections in Indonesia vary great-
ly, and concrete figures are hard to come by. However, it has been widely 
accepted that candidates need to spend around Rp 10 billion (US$1 million) 
to run professional campaigns in medium-sized districts, and around Rp 100 
billion (US$10 million) to have a realistic chance of winning a governorship in 
an average province (Rinakit 2005). For key provinces with large populations 
such as West, East and Central Java, these figures are significantly higher. 
When the cost structure of such campaigns is analysed in detail, the steep 
price tag attached to political candidature immediately becomes apparent. 
In the run-up to the gubernatorial elections of Jakarta in 2007, for example, 
a campaign consultant estimated that each candidate would have to spend 
Rp 60 billion (US$6 million) on advertising campaigns just to increase their 
name recognition and ‘electability’.10 In addition, candidates in crucial prov-
inces often pay Rp 20 to 40 billion (US$2 to 4 million) to large parties that 
nominate them, while smaller parties can ask for 5 to 10 billion (US$500,000 
to 1 million).11 For polling and consultancy services, nominees have to fork 
out another Rp 5 to 10 billion (US$500,000 to 1 million) for high-quality orga-
nizations with foreign-educated staffers, or a little less for more low-profile 
8 Based on the electoral laws, the presidential elections require a second round if no candidate reaches more 
than 50% of the votes in the first round.
9 The change was introduced through Law 32 on Local Government, which was passed in September 2004.
10 ‘Opening for Jakarta governor: only the wealthy need apply’, The Jakarta Post 12-6-2007.
11 Interview with a candidate in the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Jakarta, 23-9-2007.
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groups.12 Accordingly, it is perfectly possible for gubernatorial nominees to 
reach the 100-billion mark before they can even begin building up an electoral 
machine, handing out goodies to the electorate or paying for entertainment 
events at mass rallies. This, and the hiring of witnesses for each of the polling 
stations, can add another Rp 10 to 20 billion (US$1 to 2 million) to the bill. In 
the governor’s election of South Sulawesi in November 2007, for instance, the 
number of polling booths was more than 12,000, and witnesses were gener-
ally paid Rp 100,000 to 150,000 (US$10 to 15) per person. Golkar’s candidate 
prepared three witnesses for each station, and thus allocated Rp 5.2 billion 
(US$520,000) for their ‘pocket money’ alone.13 
These exorbitant costs often stand in sharp contrast to the officially 
reported incomes and expenditures of nominees. In the gubernatorial elec-
tions in West Java of April 2008, for example, the three pairs of candidates 
submitted grossly understated financial reports – as did almost all of their 
colleagues across Indonesia. The incumbent governor Danny Setiawan (who 
eventually lost the elections) reported official campaign donations of Rp 
16.39 billion (US$1.6 million), of which he claimed to have spent only 12.65 
billion (US$1.3 million). The biggest chunk of the donated funds allegedly 
came from the private sector (7.95 billion), while the largest item on his ex-
penditure list was the overhead cost for Golkar offices in the province (4.83 
billion). The winners of the elections, Achmad Heryawan and his running 
mate Dede Yusuf, reported only Rp 3.23 billion (US$323,000) in donations, 
and Rp 2.9 billion (US$290,000) in costs.14 The third team of candidates, led by 
former army general Agum Gumelar, was apparently so bitter over its defeat 
that it initially did not submit a financial report – following the example of 
many other electoral losers in Indonesia’s local elections who see no point in 
disclosing their finances after being defeated at the ballot box. Only after the 
electoral commission sent Agum a friendly reminder did the retired officer 
comply. However, the figures suggest that he did not take the reporting task 
very seriously: he reported almost exactly the same amount of donations as 
Danny Setiawan, Rp 16.38 billion. Danny’s and Agum’s numbers are not only 
curious because of their ‘coincidental’ similarity, however. They also raise 
suspicions because both camps had earlier announced much higher invest-
ments into their campaigns. Danny’s nominating party, Golkar, had stated 
in March that it had made Rp 30 billion (US$3 million) available for its can-
didate, while the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDI-P) and the United Development Party (Partai 
12 The most frequently used professional pollster has been Denny J.A.’s Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI, 
Indonesian Survey Cycle), which has even posted advertisements in newspapers to offer their services to local 
politicians across Indonesia. For the background of this group, see Mietzner 2009a. 
13 ‘Sebar 36 Ribu Saksi, Uang Saku 5.2 Milyar’, Harian Berita Makassar 3-7-2007.
14 ‘Laporan Aman Tak Lengkap’, Pikiran Rakyat 15-4-2008.
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Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), which stood behind Agum, said they were 
close to raising 90 billion (US$9 million).15 Even the Prosperous Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), which nominated Heryawan and Yusuf, ac-
knowledged to have allocated Rp 25 billion (US$2.5 million) for the campaign 
– a far cry from the 3.23 billion later reported.16 
None of these discrepancies have been clarified by the West Java electoral 
commission, the police, the state auditing board or prosecutors. However, 
such indifference towards obvious violations has been the rule rather than the 
exception in national and local elections in Indonesia. In the 2004 and 2009 na-
tional elections, critical NGOs identified a large number of fictitious donors, 
often tracing them back to non-existing addresses, or to poor villagers who 
allegedly had made donations worth hundreds of millions of rupiah (Badoh 
2005; Indonesia Corruption Watch 2009). These ‘phantom donors’ appeared 
in the lists of all presidential candidates, including Megawati Soekarnoputri 
and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and one party chairman admitted that ‘all 
our financial reports were lies, nothing but lies’.17 Despite indisputable evi-
dence of blatant transgressions, no measures were taken.18 Similarly, there 
were no legal implications for parties and candidates who failed to submit 
financial reports at all – in 2004, that were around half of all electoral contes-
tants. Against this background, it comes as no surprise that ‘investigations’ 
into possible campaign financing violations in the local elections were equally 
lax. To be sure, that was not for a lack of cases. In the capital, the former head 
of Jakarta’s PDI-P branch reported the winner of the election, Fauzi Bowo, 
to the electoral commission for claiming that the party had donated Rp 7 
billion (US$700,000) to him, whereas PDI-P felt that it had never made such 
a payment.19 In the West Java district of Sumedang, an official of the state au-
diting board suspected in April 2008 that ‘tens of billions of rupiah’ had been 
diverted from the district budget to finance campaign activities.20 Needless 
to say, these complaints have not led to meaningful legal examinations of the 
incriminated funds. Since the direct local elections began in 2005, not a single 
case of campaign financing violations has ever been brought to court, and it 
is difficult to imagine that this will change in the near future. 
The reasons for this ‘mismatch between legal logic and everyday practice’ 
– a phrase coined by John McCarthy in this volume to describe a similar phe-
15 ‘Parties prepare for W. Java governor race’, The Jakarta Post 6-3-2008.
16 ‘Parties prepare for W. Java governor race’, The Jakarta Post 6-3-2008.
17 Interview with a party chairman, Jakarta, 19-1-2008.
18 The authorities even refrained from investigating Amien Rais – one of the presidential candidates in 2004 – 
after he publicly admitted to having received hundreds of millions of rupiah from the corrupt former Minister 
of Maritime Affairs, Rokhmin Dahuri. In July 2007, Dahuri – who had established large off-budget accounts in 
his department – was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 
19 ‘Dana Kampanye Fiktif Fauzi-Prijanto Dilaporkan ke KPUD’, Detik.com 4-10-2007.
20 ‘Kampanye Diduga Didanai APBD’, Pikiran Rakyat 4-4-2008.
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nomenon in Indonesia’s natural resource management – are manifold. To be-
gin with, an all-out persecution of violators would simply be impractical. It is 
no exaggeration to say that if all offences were to be consistently investigated 
and brought to trial, each and every governor, regent or mayor would lose his 
or her position. Political fundraising outside of the official campaign accounts 
has become so institutionalized in Indonesia that its legal prosecution would 
unseat much of the political elite. Confronted with the choice of paralyzing 
government on the one hand and turning a blind eye to a collectively toler-
ated practice on the other, state authorities have clearly opted for the latter. 
Secondly, there is a well-founded fear that losers of elections could exploit 
accusations of campaign financing transgressions to challenge the results of 
many local ballots, and that a precedence case could trigger an uncontrollable 
wave of lawsuits. In fact, one of the reasons for the stabilization of local gover-
nance after 2004 has been the tendency of the courts to throw out complaints 
by defeated candidates against the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, allow-
ing incumbents to rule relatively undisturbed for five years.21 This move 
has marginalized political operators who – before the introduction of direct 
local elections in 2004 – had regularly extorted local government heads with 
threats of impeachment by their respective legislatures (Malley 2003). Against 
this background, law enforces apparently are concerned that investigating 
political financing cases could throw Indonesia back into the instability so 
prevalent before 2004. Third, many citizens seem happy to stomach campaign 
financing infringements as long as the moneys are raised from private sourc-
es, and not from government budgets. Even NGOs have shown much greater 
tolerance towards illicit party donations from tycoons than towards attempts 
by electoral contestants to access state funds for their purposes.
To be sure, the reluctance of investigators to focus on campaign financing 
cases is also related to the tight patronage networks cultivated by both the 
providers and recipients of political donations. In most local elections, the 
main donors of the contestants are powerful contractors who hope that their 
client will reward them with government projects should he or she win the 
ballot. In many cases, such contractors have personally joined the campaign 
teams of their candidates (tim sukses), handing out money to voters or signing 
checks to cover electoral expenses. In their paper on Aceh’s local elections, 
Samuel Clark and Blair Palmer (2008:14) have even described the contrac-
tors as a new ‘economic class [which is] dependent on securing contracts and 
21 In most cases, the legal complaints filed by electoral losers have been based on personal frustration and 
disappointment rather than on strong factual evidence of manipulations. In the vast majority of the lawsuits, 
the judges found it easy to dismiss them because no concrete examples of systematic distortions were presented 
in court. There have been some instances, however, in which judges did annul election results, often leading to 
a legal quagmire and political paralysis in the area concerned – Depok, Lampung and North Maluku being the 
most prominent examples.
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exploitation licenses through political connections with both the local and 
national governments.’ In some Acehnese regencies, contractors ‘ran as vice-
Bupati candidates, presumably providing the financial backing for the more 
well-known figure who ran as Bupati’ (Clark and Palmer 2008:33). In other 
small Indonesian towns or rural districts, the picture is similar: contractors 
have forged highly effective relationships not only with their protégées in the 
political elite, but also with police officers, prosecutors, judges, journalists and 
NGO figures (Hidayat 2007). Consequently, authorities are hesitant to initiate 
legal proceedings against influential contractors and other political donors – 
who are often personal friends, golf partners or relatives. The only motivation 
for prosecutors to take on campaign funding violations would be significant 
public pressure, but this is almost non-existent in Jakarta and even less com-
pelling in Indonesia’s regions. The remarkable ‘licitness of illegal activities’ in 
Indonesia, identified by Aspinall and Van Klinken in their introduction, thus 
seems to be an important element in the area of political financing as well.
If the elite can so openly ignore existing laws and regulations, however, 
it appears curious that it has not tried to abolish them. Initially, it was in the 
interest of the post-Suharto elite to have a strict campaign financing regime 
in place in order to reduce Golkar’s financial advantage, but this rationale is 
no longer relevant today. Given their almost unlimited power over legisla-
tion and executive orders, the leaders of political parties could have easily 
opted to lift the limits on the amount of donations, do away with reporting 
requirements and retract the threat of sanctions. There is very little pressure 
from society to maintain the existing regulatory framework, so there must 
be other explanations. Certainly, the ambition to meet international stan-
dards in campaign financing does play a role, as does the desire of the elite 
to create the impression of a sophisticated legal system operating within a 
modern, Weberian state. But the formulation of unenforceable stipulations 
is motivated by more than just the party leaders’ wish to decorate their il-
licit fundraising with a façade of legality. Instead, many politicians view 
the existing legal directives as a blueprint for an ideal political system that 
Indonesia should aspire to achieve in the future. In the meantime, however, 
they argue that Indonesia’s current economic and social conditions require 
pragmatism, improvisation and flexibility to deal with the challenges of tran-
sition. Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono, a professor of political science, 
has been one of the main proponents of this view: ‘It is simply unrealistic to 
expect that Indonesia with its current levels of economic development can 
adhere strictly to the same standards of transparency and good governance as 
consolidated democracies do. It will take time. But we will get there.’22 Many 
party leaders agree. For them, it seems, the present laws reflect the rigorous 
22 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta, 1-5-2007.
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party financing system Indonesia should practise in the times ahead – when 
it can afford to do so.
Illicit campaign financing: political consequences and implications
Whatever its reasons, there is no doubt that the inability of the Indonesian 
state to uphold campaign financing regulations has negative consequences 
for the transparency of the democratic process. With most of the campaign 
donations made outside of official channels, voters are denied the opportu-
nity to inform themselves about the origins of the candidates’ financial re-
sources. Even more importantly, they are unable to judge if electoral winners 
subsequently issue policies or reward contracts that benefit their financial 
sponsors. Given the high costs of campaigns, and the failure of most parties 
to pay for them, it is evident that new incumbents frequently take office with 
significant amounts of debt. While in office, they hence need to recoup their 
own investments and repay their sponsors, either through favours or cash.23 
Ironically, while prosecutors have largely refrained from investigating cases 
related to campaign financing transgressions, they have launched hundreds 
of investigations into corrupt practices by incumbent governors, regents, 
mayors and legislators. Roughly 10% of all top local government officials and 
parliamentarians are under legal investigation at any given time, with many 
convicted and sent to prison. However, surprisingly few investigators have 
examined the link between campaign debts and corruption while in office, 
despite the obvious circumstance that candidates who took up large credits to 
finance their election urgently require quick, regular and uncontrolled access 
to cash after their inauguration.
While Indonesia generally has made significant progress in its ongoing 
process of democratic consolidation (Mietzner 2009b), its current campaign 
financing practices stand in sharp contrast to more developed democracies. 
In most Western states, strict reporting stipulations serve as control mecha-
nisms against corrupt deals between office holders and entrepreneurs, and 
senior politicians often have to resign when their violations of financing laws 
are exposed to the public (Hopkin 2004). This is not to say that these countries 
find it easy to sustain credible campaign financing regimes. In fact, cartelistic 
23 As electoral winners have the opportunity to regain and – in the long term – multiply their investment, 
losing candidates often face commercial, personal and political decline. While not making national headlines, 
the fate of some defeated nominees has occasionally become the focus of local newspaper stories. Often 
these articles tell of divorces, bankruptcies, arrests and even suicide attempts. The very divergent paths for 
electoral winners and losers highlight the fact that most nominees risk their personal wealth to gain office, 
which arguably explains why some incumbents irrationally plunder the state coffers without any caution or 
anticipation of legal consequences. See ‘Gagal jadi bupati, coba bunuh diri’, Kompas 5-8-2008.
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political elites in Europe and the United States have spent much of their time 
and energy on creating legal loopholes through which they can continue rais-
ing funds in a non-transparent manner (West 2000). In the US, for example, 
many candidates bypass the US$2,300-limit for donations by entrusting 
much of their campaigning to formally non-partisan ‘civil society groups’, 
which are not subject to funding ceilings. With this, a huge portion of de facto 
campaign funds is never scrutinized, and corporations can contribute signifi-
cantly more than the legal limits allow. Nevertheless, the campaign funding 
system in most Western countries is constantly debated and changed, while 
Indonesia seems still far away from developing a mechanism that would offer 
the electorate at least partial insights into the financial affairs of their parties 
and electoral nominees. 
Some authors have suggested that public campaign financing may be the 
best way to interrupt the vicious cycle of exploding campaign costs, lobbyist 
interests and political corruption. Indeed, in 75% of all liberal democracies, 
the state is providing subsidies to political parties and nominees (Van Biezen 
and Kopecky 2007). This provision makes political actors less dependent 
on external sponsors, gives not-so-affluent nominees a chance to compete, 
and allows the state to impose stricter oversight over the monetary affairs of 
politicians. But while public financing can increase the electoral chances of 
monetarily disadvantaged candidates and parties, the system certainly has its 
drawbacks as well. To begin with, public subsidies tend to increase the de-
pendence of political actors on the state, isolating party leaders from society 
and encouraging them to suspend organizationally important fundraising 
activities. Secondly, state funding can sometimes inflate the costs of political 
campaigning and thus lead to more, not less corruption after the election. 
Critics of public subsidies to candidates have argued that monies provided 
by the state simply add to the budgets of all contestants, forcing them to 
raise even more money externally if they want to beat their rivals.24 Finally, 
Indonesian sceptics have maintained that when the country had a fairly gen-
erous system of public party financing in place between 2001 and 2005, the 
level of corruption in legislative and executive institutions was not lower than 
before or after that period.25 Consequently, when state funding for parties 
was cut by 90% in 2005, the Indonesian public overwhelmingly approved. 
The opponents of public subsidies to political actors have also plausi-
bly argued that although the current campaign financing system is deeply 
flawed, it has not substantially distorted the outcome of electoral contests, 
particularly at the local level. In other words, candidates with large deposits 
24 I am grateful to Ross McLeod for pointing this out to me.
25 Between 2001 and 2005, national, provincial and district-level boards of parties received Rp 1,000 (US$0.10) 
per vote obtained in the 1999 elections. This was substantially more than under the current system, which 
allocates Rp 21 million (US$2,100) per seat.
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of (illegal) donations haven’t really had a much better chance of winning 
elections than those who have run their campaigns on smaller budgets. To 
be sure, no electoral contestant can organize a competitive campaign without 
deep pockets. The costs of securing a nomination, posting advertisements in 
the media, and building up an effective campaign machine are substantial, 
and often prohibitively so. Nevertheless, there have been many candidates 
whose political track records were considerably better than those of their op-
ponents, and thus had to spend less money. Their popularity was typically 
based on long attachment with the electoral area they ran in, their favourable 
coverage by the press, or their intense interaction with key society groups 
(Vel 2005). By contrast, candidates with weak roots in local communities 
or negative reputations had to expend significantly more cash to overcome 
their disadvantages. While it is difficult to extrapolate general patterns from 
the more than 500 local elections held since June 2005, there is evidence to 
suggest that nominees with positive images and less money are more likely 
to win than unpopular candidates with big budgets. One indication for this 
is the high number of incumbency defeats in local ballots, which currently 
stands at around 40%.26 Incumbents usually control the largest campaign 
funds, but they also tend to struggle with disastrous reputations as a result of 
the corrupt or incompetent nature of their administrations. The gubernatorial 
election in West Java in April 2008 was one such example: there, a cashed-up 
incumbent finished only third, losing to a modestly funded PKS politician 
with a reputation for having high ethical standards. 
It seems, therefore, that the impact of illegal campaign financing on the 
competitiveness and fairness of local elections has not been as severe as some 
observers have suggested. Without doubt, there are numerous examples of 
nominees who have used their oligarchic connections to illicitly raise huge 
war chests and bulldozer the competition (like in the gubernatorial elections 
in Jakarta and Banten). But there are an equally significant number of cases 
in which such mafiaesque patrons were trounced by capable technocrats or 
society leaders who enjoyed the genuine support of the electorate (Mietzner 
2009c). While even truly popular nominees need money to fund their cam-
paigns (and presumably raise much of it outside of official channels too), the 
results of local elections are not dependent on the financial superiority of the 
candidates alone. For instance, Michael Buehler (2007) has shown that local 
leaders who introduce themselves to grassroots voters over a longer period 
of time and show concern for their daily problems tend to command greater 
electoral support than those who quickly distribute large amounts of money 
without cultivating long-term relationships to voters. Attending weddings, 
circumcisions, funerals, religious holiday celebrations and other social events 
26 ‘Golkar evaluasi calon incumbent’, Detik.com 19-4-2008.
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can have a much larger effect on the electability of nominees than rushed 
campaigns by wealthy but aloof elite figures.27 In addition, bureaucrats who 
have established a reputation for delivering good public services and leading 
non-excessive private lives appear to be better positioned in elections than 
those who mismanaged their portfolios while filling their own pockets. Thus 
despite the damaging effect of illegal campaign financing on Indonesia’s at-
tempts to fight corruption and establish a more transparent political system, it 
has not led to significant distortions of electoral outcomes at the local level.28 
Conclusion: campaign financing, local elections and the ‘preliminary’ state in 
Indonesia
This chapter has shown that Indonesian politicians habitually violate exist-
ing campaign financing regulations, with law enforcers and society openly 
tolerating the transgressions. Using the direct local elections for governors, 
regents and mayors as a case study, the analysis has outlined the legal frame-
work, practice and political repercussions of Indonesia’s campaign financ-
ing regime as well as its regular avoidance. On paper, the law defines clear 
limits for campaign contributions, requires candidates to establish official 
accounts, and sets deadlines for the submission of reports to state authorities. 
Contrary to claims of some observers, the legal regulations even include a 
catalogue of sanctions, ranging from fines to jail terms. However, the stipu-
lations of the law are not enforced, and the ‘transparency’ with which they 
are circumvented suggests that neither politicians nor the state and society 
have a particular interest in their implementation. The chapter has offered 
several interpretations for this phenomenon. First of all, there is a widespread 
perception that a consistent enforcement of campaign financing laws would 
lead to the collapse of local governance in Indonesia as there is hardly any 
elected official who has not violated the law in one form or another. Against 
this background, prosecutors have apparently tried hard to avoid a prece-
dence case that could open the floodgates for a wave of lawsuits by losers of 
elections. Equally important in this regard is the indifference or even ‘social 
approval’ offered by the public, which seems to care little about the violation 
27 Obviously, intensive and sustained social networking requires funds as well, with political leaders 
expected to bring gifts and donations to every event they attend. But such costs are much lower than those of 
blitz media campaigns aimed to boost name recognition in a short period of time.
28 As indicated earlier, Indonesia’s courts have generally issued very sensible verdicts whenever they felt 
that an election was manipulated through the financial superiority of the winning candidate. For example, the 
Constitutional Court in December 2008 overturned the result of the East Java gubernatorial election, in which 
the initially victorious former provincial secretary had offered village heads financial rewards if they achieved 
certain electoral benchmarks for him. The judges were satisfied that these efforts had distorted the elections in 
three districts, and consequently ordered a re-vote in two and a re-count in one district.
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of campaign financing laws as long as politicians take the money from the 
private sector, and don’t demand more funds from the state. By contrast, civil 
society groups and the press routinely express outrage whenever politicians 
propose to increase the level of public funding for parties, which would allow 
them to reduce their dependence on external donors.
The main problems created by Indonesia’s deficient campaign financing 
system are post-election rent-seeking, corruption and collusion. In order to 
address these issues, Indonesia has two major options. First, Indonesia could 
follow the ‘liberal’ tradition of the United States and impose strict limits and 
transparency regulations on external donations. In the 2008 US elections, 
Barack Obama demonstrated that the transparent collection of small contribu-
tions from a large number of voters can make campaigns not only financially 
superior, but can also lead to the electoral mobilization of previously indiffer-
ent constituencies. Unfortunately, it appears unrealistic to expect that Indonesia 
will be able to successfully implement such a system in the next two decades 
– its middle class would have to grow at a much faster pace than it does today 
and voters would have to get used to the idea of giving donations to politicians 
rather than receiving money from them. Accordingly, Indonesia will probably 
have to be content with taking small steps towards increasing transparency. 
One such step was the decision by the national electoral commission to require 
political donors in the 2009 elections to submit their tax file number if their 
contribution exceeded Rp 20 million (US$2,000). This reform was designed to 
replace the old and unworkable system that asked donors only to attach photo-
copies of their identity cards, which in Indonesia are notoriously easy to fake or 
manipulate. Unsurprisingly, however, the reform was not fully implemented. 
While some contributors complied with the new rules, most donors still feared 
identification and therefore refused to reveal their tax file number. Although 
civil society groups published the names of many violators, no significant ac-
tion was taken against them (Indonesia Corruption Watch 2009).
Beyond this ‘liberal’ solution of better transparency and accountability, the 
second option for Indonesia would be to revive its system of public funding, 
which has been virtually suspended since 2005. But despite the obvious advan-
tages of this ‘European’ model (Donnelly, Fine and Miller 1999), it has few sup-
porters in Indonesia. Ultimately, public pressure to reform campaign financ-
ing regulations is weak, and one important reason for this has been outlined 
above: while the failure to enforce campaign regulations has obstructed both 
Indonesia’s democratic consolidation and its anti-corruption drive, it has not 
reduced the competitiveness of local ballots. Financially less privileged candi-
dates have regularly toppled affluent incumbents, reducing – in the eyes of the 
public – the urgency to rebuild the campaign financing system from scratch.
In theoretical terms, the analysis of Indonesia’s campaign financing prac-
tices has highlighted both the systemic and the pragmatic dimension of the 
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relationship between state and illegality in Indonesia. Funding of political 
activity is one of the many areas in which the Indonesian state is aware but 
tolerant of illegal actions – not only because they are part of the state’s inherent 
logic, but because they underpin a system that, in Aspinall and Van Klinken’s 
words, ‘gets lots of things done’. While flawed, many Indonesians see the cur-
rent system of political financing as preferable to one funded by the state and 
subject to higher standards of transparency. Moreover, the strict prosecution 
of violators of campaign financing laws would have very impractical conse-
quences, with much of Indonesia’s government possibly collapsing. Despite 
the collective agreement that the campaign financing laws are unenforceable, 
however, there have been few demands to simply replace them with more 
‘realistic’ laws. In fact, the catalogue of fines and sanctions has been expanded 
significantly over the years. But this discrepancy between utilitarian pragma-
tism and formal adherence to unachievable ideals of Weberian state control go 
well beyond the ordinary gap between rhetoric and action. More importantly, 
it reflects the essential self-perception of the post-Suharto state and its political 
elite. The nucleus of this self-perception is the acknowledgment that Indonesia 
is a work in progress, a still deficient version of the Indonesia it wants to 
be. In this sense, many of the legal regulations Indonesia has adopted since 
1998 are reflections of its normative goals rather than of its belief that they 
can be successfully enforced. Hence the campaign financing laws mirror the 
political funding system Indonesia wishes to have, or expects to have in the 
future. However, even though many Indonesian politicians genuinely believe 
in this ‘utopian’ version of the state, it also provides the political class with a 
welcome pretext for its transgressions. The conceptualization of the state as a 
transitional entity allows the elite to use it as an arena to compete for power 
with all available (including illegal) means, while at the same time upholding 
the state’s idealized image of a positivist, neutral regulator that could materi-
alize in a fully consolidated Indonesian democracy.
gerry van klinken and edward aspinall
Building relations
Corruption, competition and cooperation in the 
construction industry
Building things has been the essence of development in Indonesia, at least since 
the oil boom began in the mid-1970s. Indeed, the word pembangunan, a central 
trope of the New Order regime, means both ‘development’ and ‘building’ 
(Heryanto 1988). But the very large construction industry is plagued by poor 
standards and corruption. It is widely known that money is routinely skimmed 
off construction contracts to pay off tendering committees, public works bu-
reaucrats and other officials with influence over the allocation of public con-
struction contracts, reducing the quality of the material and work. Construction 
contractors are an important part of the politico-business elite, especially in the 
regions, and it is often their political connections rather than their construction 
expertise that lands them the most lucrative construction contracts. 
The approach in the recent wave of expert reports by multilateral agencies 
is to view problems of corruption and standards in the industry as public pol-
icy issues amenable to improved regulation. Beginning with a set of ‘interna-
tional best practice’ norms, they develop sophisticated indices showing where 
Indonesian institutions fall short, and conclude with policy recommendations. 
But this normative approach lacks explanatory power. The present chapter 
aims to explain rather than prescribe. It seeks to account for the resilience 
of corrupt practices by viewing the construction industry ethnographically, 
namely as a set of social actors who strategize to promote their interests.1 
In the 1980s and 1990s, multilateral agency reports on the sector traced 
its problems to developmental issues such as a shortage of technical skills, 
organization, capitalization and legal protection (Kaming et al. 1997; Kirmani 
1988; World Bank 1984). Over the last decade, the emphasis has suddenly 
shifted to the issue of corruption (Kenny 2007; Pranoto 2005). A World 
Bank study on the public procurement system (mostly construction) argued: 
1  Some work along these lines already exists. Most focus on the informality of construction at the bottom 
end of the market, for example, Van der Erve 1989; Hermanto et al. 1983; Sannen 1986; Thung Ju Lan 1989.
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‘[T]he public procurement system in Indonesia does not function well. It is 
not market driven, has been prone to misuse and abuse, and reduces value 
for money for public funds’ (World Bank 2001:1). Not surprisingly, reform of 
public procurement has been a major target of post-Suharto reforms. 
Part of the sudden shift in emphasis was externally driven. A broad ideo-
logical shift took place in Washington after the end of the Cold War. More or 
less sanguine behavioural analyses influential in the 1960s saw corruption as 
good or bad depending on context (Leff 1964; Scott 1969). But in the 1990s 
the language became pathological. World Bank president James Wolfensohn 
in 1996 spoke of corruption as a ‘cancer’. He and other influential voices in 
international agencies began to portray corruption as, in the words of another 
senior World Bank official, ‘a great obstacle to economic and social develop-
ment’. They depicted corruption as a distortion in the orderly functioning of 
markets, caused mainly by excessive government interference and regula-
tion, which increased opportunities for public officials to extract resources 
from market players. In keeping with the neo-liberal mood of the times, 
corruption was thus seen as something that could be corrected by the right 
policy settings, including by rolling back the responsibilities of the state in the 
economy. The ideological shift resonated in Indonesia among liberal-oriented 
sections of the growing middle classes, which made opposition to corrupt 
favouritism central to the agenda of the movement that ended Suharto’s New 
Order regime in 1998. Responding to pressures from both international agen-
cies and large segments of public opinion, post-Suharto governments have 
introduced anti-corruption measures of varying effectiveness, including in 
the area of government procurement.
However, since the collapse of the regime in 1998, it has been all too 
obvious that patterns of corruption and predatory behaviour that grew and 
consolidated under the New Order have persisted into the new era of demo-
cratic and decentralized politics. Neo-patrimonial networks linking politics 
with business have been both resilient and adaptable, especially at the local 
level. Observers have noted the important place that the construction sector 
occupies in the corrupt nexus between business and politics, especially in 
provincial areas (Clark and Palmer 2008; Sulaiman and Van Klinken 2007). 
In the regions, construction is often a dominant part of local economies, con-
struction projects are a major focus of collusive and predatory behaviour, and 
kontraktor (contractors) are often prominent not only in business but also in 
politics. Provincial and district parliaments are full of contractors who live on 
building projects they themselves decide on. Contractors are prominent in the 
campaign teams for directly elected district heads and governors.
Thus Indonesian contractors are now the bad guys in two relatively new 
agendas: one international, focused on making government procurement 
more competitive; the other domestic, focused on making government more 
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accountable. This chapter will show that they have not been very respon-
sive to either agenda so far. Our question will be: how can we explain this 
resistance? We do so by combining detailed case study research one of us 
(Aspinall) has done in the province of Aceh, with broader national and his-
torical research conducted by the other (Van Klinken).
Corruption in the government-funded construction sector is a matter of 
worldwide concern. In China, for example, one author refers to the sector as 
a ‘quasi-criminal domain’ in which widespread official corruption leads to 
shoddy building standards and fatal building collapses (Ding 2001:180). In 
Japan, corruption in the construction industry is a lynchpin connecting the 
worlds of business and politics. The country has been described as a construc-
tion state (doken kokka) in which ‘money flows through the system guided 
by the bureaucrats to benefit those who form part of the privileged national 
grid of politicians, bureaucrats, and business people’ (McCormack 1996). A 
study of ‘everyday corruption’ in West Africa describes a world of public 
procurement and construction based on ‘a triangle composed of corrupting 
contractors, corruptor officers and intermediaries, [giving] rise to real chains 
of complicities’ (Blundo 2006:260). 
Government-funded construction is a site of predation in part because 
discretionary spending is vulnerable to corruption in every type of economy. 
It becomes especially vulnerable when there are few other sources of cash 
for provincial middle classes in an underdeveloped, otherwise agrarian and 
trade-based economy. In such societies, construction can become a major 
driver of a corrupted political process. According to business perceptions 
measured in a 15-country survey by Transparency International, construc-
tion is the most corrupt industry, exceeding even the arms industry and oil 
and gas (Stansbury 2005:36). A large international survey of company-state 
interactions in 22 transition countries (Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey, BEEPS) reported that:
It appears that construction firms in the sample think it is more common to pay 
bribes in their industry than do firms in other industries, that firms like theirs 
spend a larger percentage of revenues on bribes, and they bribe more frequent-
ly to get licenses, deal with taxes and get contracts. [...] It appears (unsurpris-
ingly) that private construction firms where the state is the largest customer are 
likely to report particularly high corruption in their industry. These results are 
highly statistically significant (Kenny 2006:14-5).
Kenny reports a common estimate that 5-20% of construction costs are being 
lost to bribe payments, with the average reported payoff for a government 
construction contract being around 7% in a range of transition countries. For 
government construction work in Indonesia in 2004 this would correspond 
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to a range of US$0.3-1.4 billion, with the 7% figure equalling US$0.5 billion. 
Indonesian politicians quote much higher losses than this.2 Indeed, bribes are 
not the only problem. A poorly constructed or sited project, for example, may 
result in economic losses many times greater than the bribes. 
The problems in the construction sector have long made it the object of 
reforms. In Indonesia, as the sector became increasingly linked to the twin 
problems of corruption and the collusive provincial politics after reformasi, 
these reforms moved closer to the centre of the Indonesian good governance 
agenda. The first presidential instruction governing procurement was issued 
in 1979, and since then there have been improved presidential instructions 
in 1980 (twice), 1984 (twice), 1988, 1994, 2000, and finally 2003 (Keppres no. 
80/2003). The first law on construction was implemented in 1999 (UU no. 
18/1999).3 All the regulations have striven to balance two competing de-
mands: on the one hand, to ensure efficient use of state funds by improving 
competitiveness, and on the other hand, to ensure social equity and employ-
ment creation and to nurture an indigenous, and state-dependent, business 
class. The former goal led over the years to the gradual professionalization 
of technical qualification criteria, tendering procedures, contract provisions, 
and the like. The latter goal led to such protective measures as reserving 
smaller contracts for ‘weaker’ groups on the grounds that they were indig-
enous, small-and-medium, or local.
The tension between the free market and the protectionist impulses in 
the regulatory framework reflects not simply official ‘lack of capacity’ but a 
political struggle. Big Indonesian and international companies have a com-
parative advantage in the free market. They support the reforms that promote 
competitiveness. Smaller provincial operators know they cannot survive 
without protection, so they argue that the government has a responsibility to 
protect the weaker players. In their world, profits are not made by lone entre-
preneurs fighting for market supremacy, but by well-connected people who 
know how to build political alliances to keep out rivals. If we want to know 
more about this political struggle, however, the otherwise highly informative 
public policy documents only take us so far. 
2 Vice President Jusuf Kalla told an Indonesian business conference in 2006 that the introduction of open 
tendering for public works projects would save the state budget 30-50% a year, though he presumably meant 
that at least some of this saving would be made by the effects of competition (Gajah Kusumo, ‘Tender terbuka 
hemat nilai proyek hingga 50%’, Bisnis Indonesia 4-8-2006).
3 A convenient summary of the history of regulation is in footnote 3 of World Bank 2001. Most of the current 
laws and regulations, as well as more detailed implementing regulations, are available at a website of the 
Public Works Department (http://www.pu.go.id/bapekin/produk/produk_statuter.html, accessed 8-12-2008). 
Technical evaluation of the procurement system is in chapter 6 of World Bank 2007. 
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Why construction?
We begin by distilling some of the central facts about the construction industry 
readily available in the multilateral agency reports, which are nothing if not 
well-stocked with figures. Worldwide, the construction industry contributes 
about 5% in value-added to the GDP of middle income countries like Indonesia, 
and capital formation in construction makes up about 10% of GDP. These per-
centages tend to rise as an economy develops (Kirmani 1988:141). Combined 
government and private infrastructure investment in Indonesia ran at 5 to 6% 
of GDP before the 1997 crisis, but fell to below 2% in 2000. Since then it has 
slowly recovered (World Bank 2007:75), and by 2006 it had reached 7.5% or 
US$24 billion (Wongso 2007). The building sector employs 4.5 million workers, 
or almost 5% of the Indonesian workforce. But over 60% of them are unskilled 
or semi-skilled.4 The high-tech end of the industry is dominated by oil and gas 
facilities, highways and other large projects built by private global companies 
such as Bechtel, Brown and Root, McDermott, and Leighton, as well as by 
large Indonesian companies such as Trans Bakrie and majority state-owned 
construction companies like PT Adhi Karya Tbk and PT Wijaya Karya Tbk. 
The much more pervasive lower end of the industry is engaged in build-
ing infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems, water supply, local power 
stations, telecommunication networks, hospitals, clinics, offices, shops, and 
housing. Collectively, this sector is very large: about one quarter of all construc-
tion in Indonesia involves building bridges and roads.5 A large proportion of 
this lower end is government-funded. The World Bank (2007:79) estimates 
that actually expended government infrastructure investment (not counting 
operation and maintenance) in 2004 amounted to Rp 62 trillion (approxi-
mately US$6.8 billion). This amount has increased considerably since then. 
Decentralization means that over half of this government money is now spent 
by provincial and especially district governments. According to the 2003 Asia 
Foundation Rapid Decentralization Appraisal (Satriyo et al. 2003:25-6), local 
governments spend most of their development funds on building basic facili-
ties in the areas of transportation (24.7% of development budget), housing and 
settlement (7.46%), regional development and settlement (7.31%), and natural 
resources and irrigation (3.50%). Little of it is spent on education and culture. 
It is estimated that 80% of building contractors depend entirely on government 
work (World Bank 2001:21), and out in the provinces this could be even higher. 
The construction sector is of central importance to Indonesia’s economic 
growth. It is also a major and growing employer. As we will see, however, 
the peculiar characteristics of the industry make it a regulator’s nightmare. 
4 ‘Dep. PU, Depnakertrans, dan LPJKN tingkatkan tenaga kerja konstruksi’, Business News 9-1-2008.
5 Indonesian Bureau of Statistics figures at http://www.bps.go.id/sector/construct/table2.shtml (accessed 14-
5-2008, archived at www.archive.org). 
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Here we focus not on the grand corruption practised by the big few,6 but on 
illegality in the dense web of relationships between government officials and 
building contractors in the provinces.
A history of corporatism 
The construction industry in Indonesia inherits a history of massive infra-
structure work developed by the Dutch in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. Built with taxes on agriculture, the roads and railways initially 
had mainly an imperial purpose, but later the emergence of a developmental 
aim led to the construction of extensive irrigation works.7 The grand phase of 
infrastructure development came to an end around 1930 and did not resume 
for another half century. The worldwide economic depression, the predatory 
Japanese occupation, the national war of liberation, and the political and eco-
nomic chaos of the first two decades of independence, left infrastructure in 
ruins. Furthermore, with independence came democracy. When construction 
work resumed, the new government had to take account of domestic politics. 
Previously disadvantaged groups demanded that business wealth be redis-
tributed as a matter of justice. A brief history of the construction industry 
illustrates a growing conflict between protectionists and free-marketeers.
Unlike the unfailingly apolitical multilateral agency reports, Indonesian 
construction contractors have written their own history in openly political 
terms (Gapensi 2004). This history describes how aspiring Indonesian en-
trants to the building sector relied less on their technical skills than on their 
political leverage to gain advantage over economically stronger European 
and ethnic Chinese rivals. When Indonesia became independent there were 
only a few indigenous contractors. Most were very small, graduates of trade 
schools in the 1930s. Their best hope was to lobby for government work on 
the basis of their indigenous, nationalist credentials. In January 1959, city-
level associations in the three biggest Javanese cities of Jakarta, Surabaya 
and Bandung joined together in the All-Indonesia Association of National 
Construction Implementers (Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional 
Seluruh Indonesia, Gapensi). Six months later the organization’s first chair-
person, Dipokusumo, became Minister of Public Works.8 It was the end of 
party politics and the beginning of Guided Democracy. The new minister 
recognized Gapensi as the sole organization for building contractors, and 
6 Such as Bechtel’s controversial role in the construction of the Freeport mine in Papua (Perlez and Bonner 
2005).
7 Mrazek 2002; Ravesteijn and Kop 2008.
8 Pekerjaan Umum, or PU, was successor to the colonial era Civic Public Works, or Burgerlijke Openbare 
Werken, BOW.
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eliminated their Dutch rivals by nationalising all Dutch construction busi-
nesses, as part of the broader process of nationalization then underway. By its 
own rather honest 2004 account, Gapensi was somewhat thuggish especially 
out in the provinces, but its members now found themselves partnering with 
experienced engineers in the nationalized companies.9 However, monopoly 
access to the government was difficult to achieve in the ramshackle state that 
was Indonesia in the late Sukarno years. Many non-affiliated local contractors 
continued to win work from local military commanders, government depart-
ments, banks, and other state agencies. Rival groups of contractors emerged, 
and political shifts favoured now one, now another. By 1961 Djuanda, the 
powerful coordinating minister in charge of the Economic and Development 
Council (Dewan Ekonomi dan Pembangunan), himself an engineer, insisted 
on another umbrella organization for building contractors, Consultative 
Body for Private National Entrepreneurs (Badan Musyawarah Pengusaha 
Nasional Swasta, Bamunas) and Gapensi was asked to join that. The Minister 
for Funds and Forces (!) asked them to help raise ‘revolutionary’ funds for the 
government by buying shares in development banks. Their reward was juicy 
construction plums in the newly Indonesian province of Irian Jaya in 1963, 
and in Jakarta (such as the Asian Games stadium at Senayan and the giant 
Conefo – Conference of the New Emerging Forces – facility that later became 
the national parliament house).10 
From that time on, construction contractors were increasingly integrated 
into the state via formal corporatist organizations. A key construction in-
dustry broker in the militarist corporatism that began to crystallize in the 
1960s and 1970s was the indigenous entrepreneur Edi Kowara Adiwinata 
(1919-1996). He had grown wealthy during the national revolution.11 Close 
9 Some of these nationalized construction companies still exist and are among the giants of the construction 
scene today. PT Adhi Karya was apparently formerly Associatie, PT Hutama Karya was Hollandse Beton, PT 
Waskita Karya was Volker Stevin, and PT Nindya Karya was Nedam (Van der Erve 1993:141).
10 The innocuous-sounding term ‘national’ deployed by Gapensi actually meant, in effect, non-Chinese, 
while ethnic Chinese were described as ‘foreign’ even if they had been born in Indonesia. Gapensi contractors 
for decades continued to pressure their ethnic Chinese rivals by deploying racist propaganda against them. 
The supposedly anti-social, anti-national character traits of the Chinese were constantly cited as a good reason 
to exclude them from government contracts. On Gapensi’s urging, the President issued decrees in the mid-
1990s (Keppres no. 16/1994 and no. 24/1995) giving special protection to small contractors on the grounds of 
expanding employment opportunities. These decrees were also thinly-veiled anti-Chinese measures (Gapensi 
2004:65; Thung Ju Lan 1989).
11 Starting work in the Dutch state company BPM that ran the Cepu oil field in East Java just before the 
Second World War, Kowara got a break when the Japanese placed him in charge of the state oil company 
working the Indramayu field in West Java. He used his own company to do the construction work required. 
At the end of the war, under the cover of a revolutionary militia he commanded called Laskar Minyak Divisi 
III that was later integrated into the Siliwangi Division, he simply seized the oil company for himself (Tempo, 
Apa dan Siapa, http://www.pdat.co.id/hg/apasiapa/html/E/ads,20030617-15,E.html, 2003, accessed 4-4-2009; 
Aditjondro 1998; George J. Aditjondro, ‘Kisah sukses yayasan-yayasan Suharto (bagian I)’, Apakabar mailing 
list, 19-8-1997 (http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1997/08/19/0008.html, accessed 4-4-2009).
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connections with the military helped him survive the transition to the New 
Order. His son Indra Rukmana married Tutut Hardijanti, the daughter of 
retired general President Suharto, his golfing buddy. He expanded into 
livestock feed, life insurance, machine parts, Coca Cola bottling, coconut oil 
processing, rubber plantations, and a steel factory. His family became one of 
the three wealthiest indigenous entrepreneurial families of the New Order, 
alongside the Suharto and Djojohadikusumo families. Starting as the Jakarta 
chapter chairperson of Gapensi in 1959, he served on the national board of all 
its various incarnations throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
Unfortunately for domestic contractors, the New Order also threatened 
to reopen the doors to their foreign capitalist rivals. In 1966 a new team of 
powerful technocrats – Radius Prawiro, Ali Wardhana, and Wijoyo Nitisastro 
– met the contractors to explain that Indonesia was changing from a ‘na-
tional economy’ to a ‘liberal economy’. There would be no more megaproj-
ects for the moment, and ‘foreigners’ would be allowed to compete for 
construction work. The president dissolved Bamunas in 1967. However, 
the protectionists had the last laugh. Ten years later, after many organiza-
tional permutations, Gapensi emerged stronger than ever. Together with two 
other associations – one for big construction firms based in Jakarta (Asosiasi 
Kontraktor Indonesia, AKI), and one for construction consultants (Ikatan 
Nasional Konsultan Indonesia, Inkindo)12 – it set up a Joint Secretariat in the 
office of Public Works Minister Radinal Mochtar in 1977. Five months later it 
was awarded a big contract to build cheap government housing for soldiers. 
Edi Kowara had already begun in 1974 to help Gapensi set up an intimate 
collaboration at provincial level with the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce 
(Kamar Dagang Indonesia, Kadin). Most Kadin provincial chapters were 
apparently run by Gapensi people. For 20 years from the mid-1980s, the 
Gapensi-Kadin link in Jakarta ran through Agus G. Kartasasmita, a Gapensi 
office-holder from 1983 and its chairperson continually from 1992 to 2008. 
Kartasasmita had been brought in to the organization by 1950s-era Public 
Works minister and engineer, Prof. Roosseno Soerjohadikoesoemo, known 
at the time as ‘Mr Concrete Indonesia’ (Bapak Beton Indonesia).13 He always 
held a Kadin deputy chair for construction and real estate (Gapensi 2004:53). 
The Kartasasmita family grew wealthy under the New Order. Kadin became 
the only association of Indonesian entrepreneurs to be recognized in law 
(UU no. 1/1987) and this gave it a strong though not exclusive place in the 
Indonesian state’s corporatist scheme. 
12 AKI is Asosiasi Kontraktor Indonesia, Indonesian Association of Contractors; Inkindo is Ikatan Nasional 
Konsultan Indonesia, National Union of Indonesian Consultants.
13 Budianta 2008:195-202. He was re-elected to a (strictly speaking illegal) fourth term in 2004 (‘BPD Gapensi 
gugat ketua umum terpilih’, Suara Merdeka 23-4-2005).
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The 1980s were the golden era for the corporatist construction sector. 
Flush with oil money, the New Order was firmly in the saddle, and the gov-
ernment’s Five Year Development Plans, called Repelita, were the contrac-
tors’ lifeline. In 1986, the Public Works Minister decreed that only members 
of AKI, Gapensi and Inkindo would be permitted to do construction work 
for the department. The Interior Minister sent a similarly worded letter to all 
provincial governors in 1987.14 Together, the department of public works and 
the interior ministry, under which were located the regional governments, 
were the two most lucrative sources of government construction work. These 
rulings led to a large influx of under-qualified local construction contractors 
into Gapensi, where they were graded according to their financial and techni-
cal capacities. Membership was open to private companies as well as those 
controlled by state-owned enterprises and cooperatives. It grew steadily – 
membership stood at 21,000 in 1987, reached 38,000 by 1993, and 41,000 by 
2000. The great bulk of membership always consisted of the least qualified 
small operators (Gapensi 2004:121-44). 
We can gain a glimpse of the intertwining of Gapensi, Kadin, Golkar and 
local government from the provincial executives list that Gapensi published 
on the internet in 2000.15 The chairman of Gapensi in Aceh, to take one ran-
dom example, was Lukman C.M. This man served at the same time as deputy 
chairman of the provincial chapter of Kadin. He was also on the provincial 
executive of Golkar as the link with private business.16 His first deputy chair-
person in Gapensi was Armen Desky, who was at the same time a member 
for Golkar in the newly democratic national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR). Armen Desky cut short his parliamentary career in 2002 when 
he was elected chief (bupati) in his home district of Southeast Aceh. There he 
immediately faced controversy over a local airport whose construction, evi-
dently to be paid by the European Union, was delayed.17 Another example 
from the Gapensi list is the oil-rich province of Riau. Chairing Gapensi here 
was the building contractor Rusli Zainal. He was at the same time district 
chief of Indragiri Hilir. Three years later he was elected governor of Riau. 
His own party Golkar at first failed to support him in this bitterly fought 
contest because it had made a deal with the then-governing party PDI-P. 
But newspapers reported that the outcome improved for Zainal after large 
14 Surat Keputusan Mentri no. 187/KPTS/1986 of 24 April (p.64-5); Surat Edaran Menteri no. 230/766/Bangda 
of 13 April 1987 (p.69).
15 Gapensi’s website www.gapensi.or.id for the year 2000 is archived on www.archive.org (accessed 19-6-
2003). 
16 ‘Firmandez ketua kadinda NAD’, Serambi Indonesia 10-7-2003; Daftar nama personalia DPP Golkar, masa 
Bhakti 1993-1998 (www.golkar.or.id, archived for the year 1998 on www.archive.org, accessed 6-2-2003).
17 ‘Anggota dewan perwakilan rakyat Republik Indonesia, periode 1999-2004’, detik.com 23-9-1999; ‘Rp 50 M 
bantuan MEE diduga dilego UML’, Waspada 18-4-2002.
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amounts of money changed hands.18 Sparser electronic news archives for the 
late New Order period make it difficult to be certain, but our experience leads 
us to think that, apart from the greater political uncertainties after 1998, the 
picture was much the same throughout the 1990s. In sum, the construction 
sector was organized along classic New Order corporatist lines. Corporatism 
has been defined as ‘a pattern of state-society relations in which the state 
plays the leading role in structuring and regulating interest groups, organiz-
ing them along functional rather than class lines (in order to minimize both 
collaboration and conflict), and typically granting official recognition to only 
one representative body in any given sector’ (MacIntyre 1991:1).
International pressure on Indonesia to liberalize the construction sec-
tor grew during the New Order. It was exercised through the International 
Federation of Asian and Western Pacific Contractors’ Associations (IFAWPCA). 
Edi Kowara himself was big enough to play along and thus earn the chance 
of working with big international corporations at the top end of the market. 
In 1969 he initiated the association of large contractors called AKI specifically 
to join IFAWPCA. But Gapensi’s large number of provincial members were 
not ready to compete on international terms. AKI agreed with Gapensi that 
it would confine itself to Jakarta, where its members would compete with in-
ternational firms for international and domestic work, but it would not form 
provincial branches. The understanding was that Gapensi members would 
do the smaller domestic government work, especially in the regions outside 
Jakarta (Gapensi 2004:56-7). 
Bribes were routine in the corporatist system in the provinces. They 
were known as ‘wild retributions’ (pungutan liar or pungli), but were quite 
institutionalized. Gapensi members did not like paying them, but they also 
saw them as a normal part of doing business, and they complained rarely. In 
1996, as the New Order was beginning to fray, some did complain. A Gapensi 
bulletin in East Java reported that pungli amounted to 20-30% of the value of 
projects, and in some districts it reached 35%. The largest amount, up to 10% 
of the project value, went to the government project leader (pimpinan proyek or 
pimpro), which could be the departmental head, the district secretary, or even 
the mayor or district chief. The pimpro would visit the contractor at home to 
make sure he got his share. The cashier at the State Treasury Office (Kantor 
Perbendaharaan Negara, KPN) got an ‘envelope’ as well. Smaller payments 
went to other relevant officials in the public works department, the offices of 
the governor, district head or city mayor, and to relevant legislators. Visiting 
officials needed to have their trips paid and be entertained. Other people 
called on the contractor to make ‘social contributions’ to various causes. 
18 ‘Zainal, champion of Riau development’, The Jakarta Post 30-10-2003; ‘Buntut pemilihan Gubernur Riau 
dugaan politik uang mulai terungkap’, Kompas 6-11-2003.
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Towards the end, thank-you gifts were made for the final handover and for a 
smooth report from the government’s internal audit agency. 
[F]or a road construction project of one kilometre, for example, when the super-
vision team came to visit just before the work was handed over to the owner, 
the team filled an entire bus, there were up to 30 supervisors. ‘From the section 
chief up, from the provincial down to the district level, they would all be there. 
As oriental people how could we refuse to provide accommodation, transport, 
food,’ he [the Gapensi report author Somingan] said. Pocket money for the su-
pervisors was normally Rp 200,000 per person [at that time US$40], Somingan 
added. …Far from paying only to be allowed to join the tender, Somingan said, 
even just to know that there is a project at all, the contractor has to prepare 
grease money for the individual bureaucrat in the government office owning 
the project.19
The contractor knew these costs would occur and recouped them by mark-
ing up the project cost above market prices as well as by cutting corners on 
construction materials. We shall see that this system remains essentially un-
changed even after the recent reforms. 
Reforms
Regulatory reform has picked up pace since 1998, but change on the ground 
has been less impressive. The multilateral agency reports acknowledge this, 
as the following paragraphs will show, but they explain it in terms of in-
stitutional ‘weakness’. Our own ethnographic work, on the contrary, sees 
remarkably successful organizational assertiveness rather than failure. An 
explanation of the resilience to reform must start by recognizing these re-
alities, not by ignoring them. Like the reforms that had come before them, 
the 2003 Presidential Decree (Keppres no. 80/2003 on ‘Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Government Procurement of Goods and Services’) sought 
to enforce more competitive and transparent tendering procedures, while at 
the same time protecting smaller businesses. It addressed serious deficiencies 
in the system and promoted international ‘best practice’ principles of pro-
curement: transparency, open and fair competition, economy and efficiency. 
It came after a period of both public and private pressure by major interna-
tional agencies for reform to Indonesia’s public procurement (see especially 
World Bank 2001, 2003:31-9). The World Bank (2003:31) explained its context 
as follows:
19 ‘Pungutan terbesar ‘fee pimpro’’, Kompas 14-4-1997.
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Looking ahead to the emergence of an Asian Free Trade Zone and the imple-
mentation of future WTO provisions that would require member states to allow 
access to government procurement for companies from Indonesia’s trading part-
ners, it well behoves Indonesia to develop a world class public procurement sys-
tem rather than one that has a poor global reputation for encouraging corruption.
The decree set tight tendering standards for large projects, relaxing them 
for smaller ones (the cut-off limits have shifted downwards over time). It 
graded contractors according to their technical and financial capacities, al-
lowing only the larger ones to take on big jobs, while reserving smaller jobs 
for smaller companies. Tendering committees now also had to be certified.
The implementation of these and other rules is another matter, however. A 
2007 UN study measuring Indonesian public procurement practices by a set 
of OECD ‘benchmarks’ still gave the country poor marks on every indicator. 
For example Indonesia scored only 33.3% on the ‘functionality of procure-
ment market’ (PCDC 2007). One problem is that the budget process actually 
stimulates corruption in the government building sector. Budget discussions 
involve many different departments and legislators, making them so drawn 
out that, every year, 50% of total capital expenditure is spent in the final 
quarter (World Bank 2007:98). This results in the routine use of a regulation 
permitting tenders for certain government contracts to be bypassed under 
‘emergency’ conditions. Budget discussions often focus on specific project 
inputs – parliamentarians taking a particularly close interest – rather than 
broader program outputs (World Bank 2007:100-1). 
Auxiliary institutions also remain ‘weak’. Abuses should be picked up 
by the various government audit agencies (World Bank 2007:96). But low 
staffing levels, overlapping responsibilities, and corruption in the auditing 
bodies themselves mean that little is uncovered. The mess of contradictory 
regulations in a decentralized environment (World Bank 2001:1, 2007:103) is 
another reason why reforms are difficult to implement. A unifying National 
Procurement Office, to be located in the national development agency 
Bappenas, is still under construction. Administrative oversight is particularly 
anemic at the provincial and district levels. A World Bank report (2007:126) 
concluded: ‘Overall, public financial management systems at the sub-national 
level are weak and risks of corruption are very high’.
In our view, contradictory, overlapping regulatory institutions are the 
sedimentation of political struggles within the state. On the one hand, the 
state budget is balanced centrally, so the pressure for reform comes mainly 
from Jakarta, especially from particular state agencies more committed to 
economic reform and, from further afield, from the international political 
economy and the neo-liberal currents and agencies that populate it. Since 
the 1998 economic crisis and political reformasi, governments in Jakarta have 
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more frequently sought the technical advice of multilateral agencies on gov-
ernance techniques. Local governments, on the other hand, derive nearly all 
their income from the centre and thus experience pressure to economize and 
regularize mainly as an external force. Internally, their need for local political 
support encourages collusive behaviour. In the following section we look at 
some actual examples of such struggles. 
How the system works: the view from Aceh
Here we examine the construction sector from below, not as a set of institu-
tions open to technocratic tinkering but as a set of social actors strategizing 
to promote their interests. Our field experience and reading of press reports 
indicate that the post-1998 regulatory reforms have so far had little impact 
on the informal practices that underpin construction contracting at the 
grassroots. Outsiders to the system still make the same complaints, report-
ing familiar types of abusive practices. Particularly out in the provinces, the 
system represents an informalized version of the New Order corporatist one 
described above. The corporatist organizations have lost the dominant posi-
tion they once maintained, but they still act as important venues through 
which influence and information is traded. More importantly, the informal 
and collusive practices that underpinned the old corporatist system remain 
intact. From the individual contractor’s point of view, success is all about the 
double strategy of building cooperation with allies and keeping out rivals.20
Aceh does not seem like a typical Indonesian province. Its long-running 
armed separatist revolt, the resulting military operations, and the terrible 
December 2004 tsunami created a degree of disruption not experienced 
elsewhere in Indonesia. The combination of a peace accord in 2005, tsunami 
disaster relief, and regional autonomy brought about an unparalleled flood of 
reconstruction money. However, the way this money was disbursed to local 
construction contractors – full of what the World Bank (2001:2) likes to call 
‘non-economic influence on public procurement’ – looked much like that in 
any other province, only more extreme. Many of the former combatants of 
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) rapidly transformed 
themselves into construction contractors, showing how easily political influ-
ence and coercive muscle power can be leveraged into business success in 
the sector. Aceh’s construction industry thus turns out to be a rather useful 
window on that in the rest of Indonesia. 
Construction takes up a large part of Aceh’s post-tsunami economy. 
20 The analysis of contracting in Aceh is partly derived from Aspinall (2009), and a more detailed discussion 
of the situation described here may be found in that publication. We thank the journal Indonesia for permission 
to re-use this material.
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According to the head of the Aceh branch of the Institute for the Development 
of Construction Services (Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi, LPJK), 
Nova Iriansyah, in 2007 alone the total money circulating in Aceh from the 
national budget (APBN), regional budgets (APBD) and the post-tsunami 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR) was approximately Rp 30 tril-
lion, of which about Rp 12 trillion (approx US$1.2 billion), or 40%, was allocated 
to construction activities.21 Little wonder that the number of players is consider-
able. According to one experienced Department of Public Works official, there 
are about 5,000 contractors in Aceh.22 The website of the LPJK puts the total at 
3,800.23 Construction contracting, however, is a steeply hierarchical world, and 
less than one percent of Acehnese contractors are in the highest grades and so 
entitled to bid for the largest contracts. According to the same informant, locals 
win only 30-40% of the big contracts, with the remainder typically being won by 
big companies from Jakarta (often state-owned enterprises known as BUMN) 
or by foreign construction companies cooperating with Indonesian firms. At the 
lower levels of the scale, contracting is virtually an Acehnese-only affair. 
Most of the attention of corruption watchers in the construction industry 
has focused on the tendering process. But in fact illicit payments are routine 
at every turn, from conception to completion of a contract, as some lists have 
shown.24 In theory the whole process is open and transparent. In reality, it is 
an open secret in Aceh – as in other parts of Indonesia – that it is shot through 
with manipulation. The central dynamic is between those bidding for con-
tracts, the contractors, and those offering them. The latter constitute a large 
network of public officials that includes, at its core, the tendering committee 
(panitia pelelangan) that assesses the bids and awards the contracts, the bureau 
heads (kepala dinas) and officials who appoint them and, ultimately, the local 
government head – the district chief (bupati), mayor or governor – who is at 
the apex of the system. It also includes budget officials and parliamentarians 
who can influence local government budgets. Payment of fees and the trading 
of political influence are virtually ever-present ingredients. At the same time, 
because of the highly political nature of the contracting world, virtually any 
actor with political influence is able to claim a stake in it.
The process begins with the budget proposals for construction that go 
21 ‘60 persen dana rekonstruksi Aceh mengalir ke luar’, Serambi 13-4-2007. Of this money, Nova Iriansyah 
estimated that about 60% ended up leaving Aceh because contracts were won by outside contractors, or 
because of the need to purchase material and employ consultants and labour from outside the province. 
22 Confidential interview, Lhokseumawe, 23-8-2008.
23 http://www.lpjk.org/modules/statistik/badan_usaha/2008/propinsi_golongan.php (accessed 4-4-2009). 
This is with a breakdown of 3,189 categorized as small, 597 as medium and 14 as large contractors. 
24 One list occurs in a 2004 report by the Habibie Center, which described local governments’ handling 
of development projects as a massive effort to divert public wealth into private pockets (The Habibie 
Center, ‘Desentralisasi korupsi melalui otonomi daerah’, Tempo Interaktif, 4 November 2004, http://www.
tempointeraktif.com/hg/narasi/2004/11/04/nrs,20041104-01,id.html, accessed 4-4-2009). 
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into the draft provincial and district budgets (APBD). It continues through 
the local parliamentary discussion process, which, as noted above, tends 
to revolve around individual projects rather than aiming at a broad policy 
level. Legislators in the Regional People’s Representative Councils (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), at both the provincial and district or 
city (kabupaten/kota) levels, help executive officials set the regional develop-
ment budget and spending priorities. They have leverage over the executive. 
Obstreperous legislators can make life difficult for local government heads 
and kepala dinas: they can alter budget allocations and so block favoured pro-
grams, they can delay budgets and other legislation, or launch investigations 
into government mismanagement. One way the executive tries to buy off 
legislators is by awarding projects to favoured contractors. Thus, Acehnese 
legislatures – as in other parts of Indonesia – have attracted large numbers of 
people with backgrounds as contractors. For example, after the 2004 election, 
20 of the 25 newly elected South Aceh DPRD members – 80% – turned out to 
be contractors.25 One of Aceh’s largest contractors estimated that about 20% 
of all DPRD members in Aceh have a contracting background; a Department 
of Public Works staff member said he thought it was more like 60-70%.26 
Executive government officials themselves often favour contractors of 
their own: sometimes they are relatives, more often their political backers 
and financiers. Such people can be assured a steady stream of construction 
contracts. Other persons able to stake a claim are from the police and military. 
During the conflict years in Aceh, it was widely known that the military (TNI, 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia) extracted massive rents from all manner of legal 
and illegal business in the province (McCulloch 2005). Since the 2005 peace 
agreement, the police are now more prominent in business, at least according 
to the daily gossip in the coffee shops where contractors, government officials 
and former combatants gather to swap stories and strike deals. Some contrac-
tors and government officials interviewed for this research mentioned cases 
where police were able to claim projects for themselves by launching corrup-
tion investigations at a suspect government agency, with the investigations 
being ended once new projects were directed their way. All players know that 
it is important to keep on side all actors with the power to punish. (Judges 
and, especially, prosecutors fall into the same category.)
For every departmental planning and tendering meeting the contractor 
pays compulsory ‘fees’ and ‘commissions’. There are more players than con-
tracts to go around. In order to keep everyone happy, the government will 
often break down large projects into smaller ones, in the name of creating em-
ployment and protecting small and medium enterprises. Next comes the pre-
25 ‘80% anggota DPRD Aceh Selatan didominasi kontraktor’, Waspada 4-9-2004. 
26 Confidential interviews, East Aceh and Lhokseumawe, 25 and 28-8-2008.
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qualification and qualification for tender participants, which involves pay-
ments to the contractors association and the local government department for 
permits. This results in a lucrative trade in forged business permits (Sertifikat 
Badan Usaha, SBU). When, at last, it is time to actually award a contract, it is 
possible to do so without a tender (direct appointment, penunjukan langsung) 
only for very small contracts, or in the case of an ‘emergency’. Both rules create 
loopholes for abuse. Large projects are sometimes split up into smaller ones 
that each fall below the limit. And a common emergency is the looming end of 
the budget year, when money must be spent quickly, as noted above. 
Tendering is a key moment in the process. Tenders are announced publicly 
in newspapers. The tendering committee (panitia pelelangan), whose members 
must be properly certified public servants, rank the bidding companies on the 
basis of price and quality. In practice, collusion is the rule at this tendering 
stage. Sometimes the strongest participant pays the others to agree on one 
winner while compensating the losers. For instance, a group of companies 
might bid for the same project and end on the tendering short list, then all but 
one will withdraw, with the winner either making payments to the others or 
striking an agreement that they will take turns in future. In some provinces, 
the agreement is known as arisan, in reference to a popular neighbourhood 
social gathering where participants contribute a small sum each week and 
give a ‘prize’ to an agreed member at every meeting. The losers in the tender 
are promised ‘withdrawal money’ (uang mundur). The phrase used for this in 
Aceh is ‘accompanying the bride/groom’ (intat linto: antar pengantin). Another 
technique to prevent an open tender is for a big player to put forward several 
of his private companies, their ownership thinly disguised through relatives, 
as ‘competitors’ in the same tender. These are known as ‘flag companies’ (pe-
rusahaan bendera) because they have nothing but their flag – usually not even 
an office, let alone equipment. They might all put in exactly the same tender 
and allow the tender committee to decide between them. Another com-
mon technique is the lending and borrowing of companies to allow poorly 
qualified constructors to bid for projects at a higher grade. Most of these 
techniques comply with the letter of the law. No one complains.
The primary axis of collusion, however, is between the contractors bid-
ding for projects and the government officials in charge of awarding them. 
Winning contractors routinely pay fees to those on the panitia pelelangan or to 
their superiors or associates. These fees are often called jatah pimpro (the proj-
ect leaders’ ‘share’: pimpro, or pimpinan proyek was the term used in the past 
for the officials in charge of commissioning and overseeing projects). Various 
anti-corruption NGO activists, businesspeople and junior bureaucrats inter-
viewed in Aceh made estimates of the amount that is usually paid by the 
winning bidder as jatah pimpro. Most fell in the vicinity of 5-10% of the project 
cost. Usually this money is paid by the winning company via an intermedi-
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ary. Part of that money is ‘deposited higher up’ (disetor ke atas), that is, the re-
ceiving officials make payments to their superiors, who in turn pass part of it 
up the chain. Some ends up with the kepala dinas, some is passed higher to the 
regional government head. In exchange for such fees, the officials’ superiors 
provide those lower down with political support and assist their promotion 
through the hierarchy.27 Bureaucrats involved directly in awarding contracts 
can also secure their positions by granting other favours to their superiors, 
notably by directing contracts to their relatives or associates.
Although it is accepted wisdom in Aceh that direct payment of jatah pim-
pro occurs in most tendering process, few of the informants who were directly 
involved in deciding on or bidding for tenders and who were interviewed for 
this research admitted directly that this was how the system works. Instead, 
they typically described a looser set of exchange relations, using terms like 
lobbying (melobi) and building relations (membangun relasi). Big contractors 
typically said that being able to ‘mix with all kinds of people’, having wide 
social relations (pergaulan luas) and being able to ‘bridge all sides’ are keys 
to their success. In short, this is a world where to be successful a contractor 
must invest not only funds, but also considerable time and energy in getting 
to know all manner of bureaucratic and business players who might one day 
be useful, and distributing petty and informal favours to them. To the extent 
that most contractors admit making direct payments to officials, they typi-
cally talk about paying for entertainment or travel. 
One successful contractor on Aceh’s east coast explained the system in 
very direct language: 
We don’t give jatah pimpro. There’s no rule of that sort. But in reality it’s not so 
much different. Instead it’s lobbying. It just depends on how clever we are at 
making promises to him, that’s all. You have to have insiders, people in the ten-
dering committee or among the kepala dinas. You approach the people in the com-
mittee. As the Batak people say: ‘to know someone is to love him, if you don’t yet 
know them, you won’t yet love them’. You have to know them. The key is you 
have to know the character of the people there. For example, if one likes girls on 
a Saturday night, then we’ll take him to Medan on Saturday night. We’ll take him 
to a hotel and give him a woman so that tomorrow he’ll love us. If he likes enter-
tainment, we’ll give him entertainment. If another one likes fighting cocks, I’ll go 
out and buy him a big rooster in a cage and bring it round to his house on a Sun-
day. If another likes to eat venison, we go and find venison and bring it to him. 
The key is that we must be able to read the character of other people. He won’t 
27 Two bupati interviewed for this research – former separatist fighters with no previous experience in 
government – explained that they were puzzled early on in their terms when kepala dinas began to make 
unexplained payments to them. They said they refused them. They presumed these monies were derived from 
project allocations in this way.
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ask for it: we need to be able ourselves to know what he likes. That’s the general 
pattern. And how much does all this cost? Well if the project is 1 billion, then 100 
million is pretty reasonable. That’s not a written rule but, yes, it’s about 10 %.28 
Another big contractor was a little more philosophical: 
Actually there’s no such thing as a set fee, say 10% of the contract cost. That’s 
not how it works. Instead, if they [that is, government officials] have a meeting, 
then we have to support them, if they want to go to Jakarta, then we support 
them. The philosophy of the entrepreneur is we have to be close to the govern-
ment leaders. There must be synergy. 
One expression of this synergy is that contractors in Aceh, as in other parts of 
Indonesia, often play an important role in supporting candidates for executive 
office in direct election (pilkada) campaigns, often as members of their ‘suc-
cess teams’ (tim sukses). Contractors fund district head or legislative election 
campaigns in the expectation of rewards to follow. Samuel Clark and Blair 
Palmer (2008:27) in their study of Aceh’s 2006 pilkada note the prevalence in tim 
sukses of ‘contractors and businessmen, people who were already enmeshed 
in neo-patrimonial networks with government figures, and used to pragmatic 
deal-making’. The tim sukses members expend their own financial resources 
in building networks and distributing material incentives down to the village 
level to build support for their candidate, with the hope ‘that their assistance 
would be repaid by political or material favors’ (Clark and Palmer 2008:28).
Once a contract is awarded there is no guarantee it will actually be filled by 
the company that won it. In fact, a well-established system exists in Aceh for 
‘borrowing’ companies during the bidding process and the sale of contracts that 
follows. Sometimes, small contractors will ‘borrow’ a higher grade company to 
make a bid for a contract for which they would not be qualified to bid directly. 
At other times, the process is reversed and a well-established contractor with 
expertise, equipment and capital, but lacking the political access required to 
win, will purchase a contract that has been won by a better-connected, but less 
capable, contractor. This happened a lot in Aceh after GAM-affiliated candi-
dates won a series of elections for local government heads from December 2006. 
Suddenly, with GAM members dominating local governments, former GAM 
fighters began to win many construction contracts, but they often lacked the 
capacity to do the work properly. As a result, many of them simply sold these 
contracts on to others, usually for a fee of about 6 to 15% of the contract value. 
Once construction work finally starts, regular payments are made to all 
the officials concerned. Especially important in the system established under 
28 Confidential interview, 26-8-2008.
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Keppres no. 80/2003, which aims to reduce corruption in government procure-
ment, is the role of supervisory consultants (konsultan supervisi or konsultan peng-
awas). These are employed to check on the progress of a project and ensure it is 
running on time and in accordance with project specifications. The government 
agency commissioning a project will pay each instalment to the contractor only 
after receiving positive reports from the konsultan supervisi. Such consultants are 
typically paid 10% of the project cost to perform this task, and in large projects 
these roles are also awarded by tender. However, according to one local leader 
of an anti-corruption group, such consultants’ reports are ‘80% lies’, because 
the consultants receive side-payments from the contractor working the project. 
Because so many fees and commissions are pulled out of the project cost 
at every stage, very few projects are completed well. To pay for all the fees, 
contractors skimp on material and equipment. Sometimes the project does 
not need to go any further than the paper stage to make money for those 
involved. The media regularly expose so-called ‘fictive projects’, which are 
completed only on paper but paid for with real money. 
In sum, despite Keppres no. 80/2003, the world of contracting is still one in 
which a great variety of actors from the executive government, security and 
law enforcement agencies, the legislature and business are bound together 
by tight webs of mutual dependence, exchange of resources and of favours, 
and of the potential threats they represent to each other. This, in short, is the 
world of ‘building relations’, membangun relasi, where rivalries and competi-
tion are suppressed in order to build the wide networks of influence and 
familiarity that are the key to business success.
That success brings rewards. The system we have described makes the 
contractors prestigious members of provincial society. One Acehnese ob-
server described their social status perceptively:
Most contractors I know look rich, especially the young ones. They have a nice 
car, at least a ‘Sabang’ [second-hand luxury car imported through Aceh’s free 
port Sabang]. Big house. They wear the latest fashion brands. Travelling to 
Medan or Jakarta, or these days even to Malaysia and Singapore, is nothing out 
of the ordinary for them. No surprise that many people admire the kontraktor. 
Older contractors adopt a simpler lifestyle, often just wearing an old T-shirt 
and sandals, even if they travel by plane overseas. Many girls love contractors. 
Potential mothers-in-law dream of getting a contractor for their daughter. A 
friend of mine complained because he lost the ‘beautiful flower’ he wanted to 
a contractor. ‘Capital shortfall!’, he said. Lots of people are proud to introduce 
themselves as a contractor, the family of a contractor, the friend or even just the 
neighbour of a contractor.29 
29 Saiful Mahdi, ‘Kontraktor’, Aceh Institute, http://id.acehinstitute.org/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=326:kontraktor&catid=25:kolom-oase (accessed 29-11-2008).
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Exclusion and violence in the contracting industry
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that political influence and 
corruption in the sector are peaceable, cooperative affairs. But competition for 
contracts produces losers as well as winners. Contractors say their system is 
based on ‘building relations’, but equally important is the exclusion of rivals, 
whether by means of gaining and defending privileged access to sources of 
government contracts, the ‘manipulation of information’ (Blundo 2006:238) 
(such as by tailoring bids to supposedly confidential information about ten-
ders) or, sometimes, by executive fiat or violent intimidation. 
The Aceh situation also illustrates this exclusionary and coercive side of 
contracting well. After the 2005 peace deal, former GAM combatants flooded 
into the construction industry, and their particular skills brought them dra-
matic success. Former GAM fighters did well not because they were skilled as 
contractors, but because they had privileged political access, especially after 
their allies won local government elections in December 2006, and because they 
deployed violence and intimidation against both officials who awarded con-
tracts and rivals who competed with them (see Aspinall 2009 for more details). 
There have been numerous reports of former fighters threatening violence 
against officials responsible for awarding tenders, or kidnapping or beating 
them or rival contractors. GAM actors often violently threatened other contrac-
tors in order to force them to withdraw bids from tenders that they themselves 
were interested in. More importantly, the GAM network continued to control 
what they call ‘access to the field’ (akses ke lapangan) through much of Aceh, 
with a network of former fighters present in most villages. These men were 
willing and able to take action against any economic activities in their villages 
that were not authorized by local GAM leaders – for example, by attacking or 
threatening staff, burning or otherwise destroying equipment, or by stealing 
material. The result is that any construction entrepreneur who wants to carry 
out work in areas where GAM is strong is required to offer sub-contracting 
work to local GAM leaders, employ local GAM men, or simply pay fees to the 
network. As a result of such methods, what on the surface passes as respect-
able contracting activity by former GAM fighters often involves little more than 
extortion and stand-over tactics, through which the movement extracts money. 
We have less data on violence, extortion and intimidation in other prov-
inces, but exclusion has long been a central dynamic in the contracting in-
dustry. During the New Order, exclusion was legislated by the state, which 
gave Gapensi members a monopoly on government contracts in the prov-
inces. Gapensi used this monopoly to keep out foreign capitalists and ethnic 
Chinese rivals. Internal discipline was strong because ejection from Gapensi 
was a career-killer. One of the more important innovations in the 1999 law on 
construction (UU no. 18/1999) was therefore to break the Gapensi monopoly. 
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The 1999 law provided for a ‘forum’ for the industry that took over some 
of the certificatory roles previously assigned to Gapensi, and allowed ‘one or 
more’ contractors’ associations to be represented on this forum. The forum 
was the LPJK.30 Its task is to professionalize the sector through research, train-
ing, and (most interestingly) accreditation. Initially LPJK awarded Gapensi 
the sole right to accredit contractors. But alternative contractors associations 
began to emerge from late 2000, such as Gapeksindo, Aspekindo, Gabpeknas, 
and Gapeknas.31 The new entrants successfully challenged the Gapensi mo-
nopoly on certification, and managed to persuade the national parliament to 
allow every association to certify its own members.32 The result has been a 
free-for-all. Increased local authority over construction budgets also meant 
each new organization had to persuade district and provincial governments 
it was acceptable to do business with them too.33 Formal organizational plu-
ralism is now a fact in every province. Nevertheless, by 2003 a new, less for-
mal, corporatism had begun to re-emerge in the form of provincial ‘forums’ 
of contractors’ associations. And LPJK membership statistics for its members 
organizations show that Gapensi remains the biggest organization in most 
provinces.34 The only exceptions are Southeast Sulawesi and the new prov-
ince of West Papua, where Gapeksindo dominates. 
In the interim, the breakdown of monopoly on information caused severe 
distress to those who had done well out of the old system. In South Sulawesi, 
matters came to a head with a murder in the island district of Selayar, near 
Makassar, on 18 July 2001. The rival association was the Association of National 
Construction Entrepreneurs (Gabungan Pengusaha Konstruksi Nasional, 
Gapeknas). One of the Gapeknas board members in Selayar was Chiwang, and 
its chairman was Chiwang’s brother-in-law Hasrun. Chiwang’s father Alwi 
Hasan was a Golkar member of the district parliament – a rather typical com-
bination in the construction business. It was the time of year when tenders are 
called, and the Selayar district chief was about to decide on up to Rp 12 billion 
(US$1.2 million) worth of projects including road improvements, schools and 
30 http://www.lpjk.org.
31 Gapeksindo is Gabungan Perusahaan Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National Association 
of Construction Companies; Aspekindo is Asosiasi Pengusaha Konstruksi Indonesia, or Indonesian Association 
of Construction Entrepreneurs; Gabpeknas is Gabungan Perusahaan Kontraktor Nasional, or National 
Association of Contracting Companies; Gapeknas is Gabungan Perusahaan Kontraktor Nasional Indonesia, or 
Indonesian National Association of Contractor Companies.
32 ‘Sertifikasi perusahaan konstruksi terusik friksi’, Bisnis Indonesia 28-2-2001.
33 For example, Gapeknas demonstratively visited the Yogyakarta local parliament late in 2000 to complain 
about the Gapensi ‘monopoly’ on gatekeeping construction contracts. Gapeksindo led a protest delegation to 
the local parliament in Garut, West Java, in mid-2006 to complain about being excluded from tendering for a 
road project (‘Gapeknas berantas monopoli Gapensi’, Bernas 5-12-2000; ‘Asosiasi perusahaan minta bantuan 
DPRD’, Pikiran Rakyat 22-6-2006).
34 http://www.lpjk.org/modules/statistik/badan_usaha/2008/asosiasi_golongan_propinsi.php (accessed 4-4-
2009).
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mosques. The Selayar branch of Gapensi, led by H. Anwar Ali, had repeatedly 
warned the district chief not to allow Gapeknas members to tender, since they 
were not in possession of a business permit. When the district head signaled 
he was about to do so anyway, the Gapensi chairperson placed an advertise-
ment in the local newspaper threatening to take the district head to court for 
breaking the rules. Seeing the advertisement, Chiwang, his father and about 20 
thugs went to the district Public Works office and threatened to blow it up with 
molotov cocktails unless they were allowed to tender. They then called by the 
Gapensi office and issued threats. The next day Chiwang and his father, who 
was wearing his parliamentary uniform, returned to the Gapensi office armed 
with knives. A shouting match ensued, followed by a frenzied attack that left 
Anwar Ali dead with 27 stab wounds to his body. By the end of the day hun-
dreds of men had gathered at their respective Gapensi and Gapeknas offices. 
They were about equally matched and ready for war. The police took several 
days to calm the situation, while the district head threatened to stop all project 
work unless the two sides agreed to lay aside their differences.35 
This example of violence in the construction industry is extreme but it 
is not unique, as the Aceh example also illustrates. In other provinces of 
Indonesia, rumours of violence and intimidation often swirl around the con-
struction industry, and preman, or small-time thugs, typically play a role in 
running protecting rackets in the industry and, often, in working construction 
projects themselves.36 The direct use of violence is only the most obvious form 
of exclusion in an industry where rivals are more often kept out by the assidu-
ous construction of intimidate relationships of mutual benefit between busi-
nesspeople and politicians, relationships that yield privileged access to the 
most business opportunities and which therefore must be jealously guarded.
Conclusions 
The neo-liberal fantasy of competition, in which there is a perfect market of 
entrepreneurial individuals who participate and succeed only according to 
their technical abilities, cannot be easily enforced in Indonesian provincial 
towns. There, emerging indigenous middle classes have made getting rich by 
35 ‘Pembunuhan: rebutan proyek berbuntut maut’, Tempo 30 July-5 August 2001; ‘Diduga dibunuh anggota 
DPRD setempat: ketua Gapensi Sulawesi Selatan tewas dibunuh’, Tempo Interaktif 19-7-2001; ‘Gapensi-
Gapeknas kisruh, proyek di Selayar ditunda’, Kompas 21-7-2001.
36 For example, the Central Java branch of Gapensi described the behaviour of rival contractors associations 
in 2001 thus: ‘These ‘cowboys’ terrorize anyone who don’t do as they say’. Exclusionary tendering practices 
for a multi-million dollar project led to a riot between Bugis and Dayak in the small town of Nunukan, East 
Kalimantan, in July 2007 (Charles Siahaan, ‘Antaretnis bersitegang di Nunukan’, www.kabarindonesia.com, 
posted 8-7-2007 (accessed 7-12-2007); ‘Cuplikan Munas Khusus Gapensi: problem kontraktor tiada berujung’, 
Suara Kontraktor , no date (2001), http://www.suarakontraktor.com/lip_beton.asp (accessed 16-6-2003).
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political means into an art form since the national revolution of 1945. The tech-
niques they have developed – some of them are analysed in the present chap-
ter – are part of their wider provincial struggles to seize state funding (known 
by economists as political transfer rents, see Khan 2000). Achieving political 
control not only gives them access to state budgets, it also allows them to keep 
out rivals. At the same time, in order to secure political dominance, they need 
to redistribute money and business opportunities to supporters, allies and, to 
varying degrees, potential rivals. In the construction sector they have done 
this by different means down the years. During the New Order years, state-
dominated corporatist organizations were a principal arena through which 
redistribution took place. Since the collapse of the New Order, a much messier 
system of ‘building relations’ has evolved, in which contractors and political 
decision-makers are connected by intricate webs of influence and exchange. In 
both periods, there was still plenty of competition between rival contractors, 
but this was never competition in which decisions were made on the basis of 
‘rational’ market considerations of efficiency and pricing. Instead, political 
connections and payments were always the key to success. 
The provincial building contractors now must wage a defensive struggle. 
The technocrats who threatened to open the doors to foreign competition in 
1966 have come to haunt them again after the reforms of 1999. In the long run 
they may prevail. In the meantime, the mess of contradictory regulations in 
the construction sector reflects slowly shifting trench warfare between pro-
vincial interests and stronger players in the centre and overseas, who push 
their agenda under the cover of anti-corruption regulations. The international 
pro-market agenda, increasingly being adopted by the government in Jakarta 
also in relation to the building industry, plays into a long-running social ten-
sion between what we may call a provincial intermediate class, consisting of 
an intermeshed amalgam of private entrepreneurs and public government 
officials, and metropolitan big business. Metropolitan actors, or at least some 
of them, are also more interested in satisfying pressures for reform imposed 
by multilateral agencies that ultimately determine the government’s interna-
tional credit rating. The larger construction companies based in Jakarta are 
relatively open to reform because they have superior skills and technology 
and would be able to compete in more open markets. 
The provincial business and political class, by contrast, is interested above 
all in redistribution along clientelist lines and in buying political stability. It 
is access to state budgets which determines business success, ensuring that 
there is no clear boundary between the private world of business and the 
public world of the government official. In part, this is because provincial 
actors neither pay nor collect taxes, but only spend them. 
The kind of networking provincial business players in Indonesia do, with 
each other and with government, is typical of smaller entrepreneurs all over 
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the world, from India to Italy (Rutten and Upadhya 1997:13-43). Consider, for 
example, the following scene: 
The waiting rooms of town halls are thus crawling with a multitudinous mi-
crocosm composed of subcontractors, artisans and canvassers seeking to see 
the mayor, his assistants or the technicians of urban planning, in the hope of 
obtaining a small construction contract or an order for supplies. For these small 
contractors, the simple fact of walking the corridors, reminding the authorities 
of their existence and ‘showing oneself’ represents the chance of being called 
one day or, failing that, of meeting big contractors likely to give them a subcon-
tract (Blundo 2006:239).
This description is from West Africa, but it is striking how it perfectly cap-
tures the atmosphere in government offices in provincial and small-town 
Indonesia. Visit almost any Indonesian district head’s offices today and you 
will find a similar diverse mixture of small-time operators, milling around 
in an atmosphere steeped in ambition, obsequiousness and anxiety. This is 
the social world of the construction contractor. Across the developing world, 
construction is a major earner for small-town dwellers who have risen above 
agriculture and petty trade. Almost everywhere, gaining privileged access to 
local government is the path to success.
In Indonesia’s building industry, corruption is thus part of a clientelistic 
system that has been in operation for a long time, and that is woven into the 
very fabric of social and political life in the regions. The agenda against it has 
been motivated by a neo-liberal push to reduce government powers. In fact 
clientelism has some advantages. It keeps wheels turning, ensures a degree 
of redistribution to small and medium entrepreneurs (albeit at the cost of ef-
ficiency), and it thus helps ensure political stability. Unbridled competition 
without the institutions to underpin it can increase uncertainty and instability 
by encouraging violent informal enforcement practices, as has happened in 
China and Russia (Ding 2001; Volkov 2002). It could even undermine exist-
ing institutional arrangements for guaranteeing property rights and personal 
security (Beeson 2001). If the globalizing anti-corruption agenda does prevail, 
it is by no means certain that Indonesia’s construction industry would look 
as benign as the agenda’s ideologues portray it. Instead of a better deal for 
average provincial contractors, it might spell their displacement by big and 
mainly foreign building companies.
Perhaps a more likely scenario than the wholesale dismantling of the ex-
isting clientelistic system, however, is the more familiar one of adaptation. 
Recent work on clientelism suggests precisely this outcome. Piattoni (2001) 
observed that democratization in Europe caused a reversal of the bureaucratic 
professionalization established in the nineteenth century era of modern state 
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formation. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) write that new forms of clientelism 
emerge out of the interaction of democratic competitiveness and economic de-
velopment. Roniger (2004), in a review of recent literature, points out that the 
post-authoritarian transition in Brazil caused a ‘reclientelization’ of business 
and politics. In fact, adaptation is the result we have so far seen in Indonesia. 
Democratic change and attempts to overhaul government procurement have 
far from eliminated clientelism in the system. The relatively centralized corpo-
ratist system for the allocation of construction contracts that developed during 
the New Order regime has been eroded. A new shell of open bidding for, and 
competitive assessment of, construction contracts has been put in place. Yet 
the real world of construction contracting is no less clientelistic (though it is 




The fragmentation and adaptability of corruption
One sector of Indonesian life where corruption arouses surprisingly little 
passion is education. While few Indonesians would deny that corruption 
is present throughout the education system, there have been relatively few 
high-profile and spectacular cases in the sector. Many people view corruption 
in education, particularly at the school level, as being petty, unavoidable and 
perhaps even morally acceptable. They see it as an understandable response 
by low-status public servants and teachers to supplement their miserable 
incomes. Moreover, a large amount of corruption in the sector simply passes 
under the radar of the public: it either takes place behind the closed doors of 
bureaucrats and politicians, or it takes the form of various education fees and 
charges that school children and their parents routinely pay without even 
realizing they are illegal. 
It is the contention of this article that corruption in Indonesia’s education 
system is both pervasive and fundamentally political in character. A number 
of cases of high-level corruption in the sector reveal a pattern of collusion 
between senior bureaucrats and politicians that resembles in form and style 
corruption in other sectors of government. Meanwhile, surveys and detailed 
case investigations carried out by my organization, Indonesia Corruption 
Watch (ICW), suggest that petty corruption at the school level, in the form of 
illegal fees and charges, is ubiquitous and closely related to the structure of 
corruption in the national education bureaucracy. Corruption in schools ex-
ists because local authorities and bureaucrats permit it, do not punish it, even 
require it (Widoyoko et al. 2007; Widoyoko 2007). 
The chapter, therefore, has several aims, and it makes several key argu-
ments. The first aim is to explain the structural context that shapes corruption 
in Indonesia’s education sector. Here, following the work of Michael Johnston, 
I argue that the general pattern of corruption in Indonesia is typical of a 
highly fragmented polity with a weak civil society. In particular, corruption 
in Indonesia since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998 has un-
dergone a process of decentralization that follows the broader rearrangement 
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of the political structure. Instead of corruption occurring within a single, uni-
fied and centralized ‘franchise system’ (see McLeod in this volume), it has pro-
liferated in an uncoordinated fashion around the new power centres that have 
emerged. The education sector is an example of this phenomenon. Education 
sector reforms have decentralized power and control over budgets both to the 
regions and to schools. As a result, the regional bureaucracy and the schools 
have become much more important foci of corrupt activity than in the past.
A second aim is to explain the structure of corruption in the sector itself. 
Here I argue that corruption is visible at four different levels. In the first and 
upper level the typical pattern involves collaboration between senior bureau-
crats and politicians, with the former providing corrupt payments from the 
education budget or from project funds in order to secure political or person-
al support. At the second level, in the regional education bureaucracies, local 
government officials and bureaucrats are the key actors. As in the first level, 
a key mode of corruption involves collaboration between government of-
ficials and private business in the manipulation of tenders and project funds, 
though local bureaucrats also treat school principals and teachers, and school 
budgets, as important targets of predation. Finally, the third and fourth levels 
of corruption, involving school principals and teachers respectively, are both 
located in the schools themselves, and to a large degree involve the extraction 
of illegal levies from parents. It is these bottom two layers of corruption that 
have become more prominent as a result of Indonesia’s recent political and 
education sector reforms.
A third and final aim is to scrutinize attempts to reform the education sys-
tem and eliminate corruption from it, to evaluate their successes and failures 
and to suggest ways forward. Here it is noted that strategies so far pursued 
have been based on a public sector reform approach and have thus involved 
manipulating the internal rules and mechanisms used by the education bu-
reaucracy (such as by making transfers of payments of school funds directly 
to schools rather than to local education bureaucrats). However, these initia-
tives fail to consider the broader context and the political structures within 
which education sector corruption takes place. As a result, corruption in the 
sector has shown an amoeba-like ability to adapt to the new reforms, dem-
onstrating that a more fundamentally political approach involving empower-
ment of societal participation in the sector is required.
The fragmentation of corruption and its effects 
In contextualizing corruption in Indonesia’s education system, it is help-
ful to draw on the analysis and framework presented by Michael Johnston 
in his research on corruption and politics, and the typology of corruption. 
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Corruption is frequently understood in narrow terms, usually focusing on 
bribery and actions that cause the state financial loss. This understanding is 
reflected in the corruption perception indexes that so dominate public dis-
course on corruption in Indonesia. A narrow understanding of corruption 
means that strategies that are used to reduce and prevent corruption often 
differ little from one state to another. However, there are many factors and 
actors to be considered in corruption. Johnston (1997) proposes a typology in 
which he groups corruption into four syndromes, each based on a distinctive 
balance between state and societal, or private, interests (see Table 1). He does 
this by comparing the strength of elite interests (he focuses on both economic 
and political elites, and measures their influence in terms of their control of 
centres of political power and economic resources) to those of civil society. 
Thus, in conditions where the ruling political elite is weak and where so-
cietal participation is high, such as in most Western liberal states, corruption 
takes the form of ‘interest group bidding’, in which powerful interest groups 
are able to influence and even enforce their will on state elites and so extract 
corrupt favours from them. The next category is ‘elite hegemony’ which is 
marked by both a powerful elite and high participation by society. In such 
circumstances political competition is limited and corruption predominantly 
takes the form of incumbent elites selling political access and directing the 
profits to themselves and their cronies. In conditions of elite hegemony, the 
border between the state and private interests is blurred, and collaboration 
between political elites and interest groups produces systemic and legal 
corruption. Examples include Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party, or 
Hong Kong before the formation of its Independent Commission Against 
Corruption. 
More relevant to our own discussion is a system of corruption dominated 
by a patronage machine, which is how Johnston categorized Indonesia under 
Suharto. Patronage machine systems are characterized by a powerful elite 
and a weak society, in which interest groups can exercise little influence on 
the state. In such systems, corruption is centred in the patronage machines 
that infuse the state: in Suharto’s Indonesia they were based around Suharto 
and the presidential palace. Yet this system also has implications for stability:
The machine leadership profits, politically and economically, from the status 
quo; it is in business for the long term, and will dole out patronage with a goal 
of maintaining its dominance rather than of looting the state. This is not to im-
ply that the corruption involved is not serious, or that it does not do economic 
and social damage. Machine-style corruption diverts wealth into the hands of 
the few, levies a ‘political tax’ on business, investment, and many ordinary jobs, 
and maintains the poor in a state of political dependency. (Johnston 1997:18-9.)
168 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
In such circumstances, the ruler or his circle can also control corruption if 
necessary. In Indonesia, if particular sites or varieties of corruption threat-
ened the broader interests of Suharto and his cronies, he took action to curb 
it and order law enforcement. One widely known example was the privatiza-
tion of the customs office in the mid-1980s which occurred when corruption 
there and poor law enforcement against smuggling threatened the economy. 
The famous ‘mysterious killings’ that occurred in the 1980s, and for which 
Suharto himself claimed credit, can also be seen as a tool to control crime 
rates when they were seen as threatening the economy (MacIntyre 2003; 
Duncan and McLeod 2007). With very high rates of corruption, but corrup-
tion that was centralized and controlled, Indonesia then enjoyed high rates of 
economic growth and was even considered in some quarters to be a success-
ful development model. 
Although the Soeharto franchise imposed net ‘private taxes’ on the outsider firms, 
it still provided sufficient in the way of the institutions needed for reasonably 
good economic performance, because it was in its own interest to do so. On occa-
sion when elements of the franchise became too greedy, Soeharto stepped in to 
bring them back into line. (Duncan and McLeod 2007:78; see also McLeod 2000.)
After the fall of Suharto, political power fragmented, giving rise to new 
power centres. At the national level, power was no longer so exclusively con-
centrated in the hands of the president. Parliament became much more influ-
ential and state reforms also created new auxiliary institutions, such as the 
Constitutional Court and the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) that have become very influential. Equally 
importantly, the government’s decentralization policy distributed power to 
the regions. Local executive government leaders – governors, mayors and 
district heads (bupati) – enjoy greater independence, as do local legislatures. 
The national government can no longer guarantee easy implementation of 
national policy as it could under Suharto. This, of course, also applies to 
anti-corruption policy: so we see that although President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono has made eradication of corruption a priority in his administra-
tion, he has been unable to ensure that all government units and departments 
comply. At the same time, societal interest groups remain relatively weakly 
organized and find it difficult to control the government. In short, Indonesia 
has become what Johnston (2000:21) would categorize as a system of ‘”frag-
mented clientelism” in which elites are poorly institutionalized and economic 
opportunities are scarce; political entrepreneurs build personal followings by 
promising material rewards, but find it difficult to “deliver”’. 
In a fragmented clientelistic polity, according to Johnston (2000:21) ‘a cor-
ruption spiral is a real possibility’ because politicians’ followers are poorly 
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disciplined and ‘leaders must compete with other factions by promising ever-
larger spoils.’ Fragmented power in Indonesia has thus created mushroom-
ing corruption throughout the country. Virtually all public officials now have 
greater authority and thus new opportunities to engage in corrupt activity. 
At the same time, members of the political elite generally feel more insecure 
than they did in the Suharto era, because of the much greater competition 
for power. The motives of corruption are thus not only self-enrichment, but 
also maintaining access to power and resources, by building political coali-
tions up into the state, down into society and even horizontally, to poten-
tial rivals. As a result, it is not only state officials and government leaders 
who can engage in corruption in Indonesia; corruption is often shared with 
outsiders, even members of the political opposition. To reduce internal op-
position and threats from within the state, meanwhile, ruling elites share the 
proceeds of corruption with their staff in the bureaucracy, or at least tacitly 
give them permission to engage in petty corruption. This permission reduces 
instability within the institution headed by the official concerned. Finally, all 
this corruption flourishes in a system of fragmented clientelism such as con-
temporary Indonesia because society and organized interest groups remain 
insufficiently powerful to prevent it.
Table 1. Regime types and patterns of corruption
Elite
Weak Strong
Interest group bidding 
Strong private interests, accessible elites; 
economic competition, interest groups 
use wealth to seek influence; corruption 
is largely individual and non-systemic.
Elite hegemony
Entrenched elites exchange scarce political 
access for wealth.
Fragmented clientelism
Fragmented and politically insecure 
elites build personal followings that are 
poorly disciplined, unstable; mafias, 
violence and intimidation may be linked 
to corruption.
Patronage machines
Strong elites control participation and limit 
competition via patronage and capitalize 
upon followers’ poverty; political mono-
polies; parties are hierarchical and tightly-
controlled and extend power into state and 
society.
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Indonesia’s system of fragmented clientelism has been highly consequential 
for Indonesia’s education sector during the Reformasi period, especially since 
decentralization. It has generated a pattern of fragmented corruption in the 
sector. Before analyzing that pattern in detail, it is necessary to understand 
the new policy and institutional framework. 
A policy of decentralization has been pursued in education. In the ter-
tiary sector, it has led to the transformation of universities into state-owned 
legal entities (Badan Hukum Milik Negara, BHMN) which can request much 
higher tuition fees from students than previously, meaning that some high-
demand courses in elite universities have become unaffordable even for com-
fortable middle class families. In the elementary and secondary schools (the 
main focus of this article), decentralization has taken the form of the intro-
duction of a new system of school-based management (Manajemen Berbasis 
Sekolah, MBS). With this system, unlike in the past when all authority was 
concentrated with the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education, school prin-
cipals together with school committees, which consist of representatives of 
parents and the community, have the authority to formulate school budgets, 
design curriculum and handle school management in its entirety. At the city 
and district level, the MBS policy also promotes the establishment of local 
education councils that give recommendations regarding education to the 
local/city government (Irawan et al. 2004). 
The MBS policy was thus intended to encourage societal participation in 
the education sector, particularly in school management. In part, the model 
was inspired by successful international experiences. Fung (2003), for exam-
ple, has described how participatory school management in Chicago through 
the vehicle of Local School Councils (LSCs) has been widely seen as a success-
ful model of grassroots participation in governance to rival the famous Porto 
Alegre participatory budgeting process.1 In Chicago, the LSCs are elected 
every two years, and each consists of six parents, two community representa-
tives, two teachers, the principal and an additional non-voting student. LSCs 
enjoy substantial powers and responsibilities, such as in hiring and firing 
principal, spending discretionary funds, and developing and implement-
ing strategic plans for school improvement in areas including curriculum, 
physical design and administrative operation (Fung 2003:111). Fung does not 
pay particular attention to the problem of corruption; however, it is easy to 
surmise that the level of scrutiny of school affairs envisaged by LSC system 
would provide a mechanism for parents and community members to closely 
monitor, and reject, wasteful or unnecessary spending in the school budget.2 
1 On the Porto Alegre participatory budgeting experience see Baiocchi 2003.
2 Currently my organization, ICW is working on participatory budgeting at the school level in Garut and 
Tangerang. Our experience is that during budget meetings, parents reject irrelevant school levies, automatically 
reducing the amount of money to be paid by parents.
 The education sector 171
The school-based management policy in Indonesia is seen by its support-
ers as a measure to return schools to community control, after the New Order 
years when schools were viewed as being dependent upon the government, 
thus killing their creativity and initiative. The policy is envisaged as a means 
to revive schools as an ‘instrument for the community to achieve its interests’, 
as Bejo Sudjanto, the Rector of the Jakarta State University has put it (Irawan 
et al. 2004:50). One focus of the policy is the school budget, which supporters 
of the policy view as being an important instrument of participatory gover-
nance. The idea is that the school budget would be subject to the scrutiny of 
parents and the broader community via the school committees. Clearly stating 
all school revenues and expenditures, and providing information about school 
programs, finances and sources of funds, the idea is that the budget would be-
come the tool whereby community members would ensure that schools serve 
community needs, and not be used for other purposes, including corruption.
Unfortunately, the systemic character of corruption has made the policy of 
decentralization of school management to local committees fail in achieving 
its goal of eliminating corruption. Instead, corruption in education is now 
carried out ‘in a new way, via school-based management. The chief actor in 
this new model of corruption is the school principal, assisted by the school 
committee and the education bureaucracy’ (Purwanto 2008). As we shall see, 
corruption in the school is still not the only form of corruption in the educa-
tion sector, but it remains virtually ubiquitous. The school-based manage-
ment policy has clearly not worked as intended. One of the problems is that 
the members of school committees generally lack adequate capacity: most 
of them do not have the skills or experience to challenge school principals 
on budget formulation, and they generally lack sufficient information about 
school expenditures, income, curriculum and special projects to be able to 
form a clear picture of what might be wasteful expenditure or illegal charges. 
The result is that school principals dominate policy formulation and budget-
ing at the school level. Parents often even lack access to school budget docu-
ments. This imbalance in power relations often results in the school committee 
simply endorsing, and therefore providing a legal basis to, the various pay-
ments arranged by the principal in the budget. Very often, therefore, instead 
of improving societal participation, the new system legitimates corrupt prac-
tices in the school. Without better skills on the part of committee members, 
the participatory governance envisaged by the school-based management ap-
proach is unlikely to be meaningful. Furthermore, despite the policy, corrupt 
practices at the school level remain linked to the interests and intervention of 
the bureaucracy. To a large degree, local education authorities (specifically, 
the district and city offices of the Ministry of National Education) still control 
schools. Unlike the LSCs in Chicago that decentralize power right down to 
parents, the Indonesian policy of decentralization of education, despite being 
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called school-based management, in some crucial regards stops at the level of 
the local bureaucracy. The power to hire and fire principals, and to approve 
school budgets, remains in the hands of local education authorities. Overall, 
the new school committees have become something like a fashion accessory 
in Indonesia’s new education system: beautiful to look at, but not performing 
a meaningful function, and certainly not bringing about basic change in the 
way that the system is run. 
The pervasiveness of corruption in education
Most Indonesians perceive corruption in the education sector as being rela-
tively inconsequential, and as involving mainly petty corruption by low-level 
public servants and school teachers. Moreover, everybody knows that the sal-
aries of teachers and junior public servants are relatively low. Many ordinary 
citizens are relatively forgiving of small-scale corruption by such people, 
viewing it as an understandable attempt to generate extra income by people 
in difficult personal economic circumstances. This situation then makes the 
education sector appear not to be as corrupt as many other government in-
stitutions, a picture confirmed by various corruption perception surveys (for 
example, ADB 2002, Simanjuntak and Akbarsyah 2008). The low ranking of 
the education sector in these surveys, it should be noted, partly reflects the 
backgrounds of the respondents: most such corruption perception surveys 
poll investors and businesspeople, who understandably highlight institutions 
whose corruption impinges most directly upon their own business affairs. 
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a wider public perception that corruption 
in the education sector is not especially serious.
As we shall see, the public perception is not entirely accurate. Corruption 
is as pervasive in education as in most other sectors of government. But the 
perception also does contain an element of truth. Certainly, the education 
sector is not mostly a site of the grand corruption that has so scandalized 
Indonesian public opinion over the last decade. In contrast, for example, 
to corruption in the banking sector, which has seen episodes like the Bank 
Indonesia Liquidity Support (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia) scandal 
that nearly caused the collapse of the entire Indonesian economy, most cor-
ruption in education gives rise to only relatively minor state losses. Moreover, 
corruption in education relatively rarely involves prominent public officials 
or politicians (though, as we shall see, there are exceptions). More frequently 
it involves only school principals, teachers and low-ranking public servants. 
Although corruption in education does not cause huge state losses and 
rarely involves elite politicians and businesspeople, it also has special char-
acteristics of its own. Instead of involving theft of state money, corruption in 
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education typically involves taking money directly from the pockets of ordi-
nary citizens. Most commonly this happens when parents of schoolchildren 
are charged all kinds of irregular and unauthorized fees for their children’s 
education. This kind of corruption, therefore, affects ordinary people very 
directly. Unfortunately, however, citizens are often not aware that money is 
being extorted from them to provide a public service that is theirs by right. A 
general lack of transparency and accountability at the school level make many 
parents think that the numerous levies they must pay are not corruption but 
obligatory charges for services. This lack of civic awareness about people’s 
rights as citizens in turn creates opportunities and incentives to act corruptly. 
The ‘citizen report card survey’ conducted in 2005 by Indonesia Corruption 
Watch shows that many parents share a perception that the government is not 
obliged to fully pay for their children’s education (ICW 2005). The survey 
was conducted in three cities: Jakarta, Garut and Solo, with 1500 parents as 
respondents. Many of those surveyed agreed that parents should contribute 
to education costs, some even believed that it was the obligation of parents 
to fully pay for their children’s education (Irawan 2006:40). In fact, the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution, passed in 2002, stipulates that every citizen 
should receive a basic education and that the government has the obligation 
to provide it (Article 31). Law no. 20/2003 on the National Education System 
states ‘National and regional governments have the obligation to provide 
good education services and facilities, with a guarantee of good quality, and 
without any discrimination to all citizens’ (Article 11(1)). Article 11(2) adds 
that ‘National and regional government have to guarantee the availability 
of a budget for the education of every citizen aged between 7 and 14 years’. 
Based on cases that have come to the attention of Indonesia Corruption 
Watch and research conducted by our teams in the field down the years, it 
is clear that corruption in education is systematic and embedded in every 
level of the education bureaucracy’s structure. Virtually every actor who has 
authority in the structure abuses that authority by acting corruptly. Thus, the 
so-called petty corruption that is the most visible form of abuse exists because 
principals order it or at least give their permission for it to go ahead. The 
principals then use some of the money that is paid by parents to pay bribes, 
disguised as transportation fees or other payments, to the school supervisors 
from the local education authority (dinas pendidikan). As a reward for such 
payments, the local education authority will prioritize the schools run by the 
most ‘generous’ principals for projects, and also protect such principals from 
investigations or parents’ complaints. ICW and parents associations have had 
experiences of filing reports on corrupt principals, who are then backed up 
by the local education office, rather than being punished. If public complaints 
increase dramatically, the office tends at most to transfer the principal to an-
other school, where he or she will again engage in corrupt practices. 
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As well as this school-level corruption that involves direct interaction with 
parents, there is also less visible corruption in the education system, includ-
ing in the higher echelons of the education bureaucracy and leaching into the 
world of national politics. As a major function of the government involving 
large sums of money (the Department of Education gets a budget allocation 
that surpasses that of other government departments) education is as vul-
nerable to corruption as other parts of government. Much of the education 
budget goes on costs, such as teachers’ salaries, that are relatively free of ma-
nipulation (though even here bureaucrats sometimes invent phantom (fiktif) 
teachers or public servants to enable money for salaries to also be diverted). 
However, the government also provides funds for purchasing materials 
(school books for example), constructing school buildings and other projects, 
all of which are vulnerable.
By analyzing corruption cases that have come to light over the last de-
cade, I have formulated a typology of corruption in the education sector 
summarized in Table 2. It can be seen here that only at the lower levels does 
corruption involve direct extraction of fees from parents, at the higher levels 
corrupt actors directly access government funds, or engage in manipulative 
behaviour to attract payments from private companies. Despite the differ-
ences, however, there is a common pattern: at each level government func-
tionaries access whatever sources of funds they exercise direct authority over 
(money from parents at the school level, money for major national projects in 
the central ministry) and use those funds both for their own consumption and 
to buy political support and protection from more powerful players in the 
education hierarchy. Thus, teachers transfer money to principals, principals 
transfer money to local education authorities, and so it goes on, right up the 
chain to the senior ministry officials who make payments to national politi-
cians to buy their support. 
The first layer of corruption
The first layer of corruption involves high-level public officials at the Ministry 
of National Education. The motives of corruption at this level in the post-Su-
harto period, besides self-enrichment and the enrichment of cronies, include 
buying political protection by giving education projects to politicians or their 
allies. In particular, unless senior bureaucrats ‘share’ their corrupt activities 
with politicians, especially by making projects available for parliamentarians 
to distribute to their constituents and supporters, there is a likelihood that 
parliament will oppose, frustrate, delay or under-fund every education poli-
cy. This is how and why legislators have become such prominent participants 
in corruption in the new system of ‘fragmented clientelism’: legislatures at 
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Table 2. Varieties of corruption in education 
Layer of corruption Actors Mode of operation 
First layer Ministry of National 
Education officials
	‘Tendering’ education pro-
jects for local government or 
allocating projects without 
proper procedures to crony 
contractors. 
	‘Buying’ political support by 
giving vouchers to politician.
Second layer Local education aut-
hority officials
	‘Tendering’ government or do-
nor-funded projects to schools. 
The schools that provide the 
highest bid in bribes will win 
the project.
	‘Tendering’ principal’s position 
to teachers.
Third layer Principals and school 
committee members
	Double budgeting. The prin-
cipals request money from 
parents for activities that have 
been funded by the govern-
ment. 
	Using school funds for non-
educational activities, such as 
‘coordination fees’ to be paid to 
bureaucrats and the police. 
Fourth layer Teachers 	Teachers use their authority 
to collect additional payments 
from students, for photocopy-
ing, examinations and so on. 
Source: Irawan et al. 2004; Aditjondro 2002.
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every level have the potential to be veto-players in all manner of government 
policy and budgets.
There are several examples of this first layer of corruption. One was a 
well-publicized scandal in a book procurement project funded by the World 
Bank. ICW publicly revealed details of this case in 2000. The case began in 
the final years of the Suharto government, with a Book Reading Development 
Project (BRDP) launched in 1995 by the Department of National Education. 
The aim of the project was to provide books to junior high schools. The total 
cost of the project was US$132.5 million, funded by a World Bank loan. It was 
planned that the project would be implemented in four phases between 1996 
and 2000 but public complaints about corruption resulted in the fourth phase 
being cancelled and the project being closed on 31 December 2001, after it had 
disbursed only US$53.23 million.
The project involved Regional Offices of the Department of Education 
organizing book procurement by tender, although the books they purchased 
were from a list already recommended by the central office of the Department. 
According to the investigations by ICW, at least 19% of the budget was dis-
tributed corruptly to various actors. Ten percent went to local project leader 
(pimpro), 5% to the Directorate General of Basic and Intermediary Education 
(Ditjen Dikdasmen), 1% to World Bank staff, 1% to the book centre (Pusat 
Perbukuan) of the Ministry of Education, 1% to the State Treasury Office 
(Kantor Perbendaharaan Kas Negara) and 1% to other parties. Furthermore, 
every publisher that won a contract had to purchase paper from PT Pinasti, 
which charged 20% more than normal market prices.3 
Because of the massive publicity in the national and international me-
dia that this scandal generated, the World Bank sent staff from INT, its 
Department of Institutional Integrity, a section based in Washington DC 
with authority to investigate corruption in World Bank projects. In 2004, the 
Bank acknowledged that corruption had occurred in the project. In response, 
it published a black list of publishers and persons who were not allowed to 
receive further World Bank projects for durations of between two and fif-
teen years. The list included top Indonesian publishing companies such as 
Grasindo, owned by the Gramedia Group, the publisher of Indonesia’s lead-
ing newspaper Kompas, as well as Mizan, Erlangga and Kanisius.4 
Corruption in the book project occurred, or at least began, in the final 
years of the Suharto regime and, typical of the pattern of corruption in that 
period, the chief beneficiaries of the Suharto ‘patronage machine’ were lo-
cated in the state bureaucracy. A more recent case of national-level collusion 
involves a national education voucher project (Irawan 2007). This scandal 
3 ICW report to Dennis de Tray, The World Bank Representative at Jakarta, September 1998.
4 The complete list can be seen at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:2
0262893~menuPK:34464~pagePK:64003015~piPK:64003012~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 7-9-2010).
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demonstrates that in recent years the pattern of patronage distribution has 
become increasingly fragmented.
In this scandal, the Ministry of National Education distributed vouchers to 
schools through politicians and other prominent figures. The so-called vouch-
ers were in effect a block grant mechanism for private schools. Schools that 
received vouchers could submit proposals for the sum of the voucher – often 
up to hundreds of millions of rupiah – for financial support from the Ministry 
to build new class rooms or libraries, or to renovate school property. The 
case attracted media attention when the speaker of Indonesia’s parliament 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), Agung Laksono, was exposed as distrib-
uting vouchers to schools. According to Bambang Sudibyo, the Minister of 
National Education, Agung Laksono was chosen not because he was speaker 
of the DPR but because he was the leader of Kosgoro, a mass organization 
related to the Golkar Party that owned around 600 schools (Kompas 19-10-
2006). Then it was revealed that several other senior politicians, notably DPR 
members who served on the DPR’s education commission, were doing the 
same thing. The MPs did not benefit by receiving money from these vouch-
ers for their personal use, but they benefited politically, because they could 
determine where to distribute them. Instead of giving vouchers to the schools 
that needed them most, politicians distributed them to schools linked to their 
own constituents, as part of their attempts to construct their own patronage 
networks and expand or solidify their political influence. Investigations by 
ICW thus found that vouchers mostly went to schools that were linked close-
ly to the individual politicians, their political parties or the socio-religious 
organizations with which they were affiliated. In particular, a large number 
of vouchers went to schools run by Muhammadiyah, the large modernist 
Islamic organization that runs many health and education services. It so 
happened that the Minister came from the National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amanat Nasional, PAN), a party that was established and previously led by 
Amien Rais, the former national leader of Muhammadiyah and which was 
still rooted in the Muhammadiyah milieu. Presumably, the minister needed 
to satisfy his own constituents in PAN and Muhammadiyah, and used the 
distribution of vouchers to do so. But other MPs also distributed vouchers to 
their own constituents, as the example of Agung Laksono and his distribution 
of vouchers to Golkar-linked Kosgoro schools demonstrates. In turn, by dis-
tributing these vouchers through politicians, rather than directly through the 
education bureaucracy, senior officials at the Ministry of National Education 
were buying good relationships with MPs and other politicians, with the aim 
of reducing criticisms of the Ministry’s policies and securing their fast ap-
proval by parliament. In this way, the distribution of the vouchers was also 
creating a conflict of interest for MPs: receiving vouchers undermined their 
independence and meant they were less likely to objectively monitor the per-
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formance of the Ministry. From the politicians’ point of view, however, the 
key motivation was that the vouchers were a convenient means to build their 
support bases and buy political support, precisely what we would expect in 
a system of ‘fragmented clientelism’.
The second layer of corruption
In the second layer, corruption involves local education authorities, most im-
portantly the education bureau (dinas pendidikan) offices at the district level. 
Substantial authority over the education sector, including authority over how 
to spend the education budget, was transferred to this level of government by 
Indonesia’s post-1999 decentralization reforms.
One example of corruption at this level concerns book procurement, which 
had caused such a scandal in 2000 at the national level. As part of decentral-
ization, the authority to procure school books was transferred to local govern-
ments, along with the other responsibilities in education and other sectors of 
government. Now, the Ministry of National Education in Jakarta only devises 
a list of recommended texts. However, this decentralized procurement system 
was not accompanied by a comprehensive corruption prevention policy, with 
the result that not only the authority to make decisions about procurement 
was decentralized, but so too were the opportunities to benefit corruptly from 
procurement. In several recent corruption cases to attract outside attention, 
local government officials have marked up book prices, particularly in coop-
eration with PT Balai Pustaka, a state-owned publishing enterprise. In some 
cases, local governments pay more for books than the price they are available 
for on the open market, despite being ordered in bulk. Book publishers often 
aggressively lobby local governments and pay bribes to local officials to en-
sure that they win tenders to provide books. With the bribes to officials being 
paid for from the money allocated to do the work, the result is often that very 
poor quality books are produced, or simply that less books are purchased than 
they would be if normal market prices were paid. Some local governments, 
for example in the province of Bengkulu, even procured books that were not 
on the list of recommended books, and which thus could not be used when 
they reached the schools. In several districts, the district heads (bupati) as well 
as members of local legislative councils and heads of education bureaus have 
been charged with corruption in book procurement scandals.5
Another example of corruption at this level involves the School Improvement 
Grant Project (SIGP), a multi-donor project managed by the World Bank. The 
project provided grants to 8,000 schools in about 130 districts, at a total cost 
5 For details, see Sugiyanti 2008.
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of about US$60 million (Baines 2004:2). This project is generally depicted as a 
good governance success story because it involved direct transfers of money 
to school accounts, a measure that was specifically designed to reduce cor-
ruption and respond most effectively to school-level needs (Baines 2004; 
Hallak and Poisson 2007). The rationale was that distributing money directly 
to schools would minimize opportunities for intervention by the bureaucracy 
and, therefore, corrupt manipulation by it. ICW conducted investigations into 
the program in 2003-2006 and showed that, indeed, there was no corruption 
in the program in terms of theft of state money. Probably 100% of the money 
distributed by the program went directly to the targeted schools, a consider-
able achievement. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy still played an important 
role. In particular, the local bureaucracy, namely the education bureaus at the 
district and sub-district levels, nominated which schools needed the grant. 
This gave local bureaucrats crucial power that they could abuse and they did 
so by inducing school principals to pay bribes, typically of around 10% of the 
total grant the school would receive, as a ‘down payment’ for being picked as 
a project recipient. This variety of corruption does not involve stealing state 
or donor money. An auditor would not find evidence of embezzlement in the 
project implementation. This is because the principals will have paid their bribe 
even before receiving the money from the grant, money which is then spent 
on school improvement as intended. To pay the bribe, however, the principals 
raised the money from other sources, such as fees charged to parents. 
More generally, it is well-known among teachers that being appointed as 
a principal is a costly exercise. Teachers who want to be promoted as a prin-
cipal have to bribe Education Bureau officials. The cost varies with the type 
and location of the school: to be a principal of a senior high school in a city 
is much more expensive than becoming the principal of a village elementary 
school. This situation then creates a cycle of corruption because the principal 
has to recoup his or her ‘investment’ by charging various fees in the school.
Another mode of corruption involving the local-level bureaucracy was 
revealed by investigations carried out by ICW and the Civil Society Working 
Group (Kelompok Kerja Masyarakat Sipil, KKMS) in the district of Lombok 
Tengah. In this instance, in order to deal with the ‘problem’ that block grant 
money was transferred directly to the school, local education bureau officials 
ordered the principals to hand the school account books to the local bureau-
cracy, which would then manage the accounts itself. By controlling school 
accounts in this way, the local bureaucracy could take part of the money they 
contained for their own purposes. The principals had little choice but to ac-
cept this irregular way of doing things because, if they refused, they would 
receive no future projects and might suffer other repercussions.6
6 Interview with Syamsudin Sirah and Ade Irawan, 2-5 November 2006.
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Such examples show how difficult it is to eradicate corruption, even by 
quite radical technical adjustments and good governance programs. Even 
transferring money directly to school accounts, with the purpose of cutting 
out the influence of a swathe of the middle bureaucracy, does not eradicate 
corruption. Instead, it only shifts the target of corruption and does not affect 
the underlying distribution of power within and over the school from which 
corruption flows. Principals, themselves the dominant player at the school 
level, remain accountable basically only to the local government authorities. 
Even with their new power to control school accounts and receive money di-
rectly, any principal who refuses to make corrupt payments to local govern-
ment officials will suffer adverse consequences. His or her school might not 
receive future grants or government projects. The bureaucracy can also pun-
ish recalcitrant principals by transferring them to schools located far away 
from their homes, potentially causing great personal inconvenience and ad-
ditional transport, accommodation and other expenses. Moreover, the SIGP 
example demonstrates another change in the mode of corruption in the edu-
cation sector. In this case, principals and officials did not take money directly 
from the state budget but instead obtained it from parents. According to the 
current anti-corruption law in Indonesia, such activity is not categorized as 
corruption. The anti-corruption law defines corrupt practices as involving 
theft of public money or bribery, not extortion from ordinary citizens. This 
limits the law enforcement options at the third and fourth levels of corrup-
tion, to which our attention turns now. 
The third and fourth layers
In order to measure corruption at the school level, in 2006 ICW conducted 
citizen report card surveys about school finances and accountability in public 
elementary schools in several cities and districts (Jakarta, Tangerang, Padang, 
Garut, Manado, Bau-Bau, Central Lombok, and West Sumba). Respondents 
were more than 8,000 parents of public elementary school children (ICW 2007).
The extent of corruption at the school level can be seen from the enormous 
range of illegal levies that parents are charged. Although a number of local 
governments have declared that education services at the elementary and 
secondary school level are entirely free, in reality even public education is 
never free. Parents of children at public schools are generally not charged 
tuition fees – it is true – but instead they have to pay various charges for 
uniforms, books, building costs, renovations, furniture, photocopying of 
teaching materials and even such basic materials as chalk. Students are of-
ten charged compulsory religious donations and even for purposes such as 
farewell parties for school principals or the weddings of their teachers. ICW’s 
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surveys have identified at least 37 categories of such illegal levies for elemen-
tary school students in Jakarta alone (Irawan et al. 2004).
These various levies are illegal because the government already provides 
support through the national and local government budgets, block grants 
and school operational support transfers to cover costs for text books, new 
student registration, examinations, photocopying and the like. Likewise, par-
ents should not be required to pay for construction or renovation of school 
buildings because these are also covered by national and local government 
budgets. Arguably, a few of the fees are in a legal grey area, such as those 
for photocopying, books and a few other expenses. In Jakarta, however, the 
Education Bureau announced to the public that there would be no entrance 
fees, school building fees or even charges for standard text books because all 
of those items had been covered by the local government budget (Elisabeth 
2006). But parents regularly report that fees for such items are still charged 
in schools. Such fees seem legal to parents because they are directly admin-
istered by the school. There are even almost comical examples: such as when 
schools hold class competitions to clean up the school, requiring parents 
to purchase detergent, paint, brooms and other cleaning implements, even 
though the budget for purchasing items is already provided by the govern-
ment. The levies thus involve another mode of corruption: double budgeting. 
The school requests money from parents for activities that actually have been 
paid for by the government. The excess money can then be used for the per-
sonal needs of the principal and teachers, for other more ‘strategic’ purposes, 
such as paying transportation fees or per diems for the school supervisor, or 
bribes to Education Bureau officials and other threatening actors.7
Teachers are the lowest link in the corruption chain in the school since var-
ious fees are announced or levied by teachers in the class. Teachers also can 
make profits themselves by levying their own fees for various activities, such 
as photocopying, buying particular books or sports. Of course the amount 
of money they collect is typically very small, because they exercise authority 
only over a small number of students and are limited by whatever subject or 
subjects it is that they happen to teach. Their motivations are typically more 
about basic economic survival because their salaries are small, so they view 
petty corruption as a way to supplement their income.
This pattern of school-level corruption reveals another feature of contem-
porary corruption in Indonesia: its adaptability. Post-decentralization chang-
es in the way funds were disbursed in the education sector involved a new 
policy of making direct payments to school accounts. In particular, School 
7 In the post-Suharto period, many journalists and NGO activists also target public servants for extortion, 
threatening not to expose them for misdemeanours in exchange for payment; schools are an attractive target 
for such extortion, not only because of their relative weakness, at the bottom of the bureaucratic feeding chain, 
but also because of new policies that transfer funds directly to school accounts.
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Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS) education sub-
sidies are intended to cover all schools’ operational costs and are transferred 
directly from the national ministry to school accounts. The amount of BOS 
subsidies payments received per school varies according to the number of 
students enrolled: the larger the school, the bigger the BOS transfer. At the 
same time, local governments also provide certain additional subsidies (thus, 
the Jakarta city government provides Education Operational Assistance 
(Bantuan Operasional Pendidikan, BOP) payments that are also transferred 
directly to school accounts. Transferring funds directly to school accounts 
was intended, in part, to cut a long corruption chain in the bureaucracy. The 
assumption behind the introduction of direct transfers was that schools were 
separable from the bureaucracy, and that reducing the bureaucracy’s author-
ity and discretionary power over school budgets, and therefore its capacity 
for abuse, would help to eliminate, or at least minimize corruption in the sec-
tor. However, as already indicated, our survey results show that much of the 
corruption that does occur now happens not by stealing state money, but by 
requesting parents to pay money. This is a clear adaptation in the pattern of 
corruption that has occurred since the post-Suharto reforms. 
Another reason for the proliferation of illegal levies at school is lack of 
accountability. Schools rarely provide adequate financial reports to parents 
about how their money is spent. Again, this is a topic on which ICW has con-
ducted extensive research, with a survey of 8,265 parents of school children. 
When asked about the various additional levies they were charged, a majority 
of parents responded that information was not available from the school about 
how these charges were used (the figures ranged from almost 35% of respon-
dents saying that such information was available for how fees for farewell 
parties were used, down to 8% availability of information for sports class fees). 
Clearly, one very basic problem of accountability at the school level is the ab-
sence of adequate financial reports for parents (for the full data, see ICW 2007).
Another source of the lack of accountability at the school level is parents’ 
generally poor levels of participation in school decision making. According 
to the school-based management system, school budgets are together formu-
lated by principals and school committees. The system also supposedly pro-
vides for participatory planning of the budget and for evaluation by parents 
of its implementation.8 However, to actively participate in school budgeting, 
parents have to be well-informed, not only about the substance but also 
about the procedures. The ICW survey of 8,265 parents thus checked whether 
parents were informed about school budgeting. One survey question asked 
parents if they knew about or had been invited to attend school committee 
8 The relevant regulation is Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan Nasional (Kepmendiknas) no. 044/U/2002 
Komite Sekolah dan Dewan Pendidikan (Minister of National Education Decree no. 044/U/2002 on School 
committees and Education Councils).
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meetings to discuss the school budget: 78.4% respondents answered in the 
negative. Lacking access to such information, parents are obviously unable to 
actively participate in decisions on levies and charges, or to monitor how the 
school’s budget is spent. Instead, principals are left to formulate and manage 
the budgets by themselves. Although formally speaking, school committees 
are powerful bodies, with bargaining power at least equivalent to that of 
school principals, because of the lack of skills, information, and knowledge 
about school management and other aspects of education on the part of their 
members and other parents, the committees are almost always dominated by 
the principal. Despite all the talk about participatory school governance in 
post-Reformasi Indonesia, in reality there is rarely extensive societal partici-
pation in school affairs, providing an environment in which corruption can 
flourish.
Critiquing the corruption eradication strategy
Anti-corruption and good governance programs in Indonesia over the last 
decade have often translated into attempts to improve public sector manage-
ment, for instance by reforming the system of public finances. In this respect, 
the dominant response to corruption in Indonesia follows an approach that 
is promoted by many international financial and development agencies. For 
example, in their analysis of corruption in secondary and tertiary educa-
tion systems around the world, published by the International Institute for 
Educational Planning, Hallak and Poisson (2007:22) recommend anti-corrup-
tion solutions like improving management skills, accounting, monitoring and 
auditing in the sector, indicating how they view corruption as essentially a 
product of poor public sector management.
In fact, if Indonesia’s experience since 1998 has taught us anything, it is 
that corruption is not merely a product of poor management systems and 
skills, easily amenable to technical solutions. Instead, it is inherently political: 
it flows from the abuse of political power and from patterns of competition 
and cooperation among political actors, and is a part of how power relations 
are structured in society. A more satisfactory explanation for corruption can 
thus be found in Johnston’s work (1997) that links different syndromes of 
corruption to relations between political elites and civil society, and finds 
that corruption becomes more systematic when the former are more power-
ful than the latter. The inherently political character of corruption helps to 
explain why technical solutions in the sphere of public sector management, 
such as those tried in Indonesia’s education system, are not enough to eradi-
cate corruption. In Indonesia, the decentralization of management in the 
education system was supposed to transfer ownership of schools directly to 
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society, by establishing school committees at the school level and education 
councils at the district level. But actually ownership was not fully transferred. 
Decentralization through the school-based management system transferred 
authority over school management only to principals. Moreover, authority to 
hire and fire principals remains in the hands of local government education 
offices, as does the power to approve school budgets. Both the new author-
ity enjoyed by principals, and the authority that local education bureaucrats 
exercise over principals, have become new sources of corruption. Domination 
by the bureaucracy also makes the schools themselves cash cows and forces 
the principals to act corruptly themselves, and permits teachers to do the 
same, in order to finance the expenditures of the school.
Here the contrast with Chicago’s LSC experience is instructive. In that case, 
decentralization involved genuine transfer of school management to school 
committees and, according to Fung (2003), these LSCs worked as local-level 
democratic institutions that effectively encouraged direct participation from 
the community. It did this by transferring real authority to the LSCs, includ-
ing authority to hire and fire principals and authority to make strategic deci-
sions for the school ranging from curriculum design to formulation of school 
budgets. In Indonesia, by contrast, as a consequence of the ‘incomplete de-
centralization’ and weak power of school committees, policy formulation and 
budgetary management at the school level remain dominated by school prin-
cipals and, to make matters worse, principals are still positioned as part of the 
education bureaucracy. The resulting proliferation of illegal levies and other 
forms of corruption at the school level seems to perfectly exemplify the propo-
sition that corruption flourishes in the absence of strong societal participation.
Another useful analysis of anti-corruption strategies, that leads us toward 
a similar conclusion, is offered by Emil Bolongaita and Vinay Bhargava (2004). 
To develop an effective strategy, they argue, program designers should con-
sider three factors: the level of state capture by corrupt interests, the extent of 
petty corruption and the quality of governance. For the Indonesian context, 
where there is simultaneously high state capture, pervasive petty corruption 
and poor quality of governance, an effective anti-corruption program cannot 
rely solely on the state apparatus, because it will be easily subverted. In such 
a context, Bolongaita and Bhargava (2004:37) argue that effective anti-corrup-
tion reforms should be found and nurtured outside the state. Civil society 
and the private sector can be mobilized to foster external demand for change. 
Following this logic, attempts to curb corruption in the education sector are 
best anchored in groups outside the state, such as school committees and 
independent teachers’ association, and empowering the school committees 
with greater authority would be a logical (and relatively easy) first step. 
Another important strategy for reducing corruption is law enforcement 
and effective punishment of wrong-doers. Huther and Shah (2000) sug-
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gest that law enforcement is likely to have a relatively high impact in poor 
governance conditions. In Indonesia’s education sector, however, there is 
typically only weak law enforcement with respect to corruption and penalties 
therefore have little deterrence value. An example is the SIGP project. Public 
servants revealed to be corrupt in this program were only punished by being 
transferred to similar positions in other offices or schools. Police and pros-
ecutors never followed up complaints from parents about embezzlement of 
schools funds.9 At a much higher level, there was also no meaningful punish-
ment in the scandal in the World Bank-funded book procurement project. The 
World Bank only sanctioned companies and individuals from the private sec-
tor, by black-banning them. Ministry of National Education and other public 
officials involved in the case were not punished. On the contrary, the World 
Bank and other donors still disburse large sums of money in the form of loans 
and grants through the Ministry which remains controlled by those involved 
in corruption. Of course, anti-corruption strategies cannot rely on law en-
forcement as their main solution: the simple fact is that there are not enough 
prisons in Indonesia to hold the huge numbers of people who are involved 
in what is a pervasive and systematic phenomenon. It would take decades 
to even prosecute all persons involved in corruption. But law enforcement 
is necessary, at least in exemplary cases, to show the public and the whole 
bureaucracy that corrupt practices are not tolerated as they were in the past. 
Law enforcement, in other words, should act as a ‘shock therapy’ that is then 
followed up by more substantial bureaucratic reform.10
In theory, law enforcement focusing on corruption at the school level 
should be relatively easy. Petty corruption in schools is small-scale when 
compared to corruption in banking, infrastructure, procurement and other 
sectors. Prosecuting corruption in schools therefore should not meet the 
political obstacles and sabotage caused by entrenched judicial corruption 
that often occurs in other cases. Instead, law enforcement at the school level 
faces a different obstacle caused by the prevailing narrow definition of cor-
ruption as involving only state losses. Law enforcement agencies define cor-
ruption as theft of state money, but in schools, as we have seen, corruption 
frequently involves taking money from parents rather than from the state. 
According to Indonesian anti-corruption law, this sort of fraud is not catego-
rized as corruption. Furthermore, petty corruption at the school level is often 
9 Interviews with Ade Irawan and activists of the Education Coalition (Koalisi Pendidikan) which often 
provided assistance for parents to submit complaints regarding misuse of school funds.
10 One relevant example is the recent high-profile (and large-scale) corruption in the central bank, Bank 
Indonesia. The KPK oversaw some dramatic prosecutions in the case, and then worked with the bank to reform 
its internal regulations (for example, those concerning overseas travel by family members of bank officials) in 
a way that reduced possibilities of corruption: ‘KPK-BI rampungkan kajian aturan yang picu koruptif’, Media 
Indonesia 9-5-2008.
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missed in audits by the Indonesian Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan, BPK), because BPK usually only examines the use of state funds, 
while fees paid by parents are not administered as a non-tax state revenue. 
Conclusion 
This study of the education sector has demonstrated how Indonesia, as a frag-
mented polity with a weak civil society, has become a place where corruption 
is all-pervasive and systematic. Petty corruption at the school level is part of 
a larger structure of corruption in the education bureaucracy. Corruption at 
the school level would not be allowed without permission from school su-
pervisors in the local education authorities. In turn, corruption is entrenched 
even at the most senior levels of the bureaucracy where it is used, among 
other things, to buy political support and protection and to build political 
constituencies. In short, corruption is systematic and involves the top-level 
bureaucracy right down to the principals and teachers in the schools.
In such a context, it is worth considering briefly some of the consequences 
of corruption in the education system, not so far highlighted in this article. 
Corruption in the system has many deleterious effects. One major impact 
is on the quality of education itself because of all its ill effects on the stan-
dards of teaching materials, books and other facilities provided to students. 
Another impact is the cultivation of a culture of corruption among children, 
and the negative consequences this has for the future. Even young children 
are surprisingly aware of the extent of corruption in their schools. The KPK, 
Attorney General’s Office and some international donors have promoted anti-
corruption education programs for school students. However laudable the 
goals, it is possible that the effect of such programs is instead to drive home 
lessons about hypocrisy, when students know that the very people teaching 
them anti-corruption values are themselves directly implicated in the practice. 
Another important lesson to be drawn from our discussion concerns the 
adaptability of corruption. During the Reformasi period there have been seri-
ous attempts to address some of the deficiencies in the education sector and 
to reduce corruption in it. In particular, international donors’ good gover-
nance recipes have involved transferring money directly into school accounts 
and decentralizing management of the education system to the regions and 
to schools. These strategies had their roots in the 1997 economic crisis, after 
which donors (especially the World Bank) introduced a ‘social safety net’ 
policy by which money was transferred directly to poor people, a policy that 
donors judged to be successful. In education, the rationale has been to by-pass 
large segments of the intermediate bureaucracy, providing money instead to 
its ultimate users, and removing discretion over school accounts from middle-
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level bureaucrats, and thus eliminating their ability to abuse those funds. 
Unfortunately, the strategy has not worked well because it does not 
concentrate upon the root sources of corruption in education which, it has 
been argued here, flow from the structures of political power in both state 
and society. The anti-corruption strategy in the sector has only changed 
how money is transferred between the bureaucracy and schools, it has not 
replaced the existing corrupt structure in the education bureaucracy. The 
structure of accountability mechanisms still flows from top to bottom in the 
system, binding the schools to the education bureaucracy. The power to fire 
and hire principals is in the hands of local education authorities, making 
principals directly accountable to bureaucrats. To be appointed as principals, 
teachers must pay bribes; to maintain their positions, principals also have to 
provide regular payments to local bureaucrats. This dynamic has encouraged 
the proliferation of fees and levies directed at parents and made money raised 
from parents a crucial site of corruption, displacing state funds as the source 
drawn upon by corrupt actors at the school level when buying the political 
protection and support they need in the bureaucracy.
On the societal side of the equation, while Indonesian reform has made a 
good start by creating and empowering school committees, it has not gone 
far enough. For anti-corruption strategies to be effective, the authority to 
select principals would need to be transferred to school committees, making 
principals accountable to the community rather than to the education bureau-
cracy. Further powers for school committees to make vital decisions about 
school policy and spending would also help to eradicate corruption at the 
school level. Strengthening such societal mechanisms needs to be the starting 
point of anti-corruption programs in a system like that of Indonesia where 
civil society weakness is one of the crucial ingredients that helps corruption 
to flourish. Public sector reform and narrow goals of ‘good governance’ will 
not be enough. Experiences in the education sector show that without deeper 
changes in the political structures that motivate and sustain corruption, public 
sector reform will only make corrupt actors adapt their modes and methods.

simon butt and tim lindsey
Judicial mafia
The courts and state illegality in Indonesia
For decades, Indonesians have regarded the Indonesian judiciary as one of 
their nation’s most corrupt institutions.1 Surveys indicate that its reputation, 
ironically, has been for its propensity to act illegally, rather than its capacity 
to enforce the law, let alone deliver ‘justice’ (Asia Foundation and ACNielsen 
Indonesia 2001). Popular belief has it that most of Indonesia’s judges and 
court officials are willing to accept, or even to extort, bribes from litigants 
to secure victory in their cases, with the Supreme Court seen as one of the 
most corrupt courts in the country. The Indonesian joke – which even judges 
tell – has the word hakim (judge) as short for hubungi aku kalau ingin menang 
(contact me if you want to win).2
It is also often said in Indonesia that corruption within the judiciary is 
systematic and institutionalized: illicit payments are filtered into patronage 
networks within which the recipient’s superiors take percentages. For these 
reasons, the Indonesian justice system is often described as a ‘mafia’ (mafia 
peradilan) because most bribes are paid as part of a complex web of well-
organized ‘arrangements’ involving a number of corrupt players, rather than 
just a few rogue individuals (Assegaf 2002:130). Even Supreme Court parking 
attendants are said to be involved.3
Senior Indonesian judges, including retired Supreme Court Chief Justices, 
have admitted that there is much in these popular perceptions that is accurate. 
Former Chief Justice Soerjono, for example, estimated that 50% of Indonesia’s 
judges were corrupt (Pompe 2005:414), as did former Chief Justice Asikin 
Kusumaatmadja,4 although well-regarded lawyers have claimed that the pro-
1 Research for this article was in part funded by AusAID through the Australia-Indonesia Governance Research 
Partnership (AIGRP), administered by the Crawford School at the Australian National University. We also thank 
Firmansyah Arifin of the National Law Reform Consortium (Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional). 
2  See ‘Mafia atau Mahkamah Agung?’ Tempo 2 April 2000.
3  See ‘Mafia atau Mahkamah Agung?’ Tempo 2 April 2000.; ICW 2001:1.
4 See ‘Courting corruption’ Inside Indonesia 49 (January-March 1997), http://insideindonesia.org/content/
view/892/29/ (accessed 12-11-2009).
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portion of corrupt judges is closer to 90%.5 Another former Supreme Court 
Justice – Adi Andojo – went even further in the mid-1990s, publicly naming 
other Supreme Court judges whom he accused of receiving massive bribes 
from litigants.6 The situation, according to one lawyer, was so dire that an 
Indonesian court
[…] shouldn’t be called a house of justice [kantor pengadilan] but instead an auc-
tion house [kantor lelang]. An auction house for cases. […] [T]he judge himself 
calls me or the prosecution calls me or a policeman calls me – they’re the ones 
who ask me, ‘Do you want your client to be helped or not? Does your client 
have enough for a donation or not?’ So they’re actively pursuing this. They’re 
the producers and they’re offering their wares [...] ’Do you have money or not? 
If you don’t, I’ll make an offer to your adversary.’ Now when I get a telephone 
call like this, I’m no longer surprised […] Now I feel that it is natural (Pember-
ton 1999:200).
In 2001, respected NGO Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) conducted doz-
ens of interviews with judges, lawyers, court employees, prosecutors, liti-
gants and police.7 Many interviewees testified that bribery was very wide-
spread and that they had either witnessed it or had participated in it. One 
interviewee even claimed ‘[…] while I have been an employee of the court 
there have been no cases which did not involve the payment of money’.8 
He concluded that ‘if most people who take bribes go to hell, I think that no 
judges will be let in heaven’.
If even some of these perceptions are accurate (and determining this is 
a complex issue, which we discuss below), then the implications go much 
further, of course, than mere corruption within the judiciary. This is because 
the courts in post-Suharto democratic Indonesia are, in principle, the forum 
where intractable disputes between citizens and between citizens and the 
state should ultimately be resolved. They are also where the meaning of laws, 
the powers and functions of private and public institutions, and the nature 
and extent of rights should be determined. In other words, much of the power 
to define and shape the relationship between state and citizens is formally in 
the hands of the courts. In theory, the judiciary in Indonesia is thus necessar-
ily a key arbiter of the post-Suharto reformasi process that has sought to roll 
5 See ‘Wawancara Trimoelja; Mahkamah Agung memang sudah bobrok’, Republika 21-4-1996, www.
republika.com (accessed 12-11-2009).
6 As discussed below in detail, these judges were, however, never convicted in relation to these allegations. 
See also ‘Wawancara Adi Andojo; Akhirnya karir saya dan juga Mahkamah Agung tidak ternoda’ Tempo 3 
March 1997, www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/02/09/nas1.htm (accessed 12-11-2009).
7 On file with authors – we thank ICW for providing this material to us. Some of the interviews were later 
published in an ICW report entitled ‘Opening the curtains on judicial corruption’ (ICW 2001). 
8 Interview with a judge conducted by Narullah from ICW on 26-7-2001 (in the possession of the authors).
 Judicial mafia 191
back the overwhelming power of the authoritarian state built under Suharto’s 
New Order and replace it with a more open, transparent system of gover-
nance in which individual rights have greater currency and the powers of the 
executive and the legislature are hemmed in by institutionalized democratic 
checks and balances (Lindsey 2002, 2004).
If, however, the courts are dysfunctional or lawless in themselves, then 
none of this can happen, or at least it cannot happen in a predictable, rational 
and fair fashion: a properly functioning judiciary is crucial to the mainte-
nance of state legality. Governments everywhere push the boundaries of 
legality and it is often left to the judiciary to formally determine whether an 
act is illegal and, if so, to punish it. In some circumstances, governments may 
breach the law blatantly, deliberately and with some form of ulterior intent, 
such as to remove political rivals or dissidents, to secure personal benefits 
from public resources, or to cover up military human rights abuses. In other 
circumstances, however, the legality or otherwise of state action is far less 
clear-cut. Well-intentioned governments might test existing rules in an at-
tempt to provide welfare benefits to citizens or improvements to governance 
systems by, for example, establishing a judicial watchdog or anti-corruption 
court to handle corruption cases more effectively (Fenwick 2008; Lindsey 
2008); or upholding important socioeconomic human rights of the majority in 
the face of the competing human rights of a minority (Butt 2007b). 
Regardless of the rationale for the government’s illegality, if the judiciary 
fails to enforce the law against state officials, then there is little else to prevent 
the state acting illegally, save for ‘shaming’ through the media or academic cri-
tique. Such strategies can be risky if the state actor can wield political or physi-
cal power or threats. During the New Order period, for example, journalists 
were routinely threatened and publications shut down for criticizing the gov-
ernment. Even after the fall of Suharto, and with the general opening-up of the 
media and more permissive stance towards criticism of the state that followed, 
some critics have been met with threats of defamation litigation. Without an 
effective judiciary, the state can proceed largely unrestrained by law. 
The dangers of judicial dysfunction for the weaker party in the state-citizen 
relationship are thus obvious. In this sense, illegality within the judiciary con-
tributes to state illegality more generally. Real reform of the kind that might 
eventually rein in the broader patterns of Indonesian state illegality that persist 
from the New Order and earlier must therefore itself depend on a transforma-
tion of the judiciary that ends illegal practices and delivers a competent, trans-
parent and predictable judicial system (Butt 2008; Goodpaster 2002; Lev 1978).
Accordingly, in this chapter we discuss a number of different types of 
judicial illegality and their prevalence, as well as their effect on different 
forms of broader ‘state’ illegality. Attention is also paid to various attempts 
at detecting and pursuing judicial illegality and how some members of the 
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Indonesian judiciary have persistently, strenuously and effectively resisted 
efforts to hold them accountable for this illegality.
Internal and external illegality
In analyzing the conduct of Indonesia’s courts, we distinguish between two 
types of illegality. The first we call ‘internal illegality’, by which we mean 
illegal actions performed by judges when exercising their judicial functions. 
Judicial corruption and lack of judicial independence in decision making are 
prime examples of this type of illegality.
The second type we call ‘external illegality’ or ‘authorizing or validating 
illegality’. This occurs when judges perpetuate or legitimize the illegality 
of the actions of parties to litigation by not enforcing or upholding the law. 
When these parties are governments or state officials, the judiciary contrib-
utes to ‘state illegality’ by, in effect, providing them with legal immunity for 
their illegal acts. 
Of course, these two types of illegality are usually linked, because external 
illegality is typically preceded by internal illegality, such as when judges are 
bribed or succumb to government pressure, leading to a prearranged out-
come in cases involving state officials. We distinguish between them, none-
theless, because we argue that while internal illegality has not significantly 
deceased overall, it is arguable that external illegality has declined since 
Suharto fell in 1998.
Defining illegality
We define ‘illegal’ for the purposes of this chapter to mean ‘contrary to law’9 
and it is clear that when judges act corruptly – that is, when they decide a case 
in favour of one party in return for some form of personal or professional bene-
fit to which they would otherwise not be entitled – they violate Indonesian law. 
Indonesia’s 1999 Anti-corruption Law, amended in 2001, provides in Article 
2(1) a very broad definition of what constitutes corruption, which includes 
9 ‘Law’ here means any type of written law, whether contained in the 1945 Constitution, statutes (undang-
undang), government regulations (peraturan pemerintah), presidential regulations (peraturan presiden), regional 
regulations (peraturan daerah), or any other of the myriad types of executive-level regulations (peraturan) or 
decisions (putusan) (see Article 7(1) of Law no. 20/2004 on Making Laws for Indonesia’s so-called ‘hierarchy of 
laws’). ‘Law’ also includes Islamic law, to the extent that it has been incorporated into state-made law, through 
the 1991 Kompilasi of Islamic Law (issued by Presidential Decree in 1991), for example; and to the extent that it is 
applied in Indonesia’s religious courts (Feener 2007; Hooker 2003, 2004, 2008; Lev 1973; Lindsey 2008; Lindsey 
and Hooker 2007). It also includes customary law (adat), where applicable (Davidson and Henley 2007; Hooker 
1978). Adat may, in turn, also include elements derived from Islamic legal traditions.
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any ‘illegal’ act that enriches the perpetrator or another, and which damages 
the finances of the state. Article 3 prohibits any person from, with the aim of 
enriching him or herself, another or a corporation, misusing their authority, op-
portunities, or means at their disposal because of the office they hold, in a way 
which could damage the state’s finances or the economy. It is clear, too, that 
judges act illegally when they act with bias – that is, when they are influenced 
(whether by inducement or threat) – or choose by reason of personal preju-
dice, not to decide a case independently on its merits. Bribery and corruption 
would constitute such interference, as would government pressure. A raft of 
Indonesian laws make the requirement of independence unequivocally clear.10 
Detecting judicial illegality: methodological challenges
As our definition of ‘illegality’ suggests, behaviour that is merely inappropri-
ate or immoral is not ‘illegal’ unless that behaviour is also contrary to law. 
This has the important implication that judicial actions or decisions that are 
merely unpopular are not necessarily ‘illegal’, but this distinction is not of-
ten drawn in Indonesia, or at least is not often clearly drawn. In the media, 
and among lawyers and civil society observers, unpopular judicial decisions 
are commonly criticized, regardless of their legal merits, for not ‘meeting 
the community’s conception of justice’ (memenuhi rasa keadilan masyarakat), 
a phrase borrowed from the Elucidation to Article 1(1) of the Judiciary Law. 
Such claims are often made without a considered analysis of the factors that 
the judges took into account in coming to their decision or of the legal rea-
soning they adopted. This is unsurprising, however, given that, as discussed 
below, most Indonesian courts do not provide easy access to their decisions. 
It should be self-evident that whether ‘illegality’ has played a part in a 
judicial decision cannot be determined conclusively purely on the basis of 
the verdict or sentence in a case. Likewise, court staff (including judges) who 
may have acted illegally in the chain of events that led to the production of 
a decision are, of course, hardly likely to admit that. There also may well be 
reasonable legal explanations for decisions that appear to be undesirable by 
reference to the vague criterion of ‘community standards’. These may not 
always be obvious, and judges may not necessarily disclose these explana-
tions in their decisions. In respect of criminal cases, for example, prosecutorial 
standards in Indonesia are, in general, low, and prosecutors may simply fail 
to convincingly prove the allegations made in their indictments. Crucial wit-
nesses or documents may be unavailable. Evidence that might be portrayed in 
10 Article 24(1) of the Indonesian Constitution, for example, states that ‘Judicial power is an independent 
power to maintain a system of courts with the objective of upholding law and justice.’ The 2004 Judiciary Law 
(Law no. 4/2004) also requires judicial independence in a number of its provisions.
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the media or elsewhere as indisputable may be brought into question at trial 
by judges and defence lawyers and, after examination pursuant to evidentiary 
rules, may be found to be of little or no weight or benefit in a formal sense. 
As in most jurisdictions, the testing of evidence is one of the main purposes of 
trial in Indonesia and that process can often lead to a conclusion that evidence 
is insufficient in a technical sense to ground a guilty verdict (in a criminal case) 
or a finding of liability (in a non-criminal case). As in many other countries, 
the subtleties of this process rarely survive media reports.
The laws that judges must apply might also be weak. Classic examples in 
the Indonesian context are Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum 
Pidana, KUHP) and Code of Criminal Procedure (Kitab Undang-undang 
Hukum Acara Pidana), both of which are criticized by Indonesian lawyers 
for being light on detail and desperately out-of-date, particularly in matters 
of evidence law (Butt 2008; Fitzpatrick 2008). A judge might, therefore, be 
acting entirely ‘legally’ to release an unpopular suspect given the weakness 
of these two statutes – indeed, a proper application of the law might require 
the judge to do so – but still find him or herself accused of ‘illegality’. In the 
media, and in public perception, this sort of decision is likely to be portrayed 
as simple wrongdoing on the part of the judiciary. 
Finally, a judicial decision might also employ weak legal arguments, as 
is, in fact, often the case in Indonesia, but this could be a result of judicial 
incompetence, rather than corruption. The two are not the same thing, even 
if they are often found together.
If detection of illegality by reference to case outcomes alone is unreliable, 
then by what means can illegality by detected? Unfortunately, particular as-
pects of ‘judging’ make both internal and external illegality very difficult to 
detect and prove. This is so in the legal systems of many countries, but the 
problem is particularly severe in the Indonesian context. 
One potential source for detection is the judicial decision itself. It is often 
presumed that close scrutiny of judicial reasoning will reveal impropriety, if 
any occurred in the case. A key preliminary issue to be addressed in this re-
gard is access to judicial decisions in Indonesia. It is, of course, impossible to 
analyse a decision without access to it. Although it would seem basic to any 
court’s credibility that its judgments be freely available, this does not occur 
in contemporary Indonesia, feeding damaging speculation on the reasons for 
unpopular decisions. 
So, for example, although several thousand decisions of Indonesia’s Supreme 
Court, the Religious Courts (Pengadilan Agama) and the Constitutional Court 
(Mahkamah Konstitusi) are, at time of writing, available on their websites,11 
11 For Supreme Court decisions, see http://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/ (accessed 13-10-2010; for Consti-
tu tional Court decisions, see www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id (accessed 8-9-2010).
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and are available through the AsianLII database,12 this constitutes only a 
miniscule proportion of the total number of decisions handed down by 
Indonesian courts each year, around 3.5 million (Mahkamah Agung 2008). 
The vast majority of the Supreme Court’s decisions are not published on these 
websites or elsewhere, and most of the millions of decisions of Indonesia’s 
lower courts remain accessible only with great persistence, often involving a 
personal visit to the court in which the decision was handed down. The most 
obvious reasons for the lack of publication in Indonesia are budgetary and, as 
discussed below, unwillingness by judges to subject their decisions to scruti-
ny, particularly in controversial cases. Another reason is that these judgments 
have for decades been seen as valuable commodities by court staff, who can 
extract significant payments for their provision to desperate lawyers, litigants, 
researchers or journalists, and who thus have a vested interest in making deci-
sions unavailable. It is therefore not unusual for parties who have a judgment 
entered against them to only discover this fact from the media. Some may, in 
fact, never receive a copy of the judgment (Butt 2008).
Another impediment to detecting judicial illegality is judicial discretion. 
Judicial discretion is a fundamental and unavoidable part of adjudication. It 
is exercised, most obviously, when judges decide whether the evidence pre-
sented is sufficient to indicate liability or guilt, but it comes into play in many 
other contexts in Indonesia, for example, when judges must choose between 
two or more laws that could be applied in a particular case, but which might 
lead to different outcomes. 
The level of discretion judges exercise differs from place to place and from 
time to time. Logically, the more scope for judicial discretion, the more difficult 
illegality will be to detect. The more free judges are in their choice of law to ap-
ply, the evidence they will allow, their analysis, and, ultimately, their decision 
making, the easier it becomes to justify any decision they are inclined to make.
Indonesia’s legal system provides judges with what is, by international 
standards, a relatively high degree of discretion and many opportunities to 
exercise it. This is partly because Indonesia’s laws are, typically, generally 
worded and thus allow much judicial flexibility when applied to the facts of 
a given case. Broadly cast laws are a feature of many, if not most, countries 
in the world, although it is sometimes said that it is particularly prevalent 
in the European-derived ‘Continental’ civil law tradition,13 which Indonesia 
follows. However, such laws can often make detecting illegality extremely 
difficult. Judges can simply declare that the facts that come before them do 
or do not fall within the scope of a particular provision without being forced 
to justify this conclusion in detail. 
12 See www.asianlii.org (accessed 8-9-2010).
13 Dawson 1994; Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe 1985; Lasser 2004; Merryman 1984.
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Detection difficulties are arguably aggravated in countries that do not 
require judges to provide decisions that contain a detailed and reasoned ac-
count of the evidence put forward in the case, the legal arguments made by 
all parties, the legal difficulties the case raised, and an analysis of the law ap-
plicable to the case (Lasser 2003, 2004). Because there are usually at least two 
sides to any legal dispute, each party often has a reasonable legal argument, 
particularly in cases that reach the appeal level in the higher courts. In many 
such cases, it can be easy for judges simply to choose the argument of the party 
he or she favours. This might require judges to do little more than regurgitate 
in the judgment the arguments of that party, perhaps simply claiming that the 
choice was a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion.
Finally, as in many other civil law countries, Indonesia has relatively few 
rules of evidence, and the admissibility of evidence is therefore largely a 
matter of judicial discretion. Although hearsay and opinion evidence are not 
formally admissible, Indonesian judges have otherwise very broad powers to 
admit or reject evidence. They can, for example, allow highly prejudicial evi-
dence, even if it lacks significant probative value; and they can reject the most 
convincing evidence in general criminal cases merely on the basis that it is not 
a formal ‘document’ or ‘testimony’.14 Likewise, decisions as to the weight to 
be given to evidence are often reserved until judgment, allowing potentially 
inappropriate material full play during the hearing, such that findings about 
its worth in the judgment may come too late to remedy any prejudice already 
caused. Clearly, then, Indonesian judges have great discretion to accept or 
reject evidence that might determine innocence, guilt or liability.
Doctrinal issues raised by the guarantees of judicial independence can 
also compound difficulties in detecting judicial illegality. Judicial indepen-
dence might appear to be a straightforward proposition: judges must be free 
to decide cases in accordance with their view of the law and the facts of the 
case before them; and they should not be pressured into making a decision in 
favour of one of the parties. If judges were not independent, litigants would 
have little faith in courts to resolve their disputes (Shapiro 1981:1, 7). Issues 
arise, however, in determining precisely how judicial independence should 
be achieved and how much independence judges require to adequately 
perform their adjudicative functions. One issue is whether judges should be 
immune from accountability measures such as performance and competence 
reviews because of fears that these measures might affect the way judges de-
cide cases, thus opening the door to improper influence. Some judges claim 
that if they are subject to review by a non-judicial body, such as parliament 
14 Butt 2008. This wide discretion exists largely because civil law tradition countries, such as Indonesia, 
have traditionally not employed juries (Merryman 1984). There is, therefore, no need to protect juries from 
prejudicial or defective evidence – a concern underlying much of the detailed evidence law often found in 
common law tradition countries. 
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or a judicial commission, they might be more likely to issue decisions of the 
kind that would be favoured by their reviewers. This is an argument that has 
long had much support among judges in developed democracies, and should 
be taken seriously. It is, however, open to exploitation by the unscrupulous. 
The Indonesian cases of Endin and the ‘three judges’, both discussed below, 
show that Indonesian judges have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid 
scrutiny and that, typically, they have pointed to the doctrine of judicial inde-
pendence when doing so (Aspandi 2002:101). By resorting to pleas of ‘judicial 
independence’, Indonesian judges have, for example, resisted a return to the 
early New Order practice of eksaminasi under which the superior of each 
judge periodically examined three criminal and three civil decisions handed 
down by that judge.15 
For example, the Constitutional Court, in a case discussed below, used the 
principle of judicial independence to justify a decision disallowing scrutiny of 
judicial decisions by the Judicial Commission in an attempt to detect irregu-
larities. It declared unconstitutional parts of the Judicial Commission Law that 
purported to allow the Commission to supervise performance of Indonesia’s 
judges – including Constitutional Court judges – by analysing their decisions. 
This activity, the Court held, was best left to the formal appeals process, under 
which senior judges assessed the previous decisions of lower-court judges. 
According to the Court, having non-judicial officers performing this assess-
ment compromised the constitutional requirement of judicial independence.
If Indonesian judicial decisions are difficult or sometimes even impossible 
to access and, even if one were to obtain them, unlikely to clearly reveal internal 
or external judicial legality, how then can judicial illegality be identified? The 
answer, we argue, is, somewhat unreliably, through admissions, anecdotes, 
estimations, perceptions and presumptions. These measures might provide an 
overall impression of the extent to which internal and external illegality occurs 
within the judiciary, but they are far from scientifically rigorous and are sus-
ceptible to being based largely simply on the outcome of cases – a danger we 
identified above. There are, however, usually no alternative methods by which 
judicial illegality can reliably be measured in contemporary Indonesia. 
For these reasons, in asserting corruption and lack of judicial independence 
in this chapter, it is generally impossible to offer unequivocal data. Instead, we 
are forced to refer to statements made by senior judges, lawyers and others 
about the prevalence of corruption, and to public perceptions, often informed 
by experience, about illegality within the judiciary. Likewise, in discussing the 
courts’ authorizing or legitimizing illegality, we have to focus on the impro-
priety of meetings between judges and government officials; and the former 
15 Supreme Court Memo (Surat Edaran) no. 1/1967 on Examinations, Monthly Reports and Appeals Lists. See 
Aspandi (2002:80, 127) and Butt (2007a).
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structural relationship between the Department of Justice and the Supreme 
Court that gave the Department a degree of authority over judges and, by all 
accounts, allowed the Department to interfere in cases. We do so, however, 
without resiling from our own critique of the limitations of this approach.
Internal illegality and corruption 
At the start of this chapter we described the parlous reputation for pervasive 
corruption of the Indonesian judiciary, and, in particular, the general courts, 
led by the Supreme Court. The perception that the general courts are ut-
terly rotten is only rarely displaced by shining examples of judicial integrity 
or excellence. It is usually accepted that the Religious Courts and the new 
Constitutional Court are relatively clean. Overall, however, there are now 
signs that internal illegality within the judiciary probably has not decreased 
and might even be on the rise. Complaints of corruption – particularly within 
the general courts and within the Supreme Court – are still very common. 
The majority of complaints lodged with Indonesia’s National Ombudsman 
Commission, for example, relate solely to this issue (M. Crouch 2008:386).
Why these high corruption levels? In Indonesia, a combination of fac-
tors is at play. Low operational budgets and low judicial salaries have often 
been cited as factors forcing judges to seek additional sources of finance and 
income.16 On the (highly questionable) presumption that increasing salaries 
will somehow reduce corruption, judicial salaries have been substantially 
increased in recent years.17 The Supreme Court’s budget has also recently 
been greatly expanded, although, so have its administrative responsibilities. 
Its budget increased drastically from Rp 79.5 billion in 2002, to Rp 153 billion 
in 2004,18 and after the satu atap (one roof) reforms, discussed below, to Rp 1.2 
trillion in 2005, Rp 2.2 trillion in 2006, and Rp 3 trillion in 2007.19 This appears 
to be a significant increase, but in real terms it is arguably a reduction, given 
the vast expansion of the court’s responsibilities and administrative burdens. 
With this budget, the Supreme Court must, for example, administer 67 appeal 
courts and 706 first instance courts, including paying for building infrastruc-
ture and the salaries of over 7,000 personnel (Mahkamah Agung 2008:i).
In any case, increased salaries, even combined with strong new corruption 
16 World Bank 2004:83-5; Menuju independensi 1999:62; Dakolias and Thachuk 2000:398.
17 See ‘ICW; Makin besar gaji hakim “gila-gilaan”’, 23-7-2002, http://www.hukumonline.com/warta/2002/7/23 
(accessed 8-9-2010).
18 See ‘Kekuasaan kehakiman satu atap, anggaran MA membengkak’, 4-9-2004, http://www.hukumonline.
com/warta/2004/9/4 (accessed 8-9-2010). 
19 See ‘Permasalahan menahun, anggaran tak cukup’, 27-4-2007, http://www.hukumonline.com/warta/2004/ 
9/4 (accessed 8-9-2010). 
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laws, have apparently failed to reduce corruption. Judges are, of course, ratio-
nal persons: corrupt ones are unlikely to change their behaviour unless it is in 
their best interests to be honest (Dakolias and Thachuk 2000:365, 398; World 
Bank 2004:vii). This might occur if detection is probable and sufficiently puni-
tive sanctions are likely to be imposed for contravention of those laws. The 
Indonesian judiciary has, however, resisted the imposition of mechanisms 
designed to do just that, so it remains unlikely that an errant judge will be 
punished. This is an issue to which we return below, when we discuss the 
ill-fated Judicial Commission. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of the contempt with which some 
Indonesian judges view efforts to bring them to account for their alleged il-
legalities is the Endin case, which occurred after the fall of Suharto in 1998 
but before the satu atap reforms. We focus on this case because it is one of the 
few in which the decision is available to us and because it does, on its face 
and when read in the context of the circumstances surrounding the case, ap-
pear to demonstrate clearly both impropriety and the courts’ determination 
to avoid outside scrutiny and detection of internal illegality.
Case study; The Endin and three judges cases
Endin admitted to bribing three Supreme Court judges on behalf of the plain-
tiff in an inheritance case, for whom he worked as a calo, or go-between.20 He 
claimed to have paid Supreme Court judges Yahya Harahap Rp 96 million, 
and Marnis Kahar and Supraptini Sutarto Rp 50 million each. Subsequently, 
Endin’s client won the case, but the defendant refused to comply with the 
decision and the district court failed to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision. 
Such enforcement failures are common in Indonesia because of serious flaws 
in its regime for enforcement of judgments that expose that process to oppor-
tunities for corruption and political interference.21
Endin’s client was, unsurprisingly, perplexed by her unenforceable vic-
tory. Frustrated, Endin claimed that he delivered a letter to the judges at their 
Supreme Court offices, in which he reminded the judges of the payment, and 
sought their assistance with the enforcement of their decision.
In September and October, I, along with my friend, gave an amount of opera-
tional money to win case no. 560.K/Pdt/1997 to Mr Yahya Harahap, Ms Marnis 
Kahar and Ms Supraptini Sutarto […] I requested that [the three judges] contact 
me to find a solution that is best for everyone.22
20 Case no 560.K/Pdt/1997.
21 For a detailed account of Indonesia’s troubled record on enforcement of judicial decisions, see Butt 2008. 
22 Endin defamation case (Central Jakarta District Court Decision no. 427/PID.B/2001/PN.JKT.PST), p. 18, 
copy on file with authors.
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Obtaining no response, an apparently infuriated Endin reported the judges 
to the police, accusing them of accepting his bribes. In a deal struck with then 
Attorney General Marzuki Darusman and Adi Andojo Soetjipto, Head of the 
Joint Corruption Eradication Team (Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi, TGPTPK) and a former well-respected Supreme Court Judge, 
Endin was assured that he would not be prosecuted for making the report.23
The Joint Team duly began preparing their cases against the judges. 
However, before the criminal case involving the judges as defendants could 
be heard, the judges reported Endin to the police, alleging that he had de-
famed them. Defamation proceedings began in the Central Jakarta District 
Court before the three judges were tried for bribery. In Indonesia, defama-
tion is often dealt with by means of criminal law, and Endin was charged 
under several articles of the Criminal Code including Article 310(1). This 
Article provides that anyone who attacks the honour or good name of a 
person by accusing them of something, with the intent that it is to become 
publicly known, faces a maximum of nine months in prison for defamation. 
The Criminal Code does not make ‘truth’ a defence to defamation in all cir-
cumstances but, under Article 312, a court can permit the defendant to avoid 
punishment by proving the truth of the allegedly defamatory allegation if it is 
made against an official performing his or her official duties (Article 314(1)). 
If the defendant fails to prove the truth of the allegation, however, the maxi-
mum penalty increases from nine months to four years under Article 311.
Endin was convicted under both Article 310(1) and 311. As for the Article 
310(1) charge, the Court considered Endin’s letter and concluded that it ac-
cused the judges of accepting a bribe to ‘fix’ a case.24 The Court found this 
allegation to be insulting and, therefore, defamatory.25 The Court gave Endin 
the opportunity to attempt to prove the truth of his allegation under Article 
311, but held that he failed to do so. The judges maintained throughout the 
trial that they had never met Endin and that they did not accept the bribes as 
alleged. The panel emphasized inconsistencies in Endin’s version of events 
that cast doubt on his story.26 In the end, Endin was convicted and sentenced 
to three months in jail, suspended for six months. 
The Court’s reasoning in its decision in this case was highly questionable, 
for two main reasons. First, the Court failed to consider Article 310(3) of the 
Criminal Code, which provides that no defamation occurs if the allegation is 
23 Lubis 2001. Declaration of Head of Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, 22-6-2000 (on 
file with authors).
24 Endin defamation case, p. 19.
25 Endin defamation case, p. 19.
26 For example, Endin had claimed that he had given the judges Rp 50,000 notes, upon which was a picture 
of WR Supratman – the composer of the Indonesian national anthem. However, testimony from an expert 
from Bank Indonesia revealed that these notes circulated from 1-6-1999, which was, according to the evidence 
adduced at trial, well after Endin claimed to have bribed the judges in late 1998. Endin defamation case, pp. 20-1.
 Judicial mafia 201
made in the public interest. Surely allegations of corruption within the highest 
level of the Indonesian judiciary are a matter of public interest? Second, Article 
314(3) of the Criminal Code states that if criminal prosecution has begun of a 
person allegedly defamed, and the prosecution relates to the same matter that 
the person claims to be defamatory, then defamation proceedings should be 
stayed until a final decision has been issued in the criminal case relating to 
the matter alleged. In this case, this would mean that as the judges faced pros-
ecution for corruption based on Endin’s allegations, their defamation claims 
should be delayed until their own prosecution was complete, to ensure consis-
tency in decisions. The Court, however, did not even consider this provision. 
In the meantime, prosecution cases against the three judges were thrown 
out of court in pre-trial (pra-peradilan) proceedings.27 The arguments pre-
sented by counsel for dismissing these cases, and which were accepted by the 
Court, were feeble in the extreme. They included that the Joint Team lacked 
jurisdiction to investigate the three judges because the Joint Team had not 
been formed at the time the alleged crime took place. As Assegaf (2002:138) 
points out, this was irrelevant, because the Joint Team was a taskforce within 
the Attorney General’s Office made up largely of pre-existing prosecutors 
and police who coordinated the handling of particular corruption cases. It 
was thus not a new body with new powers exceeding those normally exer-
cised by police and prosecutors. 
Lawyers appearing for the judges also argued that the 1971 Corruption 
Law, under which they had been charged, could not be applied in this case.28 
They pointed to Article 44 of the 1999 Anti-Corruption Law which states 
that the 1971 Anti-Corruption Law ‘is declared to be not in force (dinyatakan 
tidak berlaku)’ with the coming-into-effect of the 1999 Law (which occurred 
on 16 August 1999). In this interpretation, Article 44 deemed the 1971 Anti-
Corruption Law never to have existed. Some kind of specific ‘transitional 
provision’ is, they argued, customary when laws (particularly criminal laws) 
are changed in Indonesia and the 1971 Corruption Law contains one of these 
customary provisions.29 
The act of bribery was alleged to have taken place in 1997, that is, before 
the 1999 Law came into effect. The judges, their lawyers argued, could there-
fore not be charged under the 1971 Law, given that the national legislature 
had revoked it by enacting the 1999 Law. They could not be charged under 
27 Marnis Kahar and Supraptini Sutarto appeared together and Harahap separately.
28 See ‘Kasus korupsi hakim agung; Terdakwa bisa dikenai UU No 3/1971 dan UU No 31/1999’, Kompas 3-8-
2001.
29 It states in Article 36 that it replaces Law no. 24/1960 for crimes committed after the 1971 Law came into 
force, but that alleged acts of corruption committed before 29-3-1971 (the date the 1971 Law came into force) 
would be prosecuted under the 1960 Law. The conspicuous absence of such a provision in Law no. 31/1999 – it 
simply declares Law no. 3/1971 invalid – appears to lend support to this argument.
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the 1999 Law either, because to apply this to an act taking place before the 
Law’s enactment would breach the Indonesian legal prohibition on retro-
spectivity.30 This interpretation of Article 44 would give any person who had 
committed a corruption crime before 16 August 1999 de facto immunity from 
prosecution. The argument is unconvincing. Clearly, the legislature intended 
that the 1999 Law replace the 1971 Law, not to deem it never to have existed. 
In any event, whether or not their claim had merit, it is strongly arguable 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the application made by the judges’ 
lawyers at all. Article 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure limits pra-peradilan 
proceedings narrowly to determining the legality of arrests, detentions or sei-
zures (Fitzpatrick 2008:505-6). The focus of the judges’ claim at this hearing was 
the jurisdiction of the Joint Team itself, an issue that would seem to fall well 
outside the ambit of Article 77. Despite this, the Court accepted the arguments 
of the judges’ lawyers and dismissed the charges against their clients.
There was, of course, no legal reason to prevent prosecutors from revising 
and resubmitting their indictments; however, they did not (Assegaf 2002:138). 
Discussions with Andojo himself suggest that the Joint Team simply recog-
nized that it could no longer prevail against what appeared to him to be an 
insuperable judicial – and, he claimed, political – conspiracy against it. 
It seems he may have been right. Not content with having the case thrown 
out, the judges’ legal representatives then filed a request with the Supreme 
Court to review the Government Regulation by which the Joint Team was 
established against the statute under which the Regulation was issued. In 
their application, they argued that Law no. 31/1999 (which declared that 
the Joint Team could be established to hear particular corruption cases) and 
Government Regulation no. 19/2000 on the Joint Team (which contains details 
about the Team’s composition and functions) contradicted each other. 
Several provisions of the Regulation, particularly Articles 6(2) and 18, 
seemed to indicate that the Team was permanent (bersifat tetap); yet Article 
27 of the Law only stated that the Team ‘could be established’ (dapat diben-
tuk) ‘in the event that corruption is discovered that is difficult to prove’ 
pending creation of a later Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK). This, they argued, indicated the Team was, in 
the words of the Court, ‘impermanent, temporary, or incidental and faculta-
tive and causative’. 
[…] Article 18 of the [Regulation…] has eliminated and placed Article 43 [of 
the Law…] in a position as a ‘etre en soi’ (bein in its self), that is the Anti-
Corruption Commission has become an ‘item’ which has been alienated so that 
30 Aspandi 2002:34-5. This principle is contained in the first provision (Article 1(1)) of Indonesia’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana, KUHAP). A prohibition on prosecution for 
an act occurring before a law was passed has also been introduced in Article 28I(1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
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it has no power and even doesn’t exist because the Commission is substituted 
to become the Joint Team.31 
The Court’s reasoning is nonsensical. Rather than just affirming that the 
Joint Team was indeed only a temporary stopgap measure until the Anti-
Corruption Commission was established, the Court decided that it was neces-
sary to invalidate the entire regulation. Lacking a legal basis, the Joint Team 
was forced to cease operating altogether and so the prospects of prosecuting 
the three judges ceased with it. 
Perhaps most disturbing of all, the judge who chaired the Supreme 
Court panel appeared to have a serious conflict of interest. Justice Paulus 
E. Lotolong had previously been assigned by the Association of Indonesian 
Judges (Ikatan Hakim Indonesia, Ikahi) to ‘accompany’ the judges being in-
vestigated and, if necessary, to take any action as their legal advisor (Assegaf 
2002:139). Surely his participation on the panel should have invalidated the 
Court’s decision?32
We described earlier the very significant difficulties of detecting illegal-
ity in Indonesian court decisions, and those caveats remain valid. The Endin 
and three judges cases, however, are remarkable for an absence across them 
of clear and compelling reasons for the decisions reached, and for the strong 
suggestion of ulterior motives for those decisions arising from circumstances 
in which they were made. Read together, it is hard to resist the conclusion 
that these cases demonstrate the willingness of the Indonesian judiciary to 
conduct the most ruthless and aggressive institutional resistance to attempts 
to detect corruption in its ranks and hold its officers to account, regardless of 
the merits of accusations against individual judges, and despite what the law 
intends in such cases. This, in turn, suggests that the reason for the judiciary’s 
fiercely revanchist response in these cases is most likely a wish to protect an 
institutionalized model of corruption that implicates most of its members.
On this view, the problem of internal illegality in Indonesia’s judicial insti-
tutions in the form of corruption and resistance to efforts to detect and punish 
corruption is now primarily about advancing and defending the interests of 
the members of that institution, rather than being driven by any attachment, 
ideological or political, to any particular institution outside the judiciary – for 
example, the New Order, the state, the government, Pancasila or Reformasi. 
This can be seen, we would argue, from the fact that at the same time that 
the judiciary has continued determinedly defending its own members from 
31 MA Decision no. 03 P/HUM/2000, which can be found on http://www.hukumonline.com (accessed 8-9-
2010); mis-spelling in original.
32 Article 220 of Indonesia’s Criminal Code states that if a judge has a conflict of interest in a case, he should 
step down from the case. It does not, however, go so far as to state that the judges’ continued involvement in 
hearing the case will invalidate any decision made in that case. 
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scrutiny, offering them de facto impunity, it has been prepared to withdraw 
that impunity from other state actors. In other words, while the role of the 
general courts in authorizing external illegality has declined (although it has 
not entirely disappeared), and although its independence from the govern-
ment has been largely won, internal illegality in the sense of corruption has 
been largely undiminished, despite the immense pressure that has been 
brought to bear for judicial reform. To demonstrate this, we begin by describ-
ing briefly the practice of external illegality prior to Suharto’s fall.
External illegality and government interference
The weakening of judicial institutions under Indonesia’s first president, 
Sukarno, and their systematic degradation during Suharto’s 32 years in pow-
er, has been well-documented.33 The downfall of what had been a reasonably 
professional and independent judiciary in the 1950s, began with Sukarno’s 
introduction of ‘revolutionary law’ (hukum revolusi). Under this approach, 
courts and judges were targeted for obstructing presidential and executive 
prerogative which, Sukarno claimed, needed to be strong and largely un-
constrained so that the new state could realize the goals of the revolution. 
Sukarno’s campaign against the legal system culminated in Law no. 19/1964 
on Judicial Power. This statute explicitly rejected the trias politika (separation 
of powers), including the principle of judicial independence; stated that the 
courts were an instrument of the national revolution; and enabled the presi-
dent to interfere in, and retrospectively alter, any decision of any Indonesian 
court for the sake of the ‘ongoing revolution or national interests’.
Sukarno’s policy was catastrophic for judicial independence and integrity, 
but the courts fared even worse under Suharto’s New Order. Although the 
overt legal power of intervention under the rubric of revolutionary law was 
abandoned by Suharto, by the mid-1970s, the regime was, in any case, able to 
influence – even dictate – virtually any decision, and it consistently did so in 
cases in which it had any interest at all, even ‘petty cases, in which […] im-
portant Justice Department officials or the Supreme Court leadership defined 
an interest’ (Pompe 2005:140). 
The government achieved this influence by exercising bureaucratic con-
trol over individual judges and administrative control over the judiciary. 
Most of Indonesia’s judges (like judges in many civil law countries), became 
civil servants and as such were formally required to support government 
policy. They could, in fact, even be disciplined for breaching civil service 
33 See Butt 2008; Lev 1972, 1978; Lindsey 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2008; Pompe 2005. The beginning of 
Suharto’s rule is often traced to his actions on 1 October 1965.
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regulations, which required adherence to the state ideology (Pancasila), the 
state and the government, and the prioritizing of the interests of the state over 
those of groups or individuals.34 
As for administrative control, despite strenuous objections from many 
Indonesian lawyers and judges (Lev 1978), the Ministry of Justice wielded or-
ganizational, administrative and financial control over the lower general and 
administrative courts, under the so-called ‘two roof’ (dua atap) system.35 This 
gave the Ministry ultimate control over matters critical to the functioning of 
the courts and to the personal well-being of judges, such as the allocation of 
budgets, promotions, transfers, and dismissal, although responsibility for the 
legal competence of judges was nominally retained by the Supreme Court. 
In many other civil law countries, the government controls these admin-
istrative and organizational matters, with little apparent adverse effect on 
judicial independence (Wells 1994), at least where there are guidelines and 
protocols preventing government intrusion. However, government control 
has had a deleterious effect on judicial independence in some civil law coun-
tries, particularly countries still developing cultures of legal and judicial 
professionalism (see Hammergren 2001; Mattei 1997). In Indonesia it was 
regularly blamed for very low levels of judicial independence. Specifically, 
the government was said to commonly exploit judges’ reliance upon it for 
continued employment, pay, promotion and transfer to ensure loyalty, par-
ticularly from the early to mid-1970s (Pompe 2005:125-9). 
A system thus developed by which judicial promotions were very rarely 
based on merit; rather, they mostly were based on seniority, ‘dedication to 
service’, and ‘demonstrated loyalty’ (Supreme Court of Indonesia 2003:132). 
The Department’s power to transfer was also a powerful weapon (Menuju 
independensi 1999:50). Indonesia has a broad range of living conditions – from 
major centres with world-class facilities and luxuries, particularly in Java, to 
more remote, underdeveloped – and, at times, even dangerous – locations. 
The prospect of five years in a major centre for ‘toeing the line’, instead of in 
a backwater as punishment for recalcitrance, was a strong incentive indeed.36 
This non-merit promotion and transfer system that encouraged judicial 
acceptance of government interference is also responsible for other scourges 
that, at the time of writing, remain firmly part of the Indonesian judiciary. 
Continuing judicial education and the eksaminasi system, mentioned above, 
34 See Government Regulation no. 30/1980 on Disciplining Civil Servants, Articles 2(a) and 2(b).
35 Law no. 14/1970 on the Judiciary, Article 11(1). The Defence and Security Ministry and the Religious 
Affairs Ministry had similar levels of control over, respectively, the military courts and religious courts.
36 Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan (LeIP) points to one judge who served in 
Aceh for 11 years and to some judges who served for similar times in other ‘hardship’ provinces, and notes that 
other judges have been promoted and transferred to more comfortable locations (including the capital, Jakarta) 
far earlier than they would normally be (Supreme Court of Indonesia 2003:131). 
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were virtually abandoned during the ‘two roof’ period. After all, there was 
no need to maintain or improve judicial standards if the primary loyalty of 
judges was to the government rather than the law. In fact, forensic skill could 
be a positive disadvantage for a judge, as it might lead him or her to make po-
litically unacceptable decisions. The accountability mechanism of eksaminasi 
was also not required, indeed, it became an embarrassment: the smaller the 
chances of detection of interference in judicial decision making (even accept-
ing that detection would be difficult in any event), the better for the judiciary 
and government alike.
It must be acknowledged, however, that some judges (albeit clearly a mi-
nority) refused to succumb to these pressures, and continued to decide cases 
as they saw fit, and there were high-profile cases where the government was 
defeated in decisions at one level of appeal at least. One well-known example 
was the celebrated Tempo magazine case, where the government lost at first 
instance and at the first level of appeal, but ultimately succeeded in the 
Supreme Court (Millie 1999). This seems to indicate that the Department’s 
control over judges, at least with respect to particular cases and particular 
times, was sufficient to generally ensure that it ultimately secured the out-
comes it desired, but was not as absolute as is often presumed.
Unwinding external illegality
Within this ‘two roofs’ system, the New Order courts did not, for the most 
part, ‘punish’ illegal acts by state actors, including judges themselves, un-
less the executive directed them to do so. Rather, they generally operated to 
authorize or validate illegal acts of the state, with the politically influential 
enjoying virtual immunity from conviction. Much has been written about 
this process and for reasons of space the detail will not be rehearsed here. 37
After the fall of Suharto, significant reforms were made to Indonesia’s 
judicial system. One of the most important of these was, as mentioned, the 
transfer of the organizational, administrative and financial affairs of the lower 
courts to the Supreme Court – the so called ‘one roof’ (satu atap) reforms. 
These reforms take ultimate responsibility for the appointment, education, 
transfer, promotion and dismissal of judges away from the government. By 
forcing the government out of judicial career paths and the detail of court 
budgeting, these reforms constituted a radical reinvention of judicial admin-
istration in Indonesia. 
Although to the knowledge of the authors no comprehensive or rigorous 
study has yet been able to measure how these reforms have, in fact, improved 
37 See, for example, Aspandi 2002; Butt 2008; Goodpaster 2002; Lev 1972, 1978; Lindsey 2000, 2008; Pompe 2005.
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judicial independence, it is generally assumed in Indonesia that they have. 
Certainly it is now much rarer to hear allegations in the media and within 
Indonesian legal circles of government interference in cases in which it has 
an interest. And indeed, significant cases have emerged in which the govern-
ment or state actors have been defeated. There is even evidence suggesting 
that private parties in disputes against the state might now be on such a level 
playing field that they are able to defeat the state by offering illicit payments 
to the judges hearing those cases (Butt 2008). If this is the case, then we specu-
late that illegality in the form of internal corruption might be filling some of 
the vacuum left by a decline of state-authorized illegality. 
The apparently reduced levels of judicial authorization of external illegality 
cannot be attributed to satu atap reforms alone. The establishment of the Anti-
Corruption Court (Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Tipikor) appears also to 
have made a significant contribution. This it has done by diverting some types 
of corruption cases involving state officials away from the general courts which 
would, in the past, have been the forum before which such matters would have 
been determined. The Anti-Corruption Court has, precisely as it intended, 
removed some potentially lucrative opportunities for corruption from corrupt 
judges. In doing so, and by increasing the possibility that general court judges 
themselves may one day appear before it as defendants, it also constitutes an 
implicit threat to the impunity of state actors and, in particular, of other judges. 
The Anti-Corruption Court was established in 2003 to hear cases inves-
tigated and prosecuted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK). The KPK, made up of carefully selected 
seconded police and prosecutors, has been institutionally independent of 
Indonesia’s ordinary law enforcement apparatus. It has the authority to in-
vestigate and prosecute cases of corruption that implicate law enforcement 
officers or government officials, involve a significant amount of the state’s 
finances, or attract significant public concern (Articles 6(c) and 11 of the KPK 
Law). It can also take over corruption investigations from ordinary police and 
prosecutors if it determines that the case is not being handled expeditiously, 
if there are indications of corruption in the investigation or prosecution, or if 
the case is particularly complex or otherwise difficult (Article 9 of the KPK 
Law). Initially the KPK was criticized for choosing easy cases it could win, 
and for avoiding the ‘big fish’ corruption cases (Fenwick 2008), but in 2008 it 
began to dispel such criticisms, investigating corruption allegations against 
members of the national legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), senior 
state officials involved in significant bank scandals, and even the father-in-
law of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s son.38
38 Purba 2008; Kong and Ramayandi 2008. See ‘Vonis Hamka dan Antony tidak seragam; Aliran dana BI’, 7-1-
2009, http://www.hukumonline.com/warta/2009/1/7 (accessed 8-9-2010), and ‘Hamka divonis 3 tahun, Antony 
4.5’, Kompas 8-1-2009.
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The Anti-Corruption Court had, at the time of writing, heard and decided 
around 100 cases that the KPK brought before it and had convicted the defen-
dant in every case.39 Although there are several differences between the Anti-
Corruption Court and the general courts (Fenwick 2008), this 100% conviction 
rate is often credited to one in particular: the Anti-Corruption Court’s use of 
non-career judges. Anti-Corruption Court hearings employ five-judge panels. 
Two judges are career judges, but three are non-career judges, giving the non-
career (ad hoc) judges a majority if the court is split on whether to convict. 
These non-career judges are legal experts, such as academics, practitioners and 
retired judges and are considered less likely than career judges to be entwined 
in institutionalized corruption or to have divided loyalties. This appears to 
have been borne out in practice: several Anti-Corruption Court decisions have 
been split along ad hoc vs career lines (Fenwick 2008:414), with the majority ad 
hoc judges convicting the defendant and the minority career judges declaring 
that they would have acquitted or imposed a lower sentence.40 
The contribution of the Anti-Corruption Court should not be overstated: 
at the time of writing it was still hearing far fewer corruption cases than the 
general courts (ICW 2008). However, presuming that it remains effective in 
the future – a matter to which we return below – and assuming also that it 
continues to have high-profile cases presented to it by the KPK, it seems rea-
sonable to expect that the Court could continue to have a significant effect on 
the reduction of judicial validation of state illegality in the future, and may 
even come eventually to address internal illegality within the courts. 
Obstacles on the road to reform; Internal illegality and resistance to scrutiny
As mentioned above, Indonesia’s courts – particularly the Supreme Court 
– have strongly resisted attempts to hold them to account for misconduct, 
whether this be in the form of scrutiny of their decisions in particular cases 
(such as in the Endin case) or a more systematic mechanism to review their 
performance (such as a reintroduction of the eksaminasi system). The success 
of this resistance, it seems, allowed internal and external judicial illegality to 
continue virtually unchecked, at least until the satu atap reforms and the Anti-
Corruption Court were introduced. 
Now it seems Indonesia’s new Constitutional Court, itself enjoying a 
reputation for internal integrity, strong commitment to the new democratic 
arrangements and apparent freedom from corruption, has supported the 
wider cause of judicial resistance to external scrutiny. This court, established 
39 See ‘Pengadilan umum; ‘Kuburan’ pemberantasan korupsi’, Indonesia Corruption Watch, http://
antikorupsi.org/docs/lathukum2008.pdf (accessed 12-11-2009).
40 Appeals from the Anti-Corruption Court are lodged with a High Court, and then with the Supreme Court, 
again with three ad hoc and two career judges on the panel (see Articles 59(2) and 60(2) of the KPK Law).
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in 2003, is the first Indonesian court to have been formally granted powers of 
constitutional review. This enables it to review national statutes against the 
Constitution. This function is particularly important now that Indonesia’s 
Constitution has been expanded to include an international-standard Bill of 
Rights in Chapter XA that closely tracks the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). It is the Court’s job to ensure that the legislature does not 
illegally intrude upon these rights when making law. 
From its earliest days, the Court made it clear that it was independent and 
professional, that it intended to establish itself as a model judicial forum im-
mune to bribery, and that it genuinely intended to uphold the Constitution 
(Butt 2007a, 2007b; Butt and Lindsey 2008). In recent years, however, the Court 
has handed down some problematic decisions grounded in weak legal argu-
ment that have undermined the efforts of the national legislature to increase ju-
dicial accountability and tackle corruption. To that extent they have, intention-
ally or not, contributed to obstructing efforts to reform the general courts. Two 
of these decisions – concerning, respectively, the Judicial Commission and the 
Anti-Corruption Court – deserve discussion, albeit briefly for reasons of space.
In the first decision,41 Constitutional Court judges used the doctrine of ju-
dicial independence to make decisions that had the effect of protecting them-
selves and other judges from external scrutiny by the Judicial Commission.42 
The case was the final stage in a very public war between the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Commission. The controversy began when Professor Bagir 
Manan, then Supreme Court Chief Justice, rejected a Judicial Commission 
request to investigate several Supreme Court judges (including himself) for 
alleged corruption in cases they had handled. In response, members of the 
Judicial Commission visited the President to demand a reselection or rigor-
ous performance assessment of all 49 Supreme Court justices as the first stage 
of a comprehensive overhaul of the entire judiciary. This demand was leaked 
to the media, as was a list of allegedly ‘problematic’ or corrupt judges. In 
response, several Supreme Court judges reported then Judicial Commission 
Chairperson, Busyro Muqoddas, to the police for defamation. They also 
lodged an application with the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Judicial 
Commission’s power to monitor the judiciary contradicted the doctrine of 
judicial independence mandated by the Constitution.
On their petition, the Constitutional Court reviewed Law no. 22/2004, the 
statute which established the Commission. This Law gave the Commission 
two primary functions: to propose judicial appointments to the Supreme 
Court and to supervise the performance and behaviour of Indonesia’s judges.43 
41 This section draws on Butt (2007a), in which this dispute is discussed in detail.
42 The creation of an Indonesian Judicial Commission was mandated by the third amendment to Indonesia’s 
1945 Constitution (see Article 24B of the Constitution).
43 Law no. 22/2004, Article 13.
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However, the supervisory powers of the Commission were limited, presum-
ably in the interests of judicial independence. If the Commission suspected a 
judge of acting improperly, it could propose that the judge be punished by 
written reprimand, suspension or dismissal. However, the Commission could 
take no further direct action – it could only send the proposed sanction and 
reasons for suggesting it to the Supreme or Constitutional Court leadership. 
The statute allowed the Commission to review the performance of judges, but 
the final decision on whether action would be taken lay with other judges. 
The Court began its decision by excluding itself from Judicial Commission 
supervision, pointing to the principle of judicial independence contained in 
the Constitution, an issue neither party had asked it to rule on. The Court 
next found that judicial independence also prevented the Commission from 
supervising the Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial powers. The nub of the 
Court’s decision was as follows:
[…] even though assessing the technical-judicial skills of judges by reading ju-
dicial decisions might assist the Judicial Commission to identify a breach of 
a code of conduct or ethics, reviewing judicial decisions might place unjusti-
fiable pressure on the judges, thereby breaching judicial independence. Only 
the courts could review judicial decisions, and then only through the appeals 
process – not by evaluating and directly interfering with decisions or by influ-
encing judges (Butt 2007a:192).
 
In December 2008, the DPR amended the Supreme Court Law (Law no. 
3/2009), presumably in response to this decision. Article 11A of the Law gives 
power to the Supreme Court alone to recommend the removal of a judge to 
the president if that judge has been found guilty of a crime, neglects judicial 
duties for three months, has breached the judicial oath, or takes on additional 
unauthorized work. The Judicial Commission can propose removal for inap-
propriate behaviour (perbuatan tercela) or for a breach of the judicial code of 
ethics.44 Judges, however, have a ‘right to defend themselves’ before a Judges’ 
Honour Council (Majelis Kehormatan Hakim), comprising four Judicial 
Commission members and three Supreme Court judges. If the Council rejects 
the judge’s defence, then it is to convey its recommendations to the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Commission and, within 14 days the Supreme Court 
Chief Justice is to convey the recommendation to the President. 
In the opinion of the authors, it is possible that these new provisions are 
vulnerable to constitutional challenge on grounds similar to those accepted 
by the Constitutional Court in the Judicial Commission case. The Judicial 
Commission members are in the majority on the Honour Council and, pre-
suming that the Council votes by majority, the Judicial Commission appears 
44 At time of writing, a code of ethics had not been established.
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to have the potential to hold sway over the Council. If such a constitutional 
challenge against the review process was brought, the Constitutional Court 
might view the Judge’s Honour Council’s inclusion of Judicial Commission 
members as a threat to judicial independence.
In the second case in which the Constitutional Court appears to have made 
decisions that have weakened efforts to reduce internal judicial illegality,45 a 
number of people convicted by the Anti-Corruption Court petitioned the 
Constitutional Court to review several provisions of the statute by which the 
Anti-Corruption Court was established – the same statute that created the 
KPK.46 
The Court accepted their arguments, holding on two grounds that the 
Anti-Corruption Court had been established unconstitutionally. The first 
constitutional fault arose from the fact that both the general courts and the 
Anti-Corruption Court have jurisdiction over corruption cases. Whether the 
Anti-Corruption Court heard and decided particular cases was entirely de-
pendent on whether the KPK had chosen to investigate and prosecute those 
cases. If the KPK decided not to pursue a particular case, it would be handled 
in the ordinary way, that is, through the normal police, prosecutors and 
courts. This caused what the Constitutional Court referred to as ‘dualism’, 
which it saw as contradicting the constitutional principle of equality before 
the law. An underlying presumption in the Court’s decision appeared, how-
ever, to be that defendants were far more likely to be convicted and sentenced 
if their case was heard in the Anti-Corruption Court rather than the general 
courts and that this was unfair. As for the second ground, the Court read 
into the Constitution a requirement that new judicial bodies be established 
by their own separate statute. The mere fact that the Anti-Corruption Court 
was established in the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) Law was, it held, 
enough to fall foul of this requirement.
Despite holding that the Anti-Corruption Court had been established 
unconstitutionally, the Court recognized the seriousness of Indonesia’s cor-
ruption problem and decided not to disband the Anti-Corruption Court with 
immediate effect. Rather, it gave the DPR three years to enact a new specific-
purpose Law to re-establish the Anti-Corruption Court. The DPR met this 
deadline in late 2009, at a time when the KPK was cutting a swathe through 
legislators, with DPR members facing serious corruption charges. It is there-
fore perhaps unsurprising that the statute the DPR enacted (Law no. 46/2009) 
may, in any case, render the KPK and the Anti-Corruption Court largely 
impotent. This is because the new Law appears to bring the ordinary general 
courts and prosecutors (and thus the problems described above that are so 
45 Constitutional Court Decision no. 012-016-019/PUU-IV/2006.
46 Law no. 30/2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission.
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closely associated with them) back to the fore in corruption cases. It does this 
in two ways. First, the Law removes the requirement that ad hoc judges con-
stitute a majority on judicial panels in the Anti-Corruption Court. This means 
that future decisions over which career and ad hoc judges split could now re-
sult in acquittals rather than convictions, given that historically career judges 
have been more favourable to the accused in corruption cases than have ad 
hoc judges. Second, the statue does not mention the KPK at all, referring 
instead only to general prosecutors. This has raised concerns that the statute 
may, in fact, have implicitly removed the KPK’s prosecution function entirely. 
Conclusion: A persistent mafia
Despite the existence of some special-purpose courts that enjoy relatively 
good reputations for integrity, judicial corruption (internal illegality) in 
Indonesia probably remains as strong as ever in the general courts, where 
it may even have increased. Certainly, the judiciary as an institution has so 
far been effective in resisting almost every effort to impose tighter scrutiny 
on it, and has been able to obstruct enhanced detection of illegality within 
the courts. Against this, however, although it continues to be extraordinarily 
difficult to convict senior members of the security forces, the judiciary’s role 
under the New Order as source of validation for state (external) illegality at 
the behest of the elite has diminished significantly since the end of the New 
Order. This has occurred largely as a result of the reduction of direct govern-
ment interference in the administration of the courts through the introduction 
of the ‘one roof’ system and the removal of some of the Court’s control over 
corruption cases. 
We would also argue, however, that pressure for change in the courts has 
been brought to bear by the freeing up of the media in the post-Suharto era 
and the parallel growth of assertive and capable civil society organizations, 
both of which continue to see monitoring of state institutions and public 
‘shaming’ as legitimate levers for reform and have deliberately targeted the 
courts to this end. 
In any case, despite some signs of shift away from the high-water mark 
of judicial illegality that marked the 1990s, the magnitude of the challenge 
facing proponents of judicial reform in Indonesia remains almost overwhelm-
ing. The reformers must somehow force the institutional development of a 
hitherto neglected and aggressively resistant institution, the Supreme Court 
and the general courts below it, at the same time as driving a massive cross-
sectoral law reform agenda, most of which will ultimately end up before one 
or another of those same courts. To make matters worse, the advocates of 
reform must continue doing all this at a time of sweeping political transition, 
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in the context of a developing and shaky economy facing a global economic 
crisis, with all the long-standing geographic, political and demographic com-
plexities that have challenged every Indonesian government since indepen-
dence in 1945. 
It is therefore little wonder that the perceptions of Indonesia’s judiciary as 
little more than a ‘mafia’ with which this chapter began are still widespread. 






Migrant–police partnerships in East Kalimantan
In 2002, two Dutch inspection officers working on a joint Indonesian–Dutch 
operation against illegal trading in endangered species travelled to a large 
provincial capital in Indonesia. Shortly after arriving, they discovered that 
a brand new camera had been stolen from their luggage at the airport. In 
a meeting with the city police chief (kapolres), the Dutch officer complained 
about the incident. He said he had just bought the camera in Singapore for 
about €1,000. ‘Hold on’, said the police chief. ‘Let’s see what we can do.’ The 
next morning, when the team met again, the camera lay undamaged on the 
chief’s desk. ‘It has been returned’, the kapolres announced triumphantly. ‘We 
know how to access their networks.’1 
This incident illustrates how close the ties can be between police and 
criminal organizations in Indonesia. The police often know the thieves and 
pickpockets who are active in their district and can pinpoint the areas in which 
they operate. Sometimes they even know the pickpockets personally. To some 
extent, the police treat criminal practices as acceptable or legitimate. As one po-
lice officer put it, criminals are allowed to operate ‘as long as they do not bother 
the people too much and do not target government officials, military officials 
and officers and their families’.2 According to researchers at two Yogyakarta 
universities, pickpocketing gangs in most Javanese towns use the ‘cupboard’ 
method.3 They store the wallets or mobile phones they steal in a special cup-
board. If, after four days, no police officer, soldier or high-ranking official has 
claimed any of the stolen items, the cupboard is opened and the items are sold.
Other ties between the police and the underworld are more serious. 
Researchers and journalists have found evidence of direct involvement 
of police officers in criminal activities or even killings (Colombijn and 
1 Personal communication with AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) officer, 2003 and 
2008.
2 Personal communication with local police officer (polsek) in Samarinda, 2004.
3 Personal communication with Pujo Semedi (Gadjah Mada University, December 2005) and Argo Twikromo 
(Atma Jaya University, August 2008).
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Lindblad 2002:19-20). Today, most reported cases of police illegality involve 
graft (Montlake 2008; Shari and Einhorn 1998), illegal logging (Casson and 
Obidzinski 2002), and fraud. Some of these stories are well-documented 
and are reported in the media. Some are exposed in corruption cases in the 
courtroom. Others stay hidden or remain the subject of rumours, such as the 
alleged police involvement in the ‘mysterious shootings’ (penembakan miste-
rius or petrus) of the early 1980s (Schulte Nordholt 1991; Van der Kroef 1985).
However fragmentary the evidence from around Indonesia may be, it 
does suggest that police involvement in certain kinds of illegality is common 
enough to be considered systematic. Significant research into this phenom-
enon has been possible only in the last decade, since the separation of the 
police force from the armed forces in 1999. Previously, the police force had al-
ways been part of the military and the army had political clout. When the po-
lice became independent, they were made responsible for daily security tasks 
at the local level. This sparked a growing interest in their doings in schol-
arly journals and in reports from advocacy groups (for example, Amnesty 
International 2009). From what research has been done, it would appear that 
the police practices described in this chapter are commonplace in many parts 
of Indonesia. In the following chapter of this volume, for example, Ian Wilson 
explains the interaction between police officers and ‘protection racketeers’ in 
Jakarta. A report by the International Crisis Group illustrates how politicians 
and police officers in Bali and Lombok use local militias to levy taxes and 
keep immigrants off the islands (ICG 2003). The international NGO Global 
Witness (Paying for protection 2005) has revealed how Freeport pays govern-
ment security forces to guard its massive copper and gold mine in Papua. 
Writing for the The Jakarta Post, Apriadi Gunawan provides a detailed ac-
count of forced prostitution in the Walet Complex in Bagan Batu, Riau, where 
the guards are local police officers. On behalf of bar owners, the police pro-
vide sex workers with written permission to ply their trade. The same article 
mentions other brothels in Jakarta and Surabaya where similar practices take 
place (Gunawan 2006). These are just a few of the many known examples of 
police involvement in illegal activity.
Such stories raise several questions: How are relationships between the 
Indonesian police and criminal actors structured? In which types of illegality 
do these relationships tend to occur? How are the activities legitimized? And 
how do these relationships affect both the actors involved and the function-
ing of the state? 
These are complex questions. They are difficult to answer as well, for more 
reasons than one. Not only is police involvement in illegality typically veiled 
in secrecy, it also tends to be organized at a local level. The aim of this chapter 
is to provide some insight into the intricacies of state involvement in illegality 
in Indonesia. This will be achieved by presenting a local case study that lays 
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bare hidden practices of police officers and entrepreneurs in East Kalimantan. 
It may well be that these practices are not restricted to East Kalimantan, but 
reflect general patterns of illegality in Indonesia as a whole. 
This chapter focuses on Madurese migrant entrepreneurs in East 
Kalimantan and the relationships some of them have with police officers. 
The analysis presented here is based on the assumption that understanding 
local circumstances is the key to grasping the relationships between state and 
illegality in Indonesia. Hence, this chapter does not deal with the Indonesian 
police in general terms, but focuses instead on the relationship between poor 
people and the police in a local setting. It provides a view of state and illegal-
ity from the bottom up, by offering an account from the perspective of ordi-
nary people’s lives. In so doing, this chapter shows how essential illegality 
often is to poorer people’s lives. Without illegality, life would be considerably 
more difficult for migrants.
This research is based on field work I conducted in East Kalimantan from 
August 2003 to March 2004, with follow-up visits in 2005, 2007 and 2008. This 
is a continuation of earlier work on social security, livelihood and risk-taking 
among Madurese in East Java.4 In East Kalimantan, I had originally set out to 
study Madurese migrants and entrepreneurs and the strategies they employed 
to make a living under the threat of ethnic violence. Before long, however, I 
expanded my research focus to include illegal activities and the relationships 
between migrants and police. I realized that I could only understand the suc-
cesses, failures, and security problems of Madurese migrant entrepreneurs in 
East Kalimantan if I had a clear picture of their involvement in underworld 
activities. As we shall see, my investigations led me to the conclusion that 
migrants benefit from illegal activities and from their relationships with the 
police, while police in the East Kalimantan capital of Samarinda have to per-
mit a degree of criminality in order to keep crime under control.
Risky business
Becoming an entrepreneur is a risky business, especially for poorly educated 
immigrants of an ethnic group unpopular in the recipient society. Migrant en-
trepreneurs face numerous obstacles, including a lack of cash or credit, limited 
access to local information and support networks, and a general ignorance of 
– and exclusion from – local bureaucratic procedures. They may face discrimi-
nation and even threats of ethnic violence. Low-skilled migrants often find 
themselves excluded from the better paid jobs because these are distributed 
4 Nooteboom 2003. Many villagers from this area migrate to East Kalimantan. Chapter 7 of my dissertation 
describes illegal activities organized by local government officials (village heads), police, army officers, 
criminals, and gamblers in East Java (Nooteboom 2003:231-4).
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among more established groups. Immigrants are left with few options, aside 
from doing menial labour, taking up a trade, or going into business. 
The disadvantage of being from an ethnic minority group is compensated 
somewhat by a relative advantage. The minority group’s isolation from lo-
cal society and its governing norms makes it easier for the group’s members 
to engage in profitable, but illicit activities. Hans Dieter Evers (1990:11) de-
scribes the traders’ dilemma, 
[...] of either being integrated into the moral economy of the host society, and 
consequently subjugated to the pressure of solidarity and sharing, or, on the 
other hand, of separating from the host society, facing discrimination but also 
being able to claim debts, to accumulate capital and to conduct business and 
trade successfully. 
Elsewhere, Evers emphasizes how traders tend to minimize risk and maxi-
mize trust in inter-ethnic relationships by engaging in many kinds of trading 
and other relationships (Evers and Schrader 1994; Evers and Mehmet 1994:1). 
Such considerations may explain why large parts of many immigrant minor-
ity groups the world over are entrepreneurs (Raillon 1994) and why they 
often are successful, especially in the informal sector. The success of immi-
grant entrepreneurs seems to be the result of a combination of factors: their 
will (and need) to succeed, their strategic use of ethnic trading networks and 
inter-ethnic trust, their lack of assimilation, and their willingness to carry out 
any tasks – no matter how dirty, difficult or unacceptable to others in local 
society. The last of these factors explains why immigrant entrepreneurs are 
regularly reported to be involved in illegality.
This general impression also seems to apply to Madurese entrepreneurs in 
East Kalimantan. In Samarinda, the provincial capital, about 15% of Madurese 
migrants own a business or trade. Most of their businesses are small, but they 
provide jobs to about three-fourths of the estimated 15,000-20,000 Madurese in 
the city. Some of the migrants who arrived before the 1990s are now well-off 
and own land, houses, cars, transport businesses, recycling firms, construction 
companies, gambling dens and brothels. They earned their fortunes in the late 
1980s and 1990s when the local economy experienced a logging and mining 
boom. A number of their businesses seem to occupy a grey area, combining 
perfectly legal trade with activities such as theft, fraud, illegal logging or land 
occupation, brothels and gambling dens. Many individual Madurese also 
work as security guards and assistants for ethnic Chinese businessmen who 
organize large-scale gambling operations at malls, discotheques and bars. 
However, widespread violence against Madurese in other parts of Kalimantan 
from 1997 to 2001 damaged the image and the self-confidence of Madurese 
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migrants, making them less attractive as guards for others.5 Some Madurese 
who formerly worked as security guards have started their own businesses; 
others have retreated into less risky business.
When considered against the backdrop of all illegal economic activity in 
Samarinda, the Madurese are small players. Very few of them were involved 
in the massive illegal logging operations of the late 1990s and early 2000s, for 
instance. Nor did they play a major role in recent cases of corruption linked 
to government projects, timber and plantation concessions, or the embezzle-
ment of mining royalties.6 Although people in Samarinda often brand the 
Madurese as a criminality-prone group, they are in fact no more involved 
in illegal activities than other ethnic groups such as the Buginese, Banjarese, 
Javanese, Torajanese, and Butonese.
According to one local, middle-ranking police officer, the Banjarese and 
Buginese are currently the most criminally active ethnic groups in Samarinda. 
Buginese gangs are dominant in protection rackets, the lucrative harbour 
and market areas, and large-scale illegal trading of all kinds, while Banjarese 
gangs tend to engage in petty crime such as burglary and pickpocketing. It 
appears the police look the other way, as long as the crimes committed re-
main petty and mobs punish some of the perpetrators themselves by public 
lynching.7 In general, the Indonesian population tends not to trust the police 
and ‘people feel that lynching makes the streets safer’ (Colombijn 2002:302). 
The relationships between small entrepreneurs, illegal activities and the 
police in Indonesia are the subject of a great deal of speculation but very little 
actual research. For my own study, I closely followed several East Madurese 
entrepreneurs and analysed their involvement in both legal and illegal activi-
ties. There are several types of illegal activity which the police accept and even 
benefit from. This does not apply to all crimes, however. There are categories 
of criminality which the police attempt to stamp out. Among Madurese them-
selves, there are different views on what is acceptable behaviour. Moreover, it 
appears that police officers often collaborate with the Madurese or even help 
them carry out some illegal activities. Before discussing these situations in de-
tail, I will first elaborate on the research methodology I used and then sketch 
the background and structure of Madurese migration and entrepreneurship 
in East Kalimantan.
5 For analysis of anti-Madurese violence elsewhere in Kalimantan see Schiller and Garang 2002; Davidson 
and Kammen 2002; Peluso 2006; Peluso and Harwell 2001; Van Klinken 2002. I have discussed the loss of self-
esteem and its impact elsewhere: De Jonge and Nooteboom 2006; Nooteboom 2005.
6 For illegal logging in East Kalimantan, see Casson and Obidzinski 2002.
7 In his discussion of public lynching across the country, Freek Colombijn (2002) describes several mob 
lynchings which occur while the police stand idly by. He concludes: ‘The response of the police to mob justice 
is in general half-hearted […] After the fact, however, the police accept the lynching as it is. They never try to 
investigate the matter’ (Colombijn 2002:319). See also Welsh 2008.
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Researching illegality
For obvious reasons, studying relationships between police and migrants in 
the context of illegality is not easy. By nature, illegality concerns covert activi-
ties, sensitive topics, uneasy relationships, distrust, and a shared interest in 
secrecy for all actors involved. Migrant groups and police networks are both 
difficult to gain access to. Information and locations are often blocked by 
gatekeepers – these may be gang leaders or even police officers – who tend 
to prohibit activities, deny access, or frustrate interviews and observations. 
Outsiders, including researchers, represent a potential threat. Silence is es-
sential to the continuation of illegal activities.
Information on illegal activities is not limited to leaders though. Often 
there are many people who are aware of such activities and who possess 
crucial information about them. This is because the activities usually depend 
on social networks and may involve huge numbers of actors. These actors sel-
dom know all the facts, but they are able to reveal part of the illegal practices 
they are involved in. There are anthropological research methods suitable 
for approaching such people, gaining access to their networks and gathering 
insights without directly mentioning illegality as a research theme.
The study of illegality in daily life requires an unobtrusive and indirect 
approach. I used a bottom-up method in which I gathered information 
about various economic activities by Madurese migrants in East Kalimantan, 
embedding it in a larger study on livelihood and social security styles.8 By 
studying the migrants’ livelihood activities, insecurities, and social networks, 
it proved feasible also to study their illegal activities and their relationships 
with police officers. This method provided access to the perspective of the 
Madurese migrants themselves, rather than that of police officers. In or-
der to conduct this research, I had to develop close contacts with ordinary 
Madurese workers, migrants and entrepreneurs. Many were willing to tell 
me about their livelihood activities – including the less legal ones – and to 
show me around behind the scenes at markets, wedding ceremonies and 
bars, or take me to cockfights, illegal brothels, and gambling dens.
I studied Madurese settlers in three clearly demarcated clusters of eco-
nomic activity: brick making, stone cutting, and vegetable growing. The first 
two sectors are dominated by Madurese from Bangkalan (West Madura) and 
Sampang (Central Madura) respectively. Most brick makers work on the out-
skirts of the city of Samarinda, while stone cutters can be found in the hills 
of Batu Putih and Batu Besaung, west and north of the city. In the vegetable 
growing area of Lempake, to the northeast of Samarinda, Madurese-speaking 
migrants from Malang (East Java) dominate.
8 For the wider study see Nooteboom 2008.
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Within these clusters of economic activity, which were relatively ho-
mogeneous with respect to place, descent, social class, and ethnic identity, 
I observed a wide variety of ways in which people tried to make a living, 
interpreted ethnic violence, maintained contacts with other ethnic groups, 
and strove for business success and social advancement. My research com-
prised three phases with a progressively narrowing scope. In the first phase, 
I mapped out the various economic activities, locations and backgrounds of 
Madurese migrants. To conclude this phase, I selected three sectors domi-
nated by Madurese. In the second phase, I conducted semi-structured inter-
views with questions on livelihood constitution, livelihood patterns, incomes, 
remittances, social security, perceptions of crisis and violence, relationships 
with state officials (including police officers) and inter-ethnic relationships. 
In the last phase, I revisited a dozen families on a weekly basis to conduct 
lengthy interviews and construct life histories; I again revisited some of these 
families in 2005, 2007 and 2008.
During the second phase, I became interested in the illegal activities 
people were involved in. I made further inquiries among brick makers and 
workers in the quarries and brothels and carried out participant observation 
of cockfights, gambling, and brick making activities. Although it was nearly 
impossible to interview police officers, officials from the State Intelligence 
Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN), or politicians, I managed to conduct a 
few informal interviews with such people without revealing the purpose of 
this study. It is mainly for this reason that this chapter adopts a bottom-up 
perspective on state and illegality, looking at interactions through the eyes of 
Madurese migrants. 
The Madurese in Samarinda
Most Madurese in Samarinda are still economically unsuccessful and have 
not escaped poverty. They are poorly educated though famous for being 
hard workers. As a result, they are in demand in sectors where hard physical 
labour is required, such as transport and construction. Many porters at the 
harbour and the markets are Madurese, as are many road workers, builders, 
garbage collectors, stone cutters, and brick makers. Others work as security 
guards, carpenters, owners of repair shops and hairdressers. The banana 
trade and sate sector are dominated by Madurese, as well as most of the can-
teens at the main university campus. In general, Madurese migrants occupy 
the lower strata of East Kalimantan society. 
It is widely claimed that Madurese migrants in Kalimantan tend to spa-
tially isolate themselves from other groups (Peluso and Harwell 2001:103). In 
this, however, they do not differ from other ethnic groups who also prefer to 
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live close together. In East Kalimantan, Madurese tend to settle in close prox-
imity to each other, often in relation to their occupation or village of origin. In 
Samarinda, they live in old districts close to the harbour and the city markets. 
Clusters of brick makers from rural Bangkalan can be found on the outskirts 
of the city on otherwise unused lands. Temporary labourers who work in 
road construction and on building sites mostly originate from eastern Java 
and Sampang in Madura; they tend to live in barracks or deserted houses 
scattered throughout the city. Migrants who stay for long periods are more 
likely to live in mixed communities and interact with other ethnic groups 
such as the Javanese, Banjarese, Kutai Malay and Butonese. However, rela-
tionships between Madurese and Buginese, the second largest ethnic group 
in East Kalimantan, have long been tense. Traditionally, contacts with the 
indigenous Dayak are relatively cordial, although they became tense follow-
ing violent attacks on Madurese by Dayak in West and Central Kalimantan.
During the colonial era, most Madurese in this province were employed 
as unskilled labourers on plantations and in the mining and oil industries 
around Balikpapan.9 This situation remained basically unchanged until the 
late 1970s. From that time onwards, migrants have mainly been engaged in 
road construction, recycling (scrap metal and tires), small trade, brick mak-
ing, logging, and the building and transportation sectors. Some have become 
very successful, acquiring heavy machinery and large trucks. A small number 
have also become involved in illegal activities. 
Madurese in Samarinda live simply, save money to invest, marry young, 
and help each other. They also provide accommodation to newcomers – 
many of whom are relatives or people from their villages of origin – and help 
them to find jobs. They tend not to seek an education; the few Madurese in 
East Kalimantan who have graduated from university have difficulty finding 
suitable jobs. As a result, there are almost no Madurese in the government 
bureaucracy or higher ranks of the police in East Kalimantan. According to 
Hendro (2001:72), ‘the majority can neither read nor write’, with illiteracy 
rates of 40% to 50% for male workers and even higher percentages for wom-
en. Madurese parents often keep their children home from school and expect 
them to help the family make a living. Religious knowledge, though, is highly 
valued. In East Kalimantan, several Madurese pesantren, religious boarding 
schools, have been founded. Well-to-do Madurese often send their children 
to pesantren in Madura and Eastern Java. Some have made hajj. 
The Madurese in East Kalimantan are not a homogenous group. They 
make a distinction between Madurese from Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan 
and Sumenep. These groups speak different dialects, follow different re-
9 During the Japanese occupation an unknown number of forced labourers (romusha) were recruited from 
Madura to work on plantations and infrastructural projects in Kalimantan. 
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ligious leaders (kiai) and emphasize different cultural traits. For instance, 
Sumenep Madurese are said to be more refined than those from Pamakasan, 
whereas those from Sampang are generally perceived by others and them-
selves as being the least refined of all, as unreliable troublemakers.
According to many Dayak, Malay, Buginese and Banjarese sources, the 
Madurese have done little to adapt to their new social environment. Instead 
of accommodating other groups, they are said to look down on others. Their 
behaviour is routinely described as arrogant, short-tempered, boorishly mas-
culine, rude, uncivilized, unfair, avaricious and vengeful. These are all char-
acterizations and stereotypes that have been applied to the Madurese since 
colonial times. In times of crisis, such prejudices are infused with additional 
meaning because they are sometimes used to justify violence against the 
Madurese (De Jonge 1995). Many Madurese who were born in Kalimantan 
blame this negative image on newcomers, who they claim do not know how 
to behave, and on thugs (preman) who belong to criminal gangs involved in il-
legal logging, running brothels and gambling dens, and smuggling consumer 
goods. According to these more established Madurese, the newcomers cast a 
shadow over the whole Madurese community. 
Relationships with police officers
Whenever a theft takes place in Samarinda, local Madurese are the usual 
suspects. This is just one effect of negative stereotyping. The negative image 
also makes it hard for Madurese to establish new businesses or to expand 
existing ones. However, their lowly status as a migrant underclass also puts 
them at an advantage in the sense that they have more room to manoeuvre in 
illegal sectors of the economy. To protect their position, many Madurese en-
trepreneurs maintain regular contacts with police officers, who protect their 
businesses and informally facilitate illegal activities.
For the police, such arrangements with marginalized Madurese entrepre-
neurs are also beneficial because this is how the police gain access to lucrative 
illegal activities. Moreover, the entrepreneurs are willing to do the ‘dirty’ jobs 
which the police cannot do themselves. Examples include running semi-legal 
stone quarries and excavations of clay for the brick industry, running broth-
els, organizing cockfights and other forms of gambling, running protection 
rackets, and even engaging in petty crime such as pickpocketing, organizing 
pyramid schemes, and stealing. For each activity, the participants need to pay 
regular premiums to the police officers who routinely visit them. These pre-
miums can vary widely: 5-20% of the earnings for unlicensed brick, stone and 
transport businesses, over 50% for most illegal and criminal activities such 
as running brothels or organizing large-scale gambling. According to some 
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Madurese informants, police officers tend to keep quiet about their involve-
ment in smaller-scale activities. They usually do not tell their colleagues for 
fear of putting their own profits in jeopardy. 
Moreover, their position as members of a feared and reviled minority 
group makes Madurese ideal candidates to be hired by security personnel 
for dirty work involving intimidation and competition between political 
rivals or interest groups. Active involvement by Madurese in intimidation 
of business or political groups has declined in recent years. Many Madurese 
preman used to be involved in such activity in the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
the widespread violence against Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan 
that began in 1997 made them more politically vulnerable in East Kalimantan 
and diminished their role as henchmen, in gang conflicts and in protection 
rackets. Many Madurese are, however, still employed as security guards in 
gambling dens, bars, discotheques, and brothels. Good relationships with the 
police are essential to maintaining these positions; if relations with the police 
are poor, the Madurese are the first to be punished. 
By not engaging directly in illegal activities, the police remain free of 
direct responsibility while enjoying the profits. The ordinary police officers 
who collect the proceeds from petty crime in turn pay part of these proceeds 
as tribute to their superiors within the police apparatus. The Madurese who 
engage in these mutually beneficial relationships with the police end up, by 
visibly participating in illegality, reinforcing the negative public image of the 
Madurese as a group.
Communal norms
Within their own community, the Madurese are relatively intolerant of illegal 
activity. On the contrary; most Madurese take pride in their community and 
are religiously orthodox. They clearly distinguish between licit and illicit 
behaviour in business. Drinking, prostitution, and gambling are considered 
unacceptable, for instance. Involving Madurese women in prostitution, no 
matter how bad their reputation may be, is perceived as shameful to the 
whole community and is severely punished.10 
Crimes such as stealing and cheating customers (by not repaying debts or 
by supplying a lower quantity or quality of goods than paid for, for example) 
are considered less serious, as long as the aggrieved party is not Madurese 
10 Remarkably, Madurese-speaking prostitutes from the island of Java, especially from the areas of Pasuruan, 
Lumayang, Besuki, Bondowoso, Jember and Sitobondo, are permitted to work in Madurese-run brothels in 
East Kalimantan. They are generally considered to be outsiders by members of the local Madurese community 
who come from the island of Madura. A quick survey among brothel owners indicates that these Madurese-
speaking women from East Java comprise the largest ethnic group among prostitutes in Samarinda.
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and nobody gets hurt. Many Madurese men retell stories of their own feats 
of cheating and stealing over and over again; this enhances their status as 
‘daredevils’ and demonstrates strength and cleverness. Nevertheless, no mat-
ter how much money is earned from such activities, the profit is generally 
perceived as unclean or forbidden (haram) and cannot be used for religious 
purposes such as paying Islamic tax (zakat), donating funds for the building 
of mosques, or – according to some purists – spending on household needs. 
Many Madurese say such profits are hot money (uang panas), in other words: 
easy come, easy go. Some women told me they would not knowingly accept 
haram money from their husbands, even if they badly needed it for food and 
other basic needs. As a result, men often spend the money on clothes, food, 
or presents, and give their wives these goods rather than money. 
At Idul Fitri, the festivities that follow Ramadan, I witnessed the young-
est son of Hajji Yusuf visiting his father’s home.11 Members of the family had 
avoided talking about this son in most of my conversations with them, as he 
was a habitual gambler and working as a game organizer and security guard 
for a Chinese businessman in Balikpapan. I never got a complete picture of 
his activities because his father and brothers did not want to talk about him. 
During his visit, he offered his father some sorely-needed Rp 50,000 notes. But 
his father refused the money and ignored his son completely, which I thought 
was quite embarrassing for the son. Hajji Yusuf later told me he had not want-
ed to accept money that was probably earned through haram activities. Later 
still, when I was getting ready to leave, Yusuf’s wife proudly showed me the 
money her son had given her. She had accepted it with gratitude. Hajji Yusuf 
will probably never know how his wife paid for food that month. 
Illegality appears first and foremost to be men’s business, but women often 
condone their husbands’ activities and create a conducive environment. Wives 
are often prominent in money laundering, in sending profits to and investing 
in Madura, in managing the girls in the brothels, or in establishing legitimate 
businesses as a cover for illegality. They often remain silent when their hus-
bands lose large sums of money gambling or from fines for illegal activities 
without police protection. The wives of men involved in illegality often secretly 
save gold or cash for difficult times, act as moneylenders to other Madurese, or 
invest in legitimate businesses such as local shops, trades, food stalls (warung), 
or trucks. Some of these wives buy cattle, land or houses in Madura. At the 
same time, women often try to coax their husbands away from criminal activi-
ties and sometimes play a crucial role in persuading them to go straight. 
After achieving success illegally in their younger years, many men reach a 
turning point when they become older, typically in their mid-thirties or early 
11 Hajji Yusuf is a close friend of Hajji Romli, who is introduced later in this chapter. Hajji Yusuf worked for 
Hajji Romli before they travelled to Mecca. 
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forties. They come to see the dirty and dangerous work they are involved in 
as emotionally exhausting or unsustainable. Gradually, or sometimes abrupt-
ly, men abandon their criminal activities and invest their money in legitimate 
business activities. This change often goes hand in hand with a turn towards 
religiousness, which is usually seen as a kind of repentance and is sometimes 
sealed by a pilgrimage to Mecca. Such a transformation is usually celebrated 
by Madurese friends and relatives, who do not view this as a sign of weak-
ness or decline but as a move towards a better life. In a way, leading a ‘life of 
sin’ in youth is almost a precondition for becoming a real man and a genuine 
Muslim later. Most entrepreneurs pay a high price for their conversion, how-
ever. Their legitimate enterprises quickly lose customers and resources, and 
household income drops accordingly. A certain degree of illegality facilitates 
economic success. Therefore, good relations with the police are essential even 
to those who run a simple business. 
Three life stories
For the remainder of this chapter, I will illustrate the structure of relation-
ships between Madurese entrepreneurs and police based on three examples. 
I will discuss them in ascending order of intimacy with the police and with 
illegality. The three Madurese who I will refer to by the pseudonyms Sudi, 
Romli, and Tamim are all self-made men. We begin with ‘Sudi’, a brick 
maker who has no proper deed for the land he uses. He receives protection 
from a police officer in return for bricks or money. His good relations with 
the police, although costly, ensure the survival of his enterprise. They spare 
Sudi time-consuming red tape and legitimize his excavation of fertile topsoil. 
Moreover, his connections with the police protect him from competing land 
claims and hostility from his neighbours. 
My next example is ‘Romli’, a trader and transporter of building materials 
who formerly made a living from smuggling, theft and extortion. After ceas-
ing these activities under police pressure, Romli fell on hard times. With the 
help of his wife and brother-in-law, he succeeded in transforming himself 
from a feared gang leader into a respected community leader. Due to his close 
contacts with the police, he is often able to negotiate on behalf of Madurese 
who have been jailed for petty crimes. He can get their fines reduced or even 
secure their release from police custody. In return, Romli has to act as a police 
informant in cases of murder or ethnic violence. 
My final example is ‘Tagil’, who offers us a glimpse into the double life 
led by many criminals in Indonesia. He is a gambling boss and pimp who 
runs his own illegal activities, but is also an instrument in the hands of the 
police force. 
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Seeking protection: Sudi
I met Sudi several times in 2003 and 2004. I observed him at his brick kiln, 
situated on a back road to Bayur. Whether he was taking a break, oversee-
ing his employees, or firing bricks himself, he was always prepared to talk 
to me at length. He openly shared his life story with me. Sudi arrived in East 
Kalimantan from Madura in the mid-1980s. Within five years he had become 
a successful organizer of cockfights and other betting events. He was feared 
for his aggressiveness and bad temper. Many people saw him as one of the 
most daring young Madurese ‘madmen’ roaming Samarinda in the mid-
1990s. ‘Everyone was afraid of me’, he told me during one of our conversa-
tions. ‘I could beat anyone. Be it in fighting, drinking or motorbike racing, 
I always wanted to win. There were times when I had loads of money, but 
sometimes I lost large amounts and did not come home for days. In the end, 
I had run up a debt of Rp 26 million.’ In one of our interviews I ventured to 
ask his wife, who did not take part in our conversation but listened closely 
to our every word, whether she had been angry about his behaviour or tried 
to prevent him from gambling. ‘Angry? What do you think? Of course I was 
angry at him. But, you know, it was better to remain silent with this man. I 
had two young children. If you get mad with hot-headed people like him, 
they get even meaner and rougher. It’s better to be careful.’ Sudi nods. ‘That’s 
what I was like. When I came home late at night and my wife didn’t open the 
door fast enough, I would kick it in.’ 
After a violent fight with Buginese thugs, one of whom was reportedly se-
verely wounded or killed, Sudi ended up in a police cell.12 One of his maternal 
uncles in East Kalimantan, Saïd, knew the right people in the police force and 
managed to bribe him free on condition that Sudi would never again engage 
in crime. Saïd demanded that Sudi give up his life of drinking, gambling, and 
consorting with prostitutes, and offered him a job as foreman in his brick mak-
ing enterprise. Saïd’s close ties with the police protected Sudi from the revenge 
of the Buginese men. This marked the start of a new kind of life for Sudi.
Nine years later, Saïd sold some of his possessions in Kalimantan and 
made a pilgrimage to Mecca. When he returned, he went bankrupt, due 
to his own overspending and embezzlement by his business partner. This 
meant Sudi was out of a job. He started to gamble again. Over the course of 
a few months he lost millions of rupiah. In the hope of changing his luck, 
he borrowed money from a friend and bought a cheap brick kiln in Bayur. 
The kiln had previously belonged to a Madurese who had been accused of 
12 Sudi did not tell me exactly what happened to these Buginese men, whom he called ‘wounded thugs’. I 
got some information about them from others, but the accounts were second hand and sometimes ambiguous. 
Some said one or more Buginese thugs had been killed, while others said some had been severely wounded but 
none killed. 
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theft and killed by an angry mob. To obtain clay, Sudi rented land from vil-
lagers with the help of a policeman, a friend of his uncle Saïd’s. The police-
man paid a few of the villagers money and ordered them to cease hostilities 
against Madurese. Around the same time that Sudi was producing his first 
bricks, it became clear that there were several land claims on the plot where 
the kiln was located and where Sudi obtained his clay. Villagers from two 
neighbouring villages claimed the plot was their communal land and pro-
tested the commercial excavation of the soil. Moreover, they did not want any 
Madurese living nearby.
Sudi called on the help of the policeman. The policeman visited the area of-
ten and word of his friendship with Sudi spread fast. Regular sightings of him 
at Sudi’s kiln discouraged villagers from protesting. According to Sudi, the 
policeman also talked to the village elders. His relations with the neighbours 
have settled down. ‘I even visited their mosque and donated 4,000 bricks for 
its renovation. But I do not fully trust them. I need my friend the police officer. 
He also helped me when some Buginese men were hunting for me in an at-
tempt to reclaim a gambling debt. My friend [the police officer] brought them 
some of my money and told them to go away. They never returned.’ 
The policeman’s protection comes at a price, however. From the beginning 
of their cooperation, the officer asked to be paid 5% of all the bricks Sudi pro-
duced. In Sudi’s first year, when bricks were expensive and his production was 
still low, the policeman took 17,000 bricks whose total value was nearly Rp 6 
million. ‘Rumour had it he was building a house for himself.’ Later, when the 
price of bricks fell, the police officer wanted to be paid Rp 500,000 for every 
100,000 bricks produced. Currently, Sudi has a large business. He produces 
some 250,000-300,000 bricks per year and employs eight to ten people. Yet the 
cooperation continues. When the bricks are fired, about five or six times a year, 
the policeman visits Sudi and asks for payment. ‘I do not know where he lives, 
but if he comes, I give him Rp 100,000 or more if he keeps on asking. He’s actu-
ally poor’, Sudi explains. ‘He has to give most of his money to his superiors.’
In the course of my study of Madurese livelihoods in East Kalimantan, I 
encountered several enterprises such as Sudi’s. The entrepreneurs I met got 
access to land or even land titles thanks to their close ties with the police. 
Some of them received direct police protection during land conflicts, hostili-
ties or problems with creditors. In seven cases out of the 118 in my sample, 
entrepreneurs told me explicitly, and without being prompted, about their 
relationships with the police, including information about the payments they 
made and the percentages taken. In another five cases, businesspeople in-
formed me about similar relationships, but in less detail.13 Two-thirds of these 
13 I could not inquire directly about relationships with the police in interviews I conducted. In some cases I 
thought discussing these relationships would be deemed inappropriate, and in some of my earlier interviews I 
had not yet begun to focus on this topic. 
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twelve cases were brick making enterprises. Most of the others were remote 
quarries where stones are cut for road construction.
Most quarry labourers are from Sampang and prefer, for one reason or 
another, to work in these remote locations. Some of them have fled from eth-
nic violence in West and Central Kalimantan, while others are migrants with 
dubious legal status because they lack local identity permits (Kartu Tenaga 
Kerja, KTP). Some have problems such as unpaid debts, criminal charges or 
accusations of extra-marital relationships hanging over their heads. Many 
told me they were working in such a remote place because they had re-
ceived threats of revenge murder (carok). The quarries are located in largely 
uninhabited, hilly areas some 5-20 kilometres from the city. In the quarries, 
individual police officers provide protection in return for a percentage of the 
earnings for all truckloads of stone delivered. They come to visit every week 
and sometimes bring basic supplies such as drinking water, salt, soap or rice. 
In the quarries, policemen are paid commissions of up to 15% of the value 
of the stone produced. In general, this is higher than the percentages paid 
at the brick kilns. I did not hear of the police receiving any more than 5% in 
the brick industry. Percentages at the quarries are probably higher because 
people there are more vulnerable and the money covers personal as well as 
business protection. 
It is money well spent. In Sudi’s case, the premiums have protected the 
enterprise against legal claims by neighbouring villagers and ended his 
troubles with old enemies. Unlike earlier situations in which he paid police 
officers who turned out to be unreliable or incapable of helping out, this re-
lationship has yielded results. It has ensured continued access to resources 
and the sustainability of the family business. Five to 15% is a small price to 
pay for success, certainly for a migrant. But premiums depend on the kind 
of business, the level of illegality, and the tolerance of higher-ranking police 
officers. Sometimes the police want more control and make greater demands.
Conflicting loyalties: Romli
Hajji Romli lives on one of the main roads connecting Samarinda to the hin-
terland of East Kalimantan. His white peci hat and grey beard make it difficult 
to guess his age. He stares intently with his black eyes. He speaks quickly and 
asks direct questions. He and his wife run a successful distribution centre 
stocked with building materials such as sand, bricks, stone, cement, and tim-
ber. Since 2006, he has also operated as a subcontractor for basic construction 
work in large building projects. On these projects, Romli delivers the sup-
plies and carries out the groundwork, lays the foundations and sometimes 
completes the construction of brick walls, sewage systems and roads. Other 
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subcontractors take care of the wood, iron and roof work and other refined 
tasks. Romli also tenders as the main contractor for smaller projects, such as 
public buildings, small roads and drainage systems. The trade and contract-
ing business are basically his, but his wife organizes the transportation. She 
owns four trucks and an excavator. Romli usually uses two of these trucks for 
construction orders. ‘I only take large orders such as houses, blocks or shops, 
otherwise I do not make a profit. If the work is big, I send for more labourers 
from Java and use trucks that belong to fellow Madurese businesses.’ 
As my research progressed, I slowly realized how important Romli was as 
an informal leader in the Madurese community and a broker in relations with 
the police. He negotiates bribes when Madurese are arrested for petty crimes 
or taken into custody after traffic accidents. He supports Madurese who oc-
cupy land claimed by others, and he mediates in property conflicts. He was 
also involved in peace negotiations during ethnic tensions in 2005 and 2007.14 
In return for his loyalty to East Kalimantan’s elites, he has been granted 
excavation concessions in the rocky hills of Batu Besaung and is allowed to 
bid for construction projects. Whenever ethnic tensions arise in Samarinda 
and surroundings, Romli is called upon by the town mayor, members of the 
East Kalimantan parliament, the chief of police or a military commander to 
persuade the Madurese to refrain from violence. He is regarded as influential 
among the Madurese and loyal to the interests of the ruling elites who set 
great store by stability.15 During our conversations, fellow Madurese were 
continuously visiting his house to ask for advice, borrow money, or discuss 
matters of political interest. The nearly constant beeping and ringing of his 
several cell phones illustrated the extent of his social network. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Romli was one of Samarinda’s most notorious 
gang leaders and gamblers. His wife saved part of the profits and at the end 
of the 1980s she bought a truck to rent out and to use for the transport of 
construction materials. In those years, Romli was involved in petty theft as 
well as swindles that involved receiving payment for goods that were never 
delivered and loans that were never paid back. He also organized betting 
fraud on a large scale. However, he is quick to point out that he ‘did not steal 
from our friends and fellow Madurese’. He is also said to have been involved 
in several killings of Buginese rivals, but he always skirted this issue in our 
discussions. The rumours about him added to his reputation for toughness. 
14 The 2005 negotiations, which were initiated by East Kalimantan’s security forces, are briefly described 
in De Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:470-1. At the end of 2005 tensions rose between Dayak and Madurese in 
Samarinda due to the stabbing of the son of a Dayak adat leader and the deaths of two Madurese. Romli was 
invited to the security meetings and was able to calm Madurese groups who were calling for revenge. This 
increased his political influence and improved his contacts with high-ranking security officials.
15 See De Jonge and Nooteboom 2006 and Van Klinken 2002 for a description of these elite interests in East 
Kalimantan.
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To this day, Madurese enjoy a great deal of respect from their community if 
they killed Buginese gang leaders in those years. ‘In the 1980s, it was not safe 
in Samarinda’, Hajji Romli recalls quietly. But, as he explains, he reached a 
turning point.
I lived a bad life and almost daily we had fights at the market. I was clever 
enough never to be caught and I had many friends in the police who informed 
me when activities were getting too hot. On a certain day, a high-ranking police 
officer came to my house and asked me to stop stealing and to help them fight 
criminality. If I rejected [their offer], I would be the first Madurese to be taken 
to prison, they said. I could not do anything but obey. Moreover, deep inside 
of me, I already knew the things I was doing were wrong. I longed to live a 
better life. 
At this point, Romli stepped down as a gang leader and stopped stealing. 
I also did not fight anymore, but rather tried to prevent my people from gam-
bling. […] I was regularly asked by police officers to ‘convert’ certain hotheads 
and criminals who were fighting and causing trouble at the market. I had to 
turn them into hardworking people which I did by offering them jobs. The 
police would allow me to continue to organize gambling, but they asked for a 
cut of the profit. 
Only after Romli made a pilgrimage to Mecca did he stop gambling. As Hajji 
Yusuf told me, Hajji Romli had persuaded him to go to Mecca. ‘He even paid 
part of my way’, Yusuf said. ‘But we could not quit our habits at first. During 
the long wait at the airport, we continued gambling for money. Only after 
our return from the holy land did we stop gambling for money. Now we use 
penalties.’
In the meantime, his wife had purchased a second truck. Thanks to in-
creasing demand for construction materials, the business expanded and 
Romli offered jobs to several former members of his gang. Not everyone 
accepted his decision to go straight. Many of his former followers contin-
ued their criminal activities, while others joined different gangs or started 
businesses of their own. But, said Romli, ‘the majority remained loyal to me 
and after some time, I was able to persuade them to start working for me.’ 
Eventually, the police caught most of the notorious thieves from his group. ‘I 
was a good leader and paid the bribes needed to get them out of prison.’ He 
smiles self-confidently when he says ‘this was a good investment. They are 
now my most loyal workers […] And, I made some good friends on the police 
force, which is important.’
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Living dangerously: Tagil
Tagil’s activities are far more dangerous than either Sudi’s or Romli’s. Tagil is 
a notorious gambler and a known preman, gang leader, cockfight organizer, 
and operator of a large bar and brothel in Damanhuri, a prostitution com-
pound on the outskirts of Samarinda. Every season, 30 to 40 women and girls 
work in this brothel. Most of them come from mainland East Java and 40% to 
60% of them speak Madurese. But none of them originate from the island of 
Madura itself, Tagil says. ‘We would never permit a Madurese woman to do 
this. It would cause us shame. She would be killed.’
On Saturdays and Sundays, Tagil organizes cockfights. During these 
fights, 200-300 people place bets. Most of the gamblers are Madurese and 
Buginese, but Chinese, Banjarese, Javanese, Dayak, and Butonese also take 
part. The stakes are high. Chinese and Buginese gamblers in particular place 
large bets, but Madurese are also known to get involved in this risky level 
of gambling. On days like Christmas and New Year’s, the stakes per fight 
can soar to the tens of millions of rupiah. However, many spectators also bet 
smaller amounts ranging from Rp 50,000 to Rp 500,000 on the same fight. The 
winning better on each fight pays 10% to Tagil, who in turn pays half of that 
amount to policemen secretly present in the arena and to higher-ranking po-
lice officers. Tagil also takes a cut of the Rp 5,000 entrance fee each spectator 
has to pay, and from other gambling activities run at the same location, such 
as Cap Ceki, card and dice games. He also takes a percentage of the conces-
sion fees collected from the dozens of ordinary vendors there. The conces-
sions range from Rp 10,000 a day for a single cigarette seller, to Rp 50,000 for 
a fully equipped food stall offering a range of food and beverages. 
With such high stakes, tempers often flare during the cockfights. Things 
can get so tense that Tagil’s gang sometimes needs to restore order. If they 
are unable to do so, the undercover policemen in the crowd intervene by 
shooting into the air, arresting people or even randomly shooting some of the 
fighters in the leg or knee. Tagil then provides payment and mediation to free 
the arrested gamblers. The fees charged by the police in such a case depend 
on the status of the person taken into custody and the severity of the offence. 
Usually they range from Rp 5 million to Rp 15 million. Tagil maintains close 
ties with the policemen who attend his cockfights. They regularly visit each 
other’s homes, or go out for dinner or drinks. Police officers are said to visit 
his brothel as well.
On one of my visits, Tagil told me how in the early 1980s he was being 
sought by the police for the murder of a competing Buginese gang member. 
I fled to Madura, to a place where they would never be able to find me. After a 
few years, a distant relative of mine succeeded, after making large payments, 
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to have my name expunged from the police archives. The police officer at that 
time urged me to never commit murder again and asked if I wanted to help 
search for criminals who had fled to Java. That’s what I did and I still some-
times do. I have become quite good at it. Last year, we chased down a lad in 
Malang who had raped a girl here and run away to Java.
But Tagil’s situation was not as secure as he made it sound. ‘The police are 
asking for more and more money all the time’, he complained in confidence 
later, in 2004. ‘The work is dangerous and I cannot do business with the 
new chief commissioner. I would prefer to retire and move to Java. But I am 
obliged to keep in touch with them. It’s like an arranged marriage.’ He hoped 
to be able to save enough money for a quiet retirement. He told me he was no 
longer welcome in his home village in Madura. ‘They don’t want to take my 
money there anymore. It’s haram, they say, unclean.’
A few months after this conversation, in early 2005, Tagil was sent to pris-
on by the new police chief, who accused him of verbally abusing the governor 
of East Kalimantan. At a meeting with high-ranking officials, Tagil had ar-
gued against the closure of the Damanhuri compound during Ramadan and 
accused the governor of being inconsistent because some other compounds 
were allowed to remain open. The governor took offence. Other people sub-
sequently told me that Tagil’s business had in fact been on the decline for 
some time, as he had been unable to pay adequate protection money to the 
police. The new chief of police demanded more money than Tagil was able or 
willing to pay. Remarkably, the Damanhuri compound did not close during 
Ramadan that year and Tagil continued to run his racket from his prison cell. 
Three months later, Tagil was freed after paying large sums of money. 
Some people say that his freedom was bought by his uncles, successful entre-
preneurs with close ties to the governor. The uncles told me they had merely 
helped Tagil a bit to succeed in business. ‘This is just a family obligation’, 
they said. By 2006, Tagil had gone to work for his uncles in their new busi-
ness. They had just acquired a badly managed coal concession and started to 
excavate in areas contested by other claimants, with the backing of influential 
police officers and politicians. In 2008, Tagil and his uncles actively supported 
candidates for the provincial elections. One uncle expressed an ambition to 
enter politics himself. The fact that their business is risky and legally dubious 
does not prevent them from becoming involved in politics. On the contrary: 
it makes political ties and protection all the more important. 
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Conclusion: Out of wedlock
Madurese migrant entrepreneurs in East Kalimantan have to overcome 
numerous obstacles in making their businesses profitable. Brick makers 
face difficulties acquiring land rights and cheap firewood, transportation 
entrepreneurs have to contend with a great deal of red tape in obtaining 
transportation licences, and workers in stone quarries need protection against 
exploitative middlemen and insecure contracts. Moreover, Madurese mi-
grants are not exactly the most favoured ethnic group in East Kalimantan and 
sometimes face discrimination and deep-seated hostility. This is not always 
unjustified, as some Madurese migrants are, or have been, involved in illegal 
and illicit activities such as cockfights, gambling, theft, gang warfare, and 
prostitution rackets. Madurese entrepreneurs and preman involved in such 
illegal activities consider it crucial to maintain good relationships with police 
officers, generally low-ranking ones, to guarantee protection and the continu-
ity of their operations. They maintain close ties with police officers by way 
of regular visits and payments of either irregular sums or fixed shares of the 
profit their business generates.
Obviously, the relationships with Madurese migrants also benefit the police. 
Aside from generating additional income, these relationships offer the police 
access to a closed migrant community and help them control that community.16 
In case of increased ethnic tension or an unacceptable rise in crime, the police 
call on their contacts with entrepreneurs, preman and ethnic leaders who de-
pend on the police for business success. These same contacts can now be used 
to help control the Madurese community and fight criminality. These individu-
als can provide the police with information or utilize their own networks to try 
to restore calm or curb the activities of particular people. In extreme cases, they 
may even detain members of the community and hand them over to the police. 
These examples show how the interdependence of Madurese entrepre-
neurs and police officers not only provides direct financial and legal benefits 
to those involved, but may also serve a higher goal of maintaining security 
and stability in society. Ironically, this social control is only made possible by 
allowing criminality and instability to exist at controlled levels.
In the cases of Sudi, Romli and Tagil, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact de-
marcation line between legality and illegality. There is no need to do so. And it 
is precisely this grey area which offers Madurese entrepreneurs and the police 
financial and political room for manoeuvre. The police give migrants protection 
and in return both sides get a share of the profits generated by illegal activities. 
At the same time, the police do not tolerate any and all forms of criminality. 
16 The strategy is similar to one used by the army’s special forces (Kopassus), which frequently recruit 
criminals to use in counter insurgency campaigns (Liem Soei Liong 2002:202).
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On the contrary, they use their ties with gang leaders to help fight crime. They 
control the underworld through a combination of taxation and repression. At 
the same time, they also receive a steady flow of income from illegal activities. 
Bribes, commissions and profits from illegal activities lower the transac-
tion costs for disadvantaged groups who have no access to formal, legal 
economic activity or who lack knowledge of how the legitimate economy 
works. Without the payments and commissions, it would probably be much 
more difficult for Madurese to sustain their economic activities. At the same 
time, the police are also dependent on the entrepreneurs. Police officers in 
Indonesia are still underpaid, while the people in their social surroundings 
(friends, family members, neighbours and so on) expect them to maintain a 
comfortable standard of living and to offer financial help when it is needed. 
Police officers also face demands for contributions from their superiors on the 
police force. In short, there is a successful and mutually beneficial ‘marriage’ 
between entrepreneurs and the police. The intimacy of the marriage makes it 
unlikely that there will be a victory anytime soon in Indonesia’s repeatedly 
proclaimed war on corruption. 
The marriage is not based on love, however. Just as some marriages 
involve a certain amount of discretion or even feigned ignorance, the rela-
tionship between the police and Madurese businesspeople and criminals 
in East Kalimantan is equally paradoxical. The police in Samarinda need to 
turn a blind eye to a certain level of criminality in order to keep criminality 
in check. By permitting some forms of ‘petty’ crime such as pickpocketing, 
stealing, cheating, gambling and prostitution – activities which are detested 
by the community, but which can be kept within bounds by mob lynchings 
and public justice – they get access to information about the worst aspects of 
organized crime (such as killings, gang fights, gang rapes, and car theft) and 
even ethnic violence. They do this by mingling with networks of criminal 
groups and engaging in some aspects of their activity. 
This world of petty criminality, in East Kalimantan at least, involves col-
laboration between police and small entrepreneurs and the regular payment 
of small fees (5-15% of turnover). The payments ensure the smooth operation 
of a system based on personal contacts that is an alternative to a properly 
functioning Weberian taxation and policing system. In this alternate system, 
the state needs to be involved in illegality in order to control criminality. In 
Indonesia, state officials have been relatively successful at this. From a citi-
zen’s perspective, it is a fairly safe country. In most Indonesian cities, people 
live without constant fear of being robbed, killed, or raped. And when justice 
falls short, the police leave the mob enough space to take revenge. A 5 to 15% 
premium is a much lower price for security than the taxes most people pay 
in countries with far less corruption. Clearly, illegality is not destructive per 




Racket regimes, protection and the state in 
post-New Order Jakarta
Over and over again, effective nongovern-
mental specialists in violence have made 
alliances with governments, become parts 
of governments, taken over existing gov-
ernments, or become governments of their 
own. (Tilly 2003:38.)
In Indonesia the nongovernmental ‘specialists in violence’ described by 
Charles Tilly have been a ubiquitous and conspicuous figure throughout both 
recent and more distant history albeit in a variety of regional variations and 
manifestations. This chapter will focus upon one particular manifestation, 
the racketeer, and attempt to chart the shifting nature of protection rackets 
in post-New Order Jakarta. It will argue that, in the decade since the end 
of the New Order regime, rackets operating under a variety of guises have 
reorganized and consolidated themselves in ways that make it increasingly 
difficult to disentangle the ‘legal’ from the ‘illegal’. Going beyond criminal-
ity, these new configurations of rackets have become a fundamental currency 
of relations through which street-level power is exercised. As perpetual op-
portunists, predatory interests have sought to adapt rackets to the particular 
sociopolitical conditions in which they are immersed. These articulate and 
correlate to some of the defining features of the post-New Order political 
landscape and are useful in helping to identify the ways in which repres-
sive forms of social order have been produced and reproduced within the 
constraints of formal institutional democracy and a market-driven economy. 
A protection racket is, according to Vadim Volkov (2000a:491), ‘an insti-
tutionalized relationship whereby tribute is collected on behalf of a criminal 
group that, in exchange, claims to offer physical protection from other such 
groups’ or, some other form of external threat. Implicit in the relationship is 
the threat of violence, either from the external threat from which protection 
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is offered or from the protector directly, both often being one and the same. 
Whether the protectee considers the ostensive protector either ‘legitimate’ or 
a racketeer is largely determined by the extent to which the claim of protec-
tion against an external threat is considered real. What sets the racket apart 
from other forms of organized crime is the particular kind of commodity it 
deals in. Whereas organized crime seeks to monopolize particular spheres 
of illegal activity, for example prostitution or drug trafficking, racketeers are 
concerned with the production, supply and monopolization of one particular 
commodity: protection (Varese 2001:4). In this respect organized racketeers 
are similar to another agency dealing in protection, the state. 
While making an analogy between the state and a protection racket is sim-
plistic at best, it does pose a number of intriguing questions and, as Gambetta 
(1996:2) notes, makes us reflect on some disturbing aspects of the state. Tilly 
(1985:171) provocatively suggested that in so far as the threats against which 
the state claims to protect its citizens are either imaginary, exaggerated or 
the product of its own activities, the state itself operates in a manner not dis-
similar to that of racketeers. In so far as the state can be defined in Weberian 
terms, as a monopolistic control over the use of organized coercive force and 
taxation, what does the existence of non-state providers of protection tell us 
about the extent of state power and its effective presence at the local level? 
If both racketeers and the state deal in the same commodity, protection, and 
have a shared interest in selling its desirability, then what forms has the 
relationship between them taken? What strategies have racketeers used to 
try and establish legitimacy, and at what point, if any, is this legitimacy con-
sidered a substantive challenge to state authority? In part, racketeers count 
on the inefficiency of the state in providing protection, imposing their own 
taxes within the state’s ‘turf’ but without the constraints of at least nominal 
adherence to rules and laws. This would suggest that from the perspective 
of the state, non-state providers of protection would at the very least be con-
sidered ‘criminal’, if not dangerous rivals requiring elimination. However, in 
Indonesia the relationship has been far more complex, in part a product of the 
ambiguous nature of protection as both a genuine commodity and as a strat-
egy of domination. This chapter will ask, what was the relationship between 
the state and non-state providers of protection during the New Order, and 
what can the more recent consolidation of both criminal and non-state rackets 
tell us about the nature of the post-New Order state? 
Racket and regimes in a comparative perspective 
The concern with the monopolization of resource extraction, the use of vio-
lent coercive force, secretive hierarchical modes of organization and hostility 
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towards organized labour are all elements that criminal rackets and violent 
entrepreneurship share with authoritarian regimes and repressive modes of 
government. In a comparative perspective it is perhaps then unsurprising 
that organized rackets have with few exceptions aligned themselves with 
authoritarian governments. In post-WWII Sicily for example, the role of the 
mafia has been described by Hess (1986:128) as ‘a reactionary force […] em-
ployed to resist change, to maintain privilege and to suppress attempts to re-
define property relations and rights’. Similarly in Japan the Yakuza has been 
linked with ultra-nationalists within the military (Kaplan and Dubro 2003). 
Latin America is also replete with examples of drug lords joining forces with 
military dictatorships to fight left-wing rebels and suppress pro-democracy 
movements (Koonings and Kruijt 2004). The globalization of markets and the 
decline in state power have done little to alter this tendency. Louise Shelley 
(1999:25) described the resulting growth of transnational organized crime as 
‘a new form of non-state based authoritarianism’. 
The criminologist Schulte-Bockholt has sought to theorize this relation-
ship between regimes, organized crime and non-state providers of protection 
(Schulte-Bockholt 2006). According to this theory, a strong centralized state 
will generally endeavour to eliminate or co-opt alternate sources of protec-
tion. However during a ‘crisis of hegemony’, when elites believe their interests 
to be under threat, such as during a period of rapid sociopolitical upheaval 
or democratic transition, they will often seek to form alliances with orga-
nized criminal gangs in order to suppress counter-hegemonic forces (Schulte-
Bockholt 2006:26). In these circumstances the interests of state elites and violent 
entrepreneurs dovetail. Elites require the localized coercive power and revenue 
extraction of organized crime, while for the groups themselves alignment with 
elite interests can further integration within the central structures of domina-
tion. Rather than being purely profit-orientated non-ideological groupings, as 
organized crime is often portrayed, it regularly adopts the ideological prefer-
ences of political elites in order to facilitate integration within them. From the 
perspective of political elites, organized crime, gangs, militias and mafia are all 
potentially useful partners, particularly when their own interests are contested. 
This results in what Schulte-Bockholt (2006:35) refers to as ‘protection 
racket regimes’ which are ‘formed by state and/or non-state elites in order to 
preserve their domination through the violent exclusion of large groups in 
society that experience conditions of substantial social disparities’. In these 
racket regimes, coercion replaces hegemony as the primary means to main-
tain political and social control, and is used to extract wealth from society 
irrespective of the opposition it creates (Schulte-Bockholt 2006:27). In order 
to consolidate power, elites incorporate potentially disruptive sub-hegemonic 
groups such as gangs within their networks of economic advantage. In doing 
so the dominant class is expanded across conventional class lines, becoming a 
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‘structure of rackets rooted in a specific mode of production’ (Schulte-Bockholt 
2006:27). The degree to which organized crime and gangs are integrated into 
elite structures is determined by the needs of elites, who can always use state 
power whenever the services of organized crime are considered a threat or 
simply no longer needed (Schulte-Bockholt 2006:36). Non-state entrepreneurs 
in violence are rarely allowed to share political power as equal partners. 
There are however exceptions such as post-Soviet Russia or Bulgaria, where 
organized crime has successfully integrated itself within state institutions 
to the extent that it is almost impossible to disentangle ‘criminal’ and ‘state’ 
interests (Volkov 2000b:709). In the case of Indonesia, the New Order regime 
managed a complex network of rackets and institutionalized patterns of 
state-sanctioned illegality. Its unravelling after 1998 has resulted in a pro-
liferation of what could be described as ‘mini-racket regimes’, territorially 
based forms of repressive socioeconomic order in which local entrepreneurs 
in violence, to varying degrees, ‘corner the market’ in protection. 
The New Order racket state
During the New Order the institutionalization of local gangs, a process which 
had begun in the 1950s, was further intensified. Many gangs were at the fore-
front of the anti-communist pogroms that brought General Suharto to power 
in 1965. They were co-opted by arms of state, most significantly the military, 
and allowed to operate their own localized rackets largely undisturbed on 
the condition that most of the proceeds made their way into formal govern-
ment structures. As Barker states, preman, a colloquial term for a thug or 
gangster, became a ‘necessary component in the maintenance of state power 
and the collection of taxes’.1 Lindsey (2001:291) proposes that in the low-wage 
economy of the New Order, where access to wealth by the urban poor was so 
tightly restricted, racketeering was for some a rational livelihood strategy for 
gaining access to wealth through illegal rents. In this respect the New Order 
manufactured the conditions that resulted after its demise in the reproduc-
tion of its own predatory racketeering, albeit on a more localized scale. 
For these layers of rackets to function, preman also needed to be amenable 
to performing ‘regime maintenance chores’, including terrorizing dissidents 
and others who held the potential to disrupt established power relationships, 
and paying lip service to state ideology. To this end, preman groups often took 
1 Barker 1999b:122. Preman is originally derived from the Dutch word vrijman, meaning ‘free man’, and was 
used during the colonial period to describe those who were exempt from forced labour. During the 1950s up 
until the early 1980s preman was used to refer to a military officer or soldier wearing civilian clothes. It was not 
until the late 1980s that it started to take on its current meaning of a thug or gangster. For a detailed genealogy 
of the term, see Ryter 1998.
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on the appearance of nationalist and youth associations devoted to state-desig-
nated goals, or affiliated with state-created ones.2 They acted as sub-franchises 
of state power, adopting nationwide organizational structures that mirrored 
those of the state. Ryter (1998:66) has described their structures as a system of 
local strongmen or jago ‘where local bosses would be formally subordinate to 
the higher level ‘manager’ of the branch or sub-district but expect to retain sig-
nificant local autonomy over revenues’. While the state could not completely 
co-opt preman, it did create the conditions whereby a preman’s strength was 
ultimately dependent upon their networks of political patronage: a metaphori-
cal ‘leash’ that could be pulled when necessary. Without this patronage they 
were vulnerable to state sanction, but also to the wrath of the communities 
upon which they preyed. Organizations provided a necessary ‘cover’. This also 
allowed the state to divide economic spoils, whilst still appearing to at least 
partially fulfil some of the demands placed upon the modern state, such as pro-
viding the conditions for economic prosperity and at least mediating problems 
of poverty and distress among the larger population. 
The possibility that the cultivation of criminal networks by political elites 
and the military could result in the development of rival power bases as much 
as it could bolster state power was managed by Suharto by encouraging ri-
valries and power struggles between groups. In this way he avoided the kind 
of warlordism and ‘bossism’ found in the Philippines and Thailand (Sidel 
1999:153). It was a recurrent but unrealized fear of the New Order that pre-
man could form broader structural networks similar to the Yakuza or Sicilian 
mafia, which could coalesce into a significant challenge to its monopolization 
of resource extraction. Whenever such networks appeared possible the state 
intervened dramatically and brutally to reassert its power. This happened 
during the so-called ‘mysterious shootings’ (penembakan misterius or petrus) 
of the early 1980s, when the New Order state summarily executed around 
10,000 alleged thugs, petty criminals and recidivists (Van der Kroef 1985). 
Hence the preman gangs served a dual political purpose that reflected the 
‘double-edged’ nature of protection, as described by Charles Tilly (1985:170):
The word ‘protection’ sounds two contrasting tones. One is comforting, the 
other ominous. With one tone ‘protection’ calls up images of the shelter against 
danger provided by a powerful friend, a large insurance company, or a sturdy 
roof. With the other, it evokes the racket in which a local strong man forces 
merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage – damage the strong man 
himself threatens to deliver. The difference, to be sure, is a matter of degree. 
[…] Which image the word ‘protection’ brings to mind depends mainly upon 
our assessment of the reality and externality of the threat. 
2 The most prominent of these groups during the New Order were the nationalist youth organization 
Pemuda Pancasila and Pemuda Panca Marga, a paramilitary type organization for the children of army 
veterans. For a detailed account of Pemuda Pancasila see Ryter 1998. 
244 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
Informally these networks were an integral part of the mechanisms of power, 
while formally they could be invoked as a threat from which society needed 
to be protected. As long as groups remained relatively atomized or firmly 
under the reign of military loyal to Suharto they were left for the most part 
undisturbed. But the relationship implied an inherently unstable balancing 
act that brought with it the danger that the state could itself be revealed as 
criminal and ‘criminalized’. 
The New Order’s ‘crisis of hegemony’ seemed to be unending. For most of 
its 32 years of rule, the crisis was manufactured deliberately, a quintessential 
racket. As Tim Lindsey has argued, in order to justify its extra-legal ‘order’ 
the regime invoked a protracted state of ‘imminent crisis’, initially from the 
threat of communism and later from gangsters and thugs before finally it 
became almost spectral, such as in so-called ‘organizations without form’ 
(Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk, or OTB) (Lindsey 2001:296). The result was that 
the state became in this sense ‘an enterprise that operated on the same basis as 
criminals’ (Lindsey 2001:289). The state was criminal also in functional terms, 
as it used the same methods of extortion, racketeering, violence and secrecy 
as the preman gangs that it employed. Via state-backed subterfuge, including 
the use of preman as agents provocateurs to discredit opposition movements, 
the New Order sought to give the impression that without strict controls 
society would descend into chaos. The New Order’s racket system was multi-
layered and the relationship between its component parts complex. By the 
late 1980s this state-gang relationship has often been categorized as one of 
beking or ‘backing’, described by Lindsey (2006:32) as a ‘delicate mechanism’ 
whereby preman gangs became part of the grassroots structure of state power. 
It was in practice a privatization or franchising of state power, which allowed 
the state to distance itself from excesses conducted on its behalf, whilst mak-
ing use of gangs as a mode of social control and rent extraction. For the gangs 
themselves, such arrangements were ultimately pragmatic. They opened up 
the opportunity for economic advantage and political advancement, and re-
duced the risk of becoming a target of state pogroms. 
Unravelling rackets
Now facing a real rather than a manufactured crisis of hegemony due to the 
unpredictability of political fortunes in the post-New Order environment, 
political elites have increasingly turned to preman groups and other violent 
entrepreneurs to defend their economic and political interests. This has been 
exacerbated by the morphing of struggles for social power into more diffuse 
forms, such as party politics. The New Order normalized patterns of state-
sanctioned illegality which have continued into the present. But a crucial 
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difference is that elites and state agents no longer possess the same coercive 
means they once did. Even military figures infamous for their patronage of 
particular gangs have conceded that in the current political environment they 
are not capable of controlling them as they did previously.3 The unravelling 
of central state power together with the fracturing of social power and the 
rise of new social forces has created an open, dynamic and unstable market 
in violent entrepreneurship and its central commodity of protection. As a 
result, preman and other violent entrepreneurs have increasingly been able 
to negotiate on their own terms, transforming from sub-hegemonic groups, 
rent-a-thugs and middle-men to significant political and social actors in their 
own right. Elite patronage, while ‘useful’, is no longer a necessity for surviv-
al.4 The relationship of inter-dependence has in this respect tilted in favour 
of the preman, a process of ‘inverse racketeering’ whereby political elites have 
increasingly become clients rather than providers of protection. 
By the same token however, the very nature of what is now a highly com-
petitive unregulated market has meant that groups have been forced to take 
various measures to seek a competitive advantage. This has taken two gen-
eral directions. The first has been the development of ‘legitimations’ for rack-
ets. ‘Protection’ as an imposed form of exchange continues to exist in criminal 
rackets, informal security groups and localized territorial monopolies over 
violence, but has also surfaced on a variety of new ‘frontiers of legitimacy’ 
that reflect the decentralized environment, the emergence of identity politics 
and opening of markets. It is found in the exclusivist rights claims of ethnic 
groups and local communities, political constituencies and alliances in the 
context of electoral politics and regional autonomy, turf wars between state 
agencies and political parties and ‘morality rackets’ in the form of religious 
and ‘law and order’ vigilantism. 
The other has been a product of the demands of the market for ‘security’ in 
lieu of an adequate degree of provision by the state. Gambetta (1996:3) has ar-
gued in his study of the Sicilian mafia that consumers of private protection do 
not necessarily consider themselves to be better off if protection is supplied 
by the ‘legitimate’ state. The corruption and inefficiency of the police is one of 
many factors making non-state sources of protection appear an effective and 
economic option. As one Jakarta saying goes, ‘you lose a chicken and report it 
to the police, you end up losing a goat’. The economist Frederic Lane (1979:2) 
has proposed that on the ‘frontiers of the state’, where no one possesses an 
enduring monopoly over protection, merchants and other consumers of pro-
tection would avoid over-priced providers when they could obtain protection 
more cheaply elsewhere. When the state is ineffective or inefficient in sup-
3 Confidential interview with former TNI general, Jakarta, August 2006. 
4 Interview with Jakarta gang leader, Jakarta, December 2007. 
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plying a sufficient degree of protection for business transactions, property 
rights and land tenure and so on, an opening emerges for other actors to fill 
the demand. In Indonesia, in so far as the market can be considered ‘rational’, 
it has shown that it has tended to favour those groups that are predictable, 
well-organized and ‘reasonable’ in the costs imposed. This has resulted in a 
fundamental shift in the protection relationship towards a contract between a 
’provider’ and their ‘customer’.
 These new providers supply protection both as an illegal service demand-
ed by the illicit economy, as an imposed relationship of exchange (extortion), 
but also as a ‘public good’, one that is either ‘necessary’ or claimed as such. 
Post-New Order Jakarta 
As Robison and Hadiz (2004:31) have detailed, the fall of Suharto, while re-
sulting in a collapse of centralized state power, did not result in its complete 
demise. Rather it ‘open[ed] the door to a fresh round of struggles to reshape 
and redefine economics and politics’. The end of the New Order in 1998 
was heralded as the beginning of a new more democratic and open phase in 
Indonesia’s political history. Institutional reforms took place, most crucially 
the implementation of political decentralization and regional autonomy laws 
plus the hosting of multi-party elections. However the weak governments 
that followed Suharto’s departure, the intensification of political rivalries 
coupled with the chaotic manner in which administrative decentralization 
measures have been implemented, all contributed to the disruption of patron-
client linkages and established rackets but without the necessary strengthen-
ing of state institutions required to prevent their reconfiguration into new 
forms of rackets. Elements of the old regime have been able to successfully 
reinvent themselves and re-establish economic and political power relation-
ships within the new formally democratic institutional arrangements and 
market economies (Robison and Hadiz 2004:10). 
This has also applied to the lower levels of the New Order’s structure of 
rackets, including its preman and political gangsters, who have emerged as 
major beneficiaries of reforms introduced to decentralize power in Indonesia, 
taking advantage of the inability of the post-New Order state to ensure secu-
rity and the opportunities presented by electoral politics (Hadiz 2003a). This 
new system, which has given greater autonomy and power to regional and 
local government, has led to gangsters and violent entrepreneurs becoming 
a valuable form of political capital and influential power brokers, similar to 
their ancestors, the jago charismatic martial-arts strongmen of the colonial 
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period.5 In instances where the functional role of the state has been weak and 
the position of elites fragile, the local territorial power and coercive capacity 
of violent entrepreneurs has meant that elites themselves have become at 
times the object of rackets, forced to make political and economic concessions 
in order to secure the backing and muscle needed for consolidating power. 
The implications of this for understanding preman rackets are that rather than 
operating solely as the appendages or foot soldiers of elites, or as a criminal 
sub-class, they have in some instances successfully reconfigured themselves 
in line with the changed political format in ways that have seen them emerge 
as increasingly important and even ‘legitimate’ political actors. 
We can loosely categorize preman and violent entrepreneurs and the 
modes of legitimation for rackets they employ into three types, namely: 1) 
vigilantism, the offering of ‘protection’ against crime and a variety of det-
rimental effects of rapid social change; 2) new forms of identity politics in 
localized territorial struggles over power and resources; and 3) a product and 
cause of the emergent market in security, protection and coercive force. As 
Schulte-Bockholt (2006:35) has argued, the specific composition and strength 
of groups which come to dominate a particular racket will determine both its 
nature and the way it conducts itself. While the categories presented for clas-
sifying rackets and their modes of legitimation have general applicability for 
the whole of Indonesia, the specifics of the examples given below remain of 
course most applicable to their geographic setting, Jakarta. 
Vigilantism 
If we accept Ray Abraham’s proposition that vigilantism exists on the fron-
tiers of state power, we can demarcate such frontiers in conventional terms 
along geographical fringes and peripheral zones, but also in more abstract 
‘frontiers of legitimacy’ where the state is judged not only in technocratic 
terms of functioning institutions but by its ability to articulate and enforce 
a moral and social order and ideas of normative justice that are accepted by 
significant sections of society (Abrahams 1998:9). 
Community Vigilance 
A case of the opening up of such a ‘frontier’ can be found in the preman 
politics in the Central Jakarta district of Tanah Abang. Throughout the 1990s 
5 The jago has been a reoccurring figure in popular culture and legend, often portrayed as a kind of Robin 
Hood. For the role of jago during the colonial period, see Schulte Nordholt 1991.
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Tanah Abang’s streets and markets were controlled by a gang of largely East 
Timorese youths led by a wiry preman known as Hercules. Brutal in its extrac-
tion of protection dues from vendors and local business, Hercules’s gang was 
able to withstand the enmity of the local community and rival gangs due to 
the patronage of military figures such as Special Forces commander Prabowo 
Subianto and General Zaki Anwar, whom Hercules had befriended during 
his time as a military operations assistant in East Timor. However by late 
1997 and early 1998 Hercules’s difficulties in mobilizing support for the pro-
integration cause and the subsequent withdrawal of his patrons’ backing left 
his gang exposed.6 It didn’t take long before an alliance of rival gangs formed, 
named Family of Tanah Abang Association (Ikatan Keluarga Tanah Abang, 
IKBT), to challenge his protection regime. 
Within a few weeks of the emergence of the IKBT, Hercules’s gang was 
violently expelled from Tanah Abang.7 The district was no stranger to preman 
gang wars. However, this new crop of gangsters packaged themselves not as 
rivals but as representatives of the ‘community’ determined to rid the area of 
the ‘preman problem’.8 Straddling the end of the New Order regime in May 
1998, the takeover signalled a shift towards a new mode of organization for 
preman in Tanah Abang, the community vigilante, who invoked images of 
the charismatic and honour-bound jago martial-arts strongman of popular 
legend. With its own rich folklore of jago strongmen and silat martial arts 
masters, this means of representation for the new preman regime struck a cord 
with many long-term Tanah Abang residents, as did the IKBT’s strong stance 
against gambling, drugs and prostitution.9 Local government was happy to 
portray the formation of a local community vigilance group as the empower-
ment of local communities to self-police in lieu of the under-resourced and 
discredited police.10 The mayor of Central Jakarta, Abdul Kahfi, made the 
6 The gang had regularly held pro-government rallies and harassed pro-independence East Timorese 
activists. However, tensions emerged in 1996 after Tanah Abang police shot dead Manuel Soares, a member of 
Hercules’s gang, ostensibly after he resisted arrest over a minor criminal offence. Convinced this was due to 
his reluctance to take part in pro-integration activities, Hercules’s second-in-command Duartes Freitas issued 
a press release stating it was a politically motivated killing. Freitas then joined with left-wing activists from the 
student-based Peoples Democratic Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik, or PRD) in a demonstration protesting 
Soares’s death at the national parliament. 
7 An anecdotal account of the expulsion written by a member of Hercules’ gang can be found at: Indonesia-L 
mailing list, MateBean, ‘Tergusurnya eksistensi orang Timtim dari Jakarta’, http://www.library.ohiou.edu/
indopubs/1997/12/16/0036.html (accessed 10-3-2009). After his expulsion Hercules continued to operate both 
legitimate and illegal businesses in Jakarta as well as Indramayu. More recently he returned to his native East 
Timor, where he signed an agreement with the government to build a hotel and swimming pool in Dili. 
8 Interview with Bang Ucu, IKBT chairman, Jakarta, 15-6-2005.
9 This stance is rumoured to have brought the IKBT into conflict with the police, some of whom profited 
from the lucrative drug trade operating in Kampung Bali, a neighbourhood of Tanah Abang. The IKBT only 
succeeded in removing the drug dealers after gaining the support of marines affiliated to the New Order period 
nationalist youth organization the Pemuda Panca Marga. Confidential interview, Jakarta, December 2007. 
10 Interview with Tanah Abang government official, Jakarta, June 2006. 
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takeover official when he recruited 48 preman drawn from each of the two 
main gangs comprising the IKBT into a ‘District Civil Defence Unit’ (keaman-
an distrik, or matrik) that was authorized to patrol the Tanah Abang markets 
and extract regular ‘official’ protection fees from vendors.11 
Tensions within the IKBT over distribution of turf as well as resistance 
from transport workers to the new fees led to the alliance fracturing after 
several months, leading to ongoing rounds of gang conflict.12 However, the 
paradigm of gang-state relations had shifted to one in which gangs, in the 
guise of community organizations, were recognized by government, and by 
significant sections of the community, as legitimate ‘community partners’. 
Despite the failure of the IKBT to consolidate control over Tanah Abang, 
Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso heralded the organization as a success story, a 
community-driven initiative to deal with the problem of preman that should 
be emulated throughout the capital. He invited IKBT’s chairman Bang Ucu 
and other IKBT leaders to advise him on how to best tackle the problem of 
preman in Jakarta.13 The New Order logic of fighting ‘crime’ with criminals 
continued, but this time the initiative came from preman themselves. Preman 
no longer required state backing to survive, whereas the weakened post-New 
Order state needed the territorial power of the preman if it was to regain a 
modicum of control over Jakarta’s streets. 
Identity rackets 
As in the case of Hercules, the withdrawal of patronage left many previously 
‘invulnerable’ gangs open to challenges from rivals. Post-1998, close asso-
ciation with the discredited regime had become a political and operational 
liability. The Pemuda Pancasila for example, a New Order period nationalist 
youth organization who enjoyed significant patronage from the military and 
political elites and dominated protection rackets and illegal rents throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s, found themselves in direct competition with new 
formations of preman who gradually began to gain ascendancy in Jakarta’s 
streets. In contrast to their predecessors who had pledged undying loyalty 
to nation, state and Golkar, the new guard of preman, such as the IKBT, took 
on distinctly ‘local’ identities, developing territorial power framed in terms 
of local cultural idioms and ethnicized identities. Faced with the fragmenta-
tion of beking arrangements, many preman networks started to reconfigure 
themselves away from dependency upon vertical patronage patterns linked 
11 ‘Preman Tanah Abang aktif lagi’, Kompas 28-8-2000.
12 ‘Minivan drivers go on strike over illegal levy’, The Jakarta Post 27-6-2000.
13 ‘IKBT tangani program percontohan pembinaan preman’, Kompas 11-5-2001. Consultation with IKBT 
affiliates has been continued by Sutiyoso’s replacement as governor, former vice-governor Fauzi Bowo. 
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to national elites, and towards embeddedness in the domain over which they 
ruled, the kampung. With the weakening of centralized power, assertions of 
place-based distinctiveness became the new grounds for ‘securing rights to 
territories and resources’ (Elmhirst 2001:292). 
Abidin Kusno (2004:2384) has described how in post-1998 Jakarta the 
‘loosening’ of power at the centre has resulted in a proliferation of civil groups 
formed around identities that ‘are all linked by a sense that the nation-state no 
longer commands any power to protect and rule, or, at best, the political elites 
only safeguard their own interests’. This sense that political elites had little 
concern with improving the conditions of the general populace has, according 
to Kusno, encouraged these citizens groups, often violently, ‘to act on their 
own, creating a condition in which everyone safeguards his or her own space, 
often without regard for the public’. The streets of the capital became a zone 
of contestation between a complex mix of interests: the poor and middle-class-
es, the city administration, developers and business. The Indonesian NGO 
Yappika documented the spread of this ‘us vs. them’ mentality, identifying 
135 instances of communal and inter-neighbourhood violence in Jakarta from 
March 2001 to March 2002 alone (Fitri 2004:10). While the high level of conflict 
of this particular period has not extended into the present, it nonetheless set 
in motion dynamics that contributed to the emergence of a new crop of local 
gangs and rackets. Localism has become a new pole for contesting the territo-
rial boundaries of these aggressive forms of ‘spatial power’.
The rise of the Betawi 
From mid-2000 till early 2001, inter-gang rivalries intensified in East Jakarta 
between largely ethnic Madurese and Betawi-based gangs.14 These tensions 
came to a head in the semi-industrial district of Cakung in 2001, resulting in 
several days of intermittent street fighting and the torching of several houses 
of Madurese. The incident became the catalyst for a new ‘ethnic’ preman or-
ganization.15 On 29 July 2001 the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi 
Rempug, FBR) declared itself at a ceremony at the group’s headquarters in 
a religious school in Pengillingan, Cakung. The FBR was led by Fadloli el-
Muhir, a religious scholar with long-standing links to elements of the former 
New Order regime, such as the former Jakarta military commander and later 
governor of the Indonesian capital, Lieutenant General Sutiyoso. A leaflet 
distributed by the FBR in Cakung at the time further incited hostility towards 
Madurese and other ‘outsiders’. 
14 ‘Murder suspects gang members’, The Jakarta Post 29-3-2001.
15  For more on the construction of ethnicity within the FBR see Brown and Wilson 2007. 
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Oh children of Betawi, it is the responsibility of all sons of the land to create 
peace, tranquillity and beauty in the Betawi land which has become the capital 
of Indonesia. Forgiving, compromising, not vengeful and always seeking con-
sensus, this is the character of the Betawi. But starting from now, let us rise up 
and unite as Betawi to oppose the migrants who are arrogant, conceited, selfish, 
vengeful and disrespectful of the indigenous Betawi. We are sick of cruelty and 
barbarity, one drop of Betawi blood must be answered with an ocean of blood. 
Starting from now, let us make the Betawi champions (jawara) and respected 
ones (juragan) in Betawi land.16
The battle was no longer one between warring gangs, but between self-
proclaimed representatives of the disenfranchized indigenous community of 
the nation’s capital, who sought to reclaim the rights, land and jobs ‘stolen’ 
from them by migrants such as the Madurese. In the space of six months 
over a dozen new ‘Betawi’ groups emerged, each claiming exclusive rights 
for control over the informal economy in the neighbourhoods in which they 
were based, as well as jobs and ‘taxes’ from local business on the pretext of 
‘empowering’ the Betawi.17 Publicly endorsing the FBR’s identification of 
‘preman’ and other ‘troublemakers’ as migrant outsiders, Governor Sutiyoso, 
by then a tough retired major-general, sought to establish alliances with 
Jakarta’s Betawi preman and to harness them to the task of reconsolidating 
his security-orientated approach to governing the city. Sutiyoso was quick to 
recognize the utilitarian value of gangs citing an ‘indigenous’ Jakarta identity. 
Enamoured by this initial support, the FBR, Forkabi and others enthusiasti-
cally and independently harassed and assaulted critics of the governor, in-
cluding NGOs such as the Urban Poor Consortium.18 
The FBR’s appeals to ‘the oppressed’ struck a cord not just with local 
preman looking for a new organizational cover for their racketeering, but 
a broader spectrum of the unemployed and those scraping a living in the 
informal street economy, in particular ojek motorcycle taxi drivers. With 
this membership base, the FBR rapidly expanded to become by far the larg-
est Betawi organization in Jakarta.19 According to chairman Fadloli Muhir, 
Jakarta’s rapid development had left the Betawi dispossessed and marginal-
ized. Unlike other regions where local autonomy and decentralization has 
16 Extract from a reproduction of a leaflet distributed by the FBR in Cakung in 2001. 
17 These included Forkabi, Forum Betawi Rempug, Gerakan Ketahanan Betawi and Ikatan Keluarga Betawi. 
18 ‘NGOs accuse Sutiyoso of rent-a-thug-methods’, The Jakarta Post 23-3-2002. Sutiyoso was later to withdraw 
this support due to the FBR’s ‘unruly’ nature. Vice-governor Fauzi Bowo was later to do the same prior to the 
elections for governor in 2007, which he won. Up until this time the FBR had been enthusiastic supporters of 
Bowo due to his Betawi heritage. Bowo was advised that public hostility towards the FBR could result in a voter 
backlash if he was seen as courting the group. The FBR subsequently switched their support to rival candidate 
Adang Daradjatun. 
19  Its current membership is estimated to be around 60,000. 
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seen indigenous populations gain seats in power and an improved standard 
of living, this had not been the case in the nation’s capital.20 FBR’s answer to 
this, has been an aggressive form of ethnic chauvinism, holding to the belief 
that it is only through predatory behaviour that one will get ahead in society. 
In order to achieve their vision of a Jakarta dominated by Betawi strongmen, 
the FBR has used a number of tactics and strategies. These traverse the line 
between legal and illegal, ranging from classic extortion and stand-over tac-
tics, to political lobbying, legitimate business ventures and entrepreneurial 
initiatives.21
As one member argued, ‘If the government fulfilled its obligations and 
provided us with work, and satisfied our basic needs then there would be no 
reason for FBR to exist. As it stands, if we don’t stand up and fight for what 
is rightfully ours, we will end up with nothing.’22 In the context of a myriad 
of gangs contesting territory, the reinvention of Jakarta as an ethnic homeland 
for the Betawi has served an important function in legitimating localized 
rackets, thus cementing a role for themselves as political brokers. 
Morality racketeering 
In his examination of the market in private protection in post-Soviet Russia, 
Federico Varese (2001:7) has stated that the greater the realm of activities de-
fined as illegal by the state, the higher the demand will be for mafia services. 
If for example alcohol or pornographic materials are outlawed, this will cre-
ate a demand for the protection offered by organized crime. This has to an 
extent also been the case in post-New Order Jakarta. For example, public or-
der laws outlawing street-side vending have opened opportunities for street 
gangs, who operate in this domain as a form of informal ‘governance’, to 
cooperate with the authorities in forced evictions, but also in some instances 
to protect communities from over-zealous public order officials.23 A far more 
pervasive phenomenon however, has been the proliferation of groups of-
fering protection from more abstract ‘moral threats’ identified generally as 
vice (maksiat). Rather than seeking to fill the illegal demand for protection 
created by government prohibitions, these ‘morality racketeers’ play a kind 
of wedge politics, on the one hand publicly denouncing the dangers be-
lieved to be posed to society by bars, clubs, gambling dens and prostitution, 
while privately benefiting materially from their existence. In the past protec-
20 Interview with Fadloli el-Muhir, Jakarta, 3-8-2005. 
21 For more detail on the FBR’s activities, see Wilson 2006, and Brown and Wilson 2007. 
22 Interview with FBR member, Jakarta, 14-6-2006. 
23 Public order laws such as Jakarta Regional Law no. 11/1988, recently revised in Law no. 8/2007, allows for 
the arrest and removal of those considered to be creating a public disturbance. 
 Reconfiguring rackets 253
tion of these kinds of illicit activities was the exclusive domain of preman. 
Structurally the relationship remains the same; however the dynamics have 
been inverted. Instead of profiting from protecting ‘vice’, preman now profit 
from ostensibly combating it. 
Defenders of the Faith 
The best-publicized of these morality racketeers has been the Defenders of 
Islam Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI).24 The FPI was established in 1998, as 
part of the Pam Swakarsa civil defence force. Consisting of a rag-tag collection 
of thugs, unemployed youth and Islamic militants supportive of Suharto’s 
presidential replacement, B.J Habibie, the Pam Swakarsa were the brainchild 
of military chief General Wiranto and General Kivlan Zein. Intended to bolster 
the over-stretched police force and help counter widespread opposition to the 
Habibie presidency, as a political strategy the Pam Swakarsa was a failure and 
it was disbanded in late 1998.25 The FPI outlasted the Pam Swakarsa, and has 
over the past ten years made a name for itself as a self-proclaimed defender of 
public morality from a variety of social ills. It has focused its activities on night 
venues that it accuses of breaching operating hours during the fasting month 
of Ramadan. By the end of 2001 the FPI found that many of its more generous 
financial backers were no longer prepared to subsidize its activities, due to 
what one former patron described as its increasing ‘recalcitrance’ as well as 
the perceived political liability of its well-publicized links to radical Islam.26 
This increased pressure upon members to find other sources of income, most 
commonly in the form of pay-offs and protection fees from the targets of its 
anti-vice raids.27 While not openly condoned by the group’s leadership, such 
practices are recognized as common-place. For many preman seeking new 
organizational affiliations, the FPI offers not only rent-seeking opportunities 
but also the possibility of personal redemption, making it an attractive option. 
The FPI uses a particular ‘procedural method’ for choosing the targets of 
its anti-vice raids.28 Once a potential target has been identified, the FPI inves-
tigates the strength of the interests attached to it, that is, military, rival preman 
groups and so on. If they consider these interests to be politically weak, they 
then register a formal complaint with the police requesting that the venue 
24 For more on the FPI’s background see Wilson 2008.
25 The street presence of the Pam Swakarsa further provoked an already tense political situation, resulting in 
violent clashes with student demonstrators and locals that left fatalities on both sides. ‘Jika preman dan bambu 
rucing ikut bermain’, Gatra 21-11-1998, p.73.
26 Confidential interview, Jakarta, August 2005. 
27 Interview with senior FPI member, Jakarta , 16-8-2005. 
28 Interview with Alawi Usman, head of the FPI’s ‘investigations division’, Jakarta, 15-8-2005. 
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or activity be shut down on the grounds that it threatens public morality, or 
that is in breach of government regulations. Police almost never act on these 
complaints, but it gives them the opportunity to forewarn businesses on the 
FPI’s list, which can then pay for police protection, find an alternate source 
of protection from the market of suppliers, or make the FPI an offer.29 This 
police complicity in the racket may also explain the frequent absence or late 
arrival of the police at FPI raids despite prior warning. 
The vocal support of the FPI, FBR and similar groups for increased state 
regulation of morality issues, such as through the controversial anti-pornog-
raphy bill, has often been portrayed as an ideological battle between militant 
Islam and liberal social forces.30 However advocates of religious conservatism 
such as the FPI are well aware of the tangible opportunities these campaigns 
can create for them. Increased levels of regulation over behaviour require 
increased policing in order to enforce the regulations. Violations of these 
regulations generate income for those enforcing them as those who seek to 
avoid them pay up. With the authorities lacking the human resources, and in 
some instances the political will, to police such laws, increased opportunities 
arise for ‘civil’ morality vigilantes to extract rent and protection dues, while 
at the same achieving a degree of ‘legitimacy’. 
As in the classic protection racket, Islamic and ethnic preman first create 
a threat, for example a ‘moral crisis’ or ‘heresy’, which they are themselves 
strategically placed to resolve. By eschewing the staples of organized crime 
and preman such as protecting prostitution, gambling and drug trafficking, 
the new breed of ‘moral’ gangsters strategically position themselves as a 
moral vanguard, a ‘defender’ of the community and the faith from a variety 
of threats. No longer are they seen as the source of trouble but as its solution. 
The market in protection
Increasing crime rates, rampant unemployment, poorly enforced government 
regulations and the inefficiency and continued corruption of the police have 
all been factors increasing the demand for non-state forms of protection. 
While vigilantism surfaced as a ‘community’-based response to this demand, 
a thriving and highly competitive market in private protection services has 
also emerged. This ranges from local level gangs, private security companies, 
off-duty police and military to international security firms with branches in 
Jakarta. Former and serving members of the police or military run many of 
29 This information derived from confidential interviews with several bar owners in Jakarta who have been 
the object of FPI raids. 
30 Despite threats of non-compliance from provincial governments such as Bali and West Papua, a modified 
version of the bill was passed into law on 31-10-2008. 
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these smaller local companies, such as the marines-operated company PT. 
Bass (Masaaki 2006). Aside from protecting client’s assets, these security 
agencies also offer services such as personal bodyguards, debt collection and 
asset repossession, land acquisition brokering, ‘community mediation’, and 
the intimidation of a client’s business rivals. Several security industry associa-
tions have been established, the largest of which is the Indonesian Security 
Manager Association (AMSI) which currently has 300 affiliate companies. 
However, it accounts for only a small percentage of the overall number of 
security providers, the majority of whom operate almost entirely outside any 
regulatory framework (Robison, Wilson and Meliala 2008). Formally, regula-
tion of this sector is the responsibility of the police, who issue licences for reg-
istered companies and are required to monitor their activities and personnel. 
In practice however the actual level of police supervision is at best minimal. 
The prevailing shaping force has been the demands of the market itself. 
The inevitability that a business will be approached by a protection agen-
cy of some description has resulted in many entrepreneurs pre-emptively 
seeking out those with a reputation for being reliable and efficient.31 This 
has impacted upon the way in which protection groups market themselves. 
They recognize the importance of ‘professionalizing’ their services in order 
to attract clients. Some groups have made a transition from street gang and 
racketeer to more tightly organized protection organization, in order to carve 
a niche in this growing protection ‘industry’. This has entailed a range of 
organizational strategies: tightening membership criteria, more rigorous 
physical and mental training regimes, and the introduction of ‘procedural 
guidelines’ and ‘rules of engagement’ for ‘conflict resolution’, alongside 
regularized fees for the services offered to clients. In a competitive but un-
regulated market, groups need to justify their coercive presence at the local 
level, and also ‘deliver’ on promises to reduce petty crime, lest clients seek 
protection elsewhere. In simple economic terms, there has been recognition 
that extortion and crude racketeering is not a viable long-term strategy in the 
face of a myriad of rival providers. At the same time, territorialism still domi-
nates the industry, defined either geographically or via sectors, and groups 
often negotiate agreements regarding the demarcation of boundaries. 
31 An unpublished survey of small businesses conducted by the author in Tanah Abang in 2007 suggested 
that protection can cost anywhere between 5% and 20% of total profits. As a general rule, the bigger the business 
the fewer problems they have with protection groups. Big business, including the corporate sector, is better able 
to protect itself and many have created their own security services. 
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Protection franchises 
One example of a successful security company is Putra Perkasa, run by 
Abraham Lunggana. A former Tanah Abang gang leader, Lunggana was dep-
uty of the IKBT and head of the Jakarta branch of the Pemuda Panca Marga. 
In recent years he has become chairman of the Central Jakarta branch of the 
Islamic United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), 
and in 2008 he secured the deputy leadership of an umbrella organization 
for Betawi social and cultural associations known as the Badan Musyawarah 
Betawi (Bamus).32 Much of the conflict that occurs between rival providers 
of protection emerges due to perceived breaches of territorial domains. For 
example, the presence of a security company in an area dominated by a gang 
that has no stake in that company is often considered a provocation war-
ranting reprisal. In order to negotiate this territorialism, Lunggana has de-
veloped a franchise-like system he refers to as ‘environmental investment’.33 
A potential client for his security services, such as a department store, is 
asked to identify (in consultation with community leaders) who are the local 
youths or preman they consider to be reliable. Putra Perkasa then approaches 
these youths, offering them formal employment, training and a uniform. 
The promise of a regular fixed income is usually enough to convince them 
to join.34 In this way the company integrates local gangs within its business 
franchise, increasing its ability to secure contracts whilst maintaining com-
munity and client confidence and a ‘professional’ standard of service. This 
technique neutralizes the threats of local gangs while expanding the sphere 
of influence of the business. This franchising system has proven highly suc-
cessful for Lunggana. His company has secured contracts in major shopping 
malls in Central Jakarta, as well as control of lucrative parking areas in and 
around southern Jakarta as well as the Taman Ismail Marzuki arts centre. 
The police 
If the fragmented state is no longer the racket regime it was during the New 
Order, then what has been its relationship with racketeers’ post-1998? At the 
street level, the main interface between state power and the informal power of 
preman racketeers has been the police. Individual and territorial relationships 
32 Lunggana was also a campaign manager in the successful 2007 bid for the governorship of Jakarta by 
former vice-governor and head of Bamus, Fauzi Bowo. He has since been appointed the deputy head of Bamus. 
33 Interview with Abraham Lunggana, Jakarta, 6-12-2007. 
34 Recruits undergo intensive training and are supervised for several months. Breaches of company policy 
result in immediate expulsion, and franchise branches are required to regularly submit detailed activity reports 
and audits. 
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between police and preman racketeers range from collusion, cooperation and 
mutual expediency to, in some instances, overtly hostile competition. The 
form the relationship takes is highly dependent upon local conditions such 
as the relative size, strength and political connections of local groups and the 
immediate resources available to the police. In one district of South Jakarta 
for example, the local branch of the FBR is a major financial contributor to the 
upkeep of the under-resourced local police station, providing drinking water 
and even stationery. According to FBR members, in return the police turn a 
blind eye to occasional ‘excesses’ on the part of the group and allow them to 
manage many day-to-day policing tasks such as the apprehension of petty 
criminals.35 While this example is in some respects an extreme one, it does 
nonetheless point to the extent to which racketeers and the police establish 
‘pragmatic’ working relationships, in which preman can hold the upper hand. 
As one police officer explained, ‘as there are no clear rules for engagement we 
have to adopt an informal and conciliatory approach. The reality in the field 
is that these groups exist and exercise authority, so the police, like it or not, 
need to engage with them.’36
Not all police however are comfortable with this kind of mutual co-
existence. Junior police officers at the Indonesian Institute of Police Science 
(Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian, PTIK) for example, expressed frustration 
at what they perceived as the ‘double-bind’ in which they were caught in 
relation to preman racketeers. On the one hand they experience immense pres-
sure from the public to uphold the law and tackle crime, while on the other 
they are constrained politically by their own links with certain groups and 
elites, by the ambiguity of the law and by limited resources.37 As one officer 
quipped, ‘Our job (of tackling preman groups) would be far easier if parlia-
ment didn’t keep interfering. On the one hand politicians will condemn these 
groups, but then use them or give them overt support.’38 
At a governmental level, the primary response from the Jakarta adminis-
tration to public concern over the prevalence of racketeering, extortion and 
street crime has been a series of high-profile ‘anti-preman’ campaigns. The 
first of these campaigns was held in 2001, and they have been subsequently 
repeated in 2004, 2005 and 2008. The initiative of former governor Sutiyoso, 
the campaigns were initially limited to Jakarta but by 2004 were national in 
scope and coordinated directly by the National Chief of Police. As with the 
petrus pogroms of the 1980s, the campaigns have largely avoided targeting 
established organizations, instead focusing upon mass arrests of those identi-
35 Interview with FBR member, Jakarta, August 2007. These excesses have included hospitalizing burglary 
suspects and truck drivers who refused to pay parking fees imposed by the group. 
36 Interview, Jakarta, 3-9-2007. 
37 Interview, Jakarta, 12-11-2007.
38 Interview, Jakarta, 12-11-2007. 
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fied as ‘preman’.39 Ambiguity in the operational definition of who constitutes 
a ‘preman’, which in itself is not a criminal offence, has allowed the authorities 
to be highly discretionary in whom they have targeted. Identifiable patterns 
have emerged. Preman and racketeers with links to established organizations 
and political parties, including the FBR, have been largely left untouched, 
whilst illegal traffic wardens (pak ogah), small street gangs along with oth-
ers identified as ‘undesirables’ such as beggars, street kids, buskers and sex 
workers have been arrested en masse.40 
Subsequently many street preman joined groups such as the FBR in order 
to gain what is perceived to be ‘invulnerability’ from the law. During the 2005 
campaign for example, membership of the FBR increased by 200%.41 Hence 
one effect of the campaigns has been to aid in the consolidation of territorial 
control of established groups by, temporarily at least, rounding up small 
fry competitors for protection dues and creating the imperative for them to 
amalgamate with larger groups, many of whom already have some kind of 
negotiated established working relationship with the police.42 Whether this 
has been a deliberate strategy on the part of the authorities is debatable. 
Regardless of intent, it does indicate the limits of the power of the state and 
also shows the extent to which the ‘legitimations’ used by protection groups 
have been successful. During the most recent campaign, at a meeting with the 
vice governor, the head of the FBR, Fadloli Muhir, offered to ‘take in’ arrested 
preman in order to ‘empower’ them, in effect expanding the membership and 
territorial reach of his own group.43 It is also notable that throughout these 
campaigns public complaints of extortion and corruption on the part of the 
police have increased threefold, suggesting that some police at least have 
used the campaigns as an opportunity to reclaim sources of illegal rent ex-
traction taken from them by street level racketeers.44 While the fragmented 
state and its agents appear not to possess the capacity or political will to cur-
tail racketeer groups or comprehensively to regulate the market in protection, 
the anti-preman campaigns have shown that some of the more unruly players 
can be absorbed into more ‘stable’ formations. 
39  In the most recent campaign, begun in November 2008, police attempted to answer criticisms that the 
campaign only targeted ‘small fry’ preman by arresting Hercules on assault charges. As a gangster with a high 
media profile but whose actual power and influence is now limited, Hercules was the perfect scapegoat for the 
police. 
40 ‘Puluhan preman di kawasan Jakpus digaruk’, Liputan6.com, 1-12-2008, http://www.liputan6.com/hukrim/ 
?id=169065 (accessed 24-10-2008).
41 Interview with Nahrowi, FBR public relations official, December 2005, Jakarta, 
42 One preman interviewed was arrested in both the 2001 and 2005 campaigns. In each case he was released 
with a warning to ‘watch his step’ after being detained for 48 hours. 
43 ‘Tokoh Betawi minta pemerintah Jakarta bina preman’, Tempo Interaktif, 13-11-2008, http://www.tempo-
interaktif.com/hg/jakarta/2008/11/13/brk,20081113-145730,id.html (accessed 10-3-2009).
44 ‘Number of thugs down, number of bad cops up’, The Jakarta Post 19-9-2005. 
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Conclusion: The consolidation of rackets 
In modern democratic states formal legitimacy is ostensibly established via 
consensual democratic processes such as elections, and the provision of basic 
services such as health, education and the maintenance of law and order. 
However, it is a particular heritage of the New Order that ‘legitimacy’ in the 
use of force has been produced as a ‘racket effect’. The state has presented 
itself as the lesser of evils in relation to imminent, imaginary or actual threats 
posed by ‘others’: rival gangs, crime, ethnic and religious minorities, corrupt 
authorities, or more abstract ‘spectral’ threats such as ‘moral decay’ and ‘sin’. 
The examples described previously point to an expansion, consolidation and 
diversification of racket relationships, with the state operating as, at best, a 
kind of ‘meta-manager’.
The logic of power articulated during the New Order, of consolidating 
repressive forms of social order through the invocation of threats, has been 
retranslated in the context of a decentralized political environment and 
shaped by the market economy. In the perspective of post-colonial Southeast 
Asian states, Carl Trocki (1998), John Sidel (1999) and others have identified 
a correlation between the consolidation of gangsters and post-authoritarian 
transitions towards institutional democracy. As Volkov (2002) has shown in 
his study of violent entrepreneurs in post-Soviet Russia, in an under-regulat-
ed informal market economy organized crime groups, vigilantes and those 
trading in protection thrive and can become a significant shaping force. In 
the case of Russia, these forces have become increasingly domesticated under 
President Putin as he reconsolidated centralized state power. The possibility 
of a similar domestication or co-option in Indonesia appears unlikely due to 
the continued fragmentation and disorganization of post-New Order elites. 
What seems more likely for the foreseeable future is a continuation of current 
patterns, whereby state agents such as the police engage in largely symbolic 
campaigns aimed at containment of unruly groups in order to appease pub-
lic concerns, whilst informally cooperating with larger and better organized 
groups. The double-edged sword of protection, as a public good and a public 




Security sector politics as a Trojan horse 
for anti-reformists
Indonesia is widely regarded as a hotbed of transnational crime in Southeast 
Asia. Criminal rings involving illegal logging, human trafficking, illicit drugs, 
arms smuggling, and sea piracy have developed cross-border networks rooted 
in Indonesia’s underground economy. These crimes quickly emerged as major 
concerns for post-Suharto governments, posing serious threats to both the 
national economy and human security. For example, timber smuggling and 
illegal logging cost Indonesia an estimated US$4 billion in revenues annually, 
approximately five times the yearly budget for the Ministry of Health (Setiono 
and Husein 2005:4; EIA/Telapak 2007:3). Illegal fishing has also increased 
and cost between US$2 and 3 billion annually in state losses.1 An estimated 
100,000 Indonesian women and children are trafficked every year, accord-
ing to UNICEF (2006:4), but the police handle less than 200 cases annually 
(Yuwono et al. 2005:19). The abrupt increase of the illicit drug trade also poses 
a national threat, as the government estimates that the country’s drug trade is 
now worth almost US$4 billion a year, and that as many as 4 million people 
use illegal drugs.2 Violence at sea also became more conspicuous after 1997, as 
reflected in the number of piracy incidents and armed robberies in Indonesian 
waters – from 47 in 1997 to 119 in 2000 – and in the Straits of Malacca, from 
zero in 1997 to 75 in 2000 (ICC International Maritime Bureau 2006:5).
Though these developments in some respects reflect a global trend in 
criminal activity facilitated by the sophistication of information and communi-
cation technology, Indonesia’s outlaws have benefited greatly from domestic 
political changes since the fall of Suharto in 1998. They have successfully iden-
tified and exploited the new opportunities of democracy and decentralization 
to increase their power and influence in legitimate arenas to further their illicit 
economic activities, often involving transnational crime networks. The rela-
1 See ‘RI forms new courts to fight illegal fishing’, The Jakarta Post 18-10-2007, and Fegan 2003.
2 ‘Empat juta penduduk Indonesia pencandu narkoba’, Sinar Harapan 7-6-2006.
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tionship between the state and criminal activity is becoming a more complex 
issue in the age of globalism when the illegal cross-border flow of human be-
ings, goods, and money exceeds the capacity of state surveillance and control. 
Criminal actors are also empowering themselves by teaming up with foreign 
counterparts regardless of differences in political ideology and regime. 
The scholarship on transnational crime has long been dominated by in-
ternational relations, criminal investigation and defence-security experts. 
This is understandable as research on ‘transnational crime’ has become key 
to ‘new’ security or ‘non-traditional’ security analysis in the post-Cold War 
era.3 Their works have contributed to identifying the nature of the threat, 
related security risks, and the state’s lack of adequate institutions and poli-
cies to deal with transnational crime.4 Nevertheless, these studies tend to 
overlook domestic political analysis and do not elucidate the local dynamics 
necessary to contextualizing the ‘global threat’ of transnational crime. This 
is where area studies remains crucial in order to enrich the analysis of cross-
border crime and – perhaps more importantly – to highlight the potential 
unintended consequences generated by the spread of criminal activity and 
state response(s) thereto. It is important to emphasize that anti-crime counter-
measures are not produced in a political black box – they are the product of 
politics and shaped by existing agendas and competition for resources among 
different actors and institutions. From this perspective, this chapter exam-
ines the nexus between security sector politics and expanding transnational 
crime in Indonesia. We first look at how cross-border crime has flourished 
after the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in the context of demo-
cratic security reform and political decentralization. Then we examine how 
security-sector actors have seized this opportunity by shaping the discourse 
over countermeasures in order to advance institutional interests. The politics 
of security and institutional competition is evident in the ‘campaigns against 
transnational crime’ waged by the police, army and navy, examined below. 
Security sector reform and the criminalized turf battle
Democratization after the fall of Suharto has caused significant changes in 
the dynamics of crime and law enforcement. Most prominent among these 
is the escalating rivalry between the military and police after the former’s 
retreat from its long-standing domestic security role in 1999. This rivalry has 
undermined state control over the criminal underworld and created space for 
the extension of transnational crime activities. 
3 In the development of these discussions, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute played an influential 
role by building a school of thought in security studies. Buzan 1991 and Lipschutz 1995 represent the school.
4 Some major studies focusing on Southeast Asia include: McFarlane and McLennan 1996; Emmers 2002; 
Caballero-Anthony, Emmers, and Acharya 2006.
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During the Suharto presidency (1967-1998),5 the armed forces consisted 
of four services, including the police. The army was responsible for internal 
security, relying on a territorial command system with ten army divisions 
based around the archipelago and extending down to the village level where 
it maintained politico-security surveillance. This military network of surveil-
lance and repression was developed to implement the orders of the army 
chief down to the village level. The police worked under the army in han-
dling internal security, supporting its repressive operations against citizens 
and assuming responsibility for law enforcement. Suharto’s Indonesia estab-
lished a military authoritarian polity in which the army played a twin role 
in national defence and politics. This role was formally known as the ‘dual 
function’, or dwifungsi, of the military. 
The fall of Suharto in May 1998 created political space for questioning the 
relevance of dwifungsi. Emboldened civilian leaders in both parliament and 
civil society criticized past atrocities committed by the military and demand-
ed military reform to professionalize the armed services and to democratize 
civil-military relations. The military leadership responded to these pressures 
by formulating a vision of military reform. One of the first proposals was the 
separation of the national police from the military in April 1999. The armed 
forces returned to the pre-Suharto era organization of three services – army, 
navy and air force. This functional separation was inevitably accompanied 
by the redefinition of responsibilities between the police and the military. 
In an attempt to professionalize the security services, the military (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia, TNI) was assigned responsibility for national ‘defence’ 
and the police given the role of maintaining domestic ‘security’ and ‘order’. It 
was expected that the new role-definition would lead the military to profes-
sionalize its capacities regarding external defence matters. 
However, the reform generated dissatisfaction among TNI officers. Given 
the elimination of posts related to political affairs within the TNI and the 
shifting of domestic security functions to the police, military officers found 
gaining promotion more competitive and difficult. These frustrations fanned 
distrust of, and resentment against, the police. The relationship worsened 
due to a growing turf war between the two institutions over the conduct of 
business activities, such as protection rackets. Before the separation of the 
police, it was an open secret that the military largely dominated ‘security ser-
vices’ for private companies – including those operating brothels, gambling 
dens and night clubs.6 The criminal underworld also viewed the military as 
the sole hegemon controlling the constellation of criminal forces during the 
5 Although some date his rule from decisive acts in March 1966 and even October 1965, he was appointed 
acting president on 12 March 1967.
6 For details of these operations, see Human Rights Watch 2006.
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New Order.7 The transfer of domestic security duties from the military to the 
police inevitably reduced lucrative opportunities for the military as the newly 
independent police muscled in on these services. The impact on the TNI was 
devastating, particularly for local army commands which had relied heavily 
on revenue from such unofficial business activities to provide for their troops’ 
‘welfare’. As business income dried up significantly after the 1997-1998 eco-
nomic crisis, police encroachment on army turf after 1999 constituted a seri-
ous threat for an institution that is expected to raise its own funds to make 
up for inadequate budgetary support. Frustration within the TNI boiled over, 
leading to outright conflicts in various places around the archipelago.
In 2001, for example, the tension between military and police units in the 
East Java town of Madiun escalated into a violent clash marked by pitched 
gun battles. TNI soldiers ran amok, attacking the Madiun police station, kill-
ing two citizens and wounding several policemen. The army chief-of-staff at 
that time, General Endriartono Sutarto, admitted that the soldiers involved 
in the clash had been involved with illegal businesses in the area, referring to 
brothels, gambling dens and the drug trade.8 He also claimed that the frequen-
cy of TNI-police clashes dramatically increased by 300% in the period after the 
separation of the two organizations. Due to these turf wars and the financial 
losses caused by the shifting of domestic security to the police and the over-
all economic crisis, the military developed closer ties with criminal groups 
involved with the lucrative smuggling of goods and people. For the police, it 
was important to crack down on criminals linked with soldiers both in order 
to expand its turf and to demonstrate to the public that it was able to manage 
security and order. The turf battles between the army and police led to similar 
mayhem in cities such as Maumere (Flores) and Binjai (North Sumatra) in 
2002.9 In response, top leaders of the TNI and police pledged to tighten disci-
pline over local personnel in the field, but this did not stop the clashes. At least 
six serious melees between the TNI and police occurred in 2007. 
From the police perspective, these conflicts were triggered by ‘the jealousy 
of TNI which has no more authority to dictate to society but is still preoc-
cupied with the old thinking’.10 Clearly, the rivalry, suspicion, resentment 
and hostility between the two institutions is now deep-rooted, hampering 
post-Suharto governments’ efforts to establish an effective mechanism for 
controlling criminal activities in the archipelago.11 Importantly, the logic of 
7 On the New Order management of criminal activities, see Siegel 1998 and Barker 1998. 
8 ‘Army chief says Madiun victims shot by police’, The Jakarta Post 20-9-2001.
9 For details, see Current data 2003. 
10 Interviews with police officers in Police Headquarters, July 2007.
11 This is by no means to generalize local TNI–police relations in the archipelago. In some areas, we see the 
development of ‘peaceful’ and perhaps even entrepreneurial turf-sharing between the two institutions. I thank 
David Jansen in making this point. See his analysis on Yogyakarta (Jansen 2008). See also Baker 2008.
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turf battles – which was triggered by the separation of the police from the 
military – focused both the TNI and police on cultivating the sources of fund-
raising. Under these circumstances, criminal enterprises easily found patrons 
either in the military or the police. For example, in Riau Province, criminal 
groups have relied on the police in operating big gambling dens while col-
laborating with TNI in the business of illegal logging.12 By consolidating such 
patronage ties, criminal groups quickly developed business networks around 
the country and some actively sought cross-border ties. 
Localizing power, capitalizing crime
In addition to the security sector infighting, political decentralization in the 
post-Suharto era facilitated the flourishing of transnational crime. The decen-
tralization legislation (passed in 1999) was implemented in 2001, involving 
the transfer of control over local economic resources from the central ad-
ministration to local governments, providing them with wide discretion in 
making use of these resources. As a result, the competition for tapping these 
resources intensified among local power elites, a development characterized 
as ‘predatory decentralization’ (Hadiz 2007).
In fact, as competition intensified among local political elites for concessions 
and graft, political engineering of ‘mass movements’ became a popular means 
of lobbying. Since government projects – such as land-use planning, large-scale 
construction, and community development – were promoted in tandem with 
the implementation of regional autonomy, local political elites learned to or-
chestrate and mobilize ‘local residents’ to pressure their governments to ensure 
that these projects came under their control. Astute politicians organized vari-
ous types of ‘resident groups’ so that they were prepared to pounce on any op-
portunity to shake down the government. Responding to this surging demand 
for their services, local hoodlums (preman) started to play a decisive organizing 
role in mobilizing people to take to the streets as required. 
During the Suharto era, the two most infamous semi-official preman groups, 
Pemuda Pancasila and Pemuda Panca Marga, enjoyed privileges as the desig-
nated providers of state-sponsored civilian protest and violence throughout the 
archipelago. The collapse of the New Order, however, ended their privileged 
status, as democracy liberalized this sector and sparked fierce competition 
from other service providers eager to cash in on the bonanza of democracy.13
12 In fact, 147 policemen, including 6 high-ranking officers, were suspected of involvement with Riau’s gambling 
ring. ‘Officers questioned over Riau gambling operation’, The Jakarta Globe 2-12-2008. There are hundreds of illegal 
sawmills in Riau and many have military support. ‘Masih ada militer di hutan’, WAHLI 25-6-2007, http://www.
walhi.or.id/ kampanye/hutan/shk/070625_militer_htn_cu (accessed 6-5-2008; archived at www.archive.org).
13 About this, see Ian Wilson’s study in this book, and Ryter 2005. 
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Diversification of underworld power has been a discernible consequence 
of democratization, most notably involving a growing number of local ethnic 
identity groups, political party-affiliated youth organizations, and religious 
vigilantes, oddly mirroring the rapid growth of civil society NGOs in the 
early 1990s. Since the economic crisis in 1997-1998, which boosted the number 
of unemployed youth, the recruitment of preman members has become easy 
and less costly. The proliferation of such organizations coincided with the 
increasing reliance of local power elites on mass mobilization as an effective 
weapon in their competition for concessions. Thus, cooperation between lo-
cal elites and preman has become extensive and ‘normal’ as politicians have 
tapped the coercive power of ‘popular’ protests to muscle in on the govern-
ment’s economic resources. This trend has effectively blurred the boundary 
between political and criminal societies as the mutual dependency allows the 
latter’s penetration into the legitimate political process, bolstering the crimi-
nalization of local politics in many places.
In Medan, a city dubbed as gang city (kota preman), local political authori-
ties have developed a close relationship with the Youth Work Institute (Ikatan 
Pemuda Karya, IPK), whose leader is referred to as the ‘real’ mayor of the 
city (Hadiz 2003b). In West Kalimantan, a Malaysian Chinese timber boss has 
extended his influence among gangsters in the borderland community, and 
local political elites have weak incentives, and capacity, to eliminate such in-
formal power (Wadley and Eilenberg 2006). In East Java, the local gambling 
king has strengthened relations with politically well-connected Madurese 
preman groups (Honna 2006). In Jakarta, many of the capital’s gambling dens 
and brothels are operated by various criminal agencies and different preman 
networks provide similar protection rackets for them.14 This phenomenon 
has become so ubiquitous that Henk Schulte Nordholt (2002) suggests that 
post-Suharto Indonesia is becoming a ‘preman state’. 
In this manner, the growing presence and power of criminal networks 
is rooted in the government’s failure (or its incapacity, or indifference) to 
manage security in the context of democratization and rapid decentraliza-
tion. Conveniently overlooking the local roots of this problem, however, the 
government has fingered ‘transnational crime’ as the culprit, aiming to syn-
chronize the problem with a ‘global’ paradigm of securitizing cross-border 
organized crime orchestrated by the post-9/11 Western security community. 
For the US and its allies, the nexus between terrorism and transnational crime 
is explained in terms of drug money financing terrorists, the undocumented 
cross-border movement of people providing cover for terrorist operations, 
arms smuggling facilitating terrorist logistics, and money laundering by 
14 Among others, Madurese, Timorese, Ambonese and Betawi groups are known to be powerful in Jakarta’s 
preman sector. Regarding the Betawi preman and its links with the Jakarta government, see Wilson 2006.
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criminal syndicates being exploited by terrorist financiers (Shelley 2002; 
Makarenko 2003; Picarelli 2006). It is this discourse that has encouraged the 
Western security community to emphasize transnational crime as a top secu-
rity priority along with counter-terrorism. Drawing on this logic, several new 
‘global wars’ were declared on drugs, trafficking of persons, illegal logging, 
and other crimes linked to transnational non-state actors.
In Indonesia, where the risk of terrorist attacks and criminal penetration 
of the legitimate economy is relatively high, it is not difficult for the govern-
ment to focus attention on transnational crime and emphasize the ‘limita-
tions’ of individual countries to deal with the threats posed by ‘transnational 
actors’. Given that Indonesia shares porous and extensive borders with other 
countries and clearly lacks the state capacity to conduct nation-wide bor-
der surveillance, the logic of this argument appears persuasive. Here, the 
emphasis on ‘transnationality’ effectively obscures local roots and the ques-
tion of extensive domestic politico-criminal collusion is transformed into a 
‘capacity deficit’, which in turn provides a pretext for inviting international 
cooperation for bolstering relevant security capabilities. Thus, the rhetoric 
of the transnational crime threat enables the state to repackage the domestic 
problem of criminal penetration into state institutions as a capacity deficit 
issue that fits with the foreign policy agenda of promoting international coop-
eration. I argue that state security actors intentionally repackage the problem 
to exploit global concerns in order to promote their conservative institutional 
agendas. The three different cases of dealing with transnational crime exam-
ined below shed light on this institutional sleight of hand. 
BNN and the ‘war on drugs’
It was during the Megawati administration (2001-2003) that Indonesia ex-
plicitly declared a war on drugs. In March 2002, the president strengthened 
national anti-drug operations by establishing the National Narcotics Board 
(Badan Narkotika Nasional, BNN), a successor to the existing National 
Narcotics Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Narkotika Nasional, 
BKNN), established in 2000.15 Following this, Megawati instructed all gov-
ernment agencies down to the village level to take necessary measures to 
tackle the problem of illegal drugs.16 With these initiatives, the war on drugs 
15 During the Suharto regime, the drug problem was handled by the State Intelligence Coordinating Board 
(Bakin) which was traditionally headed by a military man. When responsibility was transferred to BKNN in 
2000, police officers dominated the new organization. Since then, the police chief simultaneously occupies the 
head of BKNN or BNN. Again, this issue is related to the turf battle between the military and police.
16 The presidential instruction is Inpres no. 3/2002 Tentang Penanggulangan Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran 
Gelap Narkoba.
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(perang melawan narkoba) was launched in 2002. It nearly coincided with 
the seizure of a very large illicit drug laboratory in Tangerang, Banten, in 
April 2002. This laboratory which produced 150,000 ecstasy tablets per day 
was the largest drug factory ever discovered in Indonesia.17 The surprising 
scale of production convinced the international community of the fact that 
Indonesia was no longer a mere transit country for illicit drug trafficking, but 
had emerged as a source of the regional narcotics trade. 
Demonstrating the government’s anti-drug commitment, BNN immedi-
ately prepared a ‘war plan’ to combat drug crime and announced its goal of 
‘a drug-free Indonesia in 2015’. In its 16-page document, the BNN empha-
sized that Chinese and West African drug syndicates were key players in the 
growing domestic production and distribution of illicit drugs – China as the 
source of precursor chemicals used for the production of synthetic drugs, 
such as ecstasy, and Nigerian crime enterprises as the smuggler of heroin and 
cocaine in Indonesia. The BNN also highlighted the sharp increase in drug 
abuse among youth, citing a survey that indicated 55% of respondents from 
64 high schools used drugs. In laying out its action plan, the BNN stressed 
major difficulties and constraints: porous borders in the world’s largest ar-
chipelagic country that render it vulnerable to drug smuggling; an ongoing 
economic crises since 1997 that led to budget cutbacks for programs targeting 
drug trafficking and abuse; and the weak capacity of BNN in terms of human 
resources, budget and equipment. These arguments effectively led BNN to 
conclude that ‘a drug-free Indonesia in 2015’ could be achieved only if these 
constraints are addressed. To this end, it recommended that: 1) BNN’s capac-
ity – manpower, budget, equipment – should be increased; 2) international 
cooperation in the field of law enforcement should be enhanced since the 
crimes were transnational, and; 3) programs for treatment and rehabilitation 
(T and R) of drug users should be urgently developed.18
In this way, BNN transformed Indonesia’s ‘traditional’ problem of border-
control into a very ‘fundable’ global problem involving organized drug traf-
ficking requiring extensive international assistance. BNN underscored the 
need for promoting international cooperation, institutional capacity build-
ing, and victim protection at the grassroots level. These countermeasures 
are no doubt important and widely recognized as such by the international 
law enforcement community, but BNN deliberately obscures one vital ‘do-
mestic’ cause of rapid drug proliferation during the post-Suharto era – that 
is, the collusion between the criminal syndicates and legitimate political ac-
tors and institutions. In the first year of BNN’s campaign, it was announced 
that the cases of drug abuse in 2003 increased by 21% from the previous 
17 ‘Digerebek, pabrik ekstasi terbesar di Indonesia’, Sinar Harapan 8-4-2002. According to BNN, US DEA (Drug 
Enforcement Administration) identified the laboratory as the world’s largest (Badan Narkotika Nasional 2003).
18 All citations in this paragraph are from Badan Narkotika Nasional 2003:5-6, 14-5.
 Orchestrating transnational crime 269
year. Ansyaad Mbai, the Vice-Director of BNN, declared that drug abuse 
had reached epidemic proportions, but BNN was hamstrung due to limited 
human resources, and an inadequate budget and equipment to combat the 
transnational crime of illicit drug trafficking.19 Having aroused public anxi-
eties, he announced that BNN would establish provincial branches (Badan 
Narkotika Propinsi, BNP) throughout the archipelago to wage the ‘war on 
drugs’ by promoting Preventing and Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking and 
Abuse (Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran 
Gelap Narkoba, P4GN).20 Then, in 2004 when the budget for the P4GN 
dropped to Rp 105 billion from Rp 150 billion in 2003, BNN started to pri-
oritize activities that directly affected potential drug users and victims. Both 
Da’i Bachtiar (Director of BNN) and Makbul Padmanegara (Vice-Director of 
BNN) stressed that the anti-drug campaign should have a positive impact 
on the younger generation, and required the full cooperation of the public.21 
These shifts in strategy illustrate how BNN and its patron – the police – pur-
sued institutional interests in waging the ‘war on drugs’. The establishment 
of BNP and the extension of grassroots community activities both contribute 
to larger budget allocations while evading institutional responsibility and 
accountability regarding the politics-crime nexus. BNN focused on the symp-
toms rather than the cause of the problem.
To maintain institutional interests, the rhetoric of war requires constant 
escalation. Coinciding with the international day for the anti-drug campaign 
led by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on 26 June 2005, 
BNN set its national agenda, ‘Improving the P4GN Implementation with 
High Commitment and Clear Actions’, in order to socialize BNN’s campaign 
both at the national and local levels.22 When General Sutanto was installed 
as the new police chief and BNN director under the government of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono in July 2005, he gathered all regional police chiefs, 
instructing them to make a contract with him for eradicating illicit drugs and 
gambling dens in their regions.23 Nonetheless, the P4GN program in 2005 
hardly changed in its combating (pemberantasan) initiatives. In its annual 
report, BNN explained that it had conducted seven activities to improve law 
enforcement capacity for combating illicit drugs – namely, hosting an interna-
tional law enforcement meeting; providing a training course for the Lao po-
lice; conducting a joint seminar with the chemical industry; cooperating with 
19 ‘Kejahatan narkoba meningkat 21,66 persen selama 2003’, Tempointeraktif 6-1-2004.
20 ‘BNN siapkan strategi bebas narkoba’, Kompas 7-1-2004.
21 ‘Police war on drugs taken to grassroots’, The Jakarta Post 9-7-2004; ‘BNN lancarkan peran melawan narkoba’, 
24-9-2004, available at BNN website, http://www.bnn.go.id/konten.php?nama= KegiatanCegah&op=detail_
kegiatan_cegah&id=23&mn=2&smn=f (accessed 12-09-2010).
22 Badan Narkotika Nasional, ‘Pedoman Peringatan Hari Internasional Melawan Penyalahgunaan dan 
Peredaran Gelap Narkoba’, 26-6-2005.
23 ‘Kontrak kerja kapolda se-Indonesia: Berantas judi seminggu’, Bali Post 12-7-2005.
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UNODC to develop computer-based training; spreading information about 
drug-related laws; destroying drug materials; and distributing operational 
equipment such as portable x-ray machines to BNN teams (Badan Narkotika 
Nasional 2006:23-4). 
There is no denying that these activities bolstered BNN’s international 
cooperation and investigative capacity, but it is telling that there were no ef-
forts targeting the domestic politics-crime nexus. As drug abuse continued to 
rise under the Yudhoyono administration, critics expressed doubts about the 
approach taken by BNN and the police. At the end of 2005, however, BNN 
persisted in emphasizing that the eradication of illicit drugs was a serious 
challenge because it involved transnational crime among other complex fac-
tors and consequences (Badan Narkotika Nasional 2005). Perhaps trying to 
boost the six-years-old anti-drugs campaign, and to gain popular support, 
Yudhoyono underlined the need for escalating the war on drugs in 2008 on in-
ternational anti-drug day by insisting that the current P4GN – which had two 
main pillars, that is, prevention and eradication – would be upgraded with an 
additional three pillars. The new pillars were ‘therapy and rehabilitation’, ‘al-
ternative development’ and ‘research and information’.24 The expanded P4GN 
now emphasizes the ‘protection’ approach and victim care, making the ‘war’ 
more like a social campaign aimed at ‘saving the youth of the next generation’.
It is widely believed that the fundamental problem of Indonesia’s illicit 
drug trafficking is corruption in the law enforcement sector which allows 
large scale criminal enterprises to operate hand-in-hand with corrupt of-
ficers. Adrianus Meliala, a prominent criminologist, openly criticizes ‘the 
police, who are supposed to fight drug crime, are drug dealers and consum-
ers’.25 These allegations raise few eyebrows among those familiar with how 
the police work and certainly resonate with public perceptions. In 1999, 2nd 
Lieutenant Agus Isrok – a son of army chief of staff General Subagyo – was 
arrested with packs of ‘shabu-shabu’ (methamphetamine), and 7,000 ecstasy 
pills at Manggabesar, Jakarta’s notorious nightspot district. Isrok was a 
member of the elite military commando unit Kopassus often deployed in 
secret operations, indicating that the police did not have a monopoly on drug 
dealing.26 This incident was followed by the establishment of BKNN in 2000 
and its operations resulted in the arrests of 398 police personnel, mostly low-
ranking officers, in the same year.27 Even after this ‘shock therapy’, the army-
police gun battles in Madiun (East Java) in 2001 and in Binjai (North Sumatra) 
24 ‘SBY: Tingkatkan perang terhadap narkoba’, Berita Sore 23-6-2008.
25 ‘From ecstasy to agony: Indonesia’s war on drugs’, Asia Times 26-11-1999. The general public also shares 
this perception as seen in The Jakarta Post’s special coverage, ‘Drug dealers are untouchable’, The Jakarta Post 
16-1-2003 and ‘Police rely on money from drug dealers’, The Jakarta Post 17-1-2003.
26 ‘Setelah Agus Isrok digaruk operasi narkotik’, Tempo 16-8-1999.
27 ‘Citra Bhayangkara ternoda Nila’, Gatra 3-7-2008.
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in 2002 both involved conflicts over the illicit drug business.28 Sutanto’s 
strong anti-drug commitment since 2005 was welcomed at large. However, 
the public still believes that the police are deeply involved in the drug busi-
ness; an opinion survey conducted by Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, Education and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan 
Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, LP3ES) revealed that more than 40% of 600 
respondents believe the police are the main ‘backers’ of drug trafficking.29 
There are even plausible allegations that drug trafficking networks exist 
within the regional police command in East Java, and probably elsewhere.30 
To sum up, the post-Suharto ‘war on drugs’ exhibits three interesting 
features. First, the government has repeatedly expressed its commitment to 
eradicate illicit drugs by promoting international cooperation. Such ‘diplo-
macy’ is always highlighted in the documents of anti-drug campaigns, and it 
effectively constructs an image of the government trying to combat domestic 
repercussions of ‘global’ crimes. The problem of illicit drug trafficking in 
Indonesia is typically tied to drug syndicates originating in the Netherlands, 
China and Nigeria.31 This emphasis portrays Indonesia as a ‘victim’ of trans-
national organized crime. Stoking the sense of victimization no doubt helps 
the government to whip up nationalism against external criminal actors, 
bolster budgets and gain public support for both a crackdown and more ex-
tensive international cooperation.
Second, it is also notable that the war on drugs emphasizes the signifi-
cance of targeting the alleged ‘root cause’ of the problem – in this instance 
community unawareness of the drug menace. BNN usually argues that 
transnational criminal groups target the country’s less-educated social strata. 
In fact, this is the largest market for illicit drugs and there is a tendency for 
targeting young users with cheap synthetic narcotics. Underlining ‘unaware-
ness’ and targeting of the poor constitutes a significant element in the fram-
ing of the transnational crime threat. This helps mobilize public support for 
the war on drugs as a facet of the larger ‘war on poverty’. It is in this context 
that policies such as ‘grassroots socialization’ and ‘alternative development’ 
are emphasized as long-term viable approaches to protect citizens from the 
alleged dangers of transnational crime. This ‘root-cause discourse’ effectively 
legitimizes government allocation of its resources for community develop-
ment projects in the name of combating crime while obscuring the key role 
played by security professionals in the drug trade. 
28 Regarding the Madiun incident, see ‘Perseteruan saudara tua dan saudara muda’, Tempo 24-9-2001. On 
Binjai’s case, see Roosa 2003.
29 ‘Survei: Hampir separuh polisi jadi beking bandar narkoba’, Koran Tempo 7-12-2007.
30 About the allegation, see ‘Karena narkoba, rusak reputasinya’, Gatra 19-6-2008.
31 According to Sri Soegiarto, Deputy Director of BNN, Jewish syndicates are also recently active in Indonesia. 
Interview 4-7-2007.
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Third, it is also remarkable that Indonesia’s war on drugs highlights the 
point that drug smuggling in the age of globalism cannot be controlled ef-
fectively by a government that only provides a minimum budget for law 
enforcement agencies. The war campaigns constantly draw attention to the 
lack of manpower, knowledge, instruments and finance to conduct effective 
anti-crime operations. Against this backdrop, foreign ‘stakeholders’ who 
share concerns about the growing threat of transnational crime – such as the 
US and UNODC – are eager to cooperate with BNN to improve its capacity 
in crime prevention and enforcement. Here, the agenda of ‘capacity building’ 
is described as the key to improve performance in the war on drugs. This 
discourse fits seamlessly with the agenda of the police and BNN, reflecting 
the fruits of their lobbying. 
There is no denying that issues like capacity building, root causes and 
foreign-organized crime are important in understanding the problems sur-
rounding transnational crime. However, Indonesia’s ‘war’ suggests that these 
issues serve to conceal the vital core of the problem – the growing criminal 
influence in political and security sectors. The rhetoric of transnational crime 
effectively contributes to the construction of a discourse that neglects the po-
litical pollution while emphasizing alleged global threats, diplomatic policies 
and socioeconomic agendas.
Army and the ‘war on terrorism’
The discourse about the transnational crime threat has also aided the army in 
promoting policies to preserve institutional interests, survive turf battles and 
emasculate pressures for reform. In particular, the ‘war on terrorism’ pro-
vides a golden opportunity to achieve these existing agendas and has been 
instrumentalized accordingly. As discussed above, the army has seen the rise 
of the police in terms of a turf battle over domestic security roles and business 
opportunities. After formally transferring the role of internal security to the 
police, the army has been particularly concerned about growing pressure to 
reform its territorial command structure, a holdover from the authoritarian 
past. In this sense, reclaiming a role in internal security would be a welcome 
lifeline, enabling the army to maintain its command structure with only cos-
metic changes. For many army officers, the elimination of the territorial com-
mand structure is unacceptable. They believe that Indonesia – a multi-ethnic 
nation spread over a large archipelago – may fall apart without the firm grip 
of the army, and also fear, perhaps even more, that such a reform would 
inevitably lead to institutional downsizing. To stave off this threat, fanning 
fears about the role of transnational actors to generate domestic instability 
can be a viable strategy. The war on terrorism created such an institutional 
opportunity to regain lost ground and deflect pressures to reform. 
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Particularly since 9/11, the army started to disseminate a discourse which 
insisted that national defence and internal security are actually inseparable 
because many of the non-traditional security threats are situated in a ‘grey 
zone’ between defence and security. The ‘theory’ then asserts that Indonesia’s 
geopolitical circumstances require the army to defend the nation from do-
mestic penetration by external threats and thus domestic security should be 
an integral part of ‘defence’ operations. From this standpoint, the army began 
to criticize the Defence Law enacted in 2002. They problematized article 7 of 
the law, which stated that the role of the military was to respond to military 
threats, but assigned non-military threats to other government institutions. 
In the eyes of army officers, this law ignores the ‘grey zone’ and does not 
reflect the reality of defence-security linkages.32 A window of opportunity to 
become more assertive came following the October 2002 terrorist bombing in 
Bali. This tragedy revealed Indonesia’s vulnerable security situation, and the 
army quickly responded by revitalizing the activity of babinsa – the village 
level unit in the territorial command – ostensibly to detect possible terror-
ist movements. Since the police organization did not reach the village level, 
the army was confident that babinsa in the army network could restore the 
legitimacy of military surveillance at the local level and the military’s role in 
domestic security. In the aftermath of the Bali bombing, Indonesia’s political 
community was reticent about questioning the army tactic to re-deploy ter-
ritorial command resources for counter-terrorism operations. 
Subsequently in March 2003, when the military published its first post-
Suharto Defence White Book, the army-orchestrated ‘grey zone’ theory was 
more explicitly articulated in terms of defence-security syncretism. The army 
stressed that the primary concerns of Indonesia’s ‘defence’ sector had shifted 
from ‘traditional’ threats – that is, conventional military attacks by foreign 
countries – to ‘non-traditional’ ones such as terrorism, piracy, illegal mi-
grants, separatist movements and armed rebellions (Departemen Pertahanan 
2003). In order to respond to these new threats, it was argued, the military 
needs to strengthen its capacity and role in military operations other than 
warfare (Operasi Militer Selain Perang, OMSP) in which the demarcation be-
tween defence and security is irrelevant. Since then, the army has intensified 
internal socialization about the legitimacy of defence-security syncretism by 
producing a set of guidelines for OMSP (Markas Besar TNI 2003). This effort 
peaked in 2004 when the long-awaited Military Law – replacing the old one 
of 1982 that legalized dwifungsi – was enacted. The army lobby successfully 
put an article in the new law to address OMSP as TNI’s basic duty.33 For the 
army, this legal basis was significant to fortify the grey zone theory, assert its 
32 Interview with Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman, Inspector General of the TNI, 9-1-2005.
33 The new TNI law is UU no. 34/2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia. OMSP is described in the article 7(2).
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legitimate role in security affairs, and to maintain the utility of the territorial 
command structure. 
The OMSP discourse was further consolidated under the Yudhoyono 
government. In July 2005, Yudhoyono claimed that Indonesia’s national in-
tegrity was seriously threatened by transnational crime, such as drugs and 
other illegal trade, and instructed both the police and the military to boost 
their law enforcement operations.34 This construction of a fiction (that is, 
cross-border crimes threaten national integrity) was repeatedly reiterated by 
other political and military elites, including the governor of Lemhanas, the 
national defence think-tank, who acknowledged rivalry between the military 
and the police, but suggested that the military had a legitimate role to play 
since the police cannot handle transnational crime on its own.35 The military 
commander, General Djoko Santoso, similarly stressed that acts of terrorism, 
both global and regional, constantly pose serious threats to Indonesia. The 
TNI, he continues, is committed to combat the terrorist threat, as specified in 
the Military Law.36
In this manner, the army skilfully neutralized pressure to limit its role to 
external defence by incorporating transnational crime – including terrorism 
– into the scope of non-traditional security issues that support the ‘defence’ 
agenda in the context of ‘grey zone’ theory. Although the army’s efforts to 
undo the separation of security and defence partly embraces its long-stand-
ing self-image as the sole guardian of the nation, it also reflects institutional 
resistance to reform targeting the territorial command structure. As discussed 
above, the territorial commands are vital for the army to promote fundrais-
ing, generate economic and promotion opportunities, and maintain the size 
of a force that is the largest – and thus most powerful and prestigious – within 
the military. The army discourse concerning transnational crime and terror-
ism contributes to this strategy of resisting reform.
The navy and transnational crime at sea
The navy has also developed its own interpretation of the transnational crime 
threat in creating a pretext for regaining its supremacy vis-à-vis the police in 
the field of maritime law enforcement.37 Warning that regional criminal rings 
operate in Indonesian waters without facing serious state interference, the 
international community has pressured the government to strengthen its law 
34 ‘Presiden: Kejahatan transnasional rugikan Indonesia’, KapanLagi.com 18-7-2005.
35 ‘Muladi: Masih ada kompetisi TNI-Polri soal keamanan nasional’, AntaraNews 13-5-2008; ‘Pemerintah 
perkuat koordinasi TNI-Polri’, Suara Merdeka 29-7-2008.
36 ‘Panglima TNI: Teroris mula tebar ancaman’, Kompas 29-11-2008.
37 For a detailed discussion in this section, see Honna 2008.
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enforcement capacity to combat transnational crime at sea. Donor countries, 
such as the US, Australia, Japan, and ASEAN members have made commit-
ments to promote regional and bilateral cooperation to fight cross-border 
maritime crime. It is in this arena that the role of the navy as a stakeholder 
in maritime security has been neutralized vis-à-vis ‘civilian’ law enforcement 
agencies that can institutionally promote closer cooperation with other coun-
tries and operate in a less threatening manner compared to the armed forces.
Clearly the navy faced several obstacles in promoting international co-
operation against transnational crime. First, the navy has been the subject 
of a US ban on military aid since 1999.38 This US sanction effectively helped 
the police to gain greater assistance from Washington in developing capac-
ity to deal with maritime security related to terrorism and crime. With this 
cooperation in progress, the navy was left behind the water police (Polair) 
which enjoyed various offers of grants, including the provision of patrol ves-
sels and training, under the US International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP). 
Second, it has gradually become common practice for the regional security 
community to build up civilian coast guard agencies both in order to deal 
professionally with maritime crime in the sovereign territory and to promote 
regional cooperation between these agencies.39 The navy’s warships are not 
suitable for handling transnational crime; instead, smaller, speedier patrol 
boats are most appropriate for the mission and cost far less to purchase, 
run and maintain. In recognition of the rising threat of crime at sea, the 
Philippines established its coast guard in 1998 and Malaysia did so in 2004. 
Clearly, the navy found itself out of the loop in the region’s newly emerging 
maritime strategic environment.
Third, there was a new priority for port security in the wake of 9/11. The 
US strongly demanded the international community, in the name of the glob-
al war on terrorism, to review the existing International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code, resulting in the adoption of an amended version by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in December 2002, and its imple-
mentation in July 2004. The amended ISPS Code had two key revisions: 1) all 
countries which signed the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) – including Indonesia – are obliged to provide appropri-
ate security measures in their ports; and 2) these countries are allowed to for-
mally exercise control over foreign ships in their territorial waters, including 
the denial of port entry. These revisions came as a big shock for the shipping 
industry in Indonesia since the country’s maritime waters were identified 
38 The ban was to protest human rights abuses by TNI in East Timor. This ban was mostly lifted in 2005 under 
the Bush administration which saw Indonesia as a partner in its ‘war on terrorism’.
39 About this trend, see Bateman 2003.
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as a ‘black spot’, or dangerous zone, in the international community,40 and 
therefore ships from Indonesia to the US could be stopped and denied access 
in accordance with the amended ISPS Code (Supit 2004:13-4). For Indonesia’s 
maritime industry, it became apparent that Indonesia’s weak governance at 
sea could prove a huge economic liability. The improvement of port security 
soon became a major concern for the government in dealing with the new se-
curity regime at sea, but the agenda of strengthening law enforcement in the 
ports was not a navy matter. Again, the navy was left bobbing in the wake of 
new developments in maritime security.
Having assessed the changing strategic environment in the age of trans-
national crime, and the limits of the navy to deal with it, the Yudhoyono 
government issued a presidential decree in 2005 to transfer the authority of 
the Maritime Security Coordinating Body (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut 
Republik Indonesia, Bakorkamla) from TNI headquarters to the Coordinating 
Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs. The new Bakorkamla is 
charged with formulating national maritime policy and coordinating the 
activities of 12 maritime-related institutions, including the navy and Polair.
When the idea of a new Bakorkamla first emerged in 2004, it was the navy 
that expressed the strongest resistance, fearing the possible loss of maritime 
authority and business interests that it has enjoyed.41 Significantly, however, 
the navy quickly recognized that its resistance would not change the situa-
tion, because – unlike the army – it had no strong political resources to shape 
the direction of government discourse. Thus, how to take the initiative in de-
veloping Bakorkamla soon dominated the agenda of the navy’s top echelons. 
They found an answer in proposing the establishment of the Sea and Coast 
Guard of Indonesia (SCGI). In December 2006, the navy headquarters submit-
ted its initial plan to establish SCGI as Indonesia’s contribution to regional 
maritime security cooperation.42
According to Vice Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, ‘it is difficult for the 
navy to fully respond to the changing demands of maritime security, therefore 
we encourage Bakorkamla to take further steps to build our Coast Guard and 
streamline the inefficient structure of maritime authority today’.43 According 
to the navy proposal, many democratic countries have professional civilian 
paramilitary organizations called coast guards that conduct maritime law 
40 See, for example, ‘Indonesia piracy black spot as attacks rise’, Lloyd’s List 7-11-2000, p.18.
41 Like other services, the navy established its own foundation and corporations, and both controlled various 
enterprises involving shipping, resorts, oil refineries, real-estate, cocoa plantations, maritime electronics 
and telecommunications, transportation, fisheries, construction, and timber. For details, see Widoyoko et al. 
2003:120. The navy’s involvement in illegal business is typified by its protection of smuggling rings, most 
notoriously in the case of illegal logging. See, for example, EIA/Telapak 2005.
42 The official document is Markas Besar Angkatan Laut 2006. 
43 Interview, 24-8-2007. Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno was Director-General of Defense Planning at the Defence 
Ministry. In 2008, he was promoted to the navy chief-of-staff.
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enforcement activities. Responsibility for Indonesia’s coast guard function 
is unclear because of overlapping authority and legal responsibilities spread 
across 12 institutions related to maritime governance. To meet global expec-
tations, the proposal argues, it is time to streamline maritime authority and 
establish a unified representative in the global community of coast guards 
(Markas Besar Angkatan Laut 2006:11). The navy insists that the new coast 
guard, or SCGI, should be given a clear legal status as a maritime law enforce-
ment agency, and that it be placed under the Ministry of Transportation in 
order to comply with international standards. With this new organization, 
the navy is proposing to rationalize the overlapping functions of other related 
agencies, including the navy itself. In this way, the navy, which was origi-
nally very reluctant to reorganize maritime security management, has now 
become the prime mover in reform and reorganization. 
What were the calculations behind this shifting attitude? First, the new 
organization can absorb some of the officers in the top-heavy navy. ‘The navy 
will be more professional if SCGI is established and staffed with our friends’, 
according to one navy officer.44 It is expected that the transfer of high-level 
officers may encourage the promotion of younger generation officers within 
the navy. In addition, if SCGI recruits personnel from the navy – like the coast 
guards of the Philippines and Malaysia – it may contribute to confidence 
building between the two institutions and nurture respect for each other’s 
jurisdictions. In the cases of the Philippines and Malaysia, many naval offi-
cers wished to move to the new agencies, motivated by higher salary and the 
relatively ‘clean’ image enjoyed by the coast guards. 
Second, emphasising the global trend of international coast guard coop-
eration is a very effective way for the navy to neutralize the role of the police 
in maritime security. With the creation of SCGI, the navy expects donor coun-
tries to provide both financial and technical assistance to develop its capacity 
to combat transnational crime, which in turn may help constrain the ascen-
dancy of the police in security sector governance. If a significant number of 
SCGI personnel is drawn from among former navy officers (as expected), the 
navy-SCGI alliance may overwhelm the presence of Polair. In May 2008, a 
new Shipping Law (UU no. 17/2008) was enacted with the powerful lobbying 
of the maritime industry and the navy. The new law’s Chapter 17 is about 
the establishment of SCGI and the new organization is directly under the 
President. Although the details of the plan are not clear yet, it is basically in 
line with the navy’s proposal.45
In this manner the discourse of transnational crime threat (at sea) has 
provided a rationale for the navy to insist on the need for ‘harmonizing’ 
44 Interview with Col. Desi A. Mamahit, Assistant of Operation to the Western Fleet Commander, 16-12-2007.
45 Interview with former navy chief-of-staff, General Bernard Kent Sondakh, 8-10-2008.
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Indonesia’s security structure with ‘global standards’, a clever tactic aimed at 
promoting navy interests. In promoting the establishment of SCGI, the navy 
expects to have significant influence over and within this new civilian institu-
tion, seeing an opportunity to build a ‘second navy’ that may effectively under-
mine the role of the police in maritime security governance. Significantly, this 
navy agenda perfectly fits with the institutional interests of the TNI as a whole.
Conclusion
One cannot neglect the problem of transnational crime in discussing the 
relationship between the state and crime in the globalizing world. It is par-
ticularly so since 2000 when leaders from 154 counties gathered in Palermo, 
Italy, in order to sign a new UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime. It was a watershed in the post-Cold War global security agenda, in a 
sense that national leaders jointly identified transnational crime as a ‘security’ 
threat. Various ‘wars’ have been conducted around the globe to fight against 
the alleged threats – including illicit drugs, terrorism, sea piracy, and human 
trafficking. The international community has supported and promoted these 
‘fight against’ projects by providing ‘weak states’ with financial support, 
capacity-building assistance, and joint training programs. Realist political 
scientists may argue that the state advances such international cooperation 
as a rational policy to enhance its ability to control anti-social forces in the 
sovereign territory. The constructivist school of thought may stress that the 
‘shared value’ – that is, the threat posed by trans-border, non-state criminal 
actors – plays an important role in harmonizing security designs of the states 
in the region. These views are well-embedded in the current trend of inter-
national assistance programs sponsored by donor countries and major aid 
institutions aimed at ‘combating common enemies together.’
What we have discussed in this chapter provides a critical view on these 
trends. The threat of transnational crime is undoubtedly real, but its image 
can be constructed arbitrarily by the state as it typically dominates intel-
ligence regarding criminal activities and can curb transparency and avoid 
accountability in the name of state and diplomatic secrecy. This creates po-
litical space to manipulate the interpretation and discourse of transnational 
crime. Those engaged in power politics exploit this open space, and construct 
scenarios to promote varied and often long-standing agendas. For BNN, in-
venting a root cause of drug trafficking that avoids the messy and dangerous 
nexus of drug syndicates and state actors helped accelerate the expansion of 
budget and institutional capacity; an important mission for the police to es-
tablish a ‘second police’. For the army, the discourse over transnational crime 
served as a pretext for legitimizing OMSP which in turn helped resurrect its 
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internal security role and preserve the territorial command structure. For the 
navy, it was able to preserve its influence vis-à-vis the police in maritime law 
enforcement activities by skilfully insisting on the need for establishing a 
civilian coast guard to deal with transnational crime at sea. In all these cases, 
there seems to be a common political strategy of instrumentalizing the threat 
of transnational crime. With this strategy, these three institutions were able to 
deflect criticism, reclaim ground lost during the democratization movement, 
and articulate this revanchism in the legitimizing vernacular of ‘global wars’. 
In this sense these security actors are hijacking transnational crime as a Trojan 
horse to regain power, build budgets, strengthen institutions and undermine 
reform pressures.
As we noted at the outset, a notable development in the post-Suharto pol-
ity is the deepening criminalization of the legitimate political and security 
sector triggered by the police-military rivalry and political decentralization. 
This is the very factor which has sustained the growing industry of cross-
border illegal businesses in Indonesia. Thus, any anti-crime countermeasures 
which fail to target the core factor may facilitate unintended consequences, 
most seriously the empowerment of anti-reform agendas. To prevent the in-
ternational community being a blind enabler of the Trojan horse, it is crucial 
to understand the dynamics of power politics and the possible impact of in-
troducing counter-crime cooperation programs on the constellation of power 
relations among domestic stakeholders. This is perhaps the most important 
contribution that area studies can make – opening the black box of domestic 
politics – to infuse global agendas with an understanding and appreciation 
for sobering local realities. Here lies the raison d’être of area studies in the 
borderless world.

AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (General Information 
and Security Service) 
AKI Asosiasi Kontraktor Indonesia (Indonesian Association of 
Contractors)
AMSI Asosiasi Manager Security Indonesia (Indonesian Security 
Managers Association)
ANRC Australia Netherlands Research Collaboration
APBD Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Indonesian Provincial 
and District Budget)
Aspekindo Asosiasi Pengusaha Konstruksi Indonesia (Indonesian Association 
of Construction Entrepreneurs)
Babinsa Bintara Pembina Desa (non-commissioned officer for village 
guidance, lowest level unit in territorial command)
BAKIN Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency)
Bakorkamla Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut (Maritime Security 
Coordinating Agency)
Bamus Betawi Badan Musyawarah Betawi (Betawi Community Consultation 
Agency)
BEEPS Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
BHMN Badan Hukum Milik Negara (state-owned legal entity)
BIN Badan Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Agency)
BKNN Badan Koordinasi Narkotika Nasional (National Narcotics 
Coordinating Board)
BNN Badan Narkotika Nasional (National Narcotics Board) 
BNP2TKI Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja 
Indonesia (National Agency for the Placement and Protection of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers)
BOW Burgerlijke Openbare Werken (Civic Public Works)
BPKRI Badan Pemeriksa Kuangan Republik Indonesia (Indonesia 
Supreme Audit Board)
BRDP Book Reading Development Project
Abbreviations
282 Abbreviations 
BRIMOB Brigade Mobil (Police Mobile Brigade)
Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistics Agency, government-owned 
company which deals with food distribution and price control)
BUMN Badan Usaha Milik Negara (state-owned enterprise)
CIFOR Centre for International Forestry Research
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 
DFID Department for International Development [United Kingdom]
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council, 
Indonesia’s parliament)
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People’s 
Representative Councils)
FBR Forum Betawi Rempug (Betawi Brotherhood Forum)
FPI Front Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Front)
Gabpeknas Gabungan Perusahaan Kontraktor Nasional (National Association 
of Contracting Companies)
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
Gapeksindo Gabungan Perusahaan Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian National Association of Construction Companies)
Gapensi Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Seluruh Indonesia (All 
Indonesia Association of National Construction Implementers)
IBRA Indonesian Bank Reconstruction Agency
ICG International Crisis Group
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICW Indonesia Corruption Watch
Ikahi Ikatan Hakim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Judges)
IKBT Ikatan Keluarga Besar Tanah Abang (Tanah Abang Greater Family 
Association )
IMO International Maritime Organization
INFID International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
Inkindo Ikatan Nasional Konsultan Indonesia (National Union of 
Indonesian Consultants)
INT Department of Institutional Integrity [World Bank]
IPK Ikatan Pemuda Karya (Youth Work Institute)
ISPS Code International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
JK Jusuf Kalla
Kadin Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce)
kapolres Kepala Kepolisian Resor (district or city police chief)
KRHN Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional (National Law Reform 
Consortium)
KKMS Kelompok Kerja Masyarakat Sipil (Civil Society Working Group)
 Abbreviations 283
KKN Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism)
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication 
Commission)
KPN Kantor Perbendaharaan Negara (State Treasury Office)
KTKLN Kartu Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri (overseas employment card)
KTP Kartu Tanda Penduduk (personal identity card)
KTP musiman seasonal identity card [valid for 6 months]
KUHAP Kitab Undang-Undang Acara Hukum Pidana (Code of Criminal 
Procedure)
LeIP Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan 
(Institute for Research and Advocacy for the Independence of the 
Courts)
LP3ES Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan 
Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and 
Information)
LPJK Lembaga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi (Institute for the 
Development of Construction Services)
LSC Local School Council
MBS Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah (school-based management)
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative 
Assembly), supreme decision-making body comprising 
members of parliament and regional, military and community 
representatives
NIE New Institutional Economics
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMSP Operasi Militer Selain Perang (Military Operations other than 
War)
OTB Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk (organization without form)
P4GN Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran 
Gelap Narkoba (Preventing and Combating Illicit Drug 
Trafficking and Abuse)
Pam Swakarsa Pasukan Pengamanan Swakarsa (Voluntary Security Guards)
paspor TKI Paspor Tenaga Kerja Indonesia (labour migration passport)
PCDC Procurement Capacity Development Centre [UN]
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (Indonesia Democratic 
Party of Struggle), party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri
PPM Pemuda Panca Marga (New Order nationalist youth organization; 
semi-official preman group)
Petrus Penembakan Misterius (‘mysterious shootings’, phrase coined 
during anti-crime killings in 1983)
pilkada pemilihan kepala daerah (direct election of chiefs of regions)
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pimpro pimpinan proyek (project overseer); local project leader
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
Polair Polisi Air (water police)
polsek Kepolisian Sektor (sub-district police)
PRD Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People’s Democratic Party, student-
based)
PTIK Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (Institute of Police Science)
PU Pekerjaan Umum (Public Works)
SBU Sertifikat Badan Usaha (business permit)
SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
SCGI Sea and Coast Guard of Indonesia
SIGP School Improvement Grant Project
SIP Surat Izin Pengerahan (migrant worker placement licence, held by 
Pelaksana Penempatan TKI or migrant worker placement agency)
SOEs State-owned enterprises
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea [1974]
TGPTPK Tim Gabungan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Joint 
Corruption Eradication Team)
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian military)
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPAN United Nations Public Administration Network
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VOC Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)
WTO World Trade Organization
beking backing
bupati district chief
carok murder by knifing (Madura)
demang colonial native district chief outside Java
Dewan Ekonomi dan Pembangunan Economic and Development Council
dinas pendidikan education bureau
disetor ke atas deposited higher up
dwifungsi the army’s ‘dual function’ (military and 
sociopolitical) in New Order Indonesia
fiktif phantom or fictitious 
hakim judge
haram unclean, forbidden
hukum revolusi revolutionary law
Idul Fitri celebrations to mark the end of the fasting 
month (Ramadan) 
jatah pimpro project overseer fee
jawara champions (Betawi, Banten)
juragan small business boss (Betawi)
kabupaten district
kantor lelang auction house
kantor pengadilan office of the justice department
Kantor Perbendaharaan Kas Negara State Treasury Office
kepala dinas bureau head
kiai religious leader
konsultan pengawas/supervisi supervisory consultants
kota city
kota preman gang city
Mahkamah Konstitusi Constitutional Court
Majelis Kehormatan Hakim Judges Honour Council
maksiat vice, ‘moral threat’
melobi lobbying
membangunan relasi build relations
Glossary
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pak ogah illegal traffic wardens
Pancasila The five guiding principles of the 
Indonesian state: belief in one supreme 
God; just and civilized humanity; national 
unity; democracy led by wisdom and 
prudence through consultation and 
representation; social justice
panitia pelelangan tendering committee
pemberantasan combating
pengadilan agama religious court
penunjukan langsung direct appointment
perang melawan narkoba war on drugs
perbuatan tercela inappropriate behaviour
pergaulan luas having wide social relations
perusahaan bendera ‘flag’ company with nothing but its logo
preman thug, gangster
polisi gadungan fake police
pusat perbukuan book centre
reformasi reform
tim sukses success team
uang mundur ‘withdrawal money’
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